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C S A B A V A R G A * 
Rule of Law between the Scylla of Imported Patterns and 
the Charybdis of Actual Realisation 
(The Experience of Lithuania) 
Abstract. Nations of Central and Eastern Europe in the near past have all faced the same 
dilemma: how can they manage international encouragement to adopt atlantic patterns in 
promise of ready-made routes with immediate success, in a way also promoting the paths of 
organic development, relying on own resources and potentialities that can only be gained from 
tradition? Or, otherwise speaking, is it feasible at all to rush forward by rapidly learning all the 
responses others elaborated elsewhere at a past time? Or are they expected themselves to 
become Sisyphus bearing his own way, at the price of suffering and bitter disillusionment? The 
question was not raised by each country individually in the region as not much time was left 
for pondering in the rapid drift of events. Anyhow, cost-free solutions adopted from without 
may easily lead to adverse results, far away from expectations for the time being. The 
principles of free market, democracy and parliamentarism-with rule of law and human rights 
in the background-are usually believed to offer a kind of panacea curing the basic ills in the 
contemporary world. Generalised experience notwithstanding, social science has to be given 
the chance to record-if found so-that the same staff may not work at some places where it has 
just recently been transplanted as it is used to work amidst its natural surrounding in the 
western hemisphera, not with the same cost/benefit ratio at the least. For that reason, 
scholarship in Central and Eastern Europe is growingly aware of the fact that what it can 
provide is by far not marginal feedback but the very first testing and teasing proof on social 
embeddedness of some ideas and ideals, deservedly fundamental for the atlantic world. 
Realistically speaking, not even western social development is separable from the economic 
reserves of the development actually run. Or, operation of any societal complexity requires 
resources in both social organisation and material production. 
Keywords: transition, rule of law, Lithuania, open society, social balance, ius and lex, 
rights and duties 
Having recovered from the trauma of surviving Soviet imperial socialism 
and compelled to open up new ways in independent state-building in parallel 
with the readjustment of what is left as local legal arrangement to common 
European standards, nations of Central and Eastern Europe all have faced the 
Scientific Adviser, Institute for Legal Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, H-
1250 Budapest, P. O. Box 25; Professor, Director of the Institute for Legal Philosophy of the 
Pázmány Péter Catholic University of Hungary, H - 1 4 2 8 Budapest 8, P. O. Box 6. 
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same dilemma: how can they manage international encouragement to adopt 
foreign patterns in promise of ready-made routes with immediate success, in a 
way also promoting the paths of organic development, relying on own resources 
and potentialities that can only be gained from tradition? Is it feasible at all to 
rush forward by rapidly learning all the responses others elaborated elsewhere 
at a past time? Or are they expected themselves to become Sisyphus bearing 
his own way, at the price of suffering and bitter disillusionment? The question 
was not raised by each country individually as not much time was left for 
pondering in the rapid drift of events. Anyhow, cost-free solutions adopted from 
without may easily lead to adverse results far away from expectations. By 
the time of awakening, however, posterior wisdom may show that there is an 
alternative always available, even if its practicability is not clear to those 
affected at the urgently given moment. 
One and a half decades after the collapse of the Soviet empire we fully realise 
now how painful the fact is that each country embarking on dramatic changes 
was completely left in isolation to face its national renewal programme, drifted 
by accidental circumstances. Neither the consciousness nor the organisational 
framework of the mutual dependence of those concerned was strong enough, 
and Moscow as the focus was this time substituted by another centre of power, 
even less interested in the target countries which were just awakening either in 
self-esteem or as a potential counterpole.1 In consequence, each country had to 
embark upon separate efforts at reform, channelled by so-called open society 
agencies;2 however, as we all know, improvisation is not likely to outcome 
products worth of consolidation. 
The early and total failure of the Hungarian efforts at coming to terms with 
the past3 was only one among a few shocking episodes. This alone might have 
made us realise that we should not have attempted to respond to a considerably 
universal challenge just on our own, and perhaps a genuine transnational co-
1
 Cf. Varga, Cs.: Amerikai önbizalom, orosz katasztrófa: Kudarcot vallott keresztes-
hadjárat? [American self-confidence, Russian catastrophe: failed crusade?] . PoLísz, 2 0 0 2 -
2003, No. 68, 18-28. 
2
 See e.g. Cohen, St.: Failed Crusade: America and the Tragedy of Post-communist 
Russia. New York, 2000 and-as a by-admission-Holmes, St.: Transitology. London Review 
of Books, vol. 23. 2001/8. 32-35. 
3
 Cf. e.g. f rom Varga, Cs.: Transition to Rule of Law: On the Democratic Transfor-
mation in Hungary. Budapest, 1995. Part on Coming to Terms with the Past, 119-155. 
[Philosophiae Iuris.] and Coming to Terms with the Past under the Rule of Law: The German 
Model. Budapest, 1994. [Windsor Klub.] as well as A »gyökeresen gonosz« a jog mérlegén 
[»Radical evil« on trial], Magyar Jog, vol. 49. 2002/6. 332-337. 
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operation might have evolved, had not been our initiative in Hungary too early, 
even pioneering. 
* 
A Lithuanian theoretical response4 will be overviewed in the following. It is 
certainly not the earliest one as its the author may have learned f rom the 
experience of others.5 Yet it is remarkably rational and systematic. For he 
reconsiders ancient wisdoms in the light of our days' ideals, and draws historical 
lessons from his Lithuanian case study by responding to the shared failures of 
our global new world. 
The ideal of rule of law-formulated also in the preamble of the Constitution 
of Lithuania (1992) after she has returned to the path of independent state-
building by 19906-indicates a recognition according to which the unlimitedness 
of observing any law in a Rechtsstaat can be restricted by the value-centredness of 
a rule of law, which value shall be fully implemented by the principle of inter-
vention of a Sozialrechtsstaat when care for "strengthening those socially weak 
4
 Vaisvila, A.: Teisinès valstybès koncepcija lietuvoje [The Lithuanian approach to 
rule of law], Vilnius, 2000. [with abstracts: Law-governed State and its Problems of the 
Formation in Lithuania: The Outline of State Ideology. 611-631. and Правовое государство 
и проблеми его становления в Литве: Поиски государственной идеологии. 632—635.]. 
Cf. also from Vaisvila, A.: Conception of the State Ruled by Law in Lithuania. (Summary of the 
Research Report Presented for Habilitation.) Vilnius, 2001. [The Law University of Lithuania.] 
as well as-in multiplication-Rechtspersonalismus (Zusammenfassung)., Die Rechtsaxiomatik 
oder das Modell der vier Axiome als inhaltliche Grundlage des Rechtspersonalismus., Die 
geometrische Formel des Rechtes als des mehrstelligen Prädikats, and Das Recht als Prozess 
(als das Werden). Chairholder for legal philosophy at the Faculty of Jurisprudence of the Law 
University of Vilnius, Professor Alfonsas Vaisvila has authored a number of books covering 
ranges of topics spanning f rom Lithuanian history of ideas (including philosophy and logic) 
via social compromise, liberalism, tolerance, democracy and state of law to statism as well as 
crime control. 
5
 As a summary of the debates in Poland, see Wronkowska, SI. (red.) Polskié dyskusje о 
panstwie prawa: Zarys koncepcji panstwa prawnego w polskiej literaturze politicznej i 
prawnej [Polish discussions on the state of law: summary of the concepts of the state of law 
in the Polish political and legal literature], Warszawa, 1995. Also cf. Varga, Cs. (ed.) Kiáltás 
gyakorlatiasságért a jogállami átmenetben [A call for practicality in the transition to rule of 
law], Budapest, 1998. [A Windsor Klub könyvei П.] 
6
 "The Lithuanian nation strives for an open, just and harmonious civil society and a 
state ruled by law." The expression 'state of l a w ' was first used in Lithuanian literature by 
M. Cimkauskas (1922) and described historically and systemically by M. Römeris-Teisinés 
valstybès organizacija. In: Lietuvos universitetas: 1927-1928 mokslo metais. Kaunas, 1928. 
6 - 3 1 - , followed by contemporaries as P. Leonas and others. 
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and weakening the strong"7 is at stake. Looking back in history, Lithuanians 
may now realise that their ancestors in the 16lh to 17lh centuries8 had already 
separated-in their search for a "well-organised" and "organic" state-law [ins] 
from the laws [lex] and demanded law to be right (by serving everyone's good 
with sound reason), moreover, that the presumed original freedom which may 
have led to their first integrative social contract could not entitle to anarchy but 
only prepare for balancing. The Lithuanian Statutes (1529, 1566 and 1588) 
ensured an extremely all-covering rule of law for the nobility. This was even 
further restricted by the Polish liberum veto.9 After all, the disintegration of the 
ruler's power and responsibility could only result in either the tyranny of nobles 
(as beneficiaries) against everyone or the coming of foreigners to rule (free of 
any limitation whatsoever) with at least some promise of order. Well, as known 
from history, both alternatives did subsequently materialise in Lithuania. 
Reconsideration is imperative for all concerned, only if in order to avoid 
the traps of the past. One has to be careful to escape the temptation of any kind 
of dogmatism-foremost that of absolutising universalisation-, even if some of 
the issues now crop up in global proportions, as a consequence of the new role 
assumed by the American foreign policy after the cold war and the Soviet 
might are over. The early 20th-century Lithuanian classic of public law already 
emphasised that the rule of law is hardly more than a specifically disciplined 
ethos, only conceivable as the direction of a constantly renewing ambition: it 
never arrives at completion for "it cannot be answered once and for all".10 Or, 
it is not even an external pattern to be simply followed and implemented, for it 
is not of the kind to presume the mechanically "obedient execution or imitation" 
of requirements once stipulated by others.11 This is all the more remarkable 
now when the course of globalisation, maximising the rule by rule of law and 
human rights with a growing disregard to other considerations and values, is 
about to tumble on disintegrating contradictions and dysfunctions. While 
eliminating certain threats to human rights, the state ruled by law-writes the 
author-originates new ones immediately, which are inherent in the notion of 
human rights itself,12 that is, in their abstract conceptualisation, totally insensitive 
7
 Stein, E. Staatsrecht. 14., völl ig neu bearb. Auflage. Tübingen, 1993. 
8
 E.g. J. Chondzinskis, A. Gostautas, M. Lietuvis, P. Roizijus, A. Rotundas, L. Sapiega, 
P. Skarga, A. Volanas. 
9
 Cf. Konopczynski, L.: Le liberum veto: Etude sur le développement du principe 
majoritaire. Paris et Varsovie, 1930. [Institut d 'É tudes slaves de l 'Université de Paris: 
Bibliothèque polonaise II.]. 
10
 Römeris: op. cit. 6. 
11
 Vaisvila: op. cit. (2001), 11. 
12
 Ibid. 6. 
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to their own social (pre)conditions, ways of operation and consequences in the 
short as well as the long run. 
The author inquires into the conditions of reaching states of genuine 
balance upon the basis of reciprocity between law and social solidarity, on the 
one hand, as well as between (with regards to the openness of social order) full 
social consent and (with regards to the openness of law and order) the inseparable 
unity of rights and duties, on the other. He reminds that just as the downfall 
of the first (1572-1795) and the second (1918-1926) republic of Lithuania was 
due to the over-limitation of the sovereign, exposing the country to external 
despotism, what happens today is the liberalisation of anti-sociality through 
the restriction of the executive power with reference to abstract human rights.13 
Preliminary to raising any issue relating to the rule of law is the assessment 
of the state of actual social conditions. For the author, the acknowledgement of 
the priority of human person with inborn rights, taken as the source of his 
autonomy, as well as overwhelming social co-operation based on contracts and 
mutual concessions and the social majority's active and organised participation 
are of utmost importance. In contrast, what reality shows now is rather legal 
statism and exclusivity of the dominance of formal law. Even rule of law is 
mostly conceived of as formal institutionalisation, mere dictate of the law [lex]. 
However, until the Lithuanian Constitution (§ 109, Section 3) provides for the 
judges to proceed "exclusively according to the laws"-instead of laws "and law 
[ius]" as he claims-, no genuine division of powers can be achieved. 
Functionally, law is based upon the unity of subjective rights and legal 
duties. Rights cannot be but relative, otherwise they degenerate into aggressive 
privileges. This mutual dependence arises as part of the natural order from the 
natural state of humankind, open to exchange equivalent services. Such an 
interconnection is not made by the state. All that the state can do is to make 
statements about. Law [ius] in a democratic society can therefore only be built 
on a legal conception not reduced to mere laws [lex]. In a democratic society 
only such claims can be posited as law that are in compliance with human 
rights, express social agreement and formulate as legal imperatives only 
provisions whose realisation is also guaranteed by the state's instruments (i.e., 
to the extent of the state's economic capacity and approval by citizens) (ch. 4). 
Or, the state is not in a position to met out justice or punish, moreover, it is 
not even the state to deprive anyone of his/her freedom, At the most, all a state 
does is to officially establish the new status of the rights of a person when it 
gets diminished by his/her own action of rejecting the fulfilment of certain 
duties. Consequently, neither capital punishment, nor its possible abolishment 
13
 Ibid. 12. 
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is within the state's but exclusively within the perpetrator's discretion. Anyone 
who kills, by negating the right to life of others, deprives himself of his right to 
his own life. The act of the Lithuanian Constitutional Court-argues the author-, 
having decided for the abolishment on December 9, 1998, declaring § 105 of 
the Lithuanian Criminal Code to be unconstitutional, can only be construed in 
that it either denied its citizens their natural right to equality in reciprocity or 
pardoned for the future in general terms on a non-legal basis (unauthorised by 
citizens, yet normatively). Moreover, not even the failure of regulation can 
result in breaking up the necessary balance between rights and duties or in 
impunishment, because otherwise criminal aggression would be encouraged. 
Therefore the formal, exhaustive and exclusive statutory definition of crimes 
needs to be complemented by the availability of judicial-casual-correction.14 
Entering the 21st century, the author perceives that the absolute prohibition of 
analogy in criminal law may have fairly been motivated by past experience of 
totalitarianism, on the one hand. On the other, he generalises from the data of 
20th-century international criminal practice, Anglo-American jurisprudence 
and continental penalising trends that the actual boundaries of today's formally 
absolute prohibition are becoming increasingly flexible under contemporary 
well-balanced rule of law conditions (ch. 5).15 
According to his vision, the prevalence of capital concentration with the split 
of society to the rich and the poor has been generating a sui generis type of 
authoritarianism-cum-totalitarianism under the guise of total liberalism. Situations 
come about by threatening effects in terms of which enlarging groups of 
addressees will have to practically resign of their rights and legal rights-
protection on the command of biological survival. The present degree of actual 
poverty and defencelessness in Lithuania is already about to genuinely erode the 
predisposition of the state. The shameful fact that only 40 to 42 per cent of the 
officially known criminal acts are actually prosecuted against can only mean that 
the other 60 to 58 per cent of national sovereignty on the field of crime control is 
lost. However, this other part must not benefit the criminals-as is the case today-
but the victims, either by providing them efficient protection or by giving them 
back the right to protect themselves against crime at least to a viable extent. It is 
14
 For case-law can only counterbalance the fact actualised by a specific case that 
legislation cannot be exhaustive, by ensuring the universality of implementation of the 
basic principles of criminal law. Ibid. 23. 
15
 Arnold, J.: Prinzipien und Grundsätze im deutschen Strafrecht und im Entwurf des 
Allgemeinen Teils des Litauischen Strafgesetzbuches. Jurisprudencija [Vilnius], vol. 9. 
1998/1. 62-74., in particular-using the expression ' f l i e ß e n d ' when surveying the German 
practice of Analogieverbot-on 68. 
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little wonder if in situations like this, citizens' traditional confidence in the state 
is withdrawn, only to be replaced, instead, either in their own hands or in powers 
beyond this world. In 1996, only 25 per cent of the Lithuanian population 
claimed they trusted their own Parliament yet 74 per cent claimed they trusted 
the Catholic Church. After many decades of Soviet occupation, it is tragic to 
recall that there was a time when power in Lithuania was seized by foreigners 
with promise of order they provided against the tyranny of Lithuanian nobles. 
Anyway, Lithuanian officials ascertain that their justice system is hardly 
sufficiently operable today. A criminal environment can be effective enough to 
deter injured parties and witnesses f rom taking part in the administration of 
justice. Law is not a protective power any more. Legal proceeding may have lost 
any sense. Criminals have in fact extended their control over law and order, 
practically depriving society of the chance of legal protection, degrading citizens 
to growingly becoming partners themselves to the very aggression criminals are 
used to commit against them. It is the aggression by criminal asociality that gets 
eventually supported by the abstract protection of human rights. 
Is it possible that after a totalitarian past, democracy will only arrive later 
on, when the present mixture of liberalism-cum-authoritarianism will have been 
left behind? Is there any logic of history in that the former lack of freedom is 
now compensated by immoderate, even asocial libertinism?16 What are the 
symptomatic indicators here? According to the author, the weakness of a 
middle-class in substantiation of democracy, the miserable state of economy, 
the lack of chance for any genuine civil initiative, the feeble self-assertivity of 
the populace (e.g., when all personal bank-savings of Soviet times were frozen 
by the Parliament once and for all on July 19, 1995, by a posterior unilateral 
statutory modification of the conditions of fulfilment of contractual obligations 
laid down in § 471 of the Lithuanian Civil Code), the want of high state officials' 
respect for the law (e.g., when the president of the republic or the Seym may 
fail to observe their formal duties without any legal consequences, or the state 
elite defines ad hoc measures when own remuneration is at stake), as well as 
the undisturbed misappropriation of public property (through commercial 
banks and companies with a state share) are among the first to be considered. 
Rule of law is hardly imaginable without proper social and psychological, 
ideological and constitutional foundations. As to the current political experience 
in Lithuania, it calls for a stronger presidency as well as for a parliament with 
more effectivity in balancing. For what the constitutionalist Römeris wrote about 
parliamentocracy as a mere theoretical potentiality three quarters of a century 
ago had by now become everyday reality, until the last election in October 2000 
16
 For the term, cf. Meyer, F. S.: Libertarianism and Libertinism? National Review, 1969. 
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brake the continuation of communists' domination. In fact, pursuant to § 72, 
Sections 2-3, of the Constitution, any bill can be-even repeatedly and without 
the slightest alteration-passed by absolute majority, despite any veto of the 
president of the state. So, nine protests by president Brazauskas could be consti-
tutionally ignored in 1997 without paying the least attention to his motifs. As 
to historical antecedents, § 51 Section 2 of their Constitution of 1928 followed 
the American model by providing for a qualified two-third majority in case a bill 
had been vetoed against. As fairly recalled, president Roosevelt interposed official 
veto 631 times until the New Deal could be implemented, moreover, Lithuania 
herself was in favour of a strong presidency both in far-away and recent past.17 
The population still trusts significantly more even a weak president than a 
Parliament formed by random circumstances and, as the case may be, some-
times tragically exposed to the play of mere chance. This is clearly indicated 
by the contrasted support through varying periods and circumstances notwith-
standing: 
president Algirdas Brazauskas Parliament 
December 1993 60,0 % 34,0 % 
June 1996 20,0 % 14,0 % 
president Vaidas Adamkus Parliament 
June 1998 7 1 , 2 % 12,7 % 
December 1998 76,4 % 13,4 % 
Thus, there is a contradiction that can barely be eliminated by means of mere 
rhetoric: while the country is actually ruled by a power of a rather low esteem, 
17
 De-stabilisation efforts were also made in 1922, at the dawn of the young republic, 
under the pretext of stabilising the legal status of Parliament. 
The partisan movement Zalioji rinktiné, continuing the fight against the Soviet occupy-
ing powers in Eastern Lithuania, declared in 1945: " W e want a presidential republic, 
similar to the one of the United States of America, with a powerful president." [V. Kurockos 
apklausos protokolas (archive manuscript). 15.]-The World Congress of Lithuanian Lawyers 
declared on May 24—31, 1992: "Exclusively a strong presidency can ensure the stability of 
social processes, block the way to chaos and neutralise the destructivity of those thirsting for 
revenge, in order to become the buttress of the further development of democracy." [Kaganas, 
I.: Lietuvos Respublikos valdymo forma-Lietuvos valstybingumo teisinés problèmes: Pirmojo 
pasaulio leituviu teisininki{ kongreso straipsnii( ir teziii rinkinys. Vilnius, 1993. 7.]-It was 
President Algirdas Brazauskas who took a stand when his vetos were ignored, in that "To be 
able to operate efficiently, the President should also be given more power , following the 
introduction of the democratic pattern of governance." [Lietuvos rytas, 1997. February 14.] 
RULE OF LAW BETWEEN THE SCYLLA OF IMPORTED PATTERNS... 9 
the power preponderably trusted by the nation is without almost any sensible 
competence (ch. 8, para 2).18 
Or, the exclusive way to, standard and criterion of a "well-organised" and 
"organic" state now are on the final analysis nothing but the "maintenance of 
comprehensive balance" in each field of the entire social, political and legal set-
up as the exclusively available guarantee of political stability, social equality 
and legal reciprocity.19 
This is the reason why the author developed his theory of so-called legal 
personalism, based on the axiomatics of the geometrical formula of law taken 
as a compound predicate. I avail just to mention some of its fundamental tenets. 
Accordingly, the equivalence in reciprocity of social relations is the pre-requisite 
of any open society. It follows therefrom that "subjective right is not the property 
of the individual but, as a compound predicate, is a relation established for the 
mutual protection of the interests of all persons concerned." Consequently, on 
the ground of the reciprocity having come about with the "unity of rights and 
duties", the individual is, depending upon his/her deeds, always in balance with 
his/her own respective rights and duties, because "by fulfilling or rejecting 
the latter, he has the former recognised, legalised or annihilated" automatically. 
And, indeed, there is no other way, for "Rights without obligations are nothing 
but downright privileges, while duties without rights can only stand for sheer 
violence."20 
* 
18
 Vaiïsvila: op. cit. (2001), 32-36. 
19
 Also see from Vaisvila: Место наказания в правовом государстве [Mesto naka-
zaniia V pravovom gossudarstve; The place of punishment in a state of law]. In: Проблемы 
вдосконаления законодавства та практика його застосувания з урахуванням прогнозу 
злочинности [Problemi vdoskonaleniia zakonodavstva ta prakt ika iogo zastoczvaniia z 
urakhuvanniam prognozu zlotsinnosti]. 1 . Луганськ [Lugansk] , 1 9 9 9 . 4 4 - 4 9 . [BÍCHHK 
Луганського шституту BHyrpiuiHix справ М В С Украши.] and Социальное правовое 
государство: Приобретамая и теряемая реальность [Sotsialnoe pravovoe gossudarstvo: 
Priobretamaia i teriaemaia realnost'; The social state of law]. In: Конституционно-
правовое проблемы формирования социального правового государства: Материалы 
международной конференции [Konstitutsionno-pravovoe problemi formirovaniia sotsial'nogo 
pravovogo gossudarstva: Materiali mezhdunarodnoi konferentsii]. Минск [Minsk], 2000. 24-28. 
20
 "Die Äquivalenz der Austausche [.. . ist . . .] die Einheit von Rechten (der Erlaubnis) und 
Pflichten (dem Gebot) zu bestimmen [ . . . : . . . ] die Menschenrechte werden nach der Erfüllung 
oder der Verzicht der entsprechenden Pflichten erworben, legalisiert oder verloren." "Das 
subjektive Recht ist nicht die Eigenschaft des Individuums, es ist ein mehrstelliges Prädikat 
bzw. das Verhältnis, das für den gegenseitigen Schutz der Interessen der Personen geschaffen 
ist." "Das Recht ohne Pflicht gleicht einen Privilegien, die Pflicht ohne Recht ist bloße 
Gewalt." 
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The oeuvre herewith presented is not a cry for help but the manifestation of a 
responsible scholarship gradually realising its own strength and independence. 
It is rewarding to learn that the same ethos that, after the Soviet regime is 
bygone, can introduce Western trends as desirable patterns to be followed with 
natural ease, also indicates the need for new foundations, by building u p -
having left behind its earlier forms rooted in Bolshevik ideology-own world-
view consequently. This is exactly what the oeuvre just surveyed did. Having 
overviewed the mostly pattern-following and more or less promising or dis-
appointing results of Lithuanian domestic development spanning over nearly 
one and a half decades as givens of their history, it assessed them monographically. 
His very approach presumed sound scepticism as pre-requisite to any responsibly 
constructive thought, subjecting any result to scrutiny, omitting reliance on either 
clearly personal [ad hominem] or exclusively authoritarian [ad autoritatem] 
reasons in their evaluation. 
It would be a shock if the arrogance of force could define again itself in the 
guise of the renewed ideology of "So much the worse for the facts"-this time 
at the overture to the 21sl century. It is a fact notwithstanding that ideas and 
constructions that stream towards us from overseas are expected to get rooted in 
a soil poor in resources, targeting a disintegrated society with distorted morals, 
in which only reliance to individual surviving strategies proves to be exclusively 
adequate a personal response amidst an economy fallen prey to the stronger and 
professionally only preoccupied with the exhaustion of national property. 
According to the creed of many, the principles of free market, democracy 
and parliamentarism (with rule of law and human rights in the background) 
offer a kind of panacea curing all the ills in the world. Still, social science 
should be given the chance to record-if found so-that the same staff may not 
work here as it is used to work there amidst its natural surrounding; not with 
the same cost/benefit ratio at the least. Social science is open for ideas to both 
receive in test and reject upon criticism. Moreover, scholarship in Central and 
Eastern Europe is growingly aware of the fact that what it can provide is by far 
not marginal feedback but the very first testing and teasing proof on social 
embeddedness of ideas and ideals exported. For whatever we think of the 
cultural anthropological preconditions of such guiding stars of modernity and 
of the scientific verifiability of the concept of man they postulate,21 Western 
21
 If the presuppositions of democracy are not provable, only tradition axiomatically 
taken from the credo of Enlightenment can be the case. Cf. Frivaldszky, J.: Gondolatok az 
ember i jogok radikális szemléletéből fakadó problémákról [Thoughts on problems arising 
f r o m the radical approach to human rights]. In: Frivaldszky, J. (ed.) Egy európai alkotmány 
felé: A nizzai Alapvető Jogok Chartája és a Konvent [Towards a European constitution: the 
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social development (with the ideocracy of Dworkin, Habermas and Rawls, in 
terms of which values are just a random function of supporting majority and 
rights are made one of the gratuitous accessories of any human existence) is by no 
means separable from the economic reserves of such a development. Or, opera-
tion of any societal complexity requires resources in both social organisation and 
material production. In the Atlantic world, presently they seem they are available 
either through economic reproduction or by using up reserves. Consequently, 
if it proves to be too wasteful or costly, less powerful regions of the world 
may encounter problems of financing, for they are in want of reserves. 
Scholarly sensitivity to issues like this has developed in the western world 
as well,22 even if not yet transcending local self-analysis. Until now, scholars 
have failed to address either other regions or their ideals' very preconditions. 
This is why the issues raised above are still questions-on and for us. This is 
why they shall have to be tackled at least by those concerned. 
Charter of Fundamental Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights]. Budapest, 
2003. 63 -74 . [Agóra II.]. 
22
 Cf. e.g. Holmes, St. & Sunstein, C. R.: The Cost of Rights: Why Liberty Defends on 
Taxes. New York, 1999. as well as, by Posner, R. A.: The Economics of Justice. Cambridge 
(Mass.), 1983. and Economic Analysis of Law. New York, 1998. As an outlook, see also 
Sajó, A. (ed.) Western Rights? Post-communist Application. The Hague, 1996. 
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Abstract. In 1918, Slovenia became a constituent part of Yugoslavia. After the Second World 
War, Yugoslavia was reconstituted as a socialist state. When the attempts to turn Yugoslavia 
into a democratic country failed, Slovenia decided to become independent. As it is reflected in 
its new Constitution (1991), Slovenia is designed as a parliamentary republic, as a unitary state 
with local self-government and is strives to become a social state. During the transition from 
socialism, Slovenian law faced numerous challenges like the privatization of economy. The 
political and legal transition is still taking place. Hopefully, the entry to the European Union 
will give it new dimensions. 
Between the two world wars, Slovenian legal science was especially influenced by Austrian-
German legal positivism; although the legal-comparative, sociological and axiological methods 
were important as well. After the Second World War, in some critical periods an apologetic 
legal positivism gained the upper hand in certain areas. On the other hand, new legal institutes 
and departments furthered the development of new sciences (criminology, sociology of 
law, political economy, public administration). New scientific areas emerged (comparative 
commercial law, comparative labour law and the law of the European Union). Some legal 
sciences (like criminal law) have been enriched by additional (sociological, axiological and 
comparative methods) methods. 
Keywords: apologetic and scientific legal positivism, legal dogmatics, science of positive law, 
socialist and traditional law, constitutional organisation, transition from socialism, political 
culture 
I. Introductory Explanation 
This paper is based on an article I wrote on Slovenian legal science in the 20th 
century.1 When preparing that article I did not specifically ask myself about 
the transition from socialist law to traditional law and its resurgence. I was 
Professor Dr. Marijan Pavcnik, Pravna fakulteta (Faculty of Law), Poljanski nasip 2, 
1000 Ljubljana, Slovenia 
E-mail: Marijan.Pavcnik@Pf.uni-lj .si 
1
 See Marijan Pavcnik: (Ne)vrednost pravoznanstva [The Worth(lessness) of Juris-
prudence], in: Jancar, D.-Vodopivec , P. (Eds.): Slovenci v XX. stoletju (Slovenes in the 
20th Century). Ljubljana, 2001. 77-78. 
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especially interested in the approach and the nature of the object studied by the 
sciences of positive law. I was interested in the concepts of law and legal science 
and tried to cover it completely and to pay attention to the roles we play, either 
as legal observers or legal participants. It is of special importance that through-
out I was centred on a longer period of time than just the period of socialism 
and that I also dealt with so-called socialist law as just a part of the legal 
phenomenon. These are the reasons for my belief that an article on Slovenian 
legal science in the 20th century can also be the basis for observations on the 
theme I will here deal with. 
II. The (In)adequacy of Legal Positivism 
1. Introduction 
I believe that a good starting point would be von Kirchmann's critical and 
provocative treatise "The Worthlessness of Jurisprudence as Science",2 which 
was published in the middle of the 19th century. Von Kirchmann maintained 
that legal science does not deal with the real, that is, intrinsic law (Germ, das 
natürliche Recht).3 Intrinsic law is independent and free and does not bother 
with whether science exists and whether it is understood by science (p. 7). It is the 
law that lives amongst people and that is put into effect by each individual 
in his environment (p. 7). Intrinsic law encompasses the rich institutions of 
marriage, family, property, contracts, inheritance, status differences, the 
relationship of the government to the people and the relations between nations 
(p. 8). Von Kirchmann expressly maintains that people can live without legal 
science, but certainly cannot live without law (p. 8). It is characteristic of 
intrinsic law that we are not only aware of it, but also feel it, that it is not only 
in our heads, but also in our hearts (p. 17). One problem of legal science is that 
it only deals with intrinsic law within a very limited scope. Nine tenths and 
even more of its object correspond to positive legislation with its numerous 
2
 von Kirchmann, J. H.: Die Wertlosigkeit der Jurisprudenz als Wissenschaft. Berlin, 
1848. Reprint: Rudolf Haufe Verlag, Freiburg, Berlin 1990. See also Klenner, H.: Kirchmann 
oder: Die Provokat ion als Produktivkraft . In: von Kirchmann, J. H.: Die Wertlosigkeit 
der Jurisprudenz als Wissenschaft. Freiburg-Berlin, 1990. 79-98., and Sprenger, G.: Recht 
und Werte. Reflexionen über eine philosophische Verlegenheit. In: Der Staat, 2000. 1, 1 -
22. 
3
 I deliberately translate the German expression as "intrinsic law", which has to be 
distinguished f rom "natural law" (Germ. Naturrecht). 
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weaknesses and shortcomings; positive statute is rigid, abstract, it contains 
gaps, contradictions and unclear points (pp. 20-21). Within this scope, the 
object of legal science is purely accidental; the accidental positive statute drives 
out intrinsic law and the legal science dealing with positive statutes is itself 
accidental as well. "Three legislative changes suffice to tum whole libraries into 
wastepaper" (p. 23). And also: lawyers have become "little worms living only 
on rotten wood" (p. 23). In short, what is of permanent existence is only the 
legal science dealing with intrinsic law, that is, with the law corresponding to 
the nature of things. 
Von Kirchmann certainly provokes and exaggerates. Legal science cannot 
avoid positive legislation; it has to analyse, systemize and interpret it. Intrinsic 
law does not suffice unless it is supplemented and elaborated by positive 
legislation. This was the case already in von Kirchmann's times, even more so 
in the 20th century and still more nowadays. And, last but not least, it is simply 
not true that positive legislation as a whole is porous, inconsistent, and unclear. 
Let us just think of the great codes (such as the Austrian General Civil Code of 
1811) that are still valid today. 
On the other hand, von Kirchmann's criticism is also creative. The basic 
question is what the science of positive law should concentrate on and what 
its attitude to its object of research should be. If the results of scientific work 
quickly tum into wastepaper, it is evident that the object and the manner of 
research were badly chosen and realized. In Slovenia, the constitutional system 
of socialist self-management, the laws on associated labour, social property, the 
association of labour and means, labour law, self-management law, etc., were 
certainly examples of the ephemeral results of legal research. 
2. Legal Dogmatics, its Objects and its Limits 
The science of positive law cannot avoid the valid (positive) legislation. One 
of its tasks is also to dogmatically study positive law, to analyse it concerning 
its meaning and to systemize it. One cannot speak of good law if it is not 
accompanied by qualified and even finely finished legal dogmatics. 
The object of legal dogmatics is given and is not created by legal science. 
None of its aims is to declare itself for or against its object from the points of 
view of values and legal politics. Legal dogmatics is based on scientific and 
specialist traditions (e.g. those of civil, criminal or administrative law) and, 
on this basis, it studies the valid law. First comes the so-called lower juris-
prudence of concepts, which interprets the statute, establishes its content 
and removes any unclear points and contradictions contained therein. Then 
comes the higher jurisprudence of concepts, which logically and systematically 
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analyses legal concepts and institutions and combines them into a suitable 
system. 
Such legal dogmatics is a typical representative of scientific positivism, 
which presupposes that the content of positive law is legitimate. A problem arises 
when the object of study is not legitimate or when it begins to lose legitimacy 
partly or completely. The worst solution is for legal science to "overlook" this 
circumstance and to behave as if everything were in the best of order. This is 
already apologetic positivism, which identifies with the valid system and-whether 
willing or unwilling-justifies it. 
Apologetic legal positivism was-at least to a certain extent-characteristic 
of the socialist period of the 20th century. It was especially emphasized in the 
areas that wanted to radically differ from the traditional Roman-Germanic 
legal family covering the continental part of non-socialist European law. I have 
already enumerated the areas of constitutional law, associated labour law and 
self-management law. 
Also in the so-called "new" legal areas, responsible theoreticians remained 
true to the scientific character of their basic science, restrained and sometimes 
very critical. As examples, the following deserve mention: Smidovnik's research 
of the communal system,4 Bucar's treatment of public administration and his 
criticism of self-managing communities of interest5 and Cigoj's insistence on 
traditional civil law.6 Finzgar's work on social property is a special case; the 
astute expert on civil law did not reject it, but constantly illuminated and 
analysed it with the instruments of civil law and especially property law. The final 
result is well-known: social property law is no longer valid law, yet Finzgar's 
theory remains and it can also explain how social property should be trans-
formed into other forms of property.7 
4
 Smidovnik, J.: Koncepcija jugoslovanske obcine (The Concept of Yugoslavian 
Municipality). Ljubljana, 1970. 
5
 Bucar, F.: Uvod v javno upravo (Introduction to Public Administration). Ljubljana, 1969. 
6
 Cigoj, S.: Obligacije —sistem obligacijskega prava v teoriji, sodstvu in primerjalnem 
pravu (Obligations-the System of the General Law of Obligations in Theory, Jurisdiction 
and Comparative Law). Ljubljana, 1976. 
7
 Finzgar, A.: Preoblikovanje druzbene lastnine v drugo obliko lastnine (The Trans-
formation of Social Property into Other Forms of Property). In: Zbornik znanstvenih 
razprav, 1992. 5 -16 . 
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3. Apologetic and Scientific Legal Positivism 
The dividing line between apologetic and scientific legal positivism is not 
clearly drawn; it is in the nature of any legal positivism to reject a metaphysical 
approach to the treatment of law and thus sharply separate positive law from 
any value criterion which would be a criterion of law concerning its content. 
The legitimacy of legal positivism can only be judged by someone who tries to 
give meaning to what he does and who is at the same time aware of the fact 
that legal dogmatics is not and cannot be self-sufficient. It is in the nature of 
law that it is a normative phenomenon which in the name of some value pre-
supposes and defines which legal consequence should occur if we find ourselves 
in certain circumstances. Phrased even more clearly: law is a normative phe-
nomenon that regulates social relations and puts values into effect. A legal 
positivist who overlooks that law has a value dimension or even tries to avoid 
it does not have a criterion for distinguishing between apologetic and scientific 
legal positivism. 
And this is the greatest danger he finds himself in and which even increases 
when he is surrounded by a single-party and monopolistic political system. 
The danger is less marked in those legal areas that are traditionally relatively 
independent (e.g. in the areas of traditional civil law) and much greater in 
the areas that are politically sensitive and simultaneously approached the 
prototypes of a new (e.g. self-management) law. 
The main works on the science of positive law were produced in the period 
between the two World Wars (especially in the areas of criminal and civil law). 
The conditions after the Second World War were less favourable to science. 
The Stalinist period forced it to adopt apologetic legal positivism, more liberal 
periods broadened the scientific horizons. Throughout this period, however, 
it was also important whether one was dealing with traditional legal areas 
domiciled also in the new system or with areas that were supposed to be typical 
of the new self-management system. 
These are external circumstances that are certainly important, yet not so 
decisive as to drown out the power and creativity of individuals. While it is 
probably tme that the sciences of legal history were more sheltered than the 
sciences of positive law, it nevertheless took the personal contributions of 
Viktor Korosec8 and Sergej Vilfan9 to write excellent works on legal history: 
8
 See e.g. Korosec, V.: Die Erbenhaftung nach römischem Recht /. Das Zivil- und 
Amtsrecht. Leipzig, 1927; Hethitische Staatsverträge. Ein Beitrag zu ihrer juristischen 
Wertung. Leipzig, 1931; Hethitica. Prispevek к razvoju hetitskega prava (Hethitica. 
Contribution to the Development of Hethitic Law). Ljubljana, 1958; Keilschriftrecht, in: 
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the former in the field of cuneiform laws and Roman law and the latter in the 
field of the legal history of Slovenes. 
Individuals reacted to external circumstances in different ways: some 
accepted a good many imaginary innovations and tried to justify them, others 
were aware of the limitations and tried to salvage what could be salvaged 
within the limits of what was possible, another group moved on the margins 
and broadened the scientific space, again others stuck to the legal comparative 
method and discussed foreign law, whereas in reality they were critical of the 
national (e.g. constitutional) law, some stated a few cheap Marxist truths in the 
introduction and then fully applied themselves to their science and there were 
very few who did not show any consideration for external circumstances and 
deal with them in a polemical manner as well. 
What I would like to say is: irrespective of the fact that some periods were 
really not favourable to science, we have high quality works in most legal areas. 
If some areas are still lacking, it is not just the dark periods of recent history 
that are to blame. The causes lie with ourselves and with the where and how of 
directing our energies. 
The knowledge I have does not allow me to pass judgment on individual 
works. Nor is such the aim of this paper. I am actually concerned with some-
thing else, namely with the concept of the science of positive law. 
4. The Concept of the Science of Positive Law 
Historic experience proves that legal dogmatics, which is methodologically 
characteristic of individual sciences of positive law, can never be self-sufficient. 
At least, the science must continuously check whether the positive legal regulation 
expresses the "normative power of the factual" (Germ, die normative Kraft des 
Faktischen). Positive legal regulation always has certain value and sociological 
backgrounds, the social and value contexts co-determine the understanding of 
the statutes and it is the social reality to which the legal behaviour, legal 
violations and legal decision-making lead. These reasons and numerous others 
Handbuch der Orientalistik, 1/3. Leiden, 1964, and Ocrt rimskega prava (Outline of 
Roman Law), 2nd edition. Ljubljana, 1980. 
9
 See e.g. Vilfan, S.: Pravna zgodovina Slovencev (The Legal History of Slovenes). 
Ljubljana, 1961; Rechtsgeschichte der Slowenen (= Grazer Rechts- und Staatswissen-
schaftliche Studien 21). Graz, 1968; Jugoslawien, in: Handbuch der Quellen und Literatur 
der neueren europäischen Privatrechtsgeschichte, HI/5. München , 1988. 323-470. ; 
Zgodovinska pravotvornost in Slovenci (Historische Fähigkeit zur Rechtsbildung und die 
Slowenen). Ljubljana, 1996. 
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confirm that the science of positive law must not live in an ivory tower of 
normativity. If it does, it may easily turn into a dead letter or into an ideological 
ornament used by the political authority. 
Legal dogmatics loses its firm ground when it deals with positive law past 
its expiration date or when positive law has been false and contrary to the nature 
of things from the very beginning. If positive law is such, life rebels against 
it sooner or later; life demands new criteria that enable it to remain in good 
condition, operate normally and develop further. Legal theory knows numerous 
schools of thought that have rebelled against fossilized legal dogmatics-e.g. 
free law theory, Interessenjurisprudenz, sociological jurisprudence, Wertungs-
jurisprudenz. Several new sciences have developed-e.g. the sociology of law, 
criminology, various legal and economic sciences, in the United States various 
critical jurisprudences have also developed in recent decades. 
Between the two world wars, Slovenian legal science was especially 
influenced by Austrian-German legal positivism based on the normative-dogmatic 
method; additionally, the legal-comparative, sociological and axiological methods 
gradually became important as well. After the Second World War the develop-
ment was rather uneven. In some critical periods an apologetic legal positivism 
gained the upper hand to a certain extent and in certain areas. It should not be 
overlooked, however, that legal positivism was also a defensive barrier against 
the invasion of legal science by political irrationality and despotism. The 
foundation of several new institutes and departments at the Faculty of Law 
furthered the development of a growing number of sciences (e.g. criminology, 
the sociology of law, political economics, public administration), which 
noticeably broadened the knowledge of law and at the same time connected 
law with the phenomena to which it is vitally linked. It is also important that 
several new scientific areas developed (for example, comparative commercial 
law, recently also comparative labour law and the law of the European Union), 
which are all legally comparative, and among the classical legal sciences, 
some (such as criminal law) have been enriched by additional methods (e.g. by 
sociological, axiological and comparative methods). Concerning the legal-
comparative method, it should probably be added that it has been intensively 
gaining acceptance in all areas of civil law and recently again in the field of 
constitutional law. 
5. The Worthlessness of Jurisprudence 
And now we should return to von Kirchmann and to his statement that juris-
prudence is "worthless" because its object constantly changes. If the sciences 
of positive law only studied the valid legislation of the day in a normative-
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dogmatic manner, von Kirchmann's objection would be almost completely 
justified. It is not the task of science to identify with any enacted law, neither 
is its task for the method of research to create its own object of research. Most 
probably, the task of science is to choose the aspect of research, these aspects 
must correspond to the legal phenomenon and the legal phenomenon is certainly 
not encompassed by the positive legislation of the day. Evidently, the science of 
positive law cannot evade positive legislation, yet its mission is also to build 
on previous knowledge, to verify, complement and, if necessary, change this 
knowledge, to consider legal-comparative findings, to assess whether the en-
acted law is rationally designed and in accordance with life (with the so-called 
"nature of things"), to accompany and judge how this law is enforced in life and 
in legal (court) practice, and, last but not least, to propose how some areas could 
be differently and better regulated. If legal science really does this and if its 
research is of good quality, the results thereof are extremely valuable and 
outlive whole generations of legislators. Also in Slovenia numerous works 
have outlived their authors. A classic example is The State (1927) by Leonid 
Pitamic, the content and language of which still make for stimulating reading.10 
Certainly, fewer works would be falling into oblivion if they had been true to 
the scientific postulates I mentioned above. A frequent weakness is that individual 
researchers focus on so-called "law in books" and neglect "law in action". An 
important element of living law is court practice, which, within a limited scope, 
also has the nature of case law. During the last decade constitutional law practice 
has also developed, which, however, is not really considered in theoretical works 
either. The shining exception has always been civil law specialists (Cigoj's 
school), who probably follow court practice in the most intensive manner. 
Let me stress once more that the science of positive law is certainly not 
"worthless", but it is evidently not good if the legal positive regulation changes 
too frequently. But things do not change so quickly as it seems at first sight. 
Apart from the novelties introduced by socialism, the basic legal concepts and 
institutions have been changing organically and gradually and, if necessary, 
newly formed (for example, in the field of commercial law). The great 
codifications of the 19th century already played an important role whereby the 
core of modern law was consolidated. Neither should it be overlooked that the 
norms regarding closing legal gaps made it possible after the foundation of the 
Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1918, for the legislation valid in 
the territory of Slovenia when it entered the former common state to be used for 
10
 Pitamic, L.: Drzava (The State). Celje, 1927. Reprint: Cankarjeva zalozba, Ljubljana, 
1996. See also the English edition: A Treatise on the State. J. H. Fürst Company, 
Baltimore, 1933. 
THE TRANSITION FROM SOCIALIST LAW AND RESURGENCE OF TRADITIONAL LAW 21 
unregulated areas. This means that practically continuously, including to a limited 
extent even in the period of socialism, the classical thought of civil law was 
maintained in Slovenia. 
6. Arguments of Unlawfulness, Legal Principles and Understanding of 
Legal Norms 
Von Kirchmann's critical questions are not sufficient. In the 20th century it was 
again clearly shown that any science, even a positivistic one, does itself a 
disservice if it is not aware of its own limitations. The main drawback is that legal 
positivism does not answer the question of how it should be legally evaluated. 
Legal positivism shuts itself off from the arguments of unlawfulness, legal 
principles and of the understanding of legal norms. All three arguments are of an 
over-positivistic nature and each of them requires answers to value questions. 
The argument of unlawfulness concedes that a valid (positive) legal system may 
be humanly intolerable to such a degree that it has to be denied the nature of 
law. The argument of legal principles considers that each legal system comprises 
value standards directing the definition of legal norms concerning their content 
and the manner of their application. And the argument of the understanding of 
legal norms emphasizes that legal norms are only a result of the understanding 
of a statute in view of factual (practical interpretation) and imagined (methodical 
interpretation) life cases. 
In the Slovenian legal sphere it was the objection of unlawfulness that fared 
worst. Between the two world wars legal positivism was too strong for this 
question to be raised at all. The most astute thinker was Leonid Pitamic, who 
already in 1917 maintained that also the science of positive law needed 
appropriate prerequisites.11 The criticism of Pure Theory of Law finally led 
him to state that legal regulation "must consider its subject at least to such an 
extent that it does not take away its nature. If law is to remain law, it may only 
command or allow external human behaviour, but not its opposite, 'inhuman 
behaviour', if it does not want to lose the nature of law".12 If I may quote 
myself, let me say that legal regulation must always be within the limits of 
legal Tightness and the measure of this Tightness comprises-at least in the 
world we belong to-basic human rights, the principles of a state under the rule 
11
 See Pitamic, L.: Denkökonomische Voraussetzungen de r Rechtswissenschaft. In: 
Österreichische Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht, 1917, 339-367. 
12
 See Pitamic, L.: Naturrecht und Natur des Rechts. In: Österreichische Zeitschrift für 
öffentliches Recht, 7 - N. F. 1956, 194. 
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of law and the institutions of democracy.13 In three cases the argument of 
unlawfulness was also used by the Slovenian Constitutional Court in referring 
to general legal principles acknowledged by civilized nations.14 
The second objection against legal positivism, i.e. the argument of legal 
principles, fares a little better. It is a majority standpoint that law is only a 
system of legal norms (some speak merely of legal provisions!), yet this does 
not mean that the meaning of legal principles is completely overlooked. The 
theory considers them especially at the level of basic principles characterizing 
individual legal fields and much less as important standards of interpretation. 
The main exceptions are the standpoints of experts in civil and criminal law. It is 
encouraging that the argument of legal principles (especially that of a state under 
the rule of law) has been applied more and more often in the recent practice of 
the Constitutional Court. 
Of the greatest practical value is the third objection, i.e. the argument of the 
understanding of legal norms. It is an invaluable argument for legal participants 
(for example, for judges), but also for all those legal observers-I am one of 
them- who are of the opinion that legal science must also deal with the nature of 
legal decision-making in concrete cases.13 A chapter on the interpretation of 
statute is contained in practically every systematic work dealing with any legal 
branch. For the most part it does not concern the theory of argumentation and 
legal valuation with special emphasis on the peculiarities of the branch in 
question, but it is more a general review of classical interpretation arguments as 
phrased by von Savigny. 
We find ourselves in a very sensitive, sometimes even fragile and very 
important legal area. Law is a linguistic and cultural phenomenon which is an 
object of understanding. Legal understanding is not just a reconstruction of a 
thought (a legal norm) reported by the legislator, legal understanding is also the 
final shaping of a legal norm that must lead to a legal decision. The lawyer's 
(e.g. the judge's) decision is a value synthesis assessing the normative starting 
point with regard to the factual starting point, and vice versa. In this context the 
interpreter is the one to "reconstruct" the possibilities of the statute, to state the 
content of these possibilities more precisely (if they are uncertain in the statute) 
and to choose the combination that is in the closest accordance with the legally 
13
 Pavcnik, M.: Teorija prava (Theory of Law). 2nd Edition. Ljubl jana, 2001. 20 and 
479. 
14
 See Pavcnik , M.: Pravni in ustavni temel j i prava (Legal and Constitutional 
Foundations of Law) . In: Ustavno sodstvo (Constitutional Judiciary). Pavcnik, M. and 
Mavcic, A. (Eds.) Ljubljana, 2000. 396-397. 
15
 Cf. Pavcnik, M.: Juristisches Verstehen und Entscheiden. W i e n - N e w York, 1993. 
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relevant characteristics of the life case. It is in the nature of legal understanding 
and decision-making that it is a creative or at least a co-creative legal act. 
It is a matter for each theory of law (in the broader sense of the word) how 
it reacts to these questions. The worst solution is to accept the thesis that 
everything has been decided by the legislator and that it is only a question of 
mechanically recreating his decision in a concrete case. This is the so-called 
ideology of the application of law, which always suits the political forces laying 
claim to "creativity" and a monopoly on law-giving. Behind this "ideological 
veil" lies the actual creativity, which is all the more bound to the "ideological 
cliché" the more politically sensitive and important the legal decision is. It is in 
the nature of things that the decision-making in civil law cases is, in principle, 
more autonomous than in administrative and criminal cases where the "ideo-
logical cliché" is much more pronounced. Yet also here there are differences 
between the classic crime and the "socially" especially dangerous "crime", 
which can be fully exploited as "political crime". 
The subject of my paper is not the concrete abuses that were most numerous 
and terrible in the Stalinist period. I would like to say that the ideology of the 
application of law disarms the legal participant and leaves him to his own devices. 
I do not at all wish to blame legal dogmatics for any abuses. I only think that it 
should also be accompanied and supplemented by other theoretical approaches, 
among them especially the theory of interpretation and argumentation in law, i.e. 
approaches that make the legal participant aware of the nature of legal under-
standing and offer him arguments for good decision-making and substantiating. 
I know very well that abuse cannot be avoided in such cases either. It does not 
lie within the power of theory to make abuse impossible, yet it is within its 
power to clearly tell the legal participant that he is also a decision-maker. 
7. Law as a Phenomenon of Understanding and Interpretation 
The fact that the law is a phenomenon to be understood and interpreted offers 
numerous creative possibilities to legal observers as well as to legal par-
ticipants. If the legal system is to be stable, legal science must assume its share 
of responsibility as well. The constitution, legal codes and basic statutes can 
only live with the help of interpretation. The free law theory, Interessenjuris-
prudenz, Wertungsjurisprudenz are typical foreign examples that enable, for 
instance, the French and the German Civil Codes to still be valid without 
difficulty: the former is nearly two hundred years old and the latter turned one 
hundred years old at the turn of the millennium. 
The same is true of the Austrian General Civil Code (of 1811), to which 
Slovenes have the closest relation and which was mentioned above in another 
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connection. This code was of special importance before 1978, when the new 
Act on Torts and Contracts was passed. Until then, torts and contracts were 
actually regulated by the rules of the Austrian General Civil Code of 1811, 
which were actively applied by the courts with the full and firm support of 
civil law theory with its interpretations and comments. The norms of the 
Austrian Civil Code also had an important role in classical law as regards real 
property and movables. 
This also shows that court practice has an important role as well. It would 
be an exaggeration to say that it is a role approaching that of Anglo-American 
case law; there are certainly numerous similarities between both systems, but 
there are also numerous differences with their own historical background. In 
continental and also in Slovenian law, established court practice supplements 
statute law, normatively implements and rejuvenates it in the long term by 
preventing it from becoming rigid and losing touch with life. In this respect 
much has been achieved in Slovenia in the field of classic civil law. In the 
last ten years, especially since 1994, when the constitutional complaint was 
instituted in practice, the Constitutional Court has done much towards making 
case law statements obligatory; if regular courts do not act in accordance with 
established court practice, they violate the basic constitutional right of equality 
before the law, which is also a reason for constitutional complaints to be 
brought before the Constitutional Court. 
The shift I am referring to will become more and more noticeable: the 
significance of court practice and Constitutional Court practice rises when 
legislation calms down and all main codes and statutes have been adopted, 
which at the same time requires that the theory of positive law also deals 
intensively with the theory of interpretation and argumentation in law. The 
statute is an object of understanding, but this understanding can only be of good 
quality and legally safe if it is ennobled by theory as well as by court practice. 
The statute-however excellent it may be-is just an element of the legal pheno-
menon; legal theory and court practice are responsible for it as well. 
III. The transition from socialist law and the resurgence of traditional law 
8. The so-called Socialist Law 
The so-called socialist law had several complexions and did not represent a 
uniform, generally accepted concept. On the one hand, there were some classic 
Marxist standpoints (among them, especially Marx's) on the nature of socialist 
law, on the other hand there were different interpretations and reactions to these 
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standpoints, and, additionally, also the practices in individual socialist countries 
were different.16 A very characteristic example was the former Yugoslavia-
Slovenia was its most-developed republic-which after the conflict with the 
Soviet Union in 1948 began to look for new solutions and after 1950 began 
to build up the political system of self-managing socialism. Self-managing 
socialism made it possible for the concept of socialist law to be less etatistic 
and more pluralistic than in the countries of the so-called "real socialism". Yet 
it was also true of socialist Yugoslavia (and thus of socialist Slovenia) that the 
"bourgeois boundaries"17 of socialist law did not allow formal democracy. This 
was a very sensitive point and also the point that put the socialist state far 
below the standards of the capitalist state. 
The so-called socialist law was not a uniform concept that could be 
compared to traditional law. If I look at former Yugoslavian and Slovenian law, 
the greatest differences with respect to traditional law can be found in the 
following areas: in constitutional law, which was supposed to have been 
surpassed by the political system of socialist self-management; in classic 
property law, wherein social property was to become the foundation of a new 
system; in labour law, which was characterised by workers' self-management; 
in commercial law where instead of contract law, a social compact should have 
developed (the so-called association of labour and means); in administrative 
law, wherein the administration was professionally degraded and fragmented 
into individual areas of interest, etc. In addition, all legal areas were eschatolo-
gically marked by the principles of socialist self-management and socialist 
morals. These principles were mostly just an ideological ornament and did 
not carry much weight in practice. An exception were the so-called reserve 
clauses, which enabled the authorities to put their political will into effect in an 
ostensibly legal manner. A classic example were some very loose definitions 
of criminal offences that were contrary to the principle Nullum crimen sine 
lege certa}% 
Among the characteristics of socialist law self-management law was often 
mentioned. Strictly speaking, self-management law was not a new kind of law 
or even a legal area (such as constitutional, civil or criminal law), but it was 
only a question of new formal sources of law comprising legal norms. These 
16
 Cf. Reich, N. (Ed.): Marxistische und sozialistische Rechtstheorie. Frankfurt/Main, 
1972. 
17
 Cf. Marx, K.: Kritik des Gothaer Programms. In: MEW 19. Berlin, 1972. 2 0 - 2 1 . 
18
 Cf. Pavcnik, M.: Nul lum crimen sine lege certa. Beitrag zur Gesetzesauslegung am 
Beispiel des jugoslawischen Rechts. In: Weinberger, O. und W. Fischer, M. W . (Eds.): 
Demokratie und Rationalität. Wien, 1992. 191-199. 
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new sources of law were charters (internal statutes), self-managing agreements, 
social compacts, etc., they were implemented especially in the areas of labour 
and commercial law. One great problem of self-management sources of law 
was that they were ostensible and thereby ideological, since they created the 
appearance of real self-management, whereas actually the questions had 
already been regulated in the statutes in much detail. 
9. Traditional Law in the Socialist Period 
I have already partially dealt with this question above. It was a characteristic of 
Yugoslavian and Slovenian law that they were always closely connected with 
traditional law. This law was still active in all areas that were not taken over by 
the so-called socialist law that was supposed to "surpass" traditional law (see 
especially point 8). The connection to traditional law was also made possible 
by the norms regarding the filling in of legal gaps. As mentioned above, in 
Slovenia the regulations of the Austrian Civil Code were applied, especially 
for the legal areas of the general part of civil law, for property law and for the 
law of contracts and torts, which were largely codified only in 1978 and 1980. 
An important role was also played by the system of legal education, which 
was mostly based on traditional law and traditional legal thinking. Of course, 
also the new socialist law was taught, yet it never dominated. One should also 
bear in mind that the older professors, who had studied in the period between 
the two world wars (often at first-rate foreign universities), mostly remained 
true to scientific legal positivism. A typical representative was the above-
mentioned Professor Finzgar, who dealt with social property by interpreting 
and explaining it with the tools of classic civil law (especially property law). 
Moreover, a number of professors studied in the West (e.g. in the United 
States) also after the Second World War. Among them were Cigoj, a professor 
of civil law who developed case law thinking, and Bucar, an administrative 
law professor who also used system theory. 
Compared to other former socialist countries, Yugoslavian and Slovenian 
theories were relatively well informed of what was happening elsewhere. If I 
take the theory of law, which is my subject, I can say that it was substantially 
more open and diverse than in other countries of "real socialism".19 I do not 
want to say that the political system did not place ideological obstacles in the 
way of researchers (e.g. in discussions about natural law), yet they were not so 
1 9 Cf. Perenié, A.: Relativna samostojnost prava (Relative Independence of Law). 
Ljubljana, 1981. and Pavcnik, M.: Der Begriff des Rechts in der jugoslawischen Rechtslehre, 
in: Jahrbuch für Ostrecht (München), 1989, 93-112. 
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high and formidable as if there were only one truth, without allowing for new 
research and new conclusions.20 
10. The New Constitutional Organisation 
In the transition from socialism to the new state organisation, an important and 
even key role was played by the new Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia 
that was adopted on 28 December 1991. The quality and the essence of the 
new Constitution are very different from the previous constitutional order of 
1974 when Slovenia was still a part of the Socialist Federative Republic of 
Yugoslavia. In the socialist era the foundations of the system were the right to 
self-management and social ownership (of the means of production), which 
were incorporated into a vision of a self-managing society and state that was 
determined right down to the last detail (which made it totalitarian in a certain 
sense). Basic human rights and freedoms were drowned in this vision. 
Basic human rights were not the starting point of the system but just an 
element thereof, the scope of which was precisely measured off in advance. It 
was characteristic of this system that it accepted the thesis of the pluralism of 
self-managing interests, yet it was not ready to institutionalise this pluralism 
legally and politically. Pluralism was acceptable as long as it remained within 
the system. Once it began to doubt the system and tried to change it, however, 
it became suspect and even open to criminal prosecution. Thus, it is certainly 
not accidental that the Communist Party was defined already in the Constitution 
as the "leading ideological and political force of the working class and of all 
working people". 
The form of the authority of the state corresponded to a directorial (assembly) 
system (with elements of a parliamentary and even presidential system). It is 
typical that the system as designed in the constitution did not work and the 
elements of the principle of the division of powers were more a kind of an 
ideological ornament than serious institutions. The rules of the "division of 
powers" only make sense if at the same time cultural, economic and political 
conditions are also provided that activate this "game" (of the system of checks 
and balances). The system that was de jure and de facto dominated by only one 
political party (i.e. the communist party) certainly did not harbour this ambition. 
And this made the legal form ideological: it offered exactly what its actual 
designers did not at all want. Nevertheless, the right to self-management, 
social property and the pluralism of self-managing interests made possible 
20
 Cf. Bröstl, A.: Troubles with Law, Justice and Nationalism. In: Rechtstheorie, 1993, 
84-85. 
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numerous particular features of the Yugoslavian order and thus distanced it 
f rom the typical countries of "real socialism". 
And now, let us return to the Constitution of independent Slovenia, which 
is centred on the classic constitutional matter (materia constitutionis).21 On the 
one hand, there are the provisions that determine the form of the (Slovenian) 
state. Slovenia is defined as a republic with a parliamentary system, as a 
democratic state wherein power is vested in the people, a territorially unified 
and indivisible state with local self-government, as a state under the rule of law 
and as a social state. The second group of provisions encompasses a catalogue 
of the classic basic human rights and freedoms, which is completely in accor-
dance with modern standards and modern constitutions. The third group of 
constitutional provisions refers to the organisation of the state. It comprises 
norms about the organisation of the central state bodies (legislative, executive 
and judicial bodies), their competencies and the relations between them. The 
relation between the legislative and the executive branches of power is designed 
in accordance with the parliamentary system (with the variant of a constructive 
vote of no confidence) and the design of the state order corresponds to the 
principle of "checks and balances". 
The principle of "checks and balances" is important not only in the relation 
between the legislative and the executive branches of powers, but also the 
composition and the manner of the operation of individual state bodies are such 
that a balanced operation is made possible within each body as well. A logical 
consequence of this regulation and of these principles is that also the judicial 
branch of power acquires a new position and a new quality.22 The Constitution 
especially emphasizes the independence of judges, the right to a natural judge 
(Germ, gesetzlicher Richter) and the principle of the permanence of judicial 
office. It is very important that the Constitution maintained the institution of 
the Constitutional Court, strengthened it and conferred numerous new respon-
sibilities upon it.23 De jure and de facto, the Constitutional Court is the "highest 
21
 Cf. Sturm, L. (Editor): Komentar Ustave Republike Slovenije (Commentary to the 
Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia). Ljubljana, 2002. 
22
 Cf. Pribán, J.-Roberts, P - Y o u n g , J. (Eds.): Systems of Justice in Transition. Central 
European Experiences since 1989. Aldershot, 2003. See especially the articles by Marko 
Novak (The Promising Gift of Precedents: Changes in Culture and Techniques of Judicial 
Decision-Making in Slovenia, 94—108) and Albin Iglicar (The Judiciary in Slovenia: a 
Profession in the Ascendancy, 180-182) . 
23
 Cf. Mavcic, A.: Slovenian Constitutional Review. Ljubljana, 1995. and Pavcnik, M . -
Mavcic, A. (Eds.): Ustavno sodstvo (Constitutional Judiciary). Ljubljana, 2000.-As regards 
the Czech experience, see the excellent monograph of Pavel Holländer: Ústavneprávní 
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office of judicial power" deciding whether general legal acts are constitutional 
and legal, deciding on constitutional complaints (due to violations of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms by individual acts of the authorities) and on 
some other matters (e.g. on the possible impeachment of the President of the 
Republic, the Prime Minister and individual ministers). 
11. Transitional Problems and New Challenges 
Since I look at the problem of transition from a broader point of view and from 
within a broader period of time, this possibly makes it easier for me not to 
dramatize the situation. Therein, I am also supported by the thought of the 
Slovenian legal historian Vilfan, who was convinced that the "Slovenian 
language as the basis of national consciousness (...) was preserved in suitable 
historical circumstances" and that "thus, Slovenes-in accordance with their 
historical situation and environment-have always been completely normal 
people."24 
I do not quote this in order to show any kind of self-satisfaction or as if I 
did not want to admit there are any problems, but simply because I think that 
the problems are anything but black and white. Neither is this purely a 
transition from the period of socialist law because this law has always been 
connected with traditional law nor are we entering a new period of traditional 
law that would be wide open and waiting for us. The traditional law to which 
we are returning is not static, but is in constant movement and itself confronted 
with challenges and open questions.25 
It is undisputable, however, that foreign examples and foreign solutions 
cannot be uncritically transferred to the local legal system. The revival of 
traditional law must occur in accordance with historical and legal tradition, it 
must consider comparable foreign examples and decide in favour of those 
solutions and developments that fit into the local conditions.26 Von Kirchmann 
argumentace. Ohlédnutí po deseti letech Ústavního soudu (Constitutional Argumentation. 
Considerations after Ten Years of the Constitutional Court). Praha, 2003. 
24
 Vilfan, S.: Zgodovinska pravotvornost in Slovenci (Historische Fähigkeit zur Rechts-
bildung und die Slowenen). Ljubljana, 1996. 481. 
25
 At the level of principles, cf. Nahtigal, M.: Vloga prava v tranziciji (The Role of 
Law in Transition). Ljubljana, 2002. 
26
 Compare with the instructions on how to fill legal gaps. See the Courts Act (1994): 
"If a civil law matter cannot be solved on the basis of valid regulations, the judge considers 
a regulation intended for similar cases. If the solution of the matter is nevertheless legally 
doubtful, he decides in accordance with the general principles of legal order in the country. 
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would probably say that it must be the law which is the most intrinsic with 
regard to the local conditions. Attention must also be paid to the fact that no 
solutions (either local or foreign or both) are introduced which are not in 
mutual harmony or are even mutually exclusive. 
The transition from socialism to traditional law evidently has taken more 
time than originally expected. This is especially true of the privatisation of 
the economy and the denationalisation of once nationalized property. These 
processes are often legally very demanding and take much time (especially if the 
complications are dealt with in administrative as well as in court proceedings). It 
is equally-and possibly even more-important that no durable and firm political 
blocks (with corresponding political parties) have developed as yet and that a 
political culture which accepts the values of a state governed by the rule of law 
and those of a social state (together with the system of checks and balances) is 
still under development. 
The question of an appropriate political culture27 is among the most sensitive 
of issues. New political parties often hide behind the principle of the division 
of powers and are more interested in the division itself (somehow in the spirit 
of Divide et impera!) than in the divided exercise of power that has to be 
mutually harmonized and controlled. A logical continuation of these views is 
that most parties do not have a well thought-out attitude to the social state and 
to social justice. Market fundamentalism and the "liberal paradigm" that any 
acquisition on the basis of (non-monopolistic) market exchange is legal, 
legitimate and just28 are just too strong and without any real competition that 
would stand up to them to any significant degree and in an efficient manner. 
Major positive changes will only occur when a sufficiently strong socially 
oriented political group is formed and when also the Constitutional Court has 
the opportunity to intervene more frequently by means of its decisions. If the 
Constitutional Court received a greater number of proposals, it could react in 
an appropriate manner because the principle of a social state is one of the most 
important constitutional principles. 
The reactions to the new challenges of traditional law are and will be some-
how different in individual (former socialist) states because also their historical 
In this he acts in accordance with legal tradition and fixed findings of legal knowledge" 
(italics added by M. P., Art. 3/2). 
27
 Cf. Gessner, V.-Hoeland, A.-Varga, Cs. (eds): European Legal Cultures. Aldershot 
(etc.) 1996. 
28 
Rus, V.: Enakost in pravicnost (Equality and Justice). In: Zalar, A. (Ed.): Enakost in 
pravicnost V pravni in socialni drzavi (Equality and Justice in a State that is Social and 
Governed by the Rule of Law). Ljubl jana, 1998, 14. 
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development and their present starting points are different. Concerning Slovenia, 
I have already explained its peculiarities and certain advantages in comparison 
with the former countries of "real socialism". But there are also new challenges 
and new circumstances that cannot be avoided. Fortunately, the approaching 
membership in the European Union has acted in a cohesive manner. The task of 
the new members of the EU is to adopt and realize the fundamental economic 
freedoms that refer to the free movement of goods, the free movement of 
workers, the right of establishment, the free movement of services and the free 
movement of capital and payments. A prerequisite for all four said freedoms is 
that traditional civil and commercial law are valid in all countries. Slovenia has 
already adopted appropriate laws in these areas. There should especially be 
mentioned the Companies Act (1993), Protection of Competition Act (1993), 
Prevention of Restriction of Competition Act (1999), Securities Market Act 
(1999), Maritime Code (2001), Code of Obligations (2001) and Property Code 
(2002). 
European unification and even wider globalisation processes also contain 
numerous hidden traps and dangers. For a small country and a small nation, it is 
of special importance to maintain the cultural and national identity. In principle, 
small countries will probably not be able to design the economic and political 
form of the EU and other broader international communities in a decisive 
manner. The power of small countries resides in their mutual cooperation and 
the preservation of the differences that are a conditio sine qua non of any 
national identity. At the same time, this is also the reserve clause and the limit 
beyond which the exercise of a part of national competence cannot be trans-
ferred to international organisations and communities. The European Union is 
"unity in variety" and "variety in unity".29 If the European Union does not accept 
this condition, it would make itself look ridiculous. Thus, the real question is 
not whether there should be variety or not, the real question is how and to what 
degree this variety should be put into effect and how harmoniously (and 
colourfully) the European orchestra should play. 
29
 Cf . the special issue "Evropski izz iv" ("European Challenge") , in: Nova revija 
(Ljubljana) , 2003, 252-253 , 1-473. 
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There have been several attempts in legal theory to clarify the conceptual relation 
of law to politics. The present paper is a part of one of those attempts. I do not 
undertake to present here my standpoint on this conceptual relationship in 
its entirety. I have done that elsewhere.1 This paper will have a distinctive 
emphasis: it concentrates on the conceptual characteristics of legal institutions. 
It is only one part of a full analysis of the conceptual relation of law to politics, 
but certainly a crucial part of it. 
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First, I shall outline my views on the basic conceptual characteristics of law. 
Then I compare it to an analysis of the conceptual nature of the "political". This 
will serve to establish my main thesis that legal institutions are to be treated as 
political institutions in conceptual legal theory. Later, I deal with some possible 
objections to my position. In the closing section of my paper, I consider some 
implications of my thesis in respect to legal reasoning. 
My thesis is neither new nor radical, and I have no wish to present it as 
a revolutionary discovery. Several authors have put forward similar views 
concerning the nature of legal institutions,2 and several authors have encouraged 
us to connect legal theory to political philosophy in some similar way.3 Never-
theless, I think there is room for further improvement in this region of 
conceptual legal theory. It is also important that, as far as I can see, the position 
I take deviates from any similar position. I hope I can make some contributions 
to the clarification of the complicated conceptual relationship between law and 
politics. 
Some Conceptual Characteristics of Law 
To put ourselves into perspective, we need a good grasp of the basic conceptual 
characteristics of law. In the following paragraphs I put forward some claims 
that concern these characteristics. The claims I make summarize the results of an 
interpretive analysis that I have carried out elsewhere in detail, and that I will 
not repeat here.4 This time around, I use these claims to outline my starting 
point. 
Law consists of purposive human activities that are connected to one another 
in several ways and that are subjects of specialized communication among the 
affected agents. This basic feature can be summarized by saying that law is a 
social practice. Law as a social practice serves various individual and communal 
goals, so it cannot be characterized adequately in terms of its objectives, points 
or functions.5 The basic conceptual character of law lies in its distinctive way of 
serving any function. Law treats human beings as rational agents who are capable 
2
 Joseph Raz took it as one of Hart 's main achievements that he depicted law as a kind 
of political institution. See Raz, J.: Ethics in the Public Domain. Oxford, 1994, 204. Cf. 
Bódig: Jogelmélet és gyakorlati filozófia, op. cit. 540-551. 
3
 See Lloyd L. Weinreb: Natural Law and Justice. Cambridge, Mass. , 1987, vii. 
4
 See Bódig: Jogelmélet és gyakorlati filozófia, op. cit. 509-535. 
5
 See Coleman, J. : The Practice of Principle: In Defence of a Pragmalist Approach to 
Legal Theory. Oxford, 2001. 184. 
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of acting on reasons. Law is one of the social practices that influence human 
conduct by way of providing (practical) reasons to the participants of the practice. 
It is its reason-giving character that makes law a normative social practice. 
"Legal" reasons addressed to the participants of the practice are not simply 
given: they are systematically provided. It is a further characteristic feature of 
the legal practice that certain individuals and groups (bodies) have the task of 
systematically providing reasons to other participants. I call these individuals 
and bodies "legal institutions". This feature makes law a characteristically 
institutionalized normative social practice. 
If law is only one of the social practices that influence human conduct by 
way of providing practical reasons there must be something distinctively "legal" 
in the reasons provided by legal institutions. Or, more exactly, if law is to be 
taken as having practical relevance some reasons must owe their distinctive 
practical force to their "legal" character. Law seeks to make some practical 
difference in respect to participant behaviour. And law can be treated as a 
separate social practice if the practical difference it makes cannot be attained in 
any other way. This is one of the considerations that are summed up in the so 
called "practical difference thesis" put forward by several contemporary legal 
positivists.6 
It is now a commonplace that legal reasons are typically authoritative 
reasons. Law seeks to make a practical difference by way of providing 
authoritative reasons.7 This is what we normally mean by saying that law claims 
authority over its addressees.8 However, pointing to the way the legal practice is 
based on authority relations is only one step towards clarifying the distinctiveness 
of law. Authority relations are pervasive features of social life. Law must be 
differentiated from the non-legal forms of authority like the parental authority 
over the children, the teacher's authority over the students, the referee's 
authority over the football players, etc. The key to drawing the relevant 
distinction can be found if we concentrate on the way law is related to the public 
life of communities. As opposed to many other alleged authorities, law claims 
6
 See ibid. 69. See also Shapiro, S. J.: The Difference That Rules Make. In: Analyzing 
Law: New Essays in Legal Theory (Ed.: Brian Bix), Oxford, 1998. 
7
 Recently, several authors challenged the standard view that law's normative claims 
are to be characterized in terms of authoritative reasons. See Soper, Ph.: The Ethics of 
Deference: Learning f rom Law's Morals. Cambridge, 2002. p. xiv. I reject those views for 
reasons not to be explicated here. See, however, my Jogelmélet és gyakorlati filozófia... op. 
cit. 189-193. 
8
 See Raz: Ethics in the Public Domain, op. cit. 215. 
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public authority. And, as a public authority, law claims superiority over rival 
authorities in cases of collision.9 
Let me dwell a little more on the issue of authority. I chose to characterize 
law in terms of the (authoritative) reasons it seeks to provide, and I find it 
particularly instructive if we reveal some features of those reasons. Of course, 
authoritative reasons have several essential features. However, one can point to 
two particularly important ones: these reasons are both pre-emptive and content-
independent. We might call a reason pre-emptive if it plays a distinctive role in 
practical deliberation: it "is not to be added to all other relevant reasons when 
assessing what to do, but should replace some of them".10 The practical reasons 
generated by legal provisions are not to "beat" rival reasons in a deliberative 
process that takes all of them into consideration. Legal reasons claim to render 
most of the potentially rival reasons ineffective and irrelevant in respect to the 
practical situation they address. If they provide a clear determination of what to 
do in themselves, no other reasons should play any role in the process of 
deliberation. In respect to law, the functioning of pre-emptive reasons can be 
characterized quite effectively by pointing to an age-old legal principle: contra 
legem non est argumentum. 
I take a reason to be content-independent if it is "intended to function as 
a reason independently of the nature and the character of the actions to be 
done".11 This is implied in the widely accepted claim that statutes and judicial 
decisions are to be followed not because they always provide good guidance to 
human actions but because they are the decisions of the proper legal authority. 
The practical force of reasons is dependent upon their sources rather than their 
content. 
For me, these two characteristic features of authoritative reasons have an 
obvious implication: the addressee who has an authoritative reason to act upon 
can be said to be bound to act in a certain way. In other words, the notion of 
authority conjures up a correlative notion: obligation. I do not claim that 
obligations are always generated within the framework of some authority 
relation. That would be a pretty silly claim. Promises and contracts are obvious 
sources of obligations, and they presuppose no authority relation between the 
affected parties. Nevertheless, authority relations are also sources of obligations. 
One of the implications of exercising authority over a person is that the one 
exercising authority can obligate the addressee by her unilateral acts. There is no 
9
 See Raz, J.: Practical Reason and Norms. Princeton, N. J., 1990. 149-154. 
10
 Raz: Ethics in the Public Domain, op. cit. 214. 
I I
 Hart, H. L. A.: Essays on Bentham: Jurisprudence and Political Theory. Oxford, 
1982. 254. 
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need for the endorsement of either the addressee or any other agent. As my 
readers will see, the notion of legal obligation will have a central position in my 
analysis. In insist that one can hardly have any grasp of the nature of law with-
out understanding that law provides reasons to its addressees that are meant to 
be obligating (authoritatively binding). 
One could carry on listing and elucidating conceptual features of law but this 
will be enough for my present purposes. The summary I have provided concerns 
several conceptual features of law. In the present analysis, however, we have a 
special emphasis: we concentrate on legal institutions. So we can formulate the 
claim that is of central significance for us now as follows: when we are talking 
about legal institutions we are referring to institutions that systematically seek to 
influence human conduct by providing practical reasons that authoritatively bind 
the affected parties. 
Why Should the Concept of Political Institution Figure in our Analysis? 
The thesis I am defending here states that legal institutions are to be taken as 
political institutions. One can quite rightly ask why we need this thesis. What 
would it add to the conceptual characteristics that I have listed above and that 
made no reference to political institutions? 
The basic point I have emphasized above concerns the bindingness of 
law. Legal institutions claim that they can provide practical reasons that are 
authoritatively binding on the addressees. However, this normative claim is 
problematic. It is so problematic that one can doubt whether it can ever be made 
intelligibly. It is far from self-evident that one can provide authoritatively 
binding reasons to other persons. First, seeking to influence other people's 
behaviour this way is an intervention that is always in conflict with their 
autonomy.12 So the very concept of authoritative reason might require us to 
show that there are situations in which such reasons can be provided in some 
justifiable way. I take this as an intelligibility condition. And, even if we 
successfully formulate an overall justification of authority, we will still need to 
find the way it can be applied to the case of law. One can quite easily admit that 
there are cases in which the normative claim we are talking about is absurd 
rather than simply problematic. It would be absurd if an Argentinean in Buenos 
Aires claimed that he can provide reasons that are authoritatively binding on me. 
12
 This is the point around which philosophical anarchism typically centres. See Wol f f , 
R. P.: In Defense of Anarchism. Berkeley, Cal., 1998. Cf. Simmons, J. A.: Philosophical 
Anarchism. In: Simmons: Justification and Legitimacy. Cambridge, 2001. 
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For me, the upshot of these considerations is that the normative claim of law we 
are talking about would be absurd without the possibility of pointing to some 
"normative state of affairs"13 that provides the framework within which one can 
provide binding legal reasons to certain addressees. 
So if we wish to argue that law's normative claims make sense (that they are 
intelligible in the sense of being potentially justifiable), we have to show that the 
functioning of legal institutions takes place within the framework of some 
normatively relevant relationship between legal institutions and their addresses. 
The normative claims that legal institutions typically make cannot be taken as 
(at least potentially) justifiable outside that framework, and one can hardly 
regard a normative claim intelligible (i.e. not absurd) if it cannot be taken as 
reasonably justifiable. 
The conceptual stmcture that I have outlined above would collapse without 
finding some solution to this problem of potential justifiability, and I am convinced 
that there is only one way we can do it: by invoking considerations that belong 
to the realm of political philosophy. Ultimately, the issue of the practical force 
of law is to be clarified by political philosophy.14 This conviction can be based 
on several theoretical sources but there is one particular consideration that 
has a prominent role for me. As far as I can see, the problem of intelligibility I 
referred to above is very much like the issue of political obligation in political 
philosophy.15 
The issue of political obligation concerns certain institutional practices 
(political practices) that claim to provide binding reasons. Those reasons can be 
treated as binding if the addressees can be said to have an obligation to obey 
the reasons provided by the institutions in question. The analogy between the 
conceptual problem of political obligation and the normative claims of law is so 
strong that it might justify in itself the claim that the conceptual clarification of 
law's distinctive normativity is connected to one of the central issues of political 
philosophy. Although I do believe that the concept of legal obligation is 
conceptually connected to the issue of political obligation and that the authority 
claims inherent in law are claims to political authority, I would not be content 
with relying on this analogy alone. I think the thesis that legal institutions are to 
13
 Cf. Dwork in , R.: Taking Rights Seriously. Cambridge, Mass . , 1978. 51. 
14
 Cf. Dworkin, R.: Law's Empire. London, 1986. 108-113. 
15
 See Bődig : Jogelmélet és gyakorlati filozófia, op. cit. 5 3 0 - 5 3 1 . See also Győrf i , 
T.: Politikai kötelezettség (Poli t ical Obligation). In: Államelmélet: A mérsékelt állam 
eszméje és elemei II. Alapelvek és alapintézmények (The Theory of State: The Idea and the 
Elements of the Moderated State II. Basic Principles and Basic Institutions.) (Ed.: Bődig, 
M. and Győrfi, T.). Miskolc, 2002. 
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be understood as political institutions (institutions claiming political authority) 
can be supported by deeper conceptual considerations. 
The point I try to make is that the conceptual clarification of both legal and 
political institutions leads us to the problem of authority claims. And if we 
identify the institutions that can be taken as making these claims we will identify 
the same institutions in both cases. 
Political Institutions 
I suppose that there are political institutions and there must be something 
distinctive that makes them political. We often speak of political institutions, 
and, by doing that, we apply criteria that are supposed to identify political 
institutions. There might be something about the discourse on political insti-
tutions that helps us outline a conceptual construction that can be associated 
with political institutions.16 
Let me start with a sort of a definition of institutions that was already inherent 
in my analysis of the conceptual characteristics of law. I would define institutions 
as frameworks of human interaction that have the function of shaping human 
conduct in certain ways. It might mean to change the conditions (i.e. risks or 
prospective benefits) of human conduct, to provide access to certain goods 
people want to acquire, to change the ways people can have access to what they 
want, to change the ways they perceive what they want, etc. Most institutions 
base their activities on the realization that human beings are rational agents so 
their conduct can be influenced by providing reasons to act in certain ways. 
Most of the institutions can be adequately characterized in terms of the reasons 
they provide to rational agents. 
If we look for the distinctive features of political institutions that differentiate 
them from any other institution we are likely to find an important clue in the 
popular and professional discourse on politics. We can quite naturally arrive at 
the suggestion that the political character of anything must have a lot to do with 
issues of power. It sounds really promising, as the concept of power is capable 
of accounting for the reason-giving character of political institutions. Power is a 
typical and important source of practical reasons. Powerful people can motivate 
others to cooperate with them by offering to distribute goods that they have and 
that others need. Powerful people can also have an influence on other people by 
16
 This is a roundabout way of indicating that I am about to reveal the conceptual 
characteristics of political institutions by an interpretive analysis. On my views on the 
interpretive methodology, see Bódig: Jogelmélet és gyakorlati filozófia, op. cit. 4 2 3 - 5 0 6 . 
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being able to make credible threats. In these cases, the power of the powerful 
people is a source of various practical reasons for others: power can be used to 
motivate people to act in certain ways and scare them off from certain acts. 
This way of approaching the conceptual problem of the "political" seems to be 
encouraged by the fact one can hardly imagine any political institution without 
possessing considerable amount of material power. This seems to be a good 
basis of accounting for even the most complex political concepts like "political 
sovereignty".17 The reasons political institutions provide may prove stronger (and, 
in this sense, "superior") to any conflicting reasons. These are institutions that 
have enough material power to have a decisive influence on certain people's 
conduct-they can outweigh any rival institution in this respect. 
Yet, there are problems with treating political institutions as mere "institutions 
of power". Not simply because this way of approaching the conceptual issues 
might have difficulties with differentiating between familiar political institutions 
like governments and others that we never call political (like well-organized 
criminal gangs). The basic trouble is that the conceptual account centring around 
power relations could hardly handle one aspect of political institutions. These 
institutions do not simply claim that they are in the position to provide reasons 
of supreme significance: they claim that they have the right to provide those kind 
of supreme reasons.18 By having the right I mean that their claim can be regarded 
as legitimate. Officials of political institutions often do their jobs thinking that 
their activities are supported by justifications that can be reasonably accepted by 
the addressees of their activities: they have a right "to rule". Of course, I do not 
believe that such a conviction is always characteristic of the officials of political 
institutions. Nor do I believe that this conviction is always reasonably acceptable. 
However, this conviction makes sense in respect to political institutions in a way 
that it never does in respect to some "institutions of power" like large criminal 
gangs. 
This point must not be confused even if we admit that, in our sublunar circum-
stances, we cannot imagine successful political institutions without enormous 
material power. Of course, political institutions often attain their objectives by 
displaying and exercising their material power. However, we can easily end up 
with a series of misconceptions if we push this line of reasoning too far. Political 
institutions do exercise power but they do it in a remarkable way. They present 
17
 For an elucidation of the concept of polit ical sovereignty in terms of power, see 
Benn, S. I.: The Uses of "Sovereignty". Political Studies, 1955. 109-122. 
18
 Cf. Strauss, L.: Természetjog és történelem (Natural Right and History). Budapest , 
1999. 136. 
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their power as justified by their right to rule. In other words, they exercise their 
power in the name of their authority. 
The conceptual consideration to be emphasized here is that a sufficient grasp 
of the political nature of certain institutions will have a normative dimension. 
The claim to legitimacy made by political institutions raises several issues of 
justification that have some conceptual relevance. As a matter of conceptual 
explanation, the political character of certain institutions lies, at least partly, in 
the normative aspects of their functioning. Some institutions are able to make 
very strong claims on human conduct without making any intelligible claim 
to being political institutions. So referring to power relations is not enough 
to single out the conceptual characteristics of political institutions.19 As the 
functioning of political institutions has a lot to do with normative notions (like 
sovereignty), the need to find the conceptual characteristics of political institu-
tions once again conjures up the concept of authority. We cannot have an 
adequate grasp of the nature of political institutions without raising the issue of 
authority. 
If we encounter again the issue of authority we are also faced with the issue of 
distinguishing political institutions from other institutions that are authoritative in 
other ways. We have already admitted that it might be characteristic of many 
institutions that they seek to provide authoritative reasons. I do believe that 
the distinctiveness of political institutions is to be revealed by reflecting on 
the claim to sovereignty that can be taken as characteristic of such institutions. 
Sovereignty is to be understood here as a kind of "superior authority".2" What 
distinguishes political institutions from other authoritative institutions is the 
way they are related to rival authority claims. It is quite obvious from the fact that 
there are several kinds of authoritative institutions that there can be and there are 
cases when they make conflicting claims on certain people's conduct. In these 
cases, some institutions might claim that the authoritative reasons provided by 
19
 The same applies to any attempt to define the political in terms of the influence on 
social relations. As an example of this approach, see Győrfi, T.: Az alkotmánybíráskodás 
politikai karaktere (The Political Character of the Constitutional Review). Budapest, 2001. 
11. The influence-based approach is but a more abstract version of the power-based approach. 
It is to be remarked, however, that Győr f i ' s other works reflect a view on the concept of 
the "political" more similar to the one taken here. See Győrfi: A politikai kötelezettség, op. 
cit. 65. 
2 0 1 have provided a conceptual analysis of sovereignty elsewhere. See Bódig, M.: 
Szuverenitás és joguralom (Sovereignty and the Rule of Law). In: Államelmélet... op. cit. 
That analysis, however, had a different emphasis, and did not give this role to the claim 
concerning superior authority. On this occasion, I do not attempt to explain how that 
analysis is related to this one. 
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them are superior to any conflicting authority claims. Or, more exactly, they 
claim that within a designated territory, over a designated group of people and 
in respect to designated forms of conduct they exercise supreme authority. I call 
institutions that make this claim political institutions. 
It is worth making a remark here concerning my terminology. I follow 
Joseph Raz in distinguishing political institutions from political organizations 
(like political parties).21 Political institutions are authoritative-they systematically 
provide reasons that are supposed to be authoritatively binding. Political organi-
zations lack this feature.22 They organize human activities with the purpose 
of influencing authoritative institutions. It can be done in various ways: helping 
their members to become officials in political institutions (through elections), 
putting pressure in political institutions (by way of demonstrations, petitions), 
etc. It clearly implies that political institutions have a sort of conceptual priority 
over political organizations. The activity of political organizations could not be 
described intelligibly without making reference to political institutions. As a 
matter of fact, the whole point of any political activity concerns the existence 
and the functioning of political institutions. It would be odd to call "political" 
any activity that is not related to political institutions-i. e. not directed to taking 
part in the activities of political institutions, or influencing political institutions 
from without, or shaping other people's views on the political institutions, or 
protecting human beings from the influence of the political institutions, etc. 
This way of clarifying the conceptual structure of the "political" allows for 
a better understanding of the issues of justification that figure in our analysis. 
Especially the significance of the concept of political obligation. It seems obvious 
that the claim of political institutions to supreme authority is problematic. It is a 
relevant question whether an institution can ever exercise such an authority over 
human beings. It is even more relevant whether certain actual institutions can 
justifiably claim this kind of authority over certain people in actual situations. 
The fact that the normative claims of political institutions are problematic makes 
issues of intelligibility dependent upon the answerability of several issues of 
justification here. And this is where the conceptual significance of the issues of 
political obligation become manifest. 
21
 See Raz, J.: The Morality of Freedom. Oxford, 1986. 4. 
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 The terminology I use here may seem a bit misleading. Political organizations like 
political parties clearly fall under my definition of institutions. However, they might lack 
the necessary features of political institutions. They are institutions but not political 
institutions. 
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The "Legal" and the "Political" 
We have now some conceptual claims on legal institutions and a short analysis 
of the nature of political institutions behind us. It is time to connect them if we 
want to use them in support of the thesis I defend in this paper. Of course, there 
are striking analogies between the two analyses. But what is the significance of 
those analogies? In order to clarify that, we need to concentrate on the real life 
applications of my abstract conceptual constructions. We need to try to identify 
institutions that fit in my analysis, which can be taken to provide practical reasons 
the way I indicated. 
Unfortunately, this issue of application concerns a series of complicated 
methodological problems, and this is not the proper occasion to explore those 
problems. As I have tried to handle those problems elsewhere,23 I simply put 
forward the conclusion of that analysis here. I hope that my claims will not be 
counter-intuitive. The relevant conclusion has two elements. The first is that the 
characterization of political institutions that I have provided can be applied, 
among others, to courts, legislative assemblies, and administrative agencies. 
The second element is that the way I characterized legal institutions would single 
out very much the same institutions: courts, legislative assemblies, administrative 
agencies. On the level of applications, there is no difference in respect to the 
implications of my two analyses. And the best explanation of this conclusion is 
that legal institutions are political institutions. 
There are two further questions still to be considered here. The first is about 
the possibility of other plausible explanations of this identity of applications. 
Are we bound to accept that the identity of the applications is enough to estab-
lish my thesis? As far as I can see, there is only one possible alternative to my 
explanation of this identity. One could claim that the issue of application is not 
conclusive here for it is possible that the legal and the political character are two 
different dimensions of the institutions we have singled out. Just like a novel can 
be the source of historical knowledge and artistic experience at the same time, 
the legal and the political character of the same institutions might be analytically 
distinguishable. A version of this position is represented by some advocates of 
system theory.24 They claim that the social system is divided into autopoietic 
subsystems. The "legal" and the "political" mark two of these subsystems. And 
although there are institutions (like legislative assemblies) that play a role in 
both subsystems, they can be clearly differentiated if we concentrate on their 
different functions and their different ways of selecting information. 
23
 See Bódig: Jogelmélet és gyakorlati filozófia, op. cit. 509-535. 
24
 See Pokol, В.: A jog szerkezete (The Structure of Law). Budapest, 1991. 65-67. 
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Can we be forced to accept this approach? I do not think so. If the above 
analyses were not basically mistaken, the legal and the political character cannot 
belong to different conceptual dimensions of the same institutions. We should 
not forget that the characterization of the "legal" and the "political" were related 
to the same aspects of the institutional practice: the distinctive character of 
the reasons they seek to provide. The conceptual characteristics were heavily 
dependent upon the authority claims of the institutions in both cases. 
The second question to be considered here concerns a possible incongruence 
of my thesis and its justification. My thesis was that legal institutions are 
actually political. However, when I tried to provide arguments to support it I 
claimed that some institutions are both legal and political. My thesis suggests 
that the "political" is conceptually more basic than the "legal", and my arguments 
did not justify this priority claim. On the basis of my analysis, one could claim 
with equal plausibility that political institutions are necessarily legal in their 
character. 
Of course, I claim that the "political" must have some conceptual priority if 
we try to clarify the nature of legal institutions. My justification for this claim is 
a consequence of the realization that the conceptual analysis of legal institutions 
will necessarily encounter problems that belong to the realm of political 
philosophy. Referring to the political nature of legal institutions provides the 
key to the solution of several conceptual issues concerning law. I do not think 
that the same can be said of the legal character of political institutions. Referring 
to the legal character of political institutions would not open up an analytic dimen-
sion that would not be revealed otherwise. This methodological consideration is 
the heart of the thesis that I defend in this paper. 
Vicious Circularity? 
There is a further question that is to be handled here and that deserves even more 
attention. I have argued that conceptual legal theory must treat legal institutions 
as political institutions. Someone might object that my justification for this 
claim is straightforwardly implausible. When I provided a basic characterization 
of law, I emphasized that law claims public authority. Although I failed to 
provide even the outlines of an adequate clarification of the meaning of "public" 
here, a careful analysis would reveal that I tacitly assumed that the public life to 
which law is to be taken to belong is something that we normally associate with 
political communities. When I reached the conclusion that legal institutions are 
political institutions it was no more then a mere consequence of this tacit 
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assumption. And, as the underlying point was not justified, I was begging the 
question here in a quite damaging way. I failed to inform my readers on the 
conceptual significance of political communities (that have public lives in the 
relevant sense). I still owe them a useful definition of political communities and 
their public lives. 
Even more unfortunately for me, my analysis does not seem to have the 
resources for providing such a definition. I relied heavily on the concept of 
political institutions. But we do not have any clear idea of political institutions 
without understanding that they are to be taken as representatives of political 
communities. They would not be political without having a political community 
they could represent. So I am in a lot of trouble if we realize that my analysis 
contained nothing that could allow for a clarification of the concept of political 
communities or, more exactly, the criteria that make certain communities political. 
My analysis is so strongly and thoroughly tied to the conceptual characteristics 
of institutional practice that I would not be able to provide any elucidation of the 
nature of the "political" without making reference to institutions. That would 
force me to describe political communities as communities having political 
institutions: a community would not be political without being dominated by 
political institutions. Then it would be terrible confusion around the claim that 
political institutions represent political communities. It would involve a pretty 
vicious circularity. 
This is undoubtedly a formidable challenge to my position. But I am confident 
that it can be met. I admit that my way of elucidating the nature of the "political" 
is strongly tied to the issues of institutional practice. I have no wish to deny this. 
What I have got to deny is the dependence of my position on a "pre-institu-
tional" notion of political community. I think there is one point in my reasoning 
that can be used as a starting point here. We can guarantee a sort of conceptual 
priority to the claim that some institutions claim superior authority over rival 
authorities. Then we could point to this as the heart of nature of the "political". 
And, as we have a chance of clarifying the conceptual character of authority in 
terms of the distinctive reasons they provide, this superiority claim can provide a 
first approximation of the concept of political institutions without begging any 
question. 
Then, in the next phase, we could point to the problematic nature of such an 
authority claim. It is not self-evident that such an authority claim can ever be 
justified. In order to make it intelligible, we need to show the relevant context 
in which it can be made with any chance of being justified. Such an authority 
claim should be situated in the framework of some distinctive relationship 
among persons. This framework cannot be generated by some "private" relation-
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ship based on direct interpersonal connections (like ordinary contracts or family 
ties). This is where the need for making reference to something like the "public" 
character comes from. Then, we could argue that the practice of an institution 
cannot involve such an authority claim without taking the addressees to 
belong to a community that the institution in question can represent. It must be a 
community that could not be maintained without the contribution of institutions 
that claim superior authority over the members of the community. We might call 
this kind of communities (for which the functioning of political institutions is an 
existence condition) "political". 
In this case the clarification of the conceptual nature of communities would 
have two essential elements: the concept of political institution and the con-
siderations concerning the need for such institutions in certain communities. I do 
not think that such a clarification would involve any vicious circularity. In 
this case, we can define political institutions without even mentioning political 
communities. The concept of political community figures in our reasoning when 
we ask what gives rise to the need for political institutions in certain communities. 
In other words, the concept of political institution is given to us as a conceptual 
possibility on the basis of our reflection on the various forms of providing 
practical reasons to rational agents, while the concept of political community 
figures in the analysis when we begin to raise questions concerning the 
applications of such a conceptual possibility. The concept of political community 
has no constitutive role in the basic conceptual characterization of political 
institutions. Political communities become a factor in the conceptual analysis 
when we begin to elucidate the issues of justification concerning political 
institutions.25 
What about Legal Reasoning? 
I would like to make one last point. If the conceptual claim I have made is 
acceptable we need to raise questions concerning its significance. Of course, a 
25
 It sounds like separating conceptual issues and issues of justification. Yet, I claim that 
the issue of justification is relevant in respect to singling out the conceptual characteristics of 
political institutions. Is not it a straightforward contradiction? No. Issues of justification play 
two roles here. They have a conceptual significance: in respect to some concepts, we have to 
realize that their elucidation must make reference to issues of justification. But making that 
reference is still a conceptual claim. When we go further and try to answer substantial issues 
of justification we leave the territory of conceptual analysis. So what I was referring to was 
partly based on the difference between determining the conceptual characteristics of issues of 
justification and providing substantial answers to issues of justification. 
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conceptual claim can be significant in several respects. What I am particularly 
interested in is its bearing on issues of legal reasoning. Lawyers normally believe 
that legal reasoning can be clearly differentiated from political deliberation. The 
conceptual claim I have made seems to undermine this way of perceiving legal 
reasoning. 
One could object that my highly abstract analysis cannot have such far-
reaching consequences in respect to legal reasoning. The way I attributed political 
characteristics to legal institutions was hardly more than a way of emphasizing 
their authoritative nature. And that is something already inherent in the way 
lawyers perceive the task of legal reasoning. Although I warn anyone against 
drawing some hasty conclusions from my standpoint concerning legal reasoning, I 
would hesitate to downplay its practical significance this way. One aspect of my 
analysis suggests possibly far-reaching consequences. I have tried to reveal a 
conceptual connection between legal and political obligation. Everyone knows 
that legal obligations play a central law in legal reasoning. Legal reasoning normally 
concerns issues of personal legal responsibility, and legal responsibility is always 
a matter performing legal obligations. On the other hand, political obligation 
is a matter of justifying obedience. In other words, it has a lot to do with the 
problems of political legitimacy. If legal obligations are conceptually connected 
to some construction of political obligation, legal obligations might become 
heavily dependent upon political legitimacy. And political legitimacy is some-
thing that is notoriously controversial. 
Of course, I cannot clarify this issue now. I admit that I have a lot to do to 
clarify the implications of my conception concerning the issues of legal reasoning. 
I use this occasion only to deepen our understanding of the way issues of political 
legitimacy concern legal reasoning. I will indicate that it is highly unlikely that I 
could end up with requiring some radical reorientation of legal reasoning. 
How could issues of political legitimacy have a profound effect on legal 
reasoning? Let me outline one possibility. Political legitimacy presupposes 
justifying reasons that are addressed to every member of the community. And as 
some people can hardly be motivated by moral reasons, such a comprehensive 
justification may be destined to be tied to some very basic forms of self-interest. 
(Like avoiding violent death.) It may be that only those interests can have equal 
justifying force in an existing community. In this case, the basic justification of 
political obligation will centre around prudential reasons originating f rom self-
interests. And if legal obligations are conceptually connected to the relevant 
construction of political obligation they will be tied to certain prudential reasons 
as well. The whole point of legal institutions will be the service of self-interest. 
And this may deprive legal reasoning of its value-content-of its moral worth. It 
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provides a basis for deeply amoral practical orientations concerning law that are 
sensitive only to the relevant prudential reasons. Law will have to be depicted as 
a web of strategic interactions. Treating legal institutions as political institutions 
will tum out to be a demoralizing aspiration. In other words, we might end 
up with Holmes' suggestions that we should see the law from the "bad man's" 
point of view when we consider issues of legal reasoning.26 
I am quite sure that some legal theorists would happily accept these 
consequences, but I do not share their views on law. I would hesitate to subscribe 
to a conceptual explanation of law that treats it as a web of strategic interactions 
and that renders legal reasoning a competition of mere prudential reasons. How-
ever, I am convinced that it is not to be taken as a necessary implication of my 
conception. 
Let me try to elucidate my views on this matter with the help of a highly 
relevant example. Very similar considerations can be put forward when we are 
discussing the justificatory issues of democracy. It might seem unrealistic to 
claim that democratic institutions are to be treated as manifestations of a self-
governing political community consisting of morally committed members. It 
is more realistic and reasonable to claim that the democratic process provides a 
framework for making political decisions that have considerable advantages 
over rival institutional solutions. And the advantages are to be explained 
only in terms of the self-interests of the affected parties. Democracy might be 
acceptable for everyone because it guarantees that his or her interests will have 
an effect on the political process. We may reasonably hope that elected officials 
in a democratic regime will understand that they will not stay in power if they 
frequently and openly ignore the interests of those they seek to govern. (Or, 
more exactly, if they do not even make an attempt to justify their activities in 
terms of the interests of the governed.) The democratic process links the interest 
to stay in power with the perceived interests of the governed.27 Of course, it will 
not guarantee that merely self-interested practices by the officials will be 
impossible or will always be revealed and eradicated. We have got to settle for a 
more modest claim: the democratic process seems to be the most effective of the 
available measures against ignoring the interests of the governed. 
26
 See Holmes, O. W.: The Path of the Law. In: The Path of the Law and Its Influence: 
The Legacy of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. (Ed.: Bur ton , S. J.). Cambridge , 2000. 2 0 0 -
204. 
27
 See Kis, J.: A politika mint erkölcsi probléma (Politics as a Moral Problem). Budapest, 
2004. 66-73. See also Bentham, J.: Plan for Parliamentary Reform. In: Works of Jeremy 
Bentham (Ed.: Bowring, J.), vol. 3, Edinburgh, 1843. 
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Does this mean that a viable justificatory theory of democracy must be based 
solely on prudential reasons generated by the perceived interests of the officials 
and the governed? I do not think so. When we describe the actual operation of 
democratic institutions and its effect on ordinary people we need a framework that 
is not tied to ideal assumptions concerning human conduct and that does not 
presuppose attitudes and patterns of behaviour that are unlikely to prevail amongst 
members of existing communities. What makes democracy work effectively is to 
be explained largely in terms of the self-interest of the participants. And certain 
issues of justification are to be answered along the lines of this explanation. In this 
case, democracy appears to be a web of strategic interactions. However, it does 
not mean that the issue of justification is exhausted by such an explanation. 
The fact that democracy as a working institutional framework does not pre-
suppose a community of moral heroes says not much on the moral worth of 
democracy. When we turn to issues of moral worth we need more elevated 
conceptions that go beyond what makes political institutions effective. These 
elevated conceptions reflect several normative (value-related) aspects of the 
democratic process that are also embodied in the operation of democratic insti-
tutions. It becomes pretty obvious when we are faced with the language of the 
democratic discourse. That language is permeated by ideals and ideal assumptions 
that have a significant effect on the outcome of democratic decision-making. If 
we are to account for this fact we need to depict democracy as a system that 
makes use of various forms of self-interested behaviour without losing its deeper 
moral point. And that way of depicting democracy will reveal some moral aspects 
of democratic policy that are highly relevant even if they are ignored by many 
members of the democratic community. Without taking these moral aspects into 
account, we would not be able to elucidate what makes democracy valuable for 
us, what makes democratic institutions worthy of our support. 
There are aspects of the theoretical and practical problems of democracy that 
may steer us towards a rather mundane view. However, the mundane view of 
democracy often breaks down. So we need to pay attention to other issues as 
well (like the issue of what makes democracy worthy of our respect) that steer 
us towards less mundane views-elevated by substantial practical principles and 
several ideal assumptions. 
Although it would be too early to claim that I have elucidated the implications 
of these theoretical problems, I suspect that we would reach very similar con-
clusions in respect to legal reasoning. Of course, there are aspects of the legal 
practice that would not be effective without addressing the prudential reasons 
available to the affected parties. It well may be that we will be more sensitive to 
those aspects if we claim that legal obligations are conceptually connected to 
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issues of political legitimacy. But there are other relevant aspects as well that 
cannot be explained in terms of mere prudential reasons. Claiming that issues of 
political legitimacy figure in legal reasoning is unlikely to force us into a sort of 
demoralization of legal reasoning. I am quite sure that this suggestion would 
be reinforced if we considered the most characteristic cases where issues of 
political legitimacy are linked with issues of legal obligation: cases of civil 
disobedience.28 
28
 Cf. Bődig, M.: Rendszerváltás, polit ikai moralitás, legalitás (Political Transition, 
Polit ical Morality, Legality). Fundamentum, 2003, 87-94. 
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Abstract. The principle of fair administration of justice requires that formal restrictions on 
initiating procedures before courts correspond to the right to access to a court. Based on the 
rule of law-Community law shall ensure that its provisions on the administration of justice 
are in accord with the fundamental law requirements established in Community law. The 
provisions on intervention before Community courts contain certain restraints on access to a 
court that are worth scrutinising on a fundamental right basis. The aim of the paper is threefold. 
First, it wishes to recover the jurisprudence of Community courts interpreting the conditions of 
intervention. Second, it attempts to reveal the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg and Luxembourg 
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access to court test on the restraints of access to justice in intervention. 
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Introduction 
Formal restrictions on initiating procedures before Community courts have 
always been in the centre of debate in Community law. The locus standi condi-
tions of annulment actions under Art. 230 EC attracted much of attention in 
the past mainly due to the notoriously strict interpretation on the postulate of 
individual concern anchored by the European Court of Justice. The ever since 
growing importance of fundamental rights in Community law established a new 
source of standards not only set against the legal provisions of the Member States 
but against the Community legal system. It became evident that the Community 
provisions restricting access to justice cannot avoid the binding criteria of 
fundamental rights. 
The expressed correspondence of the Community system of fundamental 
rights protection to the law of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR) premised that the two separate orders of European human rights' 
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protection apply similar elements when determining the limits of a basic right. 
The in Community law recognised right to effective judicial protection covers the 
right to a fair trial and the right to an effective remedy as named in the ECHR. 
The right to access to a court-developed form the right to a fair trial-provides 
that according to the principle of fair administration of justice the formal 
restrictions on the initiation of procedures before a court shall not result in a 
denial of justice. Furthermore, it requires the restrictions to be supported by a 
proportionate legitimate interest. 
The intervention before a court allows the interveners to support the parties 
in a pending procedure to attain the form of order sought. This way the interests 
can be represented before a court without launching a separate action which 
in some circumstances may be extensively difficult. It follows that the rules 
governing intervention that establish formal restrictions on applying for a leave 
to intervene before Community courts shall also correspond to the conditions 
mounted by the right to access to a court. 
How is Intervention Regulated in Community Law? 
According to Art. 40 (former 37) of the Statute of the European Court of Justice 
(Statute) in direct actions' before Community courts the Member States and 
the Community institutions have the right to intervene in any case before the 
Courts. Any other person may intervene in any case except for cases between 
the Member States, between the Community institutions or between the Member 
States and the Community institutions, if the intervener is able to establish an 
interest in the result of the case. 
Art. 93 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Court of Justice2 
provides that either the President of the Court or the Court decides on the 
application for intervention. The application must be presented after six 
weeks of the publication of the original procedure in the Official Journal. An 
application may be accepted after the expiry of the above period, but before the 
opening of the oral procedure. In appeal the intervention is open until one month 
after the publication of the appeal in the Official Journal.3 The intervener shall 
1
 The request for a preliminary ruling (Art. 234 EC) can be characterised as an indirect 
action. 
2
 Art. 115 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance contains similar 
provisions. 
3
 Art. 123 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Court of Justice. 
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accept the case as he finds it at the time of his intervention and shall support only 
one of the parties.4 
Art. 34 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Coal and Steel 
Community, however, did not apply the limitation based on the types of actions. 
It provided that any natural or legal person in any case before the Court may 
intervene, if the intervener establishes an interest in the result of the case. In 
addition, it limited the intervention to supporting or requesting the rejection of 
the submissions of one of the parties. 
In preliminary ruling proceedings the possibility of intervention does not 
exist. However, those who have intervened in the proceedings in the national 
court may participate in the procedure before the ECJ. This has been clarified 
by the Court in Biogen v. Smithkline and Beecham Biologicals? In this case 
an application to intervene in a preliminary ruling procedure was found 
inadmissible as the Court ruled that the right to intervene before the Court only 
applied "to contentious proceedings before the Court, designed to settle a 
dispute."6 The Court found that the preliminary ruling procedure was not such 
procedure, as its aim is to ensure the uniform interpretation of Community law 
by ensuring co-operation between the national courts and the ECJ. The Court 
then referred to Art. 20 (now 23) of the Statute governing the participation in 
preliminary ruling cases, which states that "the parties (...) shall be entitled to 
submit statements of the case or written observations to the Court". The Court 
asserted that the term "parties" referred only to the parties in the procedure 
before the national court. Consequently, a person who has not been granted a 
leave to intervene before the national court is not entitled to submit observations 
in the procedure before the Court. 
Even tough it is not named intervention, Art. 23 of the Statute orders that in 
cases governed by Art. 234 EC the Member States, the Commission and, where 
appropriate, the European Parliament, the Council and the European Central 
Bank are entitled to make written and oral observations of the case to the Court. 
The last paragraph of the same article provides that in cases with EEA or EFTA 
relevance non-member states are also allowed to submit written or oral obser-
vations of the case to the Court. In spite of the fact that it is clear that this 
intervention-like procedure is justifiable on functional grounds, so that the 
uniform interpretation and application of Community law is observed, in case of 
4
 Art. 40 of the Statute of the European Court of Justice. 
5
 C-181/95, Order of the President of the Court of 26 February 1996, Biogen Inc. v. 
Smithkline and Beecham Biologicals SA [1997] ECR 0357. 
6
 Par. 4; the Court also refers to C-6/64 Costa v. EN EL [1964] ECR 614 and C-19/68 De 
Cicco v. Landesversicherungsanstalt Schwaben [1968] ECR 473 . 
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a request for preliminary ruling on validity of Community acts it is questionable 
that the lawmaker(s) are able to participate in the procedure, the legal subjects 
of the act in question, however, not. Finally, the legal construction applied in 
preliminary ruling cases may be controversial in cases of a request for a prelimi-
nary ruling on the validity of Community acts, as this question may not be 
assessed in the procedure in the national court, thus the person having interest in 
this matter does not apply to intervene before the national court.7 
The Intervention of Private Parties in Direct Actions 
With the exclusion of certain cases private parties may intervene in cases before 
the Community courts, if they are able to prove sufficient interest in the result 
of the proceedings. It is for the Community courts to decide upon this question, 
which produced a large amount of case-law. The analysis of these cases will 
provide us information to establish the major tendencies on the admissibility of 
applications for intervention by private parties. The cases in which applications 
fo r intervention the most frequently take place, due to the restrictions in 
Art. 40 of the Statue, are mainly actions for annulments under Art. 230 EC and 
procedures for interim relief. The disputes cover almost all fields of substantive 
Community law from staff cases to competition law. 
How is the Concept of an Interest in the Result of the Case Interpreted by 
Community Courts? 
An important line of interpretation can be outlined from Rijnoudt and Hocken8  
in which a Community official wanted to intervene in an action for annulment of 
salary statements brought by other officials. The CFI ruled that the concept of an 
interest in the result of the case must be interpreted as a direct interest in the 
decision on the claims. The CFI dismissed the application by stating that an 
official who did not bring an action in relation to his own salary statement, 
Schermers, H. and Waelbroeck, M.: Judicial Protection in the EU, 6 th ed, Kluwer, 
2001, 724, § 1452. 
8
 T-97/92 and T-111/92, Loek Rijnoudt and Michael Hocken v. Commission [1994] ECR 
staff cases. 
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although he could have done so, can only establish an indirect interest in the result 
of the case.9 
The CFI in Elena Candiottew went further and declared that 
"an interest in the result of the case within the meaning of the second 
paragraph of Art. 37 of the (...) Statute of the Court of Justice must be under-
stood as a direct, existing interest in the success and failure of the submissions 
which relate specifically to the measure whose annulment or suspension is 
sought."11 
In this case some members of the institutions' Staff Committee applied to inter-
vene in support of the applicant who sought the annulment of a decision not 
admitting a self-employed artist to the second stage of a competition for select-
ing the works of art to be installed in a new building of a Community institution. 
The CFI found that these persons lacked direct interest in the outcome of the 
case, as they were unable to demonstrate any personal interest in the admission 
of the applicant to the second stage of the competition or to show that their 
position could be affected by the result of the case. 
In ACAVn the President of the Fist Chamber of the CFI ordered that the 
concept of an interest in the result of the case must be understood as a direct and 
actual interest in the manner in which applications for forms of order are dealt 
with. In particular, traders established in a Member State have an interest in the 
outcome of the dispute, in so far as the contested measure prevents them form 
carrying on part of their activities and affect their income. Moreover, the court 
concluded that a local or regional body also establishes such interest, if it is able 
to prove that its economic and social structure essentially depends on the sector 
affected by the contested measure, and the contested measure could require a 
conversion plan for the whole area concerned. However, to evade the risk of 
unemployment and loss of business of traders in the area as a favourable result 
to obtain is an interest indirect and remote. In order to prove direct and actual 
interest the local or regional body must show that the economical and social 
structure as a whole is essentially dependent of that sector of activity. 
9
 This ruling was repeated in an order in the very similar C-76/93 P, Piera Scaramuzza 
v. Commission [1993] ECR 1-5715 case. 
10
 T-108/94, Elena Candiotte v. Council [1994] ECR 11-0249. 
11
 Par. 5. 
12
 T-138/98, ACAV\. Council [1999] ECR 11-1797. 
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A different approach was introduced in Compagnie Maritime Belge13 in which 
the CFI held that an interest in the result of the case was established as the 
contested decision closed the procedure initiated by the Commission following 
the complaints of a trade association, whose members included the companies 
applying to intervene. The court supported its argument by stating that these 
companies participated in the procedure before the Commission by submitting 
written observations and attending at the hearings. This argument was further 
affirmed by the CFI in Eurosport14 in which it stated that an undertaking whose 
complaint caused the proceedings of the Commission to be initiated which was 
concluded by the contested decision has an interest in the result of the case. In 
another case15 the leave to intervene was granted partly on the basis that certain 
interveners took part in the procedure as complainants, in which the contested 
decision was adopted. 
In Eurosport the CFI found another specific situation in which an interest in 
the outcome of the dispute is established. It declared that an undertaking who 
was the addressee of the contested decision and, as a result, enjoyed an inde-
pendent right of action under Art. 230 EC also possessed such interest without 
the obligation to initiate the action for annulment. This approach was upheld in a 
later case16 in which the Court granted a leave intervene to a company which 
had an independent right to launch an action for annulment against the contested 
regulation under Art. 230 EC, as the company was of direct and individual 
concern of the contested measure. The fact, however, that it did not bring a 
separate action for annulment confined its rights as an intervener to support the 
forms of order sought by the respondent. 
It is also worth analysing the intervention cases under Art. 34 of the Statute of 
the Court of Justice of the European Coal and Steel Community as it applies the 
same test of having an interest in the result of the case. In a very early case17 the 
Court decided to examine precisely which provision the interveners had an 
interest in having annulled. The Court concluded that the interveners could only 
prove their interest in the result of the case in relation to a small segment of 
the case. This meant that the Court allowed their intervention to support The 
13
 T-24/93 R, Compagnie Maritime Beige Transport NV v. Commission [1993] ECR П-
0543. 
14
 T-35/91, Eurosport Consortium v. Commission [1991] ECR П-1359. 
15
 T-395/94 R, Atlantic Container Line AB and Others v. Commission [1995] ECR II-
0595. 
16
 C-245/95 P, Commission v. NTN Corporation and Koyo Seiko Co. Ltd. [1996] ECR I-
0553. 
17
 C-25/69, The Netherlands v. High Authority of the ECSC. 
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Netherlands to have only a limited part of the contested decision annulled. 
Furthermore, as a condition for intervention in this case the Court examined 
whether the interveners were directly affected by the contested decision. 
In Lemmerz-Werkels the Court assessed that the intervener must show a 
direct and existing interest in the acceptance by the Court of the submissions 
of one of the parties. The Court rejected the application to intervene because 
the only interest the intervener claimed was in the success of certain of the 
applicants arguments. In British Coal19 the CFI held that the intervention of 
a person showing direct and present interest in the result of the case was 
admissible. On these grounds it ruled that the company which made the complaint 
before the Commission was entitled to intervene, since the application sought 
the annulment of a decision favourable to it. On the other hand a purchaser 
of coal was not granted a leave to intervene in the action for annulment 
initiated by a producer of coal of the Commission's refusal to reject the comp-
laint, even though the Commission instituted proceedings against both of them 
on the basis of the same complaint, however by reason of different infringe-
ments of Community law, since the infringements were distinct and did not 
share the same legal framework. The President of the Court in National Power20  
ruled in the following way: 
"For the purposes of granting leave to intervene, the Community judicature 
ascertains whether those seeking it are directly affected by the contested act 
and whether their interest in the result of the case is established. Similarly, it 
is necessary to establish a direct, existing interest in the grant by the Court of 
the order as sought and not an interest in relation to the pleas in law put 
forward. The interest necessary in this respect must relate not merely to 
abstract legal arguments but to the actual form of order sought by a party in 
the main action." 
Just as in case of the action for annulment under Art. 230 EC21 the Community 
courts developed a separate interpretation of the admissibility conditions of 
18
 C - l 11/63, Lemmerz-Werke GmbH v. High Authority of the ECSC. 
19
 T-367/94, British Coal Corporation v. Commission [1997] E C R 11-0469. 
20
 C-151/97 P(I) and C-157/97 P(I), National Power pic and PowerGen pic v. British 
Coal Corp. and Commission [1997] ECR 1-3491. 
21
 See cases: C-67/85, C-68/85 and C-70/85, Van der Kooy v. Commission par. 21-24 
[1988] ECR 219; T-585/93, Greenpeace v. Commission par. 59 (and the cited cases) [1995] 
ECR П-2205; T-122/96, Federolio v. Commission [1997] ECR П-1559, T-84/01; T-173/98, 
UP A v. Council par. 47 [1999] ECR П-3357; T-84/01, ACHE v. European Parliament and 
Council par. 25 [2002] ECR 11-0099. 
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intervention for (trade)associations. In the Kruidvat case22 the CFI ruled that 
the as FEPD (Fédération Européenne des Parfumeurs Détaillants) represented a 
large number of undertakings in the sector. Since its objective was to protect 
their interests in particular in relation to the institutions of the European Union, 
it had an interest to intervene in a case in which the operation of selective 
distribution systems in the field of de luxe cosmetics was at stake. In Atlantic 
Container23 the intervention was found admissible, as it was ascertained that the 
immediate application of the contested measure was likely, prima facie, to affect 
the activities of the members of the intervening trade associations. The President 
of the Court in Pharos24 granted a leave to intervene an association comprising 
of national associations from the animal health industry in Europe and manu-
facturers of animal health products, since the outcome of the case was of direct 
concern to the members of this association. In another two cases25 the interven-
tion of representative associations was dependent on whether their objective 
was to protect the interest of their members in cases dealing with questions of 
principle liable to affect their members. 
The specific nature of the AAC case26 lies in the fact that the CFI decided 
upon the intervention on the basis of the termination of the interest in the result 
of the case. Casillo Grani and Italigrani were granted a leave to intervene 
in the procedure. Later, however, the lawyer of Casillo Grani submitted a 
declaration to the CFI that Casillo Grani was in liquidation. The CFI ruled that 
in spite of the fact that Casillo Gram's interest in the case was constituted by 
the fact that it was in competition with the company in receipt of the aid in 
question in the proceedings, this interest no longer existed as Casillo Grani 
was in liquidation. Moreover, the CFI added that because of the fact that the 
aid had not yet been paid to the recipient, the competitive position of Cassilo 
Grani could not have been affected before it was declared to be in liquidation. 
22
 T-87/92, Kruidvat BVBA v. Commission [1993] E C R П-1375. 
23
 Atlantic Container Line AB and Others v. Commission... op. cit. 
24
 С-151/98 P(I), Pharos SA v. Commission [1999] ECR 1-8157. 
25
 Orders in C-151/97 P(I) and C-157/97 P(I), National Power pic and PowerGen pic v. 
British Coal Corp. and Commission... op. cit. par. 66 and T-13/99 R Pfizer Animal Health SA 
v. Council par. 15 (not published in ECR). 
26
 T-442/93, Association des Amidonneries de Céréales de la CEE and Others v. 
Commission [1995] ECR П-1329. 
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Summary 
Generally speaking the Community courts interpret the condition of an interest in 
the result of the case under Art. 40 of the Statute as a direct and actual (existing, 
present) interest in the forms of orders sought by one of the parties. The decisions 
of the courts in this matter are based on the submissions of the prospective 
interveners and/or on the facts of the case. In certain cases the courts see the 
interest in the result of the case established, if the administrative procedure 
preceding the procedure in the court was instrumented on the basis of the 
complaint of the intervener and/or the intervener took part in the administrative 
procedure. In (trade)association cases the intervener's aim to protect its 
members proves to be sufficient to fulfil the condition provided in Art. 40 
of the Statute. In case of local or regional bodies such interest is established, if 
they are able to prove that their economic and social structure essentially 
depends on the sector affected by the contested measure. One specific case when 
the interest in the result of the case is established, when the intervener has the 
right to initiate an independent action for annulment under Art. 230 EC against 
the contested measure in the main procedure. This may seem to be overtly 
restrictive, as the courts examine, whether the standing conditions of Art. 230 (4) 
EC are fulfilled, however, the Community courts only applied this construction, 
when the intervener's action for annulment would have been found admissible. 
In some cases the Community courts required the prospective interveners to 
prove that the contested measure in the main procedure directly affected them. 
Finally, the power of Community courts to decide upon the admissibility of 
applications to intervene not only allows them to assign the intervention in 
support of one of the parties, but the are able restrict the intervention to certain 
claims of the supported party on the basis of the interest in the result of the case. 
Are There Cases of Specific Nature? 
The special circumstances in these cases allow to treat them separately from 
the main line of cases since considerations other than the conditions in the 
Statute may be discovered to be taken account of. In both Roquette Frères and 
Maizena27 the European Parliament applied to intervene in the cases. The 
Council argued, however, that the right to intervene was to be equated with the 
right of action, in particular the initiation of an action for annulment and the 
27
 C-138/79, SA Roquette Frères v. Council [1980] ECR 3333 and C-139/79, Maizena 
GmbH v. Council [1980] ECR 3393. 
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submission of observations in a preliminary ruling procedure, which the 
Parliament lacked. Furthermore, the Council asserted that the Parliament's right 
to intervene would depend upon the existence of a legal interest. The Court, 
however, rejected the Council's submissions and stated that such restrictions 
would adversely affect the institutional position of the Parliament and would be 
incompatible with Art. 37 (now 40) of the Statute. 
The Staff Committee of the European Parliament applied to intervene in the 
Lassalle28 case on the grounds that the word "person" in Art. 37 (now 40) of the 
Statute extend the right to intervene to all parties representing an organised 
focus of legitimate interests. The Court, on the contrary, ruled that there was no 
reason to believe that the treatymakers intended to extend the right to intervene 
to entities lacking legal personality or even its basic aspects. The Court pointed 
out that the independence, the responsibility and the functions of a body or organ 
would be decisive in ascertaining its capacity to bring legal proceedings, in 
particular to intervene in a case. 
The intervention is a major instrument in the hands of public interest 
litigation, however, the restrictions on the type of actions in Art. 40 of the Statue 
largely limit its elbow-room. Nevertheless, there are numerous examples of public 
interest litigation in intervention cases. In the Ford case29 the BEUC (Bureau 
Européen des Union Consummateurs), an international consumer protection 
organisation incorporated under Belgian law was granted a leave to intervene 
on grounds that the procedure of the Commission had originated from its 
complaints. The BEUC applied to intervene in a very similar procedure for 
interim relief in the Peugeot case.30 The Unione Nazionale Consumatori applied 
for a leave to intervene in support of the Commission against the companies 
allegedly violating the Community competition rules in Suiker Unie,31 In AM&S32  
the Consultative Committee of the Bars and Law Societies of the EC applied to 
intervene in order to support the protection of the right to confidential communi-
cation between lawyer and client. The IPO (Intellectual Property Owners 
Association) sought to intervene in the Magill case,33 in which the relationship 
between intellectual property and competition law was discussed. 
28
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29
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31
 C-40-48/73 and C-50, 54 to 56, 111, 113 and 114/73, Suiker Unie v. Commission 
[1975] ECR 1663. 
32
 C-155/79, AM&S Europe v. Commission [1982] ECR 1575. 
33
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The overtly restrictive nature34 of the limitation on the types of actions in 
Art. 40 of the Statue is exposed in a case, in which various Italian car importers 
applied to intervene in the dispute between the Commission and Italy.35 Italy was 
found to be in breach of Community law as it introduced new administrative 
requirements involving the production of documents necessary for parallel 
import of vehicles. Since Art. 40 of the Statute excludes the intervention of 
natural or legal persons in cases between a Member State and a Community 
institution, the undertakings involved in the imports of vehicles could not 
represent their presumably direct interest in the case by supporting one of the 
parties. The approach to this restrictive rule was, however, given a peculiar twist 
in the Italy and Sardegna Lines case.36 Two actions for annulment were initiated 
side by side against the Commission on the same basis. In the one case launched 
by Sardegna Lines the CFI declined its jurisdiction in order to enable the ECJ to 
hear the claim. The case was registered anew and was joined with the other 
action instituted by Italy. This meant that Sardegna Lines was able to participate 
in a dispute between a Member State and a Community Institution, which 
would have been impossible under Art. 40 of the Statute, if the two actions had 
not been joined. 
Some Recent Cases on Intervention 
In Pescadores37 the CFI ruled that an interest in the result of the case meant a 
direct and present interest in the decision on the claims. The CFI added that it 
must ascertain that the intervener is directly affected by the measure and that his 
interest in the result of the case is certain. It continued that an application to 
intervene by a local or regional body of a Member State must be dismissed, if it 
has not been proven that the economic and social structure of that entity depends 
primarily on the given economic sector. The Autoritá Portuale di Ancona (APA) 
applied for a leave to intervene in the case Сое Clerici,38 in which the applicant 
sought the annulment of a Commission letter refusing to act on the applicant's 
complaint against the bye-law of governing the carrying on of self-handling 
34
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operations in the Port of Ancona passed by APA. The CFI ordered that in its 
capacity as a party, against who the applicant's complaint was addressed, APA 
has a direct and existing interest in the grant of the order sought. In Comafrica 
Dole39 the court declared that it is settled case law that the interest in the result 
of the case must be understood as a direct and existing interest in the grant of 
the order sought. The CFT ordered that in spite of the fact that the applicant 
established a certain interest in the result of the case, the application must be 
dismissed, as the applicant did not prove the existence of a direct and existing 
interest in the grant of the claims. 
In Poste Italiana40 the CFI examined the admissibility of applications to inter-
vene by Recapitalia Consorzio Italiano delle Agenzie di Recapito Licenziatarie 
del Ministerio delle Comunicazioni and by the TNT Post Group. With respect to 
the application of Recapitalia Consorzio the CFI ordered that representative 
associations, whose object is to protect their members in cases raising questions 
of principle liable to affect those members are allowed to intervene. The CFI 
also pointed out that the member undertakings of Recapitalia Consorzio lodged 
complaints against Italy in the Commission in connection with the activity of 
Poste Italia. Furthermore, these members of Recapitalia Consorzio are able to 
establish interest in the result of the case, as their functioning depends on the 
final decision in the main proceedings. Concerning the application by the TNT 
Post Group the President of the CFI granted a leave to intervene, since the final 
order in the main procedure would determine whether it could continue its 
business activity. In addition, the complaint lodged by the TNT Post Group in 
the Commission also establishes an interest in the result of the case. 
The President of the CFI in IMS Health41 decided that the interest in the 
result of the case of the three interveners was established, as NDC was the 
complainant in the procedure before the Commission, NDC Health was directly 
involved in the copyright infringement proceedings brought by IMS Health in 
Germany and AzyX was not merely IMS Health's only other current competitor 
on the relevant market, but it was also closely associated with the investigation 
of the Commission. In the NFV case42 the CFI acknowledged the right of CEF 
City and CEF Holdings to intervene on the basis of Art. 37 (now 40) of the 
Statute, as they had lodged a complaint before the Commission and, thereafter, 
participated in the procedure. Furthermore, the CFI added that the outcome 
39
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of the procedure could adversely affect the interests of CEF City and CEF 
Holdings. 
In the PVC cases43 the Court ruled on a specific aspect of the intervener's 
interest in the result of the case. In all of these cases DSM applied to intervene 
in support of the applicants who sought the annulment of the judgements of 
the CFI denying the annulment of the Polypropylene Decision of the Commission.44 
In the mean time, the Court delivered its PVC judgement45 on an appeal annulling 
a CFI judgement denying the annulment of the Polypropylene Decision. 
Following, the Court examined whether its PVC judgement dissolved the 
interest of DSM in the result of all the cases. The Court found that the interest of 
DSM did not die on delivery of the PVC judgement of the Court of Justice and 
held that the defects found by this judgement were not such as to warrant 
treating the decision challenged in the PVC cases as non-existent. The PVC 
judgement did not establish the non-existence of the Polypropylene Decision, 
and, therefore, it did not bring the interest of DSM in obtaining a finding of such 
non-existence to an end. The Court also asserted in these cases that the fact that 
the Court, by a previous order, had allowed intervention in support of the 
form of order sought by a party does not preclude a fresh examination of the 
admissibility of the intervention. 
Summary 
These cases highlight that the Community courts interpret the condition of an 
interest in the result of the case as a direct and present interest. However, they 
also require the interveners to prove that the contested measure in the main 
procedure affected them directly. Furthermore, a new element appears in the 
test: the intervener must establish a certain interest in the result of the case. 
Moreover, it is stated that an interest in the result of the case is established, if the 
orders sought could adversely affect the interest or the functioning of the inter-
vener. In other cases the direct and existing interest was also established by 
interveners, if the administrative procedure preceding the procedure in the court 
was instrumented on the basis of the complaint of the intervener, and/or the 
43
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intervener took part in the administrative procedure, or the intervener was 
closely associated with the administrative procedure. The application to inter-
vene of a local or regional body is admissible, if their economic and social 
structure essentially depends on the sector affected by the contested measure. In 
association cases the protection of members' rights is sufficient to prove to have 
a leave to intervene granted. 
The Concept of the Right to Effective Judicial Protection in Community 
Law 
Procedural rights, such as the right to effective judicial protection, are central to 
the principle of rule of law,46 as they ensure the fair administration of justice.47 
Community law is based on the rule of law,48 thus it ensures that the right to 
effective judicial protection is observed. Moreover, it is settled case law that 
fundamental rights form an integral part of the general principles of Community 
law inspired by the constitutional traditions common to the Member States and 
by the international treaties on the protection of human rights signed by the 
Member States.49 It follows that the right to effective judicial protection is a 
general principle of Community law. 
The principle of effective judicial protection was explicitly established in 
Community law in cases Johnston and Heylens,50 In its UP A judgement51 the 
Court stated that the 
46
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4/73, Nold v. Commission [1974] ECR 491; C-36/75, Rutiii v. Ministre de TInterieur [1975] 
E C R 1219. 
50
 C-222/84, Johnston v. Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary par. 18 
[1986] ECR 1651; C-222/86, UNECTEF v. Heylens [1987] ECR 4097; see also: C-257/85, 
C. Dufay v. European Parliament [1987] ECR 1561; C-314/91, Weber v. Parliament [1993] 
ECR 1-0643; C-12/95 P, TRAMASA v. Commission [1995] E C R 1-0467; C-282/95 P, Guérin 
Automobiles v. Commission [1997] ECR 1-1503; T-107/94, Christina Kik v. Council [1995] 
ECR 1-1717; C-97/91 Borelli v. Commission [1992] ECR 1-6313. 
51
 C-50/00 P, UP A v. Council par. 39 [2002] ECR 1-6677. 
THE RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE JUDICIAL PROTECTION IN COMMUNITY LAW... 65 
"right to such protection is one of the general principles of law stemming 
from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States. That right 
has also been enshrined in Articles 6 and 13 of the European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms." 
The CFI in Jégo-Quéré52 concluded that 
"access to the courts is one of the essential elements of a community based 
on the rule of law and is guaranteed in the legal order based on the EC 
Treaty (...) The Court of Justice bases the right to an effective remedy before 
a court of competent jurisdiction on the constitutional traditions common to 
the Member States and on Articles 6 and 13 of the ECHR (...) In addition, 
the right to an effective remedy for everyone whose rights and freedoms 
guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated has been reaffirmed by Art. 
47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union proclaimed 
at Nice on 7 December 2000." 
It is evident from the above that the right to effective judicial protection covers 
the right to a fair trial (hearing) and the right to an effective remedy as men-
tioned in Art. 6 and 13 ECHR.53 It is settled in ECHR law that the rite to access 
to a court stems from the right to a fair hearing.54 The scope of the right to 
access of a court covers different sets of rules on the administration of justice55 
including the formal restrictions on initiating procedures. It follows that 
the provisions of Community law on the conditions of intervention before 
Community courts must also correspond to the right of access to justice. 
52
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The Right of Access to a Court in ECHR Law with Respect to Formal 
Restrictions on Bringing Procedures 
Notwithstanding the scope of Art. 6(1) ECHR, the interpretation given by the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) to the right of access to justice 
"can supply guidelines which should be followed within the framework of 
Community law."56 
Art. 6(1) declares: 
"In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal 
charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing..." 
In the fundamental Golder case57 the ECtHR ruled that the principle of the rule 
of law is hardly conceivable without the possibility of access to courts. It 
continued that it is one of the universally recognised fundamental principles of 
law which must be read in the light of the principle of international law 
forbidding the denial of justice. The ECtHR considered, however, that the right 
of access to a court is not an absolute right. It stated that this right was set forth 
in the ECHR without an exact definition, therefore there is room for limitations 
permitted by implications. Nevertheless, the ECtHR rejected to give a general 
theory of admissible limitations, which meant that the ECtHR will judge the 
restrictions on this right on a case-by-case basis. 
In Airey58 he ECtHR went further when deciding that the ECHR did not 
guarantee rights that are theoretical or illusory, but rights that are practical and 
effective. The ECtHR continued that this particularly applies to the right of 
access to courts, as the right to a fair trial holds a prominent place in a 
democratic society. 
The court gave a further interpretation on the restriction of the right of access 
to courts in Ashingdane,59 The ECtHR asserted that the right of access to courts 
is not an absolute right, thus it may be subject to limitations. These limitations 
are inherent in this right, as the nature of this right provide the states a certain 
margin of appreciation to regulate access to courts, which may vary in each 
state. Nevertheless, the ECtHR concluded that these limitations must not restrict 
or reduce the access to courts in such way that the essence of the right is 
56
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violated. Moreover, the restrictions can only be upheld, if it pursues a legitimate 
aim and the principle of proportionality is respected in relation of the aims of the 
limitation and means applied. 
The Right to Access to Community Courts in Community Law with Respect 
to Formal Restrictions on Bringing Procedures 
In Dufay60a three month deadline for lodging a complaint under Art. 90(2) of the 
Staff Regulations was contested by the applicant on the basis of the right to a 
fair trial. The Court decided reflecting to Art. 6 ECHR that the right to a fair 
trial, which is recognised by the Community legal order, does not prohibit the 
setting of a time-limit for the institution of legal proceedings. 
The CFI in an action for annulment launched by Christina Kik61 ruled that 
the right to a fair trial protected by Art. 6 ECHR and recognised by the 
Community judicature in the Community legal order may not be applied in the 
case, since this right cannot prohibit the application of certain criteria regarding 
admissibility set for the institution of proceedings. In Salamander62 the CFI 
decided that an action for annulment shall not be declared admissible because of 
a lack of adequate judicial protection, since this circumstance, even if proved, 
could not entitle the CFI to usurp the function of the founding authority of the 
Community in order to change the legal remedies and procedures established by 
the Treaty. 
Although the CPA judgement63 prejudiced its influence, it is still worth 
considering the Jégo-Quéré judgement64 of the CFI. The CFI decided that the 
interpretation of individual concern-the standing condition under Art. 230(4) EC 
in actions for annulments launched by natural or legal persons-set by the Court 
in Plaumann6 must be reconsidered on the basis of the right of access to courts 
and the right to an effective remedy. 
In CPA the Court following a similar line of argument decided, however, 
that it is for the Member States to alter the current system of remedies under 
Art. 48 EU to ensure that the right of access to courts and the right to an 
60
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effective remedy is observed in the Community system of remedies. Further-
more, the Court explicitly denied to give a new interpretation to the standing 
condition of individual concern conforming with the right to effective judicial 
protection, as such an interpretation cannot have the effect of setting aside the 
condition set up in the Treaty, without violating the jurisdiction of Community 
courts. 
It should be added that Advocates General in their opinions have con-
tinuously expressed that restrictions on bringing cases to the courts shall not 
result in a denial of justice.66 
Art. 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
provides: 
"Everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union 
are violated has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in 
compliance with the conditions laid down in this Art. Everyone is entitled 
to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and 
impartial tribunal previously established by law."67 
The updated explanations relating to the text of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights68 hold that the protection of the right to an effective remedy is more 
extensive in Union law than in ECHR law since it guarantees this right before 
a court. Referring to the jurisprudence of the Court69 the explanations point out 
that this right not only applies to the institutions of the Union, but of the 
Members States when implementing Union law. The explanations contend that 
while Art. 47 covers all rights guaranteed by Union law, it has not been intended 
to alter the system of judicial review laid down by the Treaties. In connection 
with the right to a fair hearing the explanations assess that Art. 47 (2) of the 
Charter correspond to Art. 6(1) of the ECHR. It adds, however, that its scope is 
not limited to the disputes recorded in the ECHR, which is the consequence of 
the fact that Union law is based on the principle of rule of law as stated in Les 
66
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Verts.10 Finally, the explanations provide that except for the limitations on the 
scope of the right the guarantees in ECHR law apply in a similar way to the 
Union. 
Carrying out the Access to Court Test / Conclusions 
On restrictions of the right to access to justice the ECtHR developed a test which 
provides that the restriction can be upheld, if it does not result in a denial of 
justice, and, if it is supported by a proportionate legitimate interest. In Commu-
nity law it is stated that the right to access to a justice may be restricted, 
however, it shall not constitute a denial of justice. It comes from the general 
principles of Community law that such restriction is subject to the principle of 
proportionality which is designed to resolve the conflicts between colliding 
legitimate interests. Furthermore, reflecting to Nold71 and the Explanations of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights the guidelines established in ECHR law 
should be followed in Community law. 
It can be concluded that for scrutinising formal restrictions the Luxembourg 
and the Strasbourg courts can apply tests that contain very similar elements. It is 
evident from the above that the correspondence of the two tests is a result of 
conscious jurisprudence and lawmaking by the Community. Nevertheless, at this 
point it cannot be concluded that the tests are uniform, since the possible 
digressions in the application of the tests has not yet been discovered. However, 
it is not the task of this paper to analyse the possible functional differences, 
rather it wishes to examine whether the restrictions in question how and with 
what possible results can be brought under this basic right analysis. 
Considering the restriction on the type of actions in which the intervention of 
any other person than the Member States and the Community institutions is 
permitted, its justification on the basis of the right of access to courts is highly 
questionable. Even tough its international public law origin is evident,72 this 
provision shall not be excluded from the requirement of the fair administration 
of justice based on fundamental rights. 
It follows from ECHR law that it is determined on a case-by-case basis 
whether the rules on the administration of justice are in conformity with the 
right to access to a court. Therefore, below it will be considered in the first 
70
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place, whether it is possible to put the rules on intervention in the Statute to a 
test, in which its compatibility with fundamental rights may be scrutinised. 
The Statute of the Court of Justice is a protocol annexed to the Treaties at 
Nice, which, under Art. 311 EC, is an integral part of the Treaty establishing the 
European Community, if adopted by a common accord of the Member States. It 
is evident from Art. 230 EC and Art. 234 EC-both designed to provide juris-
diction to the Community courts to review the legality of Community acts, that 
the founding treaties are not covered by them, thus the test based on funda-
mental rights could not be executed. On the other hand, it is a paradox situation 
that the review of a Council decision amending the Statute is possible under the 
same Treaty provisions. It follows that in Community law the genuine method 
of reviewing the restriction established in the Statute is in the hand of the 
Member States as political actors defining the framework of Community law. 
Under Art. 1 of the ECHR the contracting states are responsible for all 
acts and omissions of their domestic organs allegedly violating the ECHR 
regardless of whether the act or omission in question is a consequence of 
domestic law or the obligations to comply with international obligations.73 In 
the referred case the Commission on Human Rights dismissed the application, 
as it was basically concerned the autonomous functioning of the Community, 
although based on the act of the representatives of the Member States. The 
problem of intervention, however, is more of a question of the legal framework, 
in which the Community autonomously functions, since the statute is a protocol 
annexed to the founding treaties adopted by a common accord of the Member 
States. It can be assumed that the act of the Member States creating the legal 
framework of the Community is related to the Member States as international 
actors more closely than an act of the Council, in which the Member States act 
on behalf of the Community. It follows that the act of the Member States 
adopting the Protocol of the Statue of the Court of Justice should be such act 
which they are responsible for under Art. 1 of the ECHR, thus it should be 
covered by the jurisdiction of the ECtHR. 
It is established in ECHR law and in Community law that formal restrictions 
on access to courts may be applicable, however they may not result in a denial 
of justice. Such restriction can be upheld on the basis of a legitimate aim which 
fulfils the requirements established by the principle of proportionality. The 
restriction of the type of action in which natural or legal persons may intervene 
does not seem to establish a déni de justice, since the system of remedies in 
Community law offers other ways of judicial protection. It is relatively more 
difficult to bring forward a proportionate legitimate interest supporting the 
73
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restriction. Since Community law established a complete system of remedies 
governed by uniform principles, a restriction based on the separation of 
remedies is far from justifiable. Moreover, considering the interpretation of the 
principle of proportionality in Community law74 an absolute ban on the applica-
tions on intervention in certain cases does not seem to satisfy the rather chiselled 
approach established by Community courts. 
The requirement of an interest in the result of the case is another provision 
restricting the access of interveners to Community courts, therefore it shall also 
be scrutinised under the uniform test based on fundamental rights derived from 
ECHR law and Community law. It is clear that it does not call forth a denial of 
justice, since within the complete system of remedies established in Community 
law other means of judicial protection are provided. A legitimate interest under-
pinning the restriction may also be discovered, as the effectiveness of judicial 
protection requires the judiciary to function focusing on the essential and 
relevant matters in a case. The proportionality of the restriction may, however, 
be questioned on certain grounds. 
First, it is difficult to establish a single line of interpretation concerning the 
interest in the result of the case-as it is highlighted above, since the applications 
to intervene differ in a large extent. Furthermore, in the basic line of cases the 
Community courts apply various elements in their interpretation, even though 
the basic condition of a direct and present interest in the result of the case can 
easily be revealed. The scarcely appearing requirement of a certain interest in 
the result of the case further stiffens the conditions of admissibility. Lastly, the 
here and there established postulate of being directly affected by the contested 
measure indicates that the Community courts have the opportunity to strangulate 
the access of prospective interveners to courts. It follows that the suitability 
of the restrictive condition in question is dubious, since a single line of 
interpretative elements is difficult to allocate even in the main stream of cases. 
Moreover, the diversity of the conditions of an interest in the result of the case 
shall also be reconsidered in the light of the principle of legal certainty, how-
ever, it is true that in most case the courts apply the condition of a direct and 
present interest. 
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In the light of the fact that in certain cases75 it is rather facile to establish 
an interest in the result of the case, the overtly restrictive approach towards 
regional and local bodies which are required to prove that their economic and 
social structure essentially depends on the sector affected by the contested 
measure seems a bit out of context. Furthermore, considering that associations, 
notwithstanding their size and significance, are granted a leave to intervene in 
order to protect their members, it is difficult to appraise the fact that local or 
regional bodies are only able to intervene to protect the undertakings operating 
in their territory, if they are able to prove that they entirely and essentially 
depend on that given sector. It follows that it is worth reconsidering whether less 
restrictive means are disposable to decide upon the existence of an interest in the 
result of the case. 
Lastly, it is necessary to examine whether it is possible to submit the judicial 
interpretation of the condition of an interest in the result of the case to the 
similar access to court tests established in ECHR law and in Community law. It 
is clear from case law that the Court of Justice considers its interpretation on a 
condition and the condition itself as a unit, whose legality under basic rights can 
only be challenged, if the condition established in a Community measure can 
be subject to a scrutiny.76 Despite the fact that other opinions77 support the 
detachment of the interpretation from the condition itself, therefore allowing a 
possible self-review of judicial interpretation, it is clear that in order to create a 
new line of interpretation of an interest in the result of the case, the condition 
itself provided in the Statute must be challenged. Furthermore, even in ECHR 
law it is not ascertained whether the fundamental rights based analysis of 
national law covers the scrutiny of judge-made law-the judicial interpretation 
of admissibility conditions established in positive law.78 It follows that on this 
matter the above explained apply. 
75
 Eg.: the administrative procedure preceding the procedure before the court was 
instrumented on the basis of the complaint of the intervener, the intervener took part in the 
administrative procedure, the intervener was closely associated wi th the administrative 
procedure. 
76
 UPA v. Council... op. cit. 
77
 Opinion of Mr. Advocate General Jacobs in UPA... op. cit., Jégo-Quéré v. Commission... 
op. cit. 
78
 Hickman, Tom R.: The "uncertain shadow": Throwing Light on the Right to a Court 
under Art. 6(1) ECHR, 132, Public Law 2004 Spring. 
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Re-Codification of the Civil Code? 
Conception for Drafting the New Civil Code 
Abstract. The paper may serve as a good practical guidance for a foreign reader to the 
conception of the new Hungarian Civil Code. After a brief historical review, and description of 
the drafting process, the paper summarises the principal issues addressed in the Conception of 
the New Civil Code ("Conception"). These are: the proposed structure is a comprehensive 
code, covering all ranges of matters that are related to civil law, including commercial law, 
family matters, labour law, company law, intellectual property and conflict of laws issues. 
Then the paper describes the most important specific amendment proposals in the various 
fields covered by the Code: introduction of a preamble, basic principles of the civil law, rules 
regarding legal entities, property rights, contract law, including liability, and finally in the field 
of the law on succession. 
Keywords: Hungarian Civil Code, civil law, commercial law, family law, labor law, company 
law, intellectual property, conflict of laws 
Exposition 
1. In Hungary, Act IV of 1959 is the first Civil Code enacted. Previously, drafts 
were made in the course of the 19th century: first, partial drafts were framed 
to regulate specific areas of civil law,1 then proposals were submitted on the 
comprehensive codification of civil law.2 The most significant of these was 
submitted as Bill of 1928 on Civil Law, which, albeit was not passed by 
Parliament as an act, has been applied in judicial practice. 
Research fel low, Institute for Legal Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, H-1250 
Budapest, P. O. Box 25, Hungary 
E-mail: basa@jog.mta.hu 
1
 Partial drafts were made during the second half of the 19th century to regulate specific 
areas of civil law, e.g., the draft by Pál Hoffmann concerning a general part of civil law 
completed in 1871 and the draft by Istvan Teleszky concerning law of succession completed 
in 1887. 
2
 Draft of the First Hungarian General Civil Code of 1900, Committee text of 1913 
(second draft), the so-called Parliament text of 1914 (third draft), and finally, the so-called 
Committee text of 1915 (fourth draft). 
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Following World War II, Parliament adopted Act IV of 1959 on the Civil 
Code (Ptk),3 then, its comprehensive amendment was adopted in 1977.4 
Since the political transformation in 1989-1990, more than 50 amendments 
of the Civil Code have been passed. Meanwhile, substantial changes ensued in 
economic and social relations, and consequently, in the area of civil relations. 
Therefore, in 1998, the Hungarian government decreed "the commencement 
of the work on the comprehensive modernisation of civil law, and in this 
scope, of the Civil Code with the objective of framing a modem Civil Code in 
view, which, as an economic constitution will qualify as the fundamental law 
governing civil life".5 
As pursuant to the decision of the Hungarian government, the draft of the 
Conception was completed, then adopted as a moot point and submitted to exten-
sive professional and social debate by the government.6 The motions concerning 
the Conception were deliberated by the Editorial Committee and the Chief 
Codification Committee. The Chief Codification Committee divided the draft 
into two parts, i.e., the Conception that sets forth the cardinal principles of the 
new Civil Code and the Programme as the basis of the elaboration of the norm 
text. The main tendencies of the necessary amendments of the new Civil Code 
were summarised in a concise manner in the Conception,7 whereas, the Programme 
rendered a more meticulous elaboration of conceptual problems. In 2003, the 
government adopted the Conception,8 and published it in the Hungarian Official 
Gazette in line with the Programme. Any diversion f rom the Conception will 
require authorisation by the government, whereas departure from the Programme 
is subject to the decision of the Chief Codification Committee. 
3
 Law Decree XI of 1960 was enacted to regulate the effectiveness and implementation 
of Act IV of 1959. 
4
 Act IV of 1977, which was implemented as pursuant to Law Decree П of 1978. 
5
 Government Decree no. 1050 of 1998 (IV. 24.) on the Codification of Civil Law as 
amended by Government Decree no. 1061 of 1999 (V. 28.) 
6
 Government Decree no. 1009 of 2002 (I. 31.) 
7
 The following authors compiled specific parts of the Conception: András Kisfaludy,: 
General Rules of Liabilities Pertaining to Securities, Tamás Lábady: Liability for Extra-
Contractual Damages and Insurance Contracts, Ferenc Petrik: Volume One on Persons, 
András Kőrös: Volume Second on Family Law, Tamás Sárközy: Volume Three on Law of 
things, Lajos Vékás: Introduction, and, Volume Four on Law of Obligations (with the 
exception of Rules Pertaining to Insurance Contracts, Delictual Liability for Damages and 
Liabilities Pertaining to Securities), and, Emilia Weiss: Volume Five on Law of Succession. 
8
 Government Decree no. 1003 of 2003 (I. 25.) 
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2. The Conception takes a stand on general substantial issues with respect to 
drafting the new Civil Code.9 These are as follows: 
No foreign models were adopted for framing the new Civil Code, although, 
instances of foreign codification, such as the Civil Code of Holland and various 
international achievements of legislation were taken into consideration, such as 
the Vienna Convention on International Sale of Goods, UNIDROIT Principles 
of International Commercial Contracts (1994) and Principles of European 
Contract Law (Volumes I—II: 1999 and Volume III: 2002). Besides relevant 
directives of the European Community (considering the requirements of legal 
harmonisation as pursuant to the European Agreement), rules of civil law 
currently framed under separate provisions of Hungarian law and significant 
principles of law established by judicial practice are also designated to be 
integrated into the new Civil Code. 
Since the political transformation in 1990, a different social model has 
emerged that needs to be responded to. According to the Conception, the 
framing of the new Civil Code will conform to the image of society that evolved 
in the EU, to the social model of a constitutionally protected market economy 
shaped by welfare elements. 
The new Civil Code is designated to codify civil law on a national level and 
enact the accomplishments of legislation within the framework of a code. 
The new Civil Code would be based on a monist principle and would 
encompass civil relations of professional entities in the business world and in 
financial transactions and civil relations of private entities. Among other factors, 
this is justified by the followings: "in relevant foreign instances of codification, 
separate codification of contractual rules of commercial transactions may not be 
considered modem any longer ..., since general contract law has transformed to 
bear the mark of 'commercial law' during the recent 100 years". In case of the 
application of the monist principle, parallel regulation could be avoided and 
current problems of denotation could be eliminated. 
Scopes of content of the future Civil Code will be defined as follows: 
— Family law will be integrated into the new Civil Code, 
- The elaboration of the new Civil Code is designated to be in accordance 
with the comprehensive reform of the Labour Code. As a consequence, 
norms of particular labour agreements as a separate type of agreements 
may be integrated into the Volume on Contract Law of the new Civil 
Code, and hence, special norms of labour agreements will be substantiated 
9
 The document on "The Conception of the new Civil Code" is accessible on the 
homepage of the Minis t ry of Justice of the Republic of Hungary: ht tp: / /www.im. 
hu/mainpage. 
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by the general rules pertaining to contracts as pursuant to the new Civil 
Code. 
- According to the monist conception, rules of company law formulated 
under separate law would be integrated into the scope of special norms 
pertaining to particular legal entities under the new Civil Code. An advan-
tage of that regulation would be that the scope of legal entities could be 
regulated under the new Civil Code in full breadth, the scope of general 
rules pertaining to legal entities could be extended, the repetition of 
particular rules could be avoided and the character of the norms of the 
new Civil Code as secondary law would become manifest. (This cor-
responds to foreign pattern, as well.) The Conception enumerates some 
instances of counter-arguments vis-à-vis the monist standpoint: as pursuant 
to such regulation, norms of civil law and public law would mingle, the 
unity of the Act on Business Associations (which should be repealed in 
case of the purported regulation under the new Civil Code) would cease, 
furthermore, the cogent character of company law would also encumber 
its incorporation into the new Civil Code. The viability of the application 
of the monist conception is debated in special literature and in professional 
circles. The Chief Codification Committee, following the deliberation 
on the draft of the Conception, formed the opinion that the relationship 
between company law and the new Civil Code will be defined following 
the supplementary review of the Act on Business Associations. Since 
the viability of the monist solution is under dispute, with all probability 
the dualistic approach vis-à-vis the Conception would be adopted 
pursuant to the Amendment Act on Business Associations.10 
- The volume of rules on industrial property rights and copyright law is 
not integral to the effective Civil Code, which needs to be maintained on 
the following grounds: in re separate provisions under this branch of law 
set forth complex norms, they should not be extricated, furthermore, 
some powers are conferred as pursuant to administrative acts. Finally, the 
effective settlement is customary and internationally recognised. 
- The Conception does not include a proposal for the re-codification of 
international private law and its manner, merely makes reference to 
scopes of content. 
By reason of considerations of volume and content, the new Civil Code would 
be extended by a further structural unit, i.e., the "Volume". Therefore, the new 
Civil Code would consist of Volumes, Sections, Titles and Chapters. (The 
10
 The deadline for drafting the norm text of the new Civil Code is December, 2005. 
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numbering of articles would be continuous, whereas, the numbering of Sections 
within the Volumes, of Titles within the Sections, and of Chapters within the 
Titles would recurrently start from the beginning.) 
As pursuant to the Conception, the Civil Code will simultaneously be adopted 
by Parliament and take effect. 
Concerning the inner structure of the new Civil Code, the following proposal 
has been made: 
The objectives of the new Civil Code will be formulated in a concise manner 
under the Preamble, which will precede the "Volumes" and the "Introductory 
Provisions". The fundamental principles of the new Civil Code will be summa-
rised under the "Introductory Provisions". The new Civil Code, accordance with 
the Civil Code in force or the Bill on Civil Law of 1928, will not contain a 
General Section. According to the preamble to the Conception, the General Part 
would unnecessarily complicate the structure of the law and excessively increase 
the significance of the rules of legal transactions, furthermore, would encumber 
the application of the law. 
The new Civil Code is going to contain the following Volumes: 
Volume One on Persons 
Volume Two on Family Law 
Volume Three on Law of Things 
Volume Four on Law of Obligations 
Volume Five on Law of Succession 
The significance of the new Civil Code would be guaranteed by the stipulation 
of a clause, according to which exclusively a separate act could amend it 
expressly designed to do so, as opposed to the effective practice, when the Civil 
Code is marginally amended by acts adopted on other matters. 
3. In the followings, we will outline major proposals for amendment with 
reference to the Programme: 
Preamble: The objective of the act is not normatively based, therefore, it will 
be formulated under a Preamble, separately from the normative text. Besides 
emphasising that the Code regulates pecuniary circumstances with respect to the 
integration of family law, it will highlight that civil relations of entities are also 
regulated under the new Civil Code. 
Introductory Provisions: Fundamental principles that pertain to the whole 
body of the new Civil Code will be formulated under the Introductory Provisions, 
however, separate fundamental principles may be laid down within the Volumes, 
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if necessary. According to the Conception, overlaps of effective fundamental 
principles will be eliminated and the regulation will be more focused. 
The following fundamental principles will be upheld under the new Civil 
Code: 
- The principles of bona fides (good faith) and honesty will be upheld as 
requirements with respect to the exercise of civil rights and fulfilment of 
duties, 
- The principle of nemo suam turpitudinem allegans auditur will be upheld, 
since a mainly correct relevant judicial practice has been established in 
broad scope, 
- The new Civil Code will also set forth the principle of the prohibition of 
the abuse of the law, however, shall not render a definition of the content 
of this prohibition, but transfer this power to judicial practice, 
- Substitution of legally required statements by judicial decisions will qualify 
as significant intervention into the private autonomy of the parties 
concerned, therefore, this, as opposed to former practice, would only 
exceptionally be admissible, 
- The new Civil Code will also set forth the currently effective fundamental 
principle that protection of rights guaranteed by law shall primarily 
pertain to the powers of courts.11 
Volume One on Persons 
This Volume will specify rules concerning natural persons and legal entities. 
According to the Conception, substantial amendments of the regulation concerning 
natural persons will not be made under this Volume. 
11
 The prescription of requirements of generally expectable behaviour and proper 
exercise of powers as fundamental, formally recognised principles is not deemed necessary, 
since their content corresponds to that of the requirements of bona fides and honesty. 
The principle of the obligation to co-operate formerly prescribed as a fundamental 
principle shall not be a general requirement, therefore, it shall not be set forth under the 
Introductory Provisions, but under law of obligations. 
The principles of the protection of the fundamental right of the person to property and of 
the right of the person to protection of the law set forth under the effect ive Civil Code as 
fundamental principles do not need to be framed under the new Civil Code, since the 
protection of these rights are laid down under the Constitution and their formulation under 
the new Civil Code would be a mere repetition. 
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Provisions, primarily general provisions concerning legal entities and rules 
concerning the foundation and cessation of legal entities will require significant 
amendments. 
According to the preamble to the Programme, the Hungarian legal system is 
devoid of basic directive principles pertaining to legal entities. Therefore, the 
new Civil Code would reasonably stipulate, on the one hand, general rules 
pertaining to legal entities, on the other hand, an entire scope of rules pertaining 
to the types of legal entities. The determination of general criteria would be 
essential, since, as expressly pursuant to the new Civil Code, any law beyond its 
scope could establish a legal entity exclusively on condition that the respective 
entity complies with the general criteria specified under the new Civil Code. In a 
given case, the organisational unit of the legal entity may qualify as a legal 
entity exclusively on grounds of its compliance with the general criteria. Under 
the new Civil Code, the legal entity of the volume of the property (primary 
capital) specified by law could be recognised on condition that its administration 
and representation is secured by a trustee. 
A significant amendment of rules pertaining to the establishment, content-
based modification and cessation of legal entities will be effected under the 
new Civil Code. Therefore, legal entities would acquire legal capacity not by 
establishment, but as pursuant to an act of constitutive force, i.e., registration. 
Furthermore, all modifications would take effect exclusively as pursuant to 
registration of constitutive force, whereas, the cessation of a legal entity would 
take effect as pursuant to cancellation from registration. Duties related to keeping 
the registers would be administered by an office under judicial supervision to be 
organised by a court. 
According to the Conception, during the term between registration and 
establishment, a so-called preliminary legal entity would be operative upon the 
model of preliminary association. 
In the scope of general rules pertaining to the establishment and cessation 
of legal entities, the new Civil Code would regulate that a legal entity may 
be established as pursuant to an agreement, a deed of foundation or charter 
(hereinafter: charter), in case the type of legal entity specified under the Civil Code 
or other law is applicable. Failing a provision to the contrary, the followings 
will be specified under the charter on a mandatory basis: designation of the 
founder, the name and seat of the legal entity, the objective of the foundation of 
the legal entity, the volume of assets designated to the legal entity, the area of 
economic activity of the entity, the main decision-making and managing body 
of the legal entity, its legal representative, the manner and extent of acceptance 
of responsibility for the liabilities of the legal entity. As pursuant to Directive 
no. 1 of the European Community on Company Law, the determination of the 
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area of economic activity (objective) of the legal entity under the charter will 
have no pertinence on the scope of the legal capacity of the legal entity. 
The general rules pertaining to the cessation of the legal entity will be 
stipulated according to uniform principles as opposed to the effective Civil Code. 
Accordingly, cessation of legal entities would ensue in the following instances: 
a) expiration of a specified period or supervention of a specified condition, b) 
dissolution, с) fusion or merging, d) de-merger or withdrawal, e) transformation 
into another type of legal entity, f ) liquidation, g) declaration of cessation by 
court. Elements, such as the manner of legal succession, the obligation of the 
legal successor to accept responsibility and related issues, cessation without a 
legal successor would be provided for under the new Civil Code. 
Business associations that currently do not qualify as legal entities (general 
partnerships and limited partnerships) will be defined as legal entities under the 
new Civil Code. According to the preamble to the Programme, these, in re their 
legal substance, currently also function as legal entities and their legal capacity 
corresponds to that of other forms of associations. In case an organisation that 
does not qualify as a legal entity is conferred legal capacity by law, then such 
law will specify the representative and managing body of the organisation as 
a lawful minimum and determine conditions of the assumption of financial 
obligations by the organisation. 
In the scope of the protection of civil rights of entities, the most significant 
proposal for amendment concerns the introduction of the institution of remu-
neration for the injury of the entity. The effective objective legal consequences 
of the violation of privacy would be upheld, however, the legal institution 
of the so-called remuneration for the injury of the entity would replace non-
financial restitution. This, on the one hand, would imply indirect compensation 
for the violation of privacy, on the other hand, civil penalty, which would 
incur indemnification. Remuneration for the injury of the entity could also 
be adjudged in cases if the violation of privacy did not incur losses for the 
aggrieved party, however, considering all circumstances, indemnification for the 
aggrieved party would be reasonably due. On grounds of the extent of the loss 
and the seriousness of the breach of the law and of imputability, the adjudication 
of remuneration for the injury of the entity and the determination of its extent 
would be subject to the discretion of the court. Irrespective of or besides the 
adjudication of remuneration for the injury of the entity, the court could adjudge 
compensation for pecuniary losses as pursuant to the rules of liability for 
damages. 
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Volume Two on Family Law 
According to the Conception, family law will be integrated into the new Civil 
Code with respect to peculiarities of relations under family law. In the area of 
family law, the legislator will not primarily conform to effective norms of 
the EU, but to specific provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights 
pertaining to family law and to adjudication by the Strasbourg Court of Human 
Rights pertaining to family law, and, in the scope of international treaties, 
primarily to the Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989. 
The Volume on Family Law would be introduced by special fundamental 
principles that are peculiar to rules of family relations or depart from rules of 
civil relations. 
The following principles regulated under the effective Act on Family Law 
will be reasonably upheld in the new Civil Code: the principle of protection of 
marriage and family, the principle of guaranteeing equal rights for the spouses 
and in the child-parent relationship, and, finally, the principles of protection of 
the child and of the primacy of their interests. 
The requirement of harmony between the interest of the family and of 
the individual, instead of the currently effective requirement of harmony between 
the interest of society and of the individual would be stipulated as a new principle. 
Some principles and provisions of family law framed under the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child will be included into the new Civil Code: for instance, 
that potentially the child should be brought up in his/her own family, or in case 
no other possibility obtains, in a family. 
The structure of the Volume on Family Law would conform to the effective 
framework that consists of the following three main sections on: 
1. Marriage 2. Relations 3. Guardianship. 
In the scope of regulations concerning marriages, the rules of law of matri-
monial property will be basically transformed. It can be justified by several 
factors, one of the most important is that these rules have been adjusted to 
transformed social-economic conditions to a marginal extent. Therefore, in this 
scope, content—based amendments and more detailed regulation will be required 
with special regard to the interest of the protection of the family. These will be 
harmonised with the broader recognition of the autonomous financial decisions 
of the spouse engaged in economic activity, with the requirement of the 
security of transactions, and particularly, with the protection of the interests of 
creditors. 
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Volume Three on Law of the Things 
Instead of Right of Ownership, the title of this Volume will be Law of the Things, 
and therein, the following maxims will be proclaimed as fundamental 
principles'. 
- Rules of Law of the Things may be exclusively formulated under the 
Civil Code (by reason of the constraint of standard form), 
- Rules of Law of the Things may not be disregarded despite the according 
common wish of the parties concerned, 
- Peremptory prohibition of nationalisation by law, which overreaches the 
scope of appropriation, will be formulated as a fundamental principle, 
- Appropriation under terms regulated by law will exclusively be admissible 
by reason of exceptional and cogent public interest and will be attached 
to guaranteeing full, immediate and unconditional compensation, 
- Restriction of proprietary rights by reason of public interest may be 
effected exclusively on legal grounds and will be attached to guaranteeing 
full indemnification if legal conditions obtain. 
The Volume on Law of the Things will specify rules pertaining to res and rights 
in rem. 
Accordingly, the Volume on Law of the Things will specify rules pertaining 
to blocks of freehold flats, basic rules of land law and substantive rules of civil 
law pertaining to the registration of estates. According to the Chief Codification 
Committee, problems related to the registration of estates could be solved if the 
effective system was replaced by a system of administration implemented by 
an organisation under the direct supervision of courts. This would adequately 
guarantee publicity and public authenticity. 
The Programme does not propose further specification of the scope of the 
notion of res under the Volume on Law of the Things, but recommends further 
regulation under the rules pertaining to sales agreements. 
State property: As pursuant to the civil law of market economies, the property 
of all subjects of law is construed as private property, which also pertains to the 
property of the state: under civil law, the property of the state shall qualify as 
private property. As a main rule, the property of the state is administered by 
publicly financed institutions that qualify as autonomous legal entities as 
pursuant to the rules of budget economy set forth under the Budget Act. In case 
the administration of government property does not pertain to the authority of 
any publicly financed institution, such property is administered by the Treasury 
as a legal representative of the state exercising the powers of the minister 
responsible for government property. In case the property of the state does not 
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qualify as government property, but is constituted as venture capital, the state 
will be liable to utilise it in business associations or non-profit organisations. 
The scope of the venture capital of the state will be circumscribed under separate 
law, however, within venture capital, the circumscription of the scope of 
property to be maintained as long-term state property and of the property 
designated to be privatised and realised, i.e., transferred to private ownership is 
deemed to be necessary at the same time. 
Exclusive and not-negotiable objects of the property of the state and of local 
authorities will be defined, whereas, the scope of negotiability will be reduced 
as pursuant to the new Civil Code. Activities pertaining to the monopoly of the 
state, which the state may benefit from as pursuant to concession agreements, 
may exclusively be prescribed by law. 
Besides framing the rules of civil law pertaining to the right of ownership, 
the new Civil Code will set forth norms of so-called restricted rights pertain-
ing to another res. In this scope, rights of use and rights of assets will be 
regulated under separate chapters: personal and predial servitude shall qualify 
as rights of use, whereas, lien shall qualify as rights of assets. As pursuant to 
that proposal, hypothecary law would be reintegrated into substantive law, or 
at least, pertinent rules under the Volume on Substantive Law and on Contract 
Law would be divided. 
Volume Four on Law of Obligations 
Structure: This Volume will consist of six Sections: 
1. Section One: will set forth general rules pertaining to liabilities, 
2. Section Two: will set forth general rules pertaining to contracts, 
3. Section Three: will set forth rules pertaining to specific types of contracts, 
4. Section Four: will set forth general rules of liabilities pertaining to 
securities, 
5. Section Five: will set forth rules pertaining to extra-contractual liability 
for damages, 
6. Section Six: will set forth rules pertaining to various facts of cases that 
establish liabilities such as accession of unjust enrichment administration 
without mandate, promises of reward, other itemised unilateral legal 
transactions and implied behaviour. 
1. General rules of liabilities will include regulations concerning the limi-
tation and calculation of deadlines, rules of representation in transactions, rules 
concerning interest and compensation, norms pertaining to the order of liquidation 
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of debts of the obligee, rules of multi-civic liabilities and rules pertaining to 
unilateral legal transactions.12 
2. Section Two will set forth general rules pertaining to contracts. By way 
of introduction, the Conception stipulates general principles, which will be 
applied for the purpose of the regulation of contract law. 
As pursuant to the new Civil Code, the effective system of regulations will 
be replaced by an uniform regulation pertaining to contractual relations in com-
mercial transactions and between private entities. It may be regarded as a substan-
tive change that the legislator, for the purpose of framing contract law, construes 
contracts concluded in commercial (business) transactions as a model to be 
followed, instead of traditional contractual relations between private entities. 
According to the assumption of the Conception, the parties engaged in 
financial transactions are capable of enforcing and protecting their interests, there-
fore, civil law should interfere with contractual relations in the least possible 
degree. This both entails recognisance of private autonomy in a broad scope and 
supplanting legal possibilities of judicial intervention by the state. (This would 
be admissible exclusively in exceptional cases and in the interest of the so-called 
"weaker party" and its possible instances will be expressly defined. Such instances 
typically obtain in consumer legal relations, relations under labour law and 
transactions realised as pursuant to the application of general conditions of the 
conclusion of contracts.) As a traditional means of protection, nullification of 
prohibited, immoral and usury transactions may be resorted to as a sanction. 
As pursuant to the above, the principle of dispositivity shall be applied in the 
scope of mles pertaining to contracts. Cogent rules in a broader scope shall be 
formulated for the purposes of the regulation of consumer contracts. 
According to the Conception, the effective framework of contract law would 
be upheld with respect to the inner structure of the rules of contract law. 
Special rules pertaining to consumer contracts will be specified under the 
new Civil Code, which mainly implies the adoption of Community Law. Certain 
norms of consumer contracts will be stipulated under general rules governing 
contract law, whereas, other norms will be stipulated under the respective type 
of contracts. This would merely imply further specification of the effective 
regulation of concepts of the consumer and of consumer contract.13 
12
 Unilateral legal transactions could include itemised unilateral legal transactions 
effecting liabilities, such as norms governing promises of reward and assumption of duties 
for purposes of public interest. 
13
 The concept of the consumer shall be construed as a natural entity concluding a 
contract beyond its scope of self-employment or business activity. Consumer contract shall 
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A fundamental principle of contract law will be stipulated as the freedom of 
the parties to determine the content of the contract. Furthermore, the principle of 
the freedom of the parties to decide on the conclusion of the contract will be laid 
down. The parties may be obliged to conclude a contract exclusively under 
separate law, which may stipulate such obligation in exceptional cases. 
The obligation of the parties to co-operate will be set forth as a specific funda-
mental principle of contract law, which, as a general fundamental principle, will 
not pertain to the whole body of the new Civil Code. 
In the scope of general rules of contract law, the Conception proposes the 
introduction of amendments of substance pertaining to: I. invalidity of contracts, 
II. indemnification. 
I. Rules pertaining to invalidity shall be based upon new bases of principle, 
since the Conception introduces amendments with respect to three elements: 
a) causes of invalidity, b) nullity, c) the legal consequences of invalidity. 
a) According to the Conception, causes of invalidity shall be formulated in 
an unified system, whereas, so far as possible, the legal consequences 
of the conclusion of invalid contracts shall be attached to causes of 
invalidity. 
In the scope of the causes of invalidity, the invalidity of illegal con-
tracts, which violate law, has posed a difficulty of construction in judi-
cial practice for a long time. Therefore, the following textual amendment 
will be deemed reasonable: irrespective of other legal consequences, any 
contract that violates a rule of law shall be null and void provided that it is 
either specified under the respective rule of law, or the objective of such 
rule of law is expressly the prohibition of the provision of the service 
defined by the parties to the contract or the prohibition of other content of 
the contract. 
According to the Conception, the interest of the elimination of unnec-
essary legal impediments in business transactions requires the adoption 
of the principle prevailing in judicial practice that in re invalid contracts 
by reason of defect of form, unless an exception is allowed by law, the 
defect of form of the legal statement shall be redressed by completion. 
be construed as a contract, which has been concluded between the consumer and the entity 
("trader") that concludes such contract within its scope of self-employment or business 
activity as pursuant to Para, d) of Article 685 of the effective Civil Code. 
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To ensure doctrinal completeness, coercion will be introduced as a 
further cause of invalidity. 
The element of "conspicuously considerable difference in value" that 
obtains between service and valuable consideration in the moment of the 
conclusion of the contract would be upheld as a further cause of invalidity. 
As pursuant to the new Civil Code, the inclusion of certain elements in 
specific types of contracts, such as the element of chance, shall constitute 
an incontestability clause on grounds of invalidity, or, with the exception 
of consumer contracts, the parties upon the conclusion of specific 
contracts could waiver their right to impugn on grounds of invalidity. 
b) In pais reference to the invalidity of null and void contracts will be main-
tained as admissible, furthermore, the rule, according to which the court 
deciding on the case shall not take the nullity of contracts into conside-
ration ex officio without the according request of the parties concerned, 
will also be maintained. For further specification of these maxims, 
the legal principle prevailing in judicial practice, according to which 
exclusively a legally concerned entity with contentious legal capacity may 
institute action (objection) for the establishment of invalidity by court, will 
be formulated under the new Civil Code. The general fundamental principle 
of nemo turpitudinem suam allegans auditur will be specified not only 
under the Introductory Provisions, but also in re invalidity, with the 
stipulation that the entity incurring the cause of nullity in an imputable 
manner may not refer to the invalidity of the contract. 
The distinction between null and void and voidable contracts will be 
upheld. The relative ineffectiveness of contracts concluded via violation 
of the right of the first refusal would be regulated as a new instance of 
ineffectiveness. 
c) In the scope of the legal consequences of invalidity, the rule that comple-
tion may not be demanded on grounds of an invalid contract shall be 
formulated. 
Provided that partial completions have been effected as pursuant to 
invalid contracts, the Conception introduces solutions based on new 
principles that depart from effective rules: the restitution of the status quo 
ante is admissible provided that the conditions preceding the conclusion 
of the contract may be restituted in kind. Based on a claim of ownership, 
this option is applicable in case of the provision of reversible real value 
services, whereas, a claim of ownership may not be made for matching 
payment as valuable consideration by reason of its character. A refund of 
payment may be ordered by court on the basis of rules pertaining to 
accession of unjust enrichment. 
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Financial discrepancies (deriving from costs, profits, damages, etc.) 
not settled by the restitution of the status quo ante shall be adjudicated 
on the basis of rules pertaining to possession without legal grounds, 
whereas, rules pertaining to accession of wealth without legal grounds 
shall be applied as auxiliary rules. 
In a given case, conditions preceding the conclusion of the contract 
may not be restituted in kind either by reason of the character of the service, 
which substantiates genuine irreversibility, or by reason of annihilation, 
consumption, utilisation, processing or alienation of the service, etc, which 
substantiates subsequent irreversibility. In such cases, for the settlement 
of the relations of the contracting parties, the Conception stipulates the 
application of rules pertaining to accession of unjust enrichment. How-
ever, in favour of the party that acceded to unjust enrichment, preferential 
rules of loss of enrichment shall not be applied by reason of the consideration 
of bearing responsibility and risk. 
The option that on condition the cause of invalidity of the contract 
may be terminated, the contract may be pronounced to be valid by court, 
will be upheld. 
The legal consequences of invalid contracts shall he adjudicated by 
courts. As opposed to effective regulations, the Conception proposes that 
even in re nullity of contracts, courts do not make decisions ex officio, 
but exclusively at the request of the parties concerned. 
Under the new Civil Code, the sanction of condemnation in favour of 
the state shall be nullified as a legal consequence of invalid contracts and 
accession of wealth without legal grounds, since their major cases have 
been eliminated from adjudication. 
II. According to the Conception, on the one hand, rules pertaining to exemption 
of the party infringing the contract from liability for damages will be 
rendered more rigorous (A), on the other hand, the scope of indemnification 
will be determined contrary to the effective Civil Code (B). 
a) Exemption of the party infringing the contract from liability for damages: In 
this scope, a more inflexible principle of exemption established in international 
trade will be introduced under the new Civil Code by separation of the sanction 
of indemnification for breach of contract from the condition of the imputability of 
the party infringing the contract. According to the Programme, in case of 
contracts concluded in commercial transactions, allocation of consequential 
damages as pursuant to breach of contracts implies primarily the spread of losses, 
instead of the repression of individual fault. Therefore, the party infringing the 
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contract shall not be exempted by reference to compliance with the principle 
of generally expectable behaviour in the given situation. Exemption would 
exclusively be substantiated if the party infringing the contract can prove that 
the damage was incurred by an unavoidable obstacle, which was not predictable 
in the moment of conclusion of the contract. That principle of exemption shall 
be applicable to the contributor of the obligee, as well. 
b) Scopes of indemnification: It needs to be set forth as a starting point, that 
damages deriving from breach of contract shall be fully indemnified. 
In conformity with recognised norms under international commercial law, 
the standard of rational predictability as a basis of limitation of the extent of 
unrealised profits and consequential damages will be introduced. This implies 
that the extent of indemnification shall not exceed the extent of losses that 
the party infringing the contract could or had to foresee in the moment of 
infringing the contract on the basis of facts and circumstances he could be or 
had to be aware of as potential consequences of the contract upon concluding the 
contract. The aggrieved party shall be liable to furnish evidence concerning the 
extent of damages foreseeable for the party infringing the contract. 
Under the new Civil Code, the regulation of contractual liability for damages 
deriving from breach of contract would be separated from extra-contractual 
(delictual) liability for damages with respect to different conditions of exemption, 
whereas, under the effective Civil Code, the general rule (on grounds of 
imputability) pertaining to delictual and contractual liability for damages is 
formulated in a principally uniform manner and their partial elements are regulated 
accordingly. In the framework of the new Civil Code, it is the condition of 
liability with respect to exemption that will be separated. The regulation of 
the manner and extent of indemnification would be upheld as uniform. The 
norms of the manner and the extent of indemnification would be set forth 
within the scope of rules pertaining to delictual liability, however, the inclusion of 
a mere reference to these shall suffice within the rules pertaining to contractual 
liability. 
In view of the demands posed by market competition, restriction and ex-
clusion of liability for breach of contracts would be admissible with the 
exception of consumer contracts. 
3. Subsequently to the formulation of general rules pertaining to contracts, 
the new Civil Code would not set forth norms of delictual liability, but rules of 
specific types of contracts and of liabilities pertaining to securities. It would sub-
sequently stipulate terms of extra-contractual damages, and finally, other elements 
that establish liabilities. 
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Rules formulated under particular parts of most types of contracts call for 
modernisation primarily by reason of the requirements of commercial trans-
actions, and accordingly, rules pertaining to certain types of contracts under 
the Civil Code do not respond to the requirements of the business world, there-
fore, they require modernisation, as well. Various commercial contracts are not 
integral to the effective Civil Code, therefore, these contracts need to be 
integrated into the new Civil Code. The sequence of types of agreements will 
be determined on grounds of their financial import, however, the dare, facere, 
praestare character of services shall also be taken into consideration. 
4. General substantive rules pertaining to securities will be summarised 
under the new Civil Code, which will define securities in a normative manner 
and circumscribe their content-based criteria, furthermore, it will set forth 
procedural rules of legitimation, rules of the transfer of securities, of the 
restriction of raising objections and substantive rules of the rescission of 
securities. These elements will also be regulated with respect to dematerialised 
securities. 
5. According to the Conception, rules pertaining to liability for extra-
contractual damages will be divided into two parts, i.e., the general and the 
particular part. 
The general part would establish the universally recognised framework of 
delictual liability, rules of law of liability with peremptory effect and pertinent 
sanctions (provisions concerning the manner and extent of indemnification). 
Increasing the rigour of the general rule pertaining to liability for extra-
contractual damages is not deemed to be necessary. 
According to the Conception, the particular part would establish the frame-
work of special liability and indemnification and specify the respective particular 
rules. 
By reason of the inconsistencies prevailing in judicial practice, the rule that 
incurring damages is prohibited by law will be formulated under the general 
part of the new Civil Code. Accordingly, all forms of incurring damages shall 
be illegal, unless a rule of law provides otherwise. By reason of the stipulation of 
a general prohibition of incurring damages, the instances of the admissibility of 
incurring damages and the causes that exclude unlawfulness should be expressly 
specified. In the scope of the specification of causes that exclude unlawfulness, 
the rule, according to which indemnification shall be due in instances of 
incurring damages permitted by law, will be formulated with peremptory effect. 
Exemption is admissible exceptionally and in favour of public interest exclusively 
as pursuant to a provision of law. 
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The manner and extent of indemnification: As pursuant to Para. 4 of Art. 355 
of the effective Civil Code, four types of damages are distinguished: a) depre-
ciation, h) unrealised profits, c) non-pecuniary damages, d) expenses required 
for the elimination or reduction of financial losses. 
a) According to annotations and judicial practice, the concept of deprecia-
tion of the property of the aggrieved party is defined as loss as pursuant 
to changes incurred in res. This interpretation should be extended to 
non-in-rem pecuniary damages (e.g., losses proceeding from loss of 
rights or claims). 
b) The category of unrealised profits contains several elements of un-
certainty, therefore, its scope should be circumscribed within limitations 
of predictability, as that is manifest in standard judicial practice. 
According to the proposal, under the new Civil Code, the party incurring 
damages shall be exclusively accountable for unrealised profits that 
could be reasonably foreseen as a consequence of a given activity under 
normal circumstances. As a conditio sine qua non of the establishment of 
liability for damages, the aggrieved party would be liable to prove that 
the probability of real risk obtained. 
c) Regulation of non-pecuniary damages is not deemed necessary under the 
new Civil Code, in view of the fact that the introduction of remuneration 
for the injury of the entity as a civil sanction of the violation of privacy is 
on the agenda, which would qualify as compensation for non-pecuniary 
damages. 
d) The category of expenses required for the elimination or reduction of 
financial losses affecting the aggrieved party should be supplemented by 
a limitation of content developed in the course of judicial practice with 
the purport that exclusively reasonable and expedient expenditure and 
costs could be claimed as damages. 
Besides upholding the principle of full indemnification, the new Civil Code 
should primarily provide for the manner of pecuniary indemnification. The 
options of restitution in integrum and indemnity in kind would be admissible as 
marginal manners of compensation, which may be ordered by court at the 
express request of the aggrieved party and if the conditions set forth by effective 
provisions obtain. 
The particular part, within the scope of special instances, will specify rules 
pertaining to civil liability currently set forth under separate provisions. Among 
these, the following clauses are deemed to be most important: 
- Problems of liability for damages under labour law: In case particular labour 
agreements are regulated in the framework of the new Civil Code, then 
liability for damages by the employee and the employer will also be regulated 
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therein, either within the scope of rules of particular labour agreements or 
under rules pertaining to delictual liability. 
- Liability of public officials: Under the new Civil Code, the specification of 
special rules pertaining to the liability of (head) officials of business associa-
tions, of co-operatives and of various partnerships that obtains for the associa-
tion (co-operative, partnership) will be subject to the discretion of the legislator. 
- Act X of 1993 on Product Liability will be re-enacted under the part of the 
new Civil Code regulating delictual liability. 
- Absolute liability: Subsequently to the harmonisation of different rules, rules 
pertaining to liability for damages incurred by the application of nuclear 
energy and the provisions on amends for damages as pursuant to Act CXVI 
of 1996 on Nuclear Energy will be incorporated into the new Civil Code. In 
case the clause on absolute liability is integrated into the new Civil Code, 
these provisions will introduce the part on delictual liability. 
- As a fact of the case of autonomous liability, causal liability for damages will 
be established in case of endangering, polluting or otherwise harming the 
environment or nature. Thereby, rules of liability currently set forth under 
separate law would be defined in a unified manner under the new Civil Code 
with the application of the doctrine of the European Community pertaining 
to causality and allocation of damages. The admissibility of the institution of 
action by the public prosecutor in favour of public interest and condemnation 
in favour of the Fund for Protection of the Environment could be prescribed 
separately. 
- Liability for hazardous activities: The effective rule would be upheld with 
the adoption of the amendment elaborated in judicial practice that in case 
the instrumentality of the aggrieved party can be established, upon the 
determination of the extent of instrumentality, the degree of risk of the 
operation should be evaluated. 
- Damage done by game or incurred in the course of hunting, damages caused 
to game: Provisions on damage done by game or incurred in the course of 
hunting and on damage caused by killing game currently regulated under 
separate provisions will be integrated into the effective Civil Code. Under 
the new Civil Code, as a replacement of the liability clause for hazardous 
operation, the regulation of acceptance of responsibility for damage done by 
game would reasonably prescribe stricter liability of the party with hunting 
licence. The party with hunting licence would exclusively be exempted from 
liability on condition that the damage was incurred by the imputable fault of 
the aggrieved party. 
- Damages incurred by the employee and the substitute: Under the new Civil 
Code, the effect of operative provisions that establish the liability of the 
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employer (and co-operative) for damages will be extended to all legal entities 
in cases when the (head) official or member (in the context of its position) 
incurs damages to a third party. It needs to be stipulated that if an employee, 
substitute or member incurs damages by deliberate criminal act or misde-
meanor, s/he will (potentially jointly with the employer or the legal entity) be 
directly liable to the aggrieved party. 
- State Liability for damages: Effective rules pertaining to damages incurred 
in the scope of exercise of administrative power will be amended according 
to maxims established by judicial practice. Therefore, liability for damages 
incurred by the state, the local government or their institutions shall exclusively, 
if damages are incurred in the scope of the exercise of public authority, i.e., 
of the activity or negligence of the public authority. Rules pertaining to 
liability for damages incurred in the scope of exercise of judicial power will 
be formulated under a separate scope of actual circumstances with respect to 
the regulations of the EU. Under a relevant clause, the new Civil Code should 
stipulate as pursuant to the effective Act on the Rules of Procedure, that 
the state, irrespective of imputability, will be liable for grievances incurred 
by the violation of the right to due process of law and to its conclusion 
within a reasonable period. The regulation of claims for damages by reason 
of unlawful arrest or detention will be reasonably provided for under this 
clause. In the scope of the regulation of judicial liability, the stipulation 
that wrong decisions in their content made in particular cases shall not sub-
stantiate liability for damages by the state will be introduced as a peremptory 
non-liability clause. Liability for damages incurred by the state via legislation 
could be established with the limitation that the state shall be liable exclusively 
for damages incurred by particular acts that are substantiated by statutes 
pronounced ex post facto unconstitutional. 
6. Section Six: will set forth rules pertaining to various facts of cases that 
establish liabilities such as accession of wealth without legal grounds, adminis-
tration of affairs without order, promises of reward, other itemised unilateral 
legal transactions and implied behaviour. 
Volume Five on Law of Succession 
According to the Programme, commitment to tradition and conventions have 
greater significance under law of succession than in other branches of civil law. 
According to the Conception, "the objective of drafting a new Civil Code may 
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not be construed as the replacement of rules responding to contemporary social-
economic relations by necessarily new regulations". Accordingly, the Conception 
proposes the introduction of minor and no fundamental amendments in the area 
of the law of succession. Therefore, with minor amendments, lineal inheritance 
as a specific Hungarian institution and the legal share of inheritance would be 
upheld. 
The society of Hungarian lawyers is further intrigued by both the Conception 
and the Programme: their maxims are analysed, assumptions are debated.14 The 
elaboration of the norm text of the new Civil Code has commenced as pursuant 
to the decision of the government.13 
14
 This was demonstrated as a moment in the course of professional debates by the 
Conference on Codification of Civil Law held at the Eötvös Loránd University of Sciences in 
November, 2003, which dealt with significant institutions of civil law in the context of the 
Conception and the Programme of the Civil Code. Reputed invited lecturers explicated their 
views on the following subjects: Pál Solt and János Zlinszky delivered lectures on strict 
liability, András Kisfaludy and Tamás Sárközy held forth on general rules pertaining to legal 
entities and on the powers of business associations. György Boytha lectured on non-financial 
indemnification and remuneration for the injury of the entity, and finally, Attila Harmathy 
and Lajos Vékás expounded the legal consequences of invalid contracts. 
15
 Governmental Decree no. 1003 of 2003 (I. 25). 
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I. The concept of Augustus's numen is of utmost importance from several 
points of view with respect to the subsequent cult of the emperor since it is not 
only the late Octavianus who, as a living person, is invested with the numen 
that could be put to use in public life, his given name, Augustus, carries in 
itself the expression augus, which bears religious connotations.1 The leader 
having impérium and auctoritas in the Roman conceptual sphere, represents a 
certain archetype; because impérium originally meant nothing else than mana, 
the charisma of the leader, i.e. one 's capacity of implementing, of giving birth 
to something in other persons.2 The expression of nn/nen-especially in ancient 
Roman sources-is mentioned in connection with the gods, the senate, the 
Roman people, as well as in connection with the mind on a more abstract, 
philosophical level, as a superhuman force in itself which is nevertheless most 
frequently connected to a person of some kind; Rose defines the concept in 
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 Wagenvoort, H.: Roman Dynamism. Studies in Roman Literature, Culture and Religion. 
Leiden, 1956. 12. 
2
 Köves-Zulauf, Th.: Bevezetés a római vallás és monda történetébe (Introduction to 
the history of Roman religion and myth). Budapest, 1995. 31. 
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perfect accordance with the meanings occurring in these sources: „Numen 
signifies a superhuman force , impersonal in itself but regularly belonging to 
a person (a god of some kind) or occasionally to an exceptionally important 
body of human beings, as the Roman senate or people. " 3 This does not seem to 
be especially surprising, as the senate fulfilled numerous religious functions. 
The religious identity and divine origin of the Quirites was widely accepted 
as well, and Cicero also drew a parrallel between the aminus and the princeps 
deus in Somnium Scipionisf Thus, the numen, especially according to the 
dynamistic trend, connected to Wagenvoort 's name, signified-to use this 
Polinesian expression-a kind of mana, a mysterious force dwelling in a thing 
or in a person.5 
The numen Augusti, the concept of the charismatic leader, representing 
the deity in a special way, can be understood precisely by investigating the 
ambivalent relationship of Roman religion with the epiphany, the numinous 
experience of the divine presence; here it becomes visible that certain sub-
sequent outcomes were already present in their germs in the most ancient 
Roman religion.6 The triumphus is the archetypal-numinous event of the 
embodiment of the deity, in concreto Iuppiter, surrounded by numerous 
preventive rites. It is not by chance that pondering over the role of the numen 
in antique religion (Antike, magische, faustische numinaf Oswald Spengler 
mentions that the Roman cult of the emperor-which must be clearly separated 
from the oriental cult of the sovereign because of their different origins-is a 
natural consequence of Roman religion, and the role of the triumphator must 
be regarded as its precedent, as Iuppiter's numen was embodied in the consul 
holding the triumphus during the triumphal procession.8 It should be noted that 
the Jupiterean role of the presence of the triumphator's embodying the divine 
numen was, among other things, a numinous, awe-inspiring experience for 
the Romans, because Roman religion-unlike Greek religion-tried to avoid 
the divine presence, the epiphany; e.g this was the reason for the complete 
turning around, the circumactio corporis after finishing the prayer, as well as 
3
 Rose, H. J.: Numen and mana. Harward Theological Review, 44. 1951. 109. 
4
 Cicero De re publica 6, 15. Homines enim sunt hac lege generali, qui tuerentur ilium 
globum, quern in hoc templo medio vides, quae terra dicitur, Usque animus datus est ex Ulis 
sempiternis ignibus quae sidera et stellas vocatis, quae globosae et rotundae, divinis 
animatae mentibus, circos suos orbesque conficiunt celeritate mirabili. 
5
 Köves-Zulauf: Bevezetés a római vallás... op. cit. 29. 
6
 Ibid. 177. 
7
 Spengler, О.: Der Untergang des Abendlandes. München, 1991. 517-522. 
8
 Ibid. 521. sq. 
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the well-known fas sit vidisse9 formula, meaning: „I should not he blamed for 
seeing it. 
II. The first occurrence of the word numen can be found-/« concreto in a 
genitival and an attributive construction belonging to a god's name-in Aerius," 
later near the genitives of the words deus and divus?2 referring to a particular 
god, e.g. Ceres13 or Iuppiter,14 as well as in an attributive construction with the 
adjective divinum?5 It characteristically occurs in verbal constructions near 
the verbs denoting ritual activities,16 whereas in attributive constructions it 
appears near adjectives denoting piety, anger, reconciliability, or, on the contrary, 
implacability.17 In Augustus's time the numen can also mean the deity himself, 
previously having meant only one of his properties or functions18-a typical 
example for this can be found in the prooemium of the Aeneis19 and Servius20 
also defines it in accordance with this thought when recounting Iuno's func-
tions in his commentary.21 The antique grammarians also tried to explain 
4
 Seneca: Epistulae 115, 4. 
10
 Latte, К.: Römische Religionsgeschichte. Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft V. 4. 
München, 1967. 41. 
" 646 R. b. Non. 173, 27. nomen et numen Iovis\ 692 R. nomen vestrum numenque. 
12
 Cicero: De divinatione 1, 120. numen der, 2, 63. divum numina; Philippicae 11, 28; 
De finihus bonorum et malorum 3, 64; De natura deorum 1, 3; 2, 95; 3, 92. deorum 
immortalium numen. 
13
 Cicero: In Verrem 5, 107. 
14
 Cicero: Pro rege Deiotaro 18; Tusculanae disputationes 2, 23. 
15
 Cicero: De natura deorum 1, 22; Pro Milone 83. numen divinum. 
16
 Cicero: In Verrem 2, 4, 111. expiare\ De divinatione 2, 63; De domo sua 140; Caesar: 
De hello Gallico 6, 16, 3. placare\ Vergilius: Georgica 1, 30 colere\ Ovidius: Tristia 5, 3, 
46./7ectere; Horatius: Epistulae 17, 3; Vergilius: Aeneis 2, 141. orare\ Vergilius: Aeneis 3, 
437; Ovidius. Tristia 3, 8, 13. adorare. 
17
 Vergilius: Aeneis 2, 141. conscium veri\ Ovidius: Metamorphoses 4, 452. impla-
cabile\ Corpus Inscriptionum Latinatum VI 29944. iratum; Vergilius: Aeneis 4, 521. memor, 
4, 382. pium\ Culex 271. placabile', Statius: Thebais 10, 486. providum. 
18
 Pfister, Fr.: Numen. In: Paulys Real-Encyclopädie der klassischen Alterumswissen-
schaft XVII. 2. 1937. 1273. 
19
 Vergilius: Aeneis 1, 8. quo numine laeso quidve dolens regina deum. 
20
 Servius: Commentarius in Verg. Aen. 1, 8. Nam luno habet multa numina: est Curitis 
... est Lucina ... est regina. 
21
 Pötscher, W.: 'Numen ' und ' numen August i ' . In: Pötscher, W.: Hellas und Rom. 
Hildesheim, 1988. 449. 
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this expression, e. g. Festus defines it as a divine nodding, and divine power,22 
Varro defines it as impérium,23 These interpretations lead to the basic meaning 
of the word, i. e. the (assenting divine) nodding.24 Various authors-like Pfister,25 
Wagenvoort26 and Rose27-identify the expression with the verbum 'to move'. 
Interpreting a pregnant locus by Catullus,28 Pfister also takes position vis-a-vis 
the orendistic, will-expressing meaning of the word numen,29 which seems 
to be strongly corroborated not only by the expression adnuit in the text of 
Catullus, but also by other constructions with the verb *nuo,i0 which reinforce 
the (personal) expression of the will, with the help of the emotionally charged 
gesture of the nodding.31 Opinions also differ concerning the age of the 
expression numen itself. Pfister ranks it into the most ancient layers of 
religious terms,32 Rose prefers not to take sides in this question.33 Latte's 
opinion deserves special attention. On the one hand he states that the expres-
sion numen can be encountered neither in ancient religious texts nor in the 
works of Plautus, Ennius and Cato, its first occurrence in the works of Accius 
and Lucilius could be dated to the second half of the 2nd century ВС., so he 
thinks it possible that it became part of the Latin language only because of the 
influence of Stoic philosophy, as a translation of the Greek dynamisé on the 
22
 Festus 172. numen quasi nutus dei ac potestas. 
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other hand he notes that it is impossible to explain why this particular word 
was used to translate the concept of dynamis theou,35 Concerning the first part 
of Latte's idea, it cannot be disregarded that both Ennius's and Cato's texts are 
considerably incomplete, thus the lack of the word numen does not provide 
sufficient reason for drawing conclusions, Plautus's comedies cannot contain 
the expression becuse of their very nature, while in the religious texts the 
expression numen signifies a concept pertaining to the sphere of the religious 
experience rather than to the ritual.36 In connection with Cicero's relevant 
locus,37 Latte seems to forget about the important sacred functions of the 
senatus, like the ordering of the triumphus , the consecration of a certain plot 
of land to the gods and later the initiation of the emperor to the divine status. 
Pötcher also states that through the functions the senatus assumed certain 
competences belonging to the divine sphere.38 When Lucretius connects the 
concept of the numen to the human mind,39 he presumably speaks only about 
the familiar mechanism through which religious concepts mutatis mutandis 
gain philosophical significance. 
The question concerning the numen's main operational principle, which 
at the same time means the manifestation of the divine will, is of utmost 
importance. Pötscher considers the *nuere, the manifestation of the divine will, 
an ancient component of Roman religion, which avoided epiphany, carefully 
guarded the pax deorum, and interpreted the slightest deviation from the order 
of daily routine as a sign (more precisely as a sympthome, according to Köves-
Zulauf40) without attempting to draw any conclusion with regard to the age of 
the expression numen.41 Similarities of the expression with Greek terms are 
striking, the word numen can be connected with neyma, the meaning of nutus 
can be connected to neysis, the common characteristic feature of these latter 
two is the dynamism inherent in them,42 but the closest parallel can be drawn 
35
 Ibid. 57. 
36
 Pötscher: op. cit. 451. 
37
 Cicero: Philippicae 3, 32. magna vis est, magnum numen ... idem sentientis senatus. 
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 Pötscher: op. cit. 452. 
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paret et ad numen mentis momenque movetur. 4, 179. in quern quae que locum diverse 
numine tendunt. 
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41
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between пеуоАЪ and *nuo, known in its constructions.44 The concept of divine 
warning, consent or disapproval appearing in the form of natural phenomena 
can be encountered both in Greek and Roman authors.45 However, the different 
omina cannot be strictly paralelled with the divinity expressing his will with 
a nod (nutus), because in most cases only the Romans' conviction about a 
certain event's being proper or not can be inferred without the possibility of 
establishing whether or not the given warning was connected to the will of a 
personal god.46 In numerous cases it is not possible to separate the personal 
energy-component and the one manifesting only in the course of operation, 
or it is not possible to define their precise amount and proportion, these 
phenomena being ouside the logical sphere. At the same time certain omina-
e.g. the augurium connected to the founding of Rome-were traditionally 
related to particular gods.47 Presumably here belong both the local, less 
important divinities mainly manifesting in the form of natural phenomena, 
conceived as operating natural forces, and the more important ones, invested 
with a certain cult and precisely defined personal characteristics, almost a 
personality-this coincides with the concept of Person-Bereichenheit, the 
concept of the unity of person and sphere of authority which for the antique 
man meant the unity and the simultaneity of the material component and the 
divinity of the given phenomenon.48 As Kerényi also notes: „Apollo-and every 
other Greek god-is a primordial type that was recognised by the Greeks as 
the metaphysical form of experienced spiritual and plastically contemplated 
natural realities."4y According to the conviction of ancient Romans the lack 
of a precise denomination does not mean that the augurium would have been 
the work of chance, and not the manifestation of a particular (personal) will. 
43
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The concept of divinities invested with a concretely defined personality is not 
excluded by the fact that they are not called by a precise name, it is enough to 
think of the text and the ritual of evocatio,50 belonging to the sphere of the ius 
sacrum, known from Macrobius,51 which, without mentioning names, appeals 
to personal gods and not impersonal forces.52 The image of Zeus, shaking the 
skies and the earth with a little movement of his head, as well as the image of 
Iuppiter can be frequently encountered.53 
It seems to be worth returning to the two oldest occurrences of the term 
in the constructions nomen et numen Iovis and nomen vestrum numenque in 
Accius. In both cases the expression numen is connected with the word 
nomen. Two widely differing opinions collide here. Wagenvoort thinks that 
this construction might help to grasp the historic moment when the concept of 
the personal God comes to existence as a development of the impersonal, 
magical force, just as the primary expression of numen is later associated with 
the secondary term nomen as the result of a kind of evolution.54 Conversely, 
Pötscher argues that the expressions numen and nomen are two different 
aspects of the same phenomenon without either of them being secondary to the 
other with regard to both their meaning and their chronology.55 This view is 
corroborated by the analogy taken from the functions of the Roman military 
leader, i. e. the ductus, the impérium and the auspicium are concepts appearing 
50
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51
 Macrobius: Saturnalia 3, 9, 7 - 8 . Si deus, si dea est, cui populus civitasque 
Carthaginensis est in tutela, teque maxime, ille qui urbis huius populique tutelam recepisti, 
precor venerorque veniamquea vobis peto ut vos populum civitatemque Carthaginensem 
deseratis, loca templa sacra urbemque eorum relinquatis, absque his abeatis eique populo 
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together, in juxtaposition, overlapping with one another but not altogether 
synonymous.56 These concepts express different aspects of the same office and 
it is highly unlikely that they would be only synonyms heaped together-the 
impérium primarily signifies the effective power of the commander but is also 
related to the religious sphere, in the case of auspicium the sacred element is 
dominant, at the same time it carries within itself the executive competence 
needed for its fulfillment.57 According to Wagenvoort, in Roman thinking, certain 
persons disposed of a special mana of their own, e. g. the imperátor-if the 
origin of the word is considered-has a creative fertilising power,58 and when, 
as a general, he ordered his soldiers to occupy an enemy camp, he conjured 
up the force necessary to carry out the order with the help of his magic words; 
hence it can be inferred that the impérium is nothing other than a form of 
transmitting a mysterious force.59 It cannot be disregarded that according to 
antique views, the name is never arbitrary but it always, thus in the case of 
gods as well, constitutes an integral part of personality; it was not by chance 
that they proceeded with such caution in the precise naming of the gods or in 
keeping their names in secret if it was necessary.60 
III. Payne thinks that it is not possible to understand Roman thinking with-
out understanding the triumphus,61 Although tradition knows about triumphus 
already held by Romulus, the ceremony of the triumphus is connected to the 
introduction of the cult of Iuppiter Capitolinus in the year 509 ВС.62 The last 
triumphus corresponding to all religious prescriptions were held at the end of 
56
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the 3rd century AD,63 the triumphus organised later-the custom well survived the 
fall of the empire-cannot be considered the continuation of the religious 
tradition.64 Although the political importance of the triumphus can hardly be 
overestimated, and countless examples can be found for its ahusus for profane 
purposes in Roman history, it must be kept in mind that the triumphus is 
originally a religious act65-both in the magic and the sacred sense of the 
word66-because, as it was mentioned in the introduction, in the course of 
this, the numen of the Iuppiter Capitolinus is incarnated in the triumphator,67 
In ancient times, the archaic triumphus, presumably taken over from the 
Etruscans, started from the Alban mountains, and according to the classic rite 
that had been formed through historical development, it proceeded according 
to the following itinerary: The procession started from the Campus Martius, got 
into the city through the Porta Triumphalis, there they presented the prescribed 
sacrifice, then headed towards the Porta Carmentalis-after the building of 
Circus Flaminius had been finished, the procession naturally touched it as 
well-originally they went across the Velabrum towards the Capitolium, later 
they went round the Palatinus along the Via Sacra to reach the same place.68 In 
the procession, the looted treasures, the weapons seized from the enemy, the 
sacrificial gifts, the group of captives, among whom the captive generals, 
rulers and their courts were followed by the triumphator himself, escorted by 
his officers and the soldiers of his army.69 The triumphator was standing on a 
two-wheeled, horse-drawn quadriga, holding an ivory sceptre with Iuppiter's 
bird the eagle in one hand and a laurel twig in the other, a slave standing 
behind him on the quadriga was holding a golden wreath above his head, he 
was wearing a laurel wreath on his head and festive clothes on his body, which 
63
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64
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he put down when he reached the Capitolium70 and he sacrificed a white bull 
to Iuppiter there.71 
The characterisics likening the general to Iuppiter, more precisely incarnating 
Iuppiter in him were the following: the triumphator's face was painted 
vermilion,72 the colour of the face of the Iuppiter Capitolinus's clay statue. 
The red painting on the face did not only serve his identification with Iuppiter, 
but it also symbolised blood thus investing the general with the magic power 
dwelling in blood,73 his clothes did not merely resemble the clothes of 
Iuppiter's statue but they were identical, as they took off the statue's clothes 
(this on the one hand meant the toga palmata, on the other hand the toga picta 
decorated with golden stars that was worn over it) to dress the triumphator 
in them.74 The triumphator was driving a quadriga like the one standing on 
the top of the temple of the Capitolium, where the above mentioned statue 
of Iuppiter was standing too.75 Many scholars, like Fowler76 and Deubner77 
attempted to deny that the triumphator represented Iuppiter and he was regarded 
as being Iuppiter for that period, but they could not shake the identifying view, 
counting as communis opinio in the literature on the subject.78 It is true that 
it is hard to interpret the duplicity according to which the triumphator who-
by virtue of the above identification-is none other than Iuppiter during this 
period, is heading towards Iuppiter's Temple on his quadriga in order to present 
sacrifice to the god there, thus Iuppiter's presence is somehow redoubled for this 
period. However, it must be taken into account that the contradiction that is 
rationally percieved in the triumphus but not disturbing the experience on the 
religious level cannot be reconciled according to the rules of linear logic,79 
it must also be observed that the divine character of the triumphator was 
gradually waning in the course of the ceremony until it completely ceased 
when he put down his wreath and his clothes at the statue.80 (The sacrifice 
70
 Plinius: Naturalis história 15, 133; Silius: Punica 15, 118. sqq. 
71
 Servius: Commentarius in Verg. Georg. 2, 146; Ehlers: op. cit. 493. sqq; Wissowa: 
op. cit. 126. sq; Köves-Zulauf: Bevezetés a római vallás... op. cit. 156. 
72
 Plinius: Naturalis história 33, 111; Servius: Commentarius in Verg. eel. 6, 22. 10, 27. 
73
 Köves-Zulauf: Bevezetés a római vallás... op. cit. 156. 
74
 Livius: 10, 7, 10; Suetonius: Augustus 94; Iuvenalis: Saturae 10, 38. 
75
 Dionysius Halicamassensis 9, 71, 4; Ovidius: Epistuae ex Ponto 2, 1, 58. 
76
 Fowler, W. W.: Iuppiter and the Triumphator. Classical Review 30. 1916. 153. sqq. 
77
 Deubner, L.: Die Tracht des römischen Triumphators. Hermes 69. 1934. 316. sqq. 
78
 About the controversial theses cf. Köves-Zulauf, Th.: Reden und Schweigen. 
Römische Religion bei Plinius Maior. München, 1972. 136. 
79
 Payne: op. cit. 57. sq. 
8(1
 Köves-Zulauf: Reden und Schweigen, op. cit. 136. 
ON SOME ASPECT OF THE ROMAN CONCEPT OF AUTHORITY 105 
presented on the Capitolium was followed by the ludi magni, which probably 
constituted an integral part of the triumphus; this seems to be corroborated by 
the fact that though the independent ludi magni separated from the triumphus 
itself appeared only later, the magistratus organising the games still appeared 
in the clothes resembling those of the triumphator, the date of the games were 
connected to the founding ceremony of the Capitolian Temple celebrated on 
the 13th of September.81) 
At the same time, the special position aquired by the triumphator through 
his temporary deification was carrying numerous dangers. The rational core 
of these dangers was the envy manifested towards the triumphator which 
embodied in the malocchio from the magical aspect, and in the ire of Nemesis 
and Fortuna from the religious aspect, against which they tried to defend the 
triumphator with the help of various preventive means well-known from antique 
magic, e. g. amulets put round his neck, bells fastened onto the quadriga that 
were meant to keep demons away, obscene accessories,82 as well as by singing 
satirical songs in order to belittle the glory of the triumphant general, thus 
diminishing the danger of divine envy.83 
However, more important than all these is the rite according to which the 
slave holding a golden wreath above the triumphator's head was shouting into 
his ears reminding him of his being human, as it is mentioned in a locus of 
Naturalis História by Plinius Maior.84 Köves-Zulauf thoroughly examined both 
the Plinian and the parallel loci85-with special attention to the hoti antrópoi 
eisin in Arrianos's text and the Hominem te memento! phrases in Tertullianus's 
and Hieronymus 's works-therefore we took over the recipere version in the 
Plinian text recommended by him instead of the respicere version, proposed 
by Ernout.86 A particular mixture can be traced in Fortuna's character: the 
81
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Romans regarded Fortuna as being an aspect of Nemesis87 thus she entered the 
Roman pantheon as the enemy of human intemperance and conceit; in this 
function she is rightly conferred the appositio of carnifex gloriae-thus being 
not only the enemy but the executioner of glory-which mutatis mutandis 
should be taken not only for Fortuna but also for the servus publicus, i.e. the 
triumphator-in order to defend him from hybris and in order to diminish his 
glory the way the satirical songs were meant to do-containing some kind of 
concealed threat as well. The godess's place in Plinius's text is exactly where 
the other sources localise the servus publicus, this also alludes to their 
symbolic identifiability, as well as to Envy watching from his back, ready 
to pounce on him.88 It is a question whether Fortuna and Nemesis had any 
concrete function in the liturgy of the triumphus, or the Plinian locus has got 
into the text as an element of the author's personal style of composition and 
message. Although there is no knowledge of any cultic prayer or ritual act 
addressed to Fortuna in the course of the triumphus, fear of the power of 
Fortuna and Nemesis probably occurred in the thoughts of the the triumphator,89 
as certain references seem to prove this. Plinius's wording testifies to the fact 
that perceiving Fortuna's power not only on the real but also on the religious 
level was at least not strange from the atmosphere of the triumphus.90 The 
restraining, moderative character of the recipere could be taken stricto sensu 
for the speed of the quadriga, i. e. the triumphator should proceed more slowly 
in his carriage (which-taking into account the ceremonial clothes, the sceptre 
and the laurel stick- was probably not driven by himself91) because in this way 
it could have moved away too much from his soldiers, making them rightly feel 
offended, as the triumphus was meant to recognise not only the triumphator's 
merits but their merits as well;92 at the same time, considering the magical 
religious atmosphere of the triumphus, it could carry a more abstract, spiritual 
meaning, fitting into the line of the rites of prevention. It can be legitimately 
asked what is the substantial difference between the textual variant recipe and 
that of respite. It is perhaps not necessary to treat more amply the literary 
historical and textual arguments proposed by Köves-Zulauf, which make his 
87
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version more plausible, it seems more important to give an overview of his 
conclusions drawn from the immanent structure of the triumphus,93 
The inadequacy of looking back is substantiated by other sources as 
well,94 emphasizing the rigid, statue-like posture of the triumphator modelling 
Iuppiter Capitolinus, meant to evoke the feeling of tremendum maiestatis, which 
completely harmonizes with the description of the Persian ruler's posture, 
probably influencing the formation of the rite of the triumphus relatively early.95 
It is possible to ponder on the fact that the prohibition of looking back is well-
known from mythology in cases when a given person is standing at the limit, 
the meeting point of two spheres, one negative, harmful, demonic,96 from the 
past, the other positive, fulfilling, pointing to the future. The story of Deucalion 
throwing stones behind his back is an example of the threat of the demonic 
sphere,97 or the ceremony of the magic digging out of the plant,98 looking back 
appears as the threat of losing the mission-fulfilling, positive future in numerous 
texts from both the Old and New Testaments.99 The equally strong presence of 
the two spheres is exemplified by the story of Orpheus looking back100 and by 
the story of Lot's wife.101 Several circumstances prohibiting looking back meet 
in the ceremony of the triumphus'. The triumphator is preparing to perform a 
religious act, the sacrifice dedicated to Iuppiter Capitolinus, in the most important 
moment of his life, he is returning from the scene of his triumph to the most 
sacred place of his motherland, in his back the power of Nemesis, the harmful 
force of the malocchio is watching.102 At the same time the prohibition of 
looking back seems to be corroborated by the circumstance that the triumphator, 
who will take off the divine insignia when reaching the sanctuary of Iuppiter 
Capitolinus, thus ending his temporary identification with the deity, would 
93
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hinder his own rehumanisation aimed at in fact by the entire ceremony, thus 
provoking Nemesis even more. 
IV. First let us take a brief overview-following mainly Taeger103 and Pötscher104-
of the literature of the numen Augusti problem. Toutain, somewhat simplifying 
the question, regards Augustus's numen and person as being basically the 
same, substantiating his views by stating that-especially for the provincial 
usage-the conceptual separation is too nuanced, almost hair-splitting.105 In his 
opinion he seems to forget the characteristic Roman religious tendency prone 
to atomizing and separation, which instead of synthetizing, connected clearly 
separable divine forces, so-called Sondergottheiten to numerous phenomena of 
everyday life, like the different phases of the life of corn.106 Pippidi identifies 
the concepts of numen Augusti and genius Augusti with each other,107 his view 
being challenged by Taeger, who, highlighting the fundamental differences 
between the cult of the numen and that of the genius categorically rejects the 
attempt at identifying numen Augusti and genius Augusti.108 In his opinion this 
cult was dedicated to Augustus's numen, i.e. the numinuous force present in 
the emperor as Augustus, to obtain a general cultic figure, not one connected to 
some particular function,109 the numen being a concept less strictly cultic than 
the genius, rather connected to experiencing of a given phenomenon as a 
religious experience.110 With regard to the problem of genius and numen 
Fishwick states that the numen Augusti phrase was frequently used instead of 
the construction genius Augusti but this does not mean at all that the term 
numen would have meant the same as the term genius.111 According to Latte 
the genius is the life-giving, personal creative power that dwels in man, never 
becoming abstract;112 this, naturally does not mean that a given god, a human, 
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or a corporation could not have possessed numen on the one hand and genius 
on the other in Roman thinking.113 The numen is rather a given momentary 
operation, a (divine) manifestation, involving a kind of extra energy.114 The 
divinity possesses genius, though it is not itself genius, at the same time, it 
possesses numen and-especially according to the Augustan and the subsequent 
terminology-is itself numen. This, however, does not solve the numen Augusti-
genius Augusti problem, because the term numen genii would be possible de 
iure, but it does not de facto appear in textual tradition, on the contrary, the 
construction genius numinis is somewhat problematic, especially with respect 
to the living princeps, considering the fact that-at least the emperors of the 
Augustan age-were not regarded stricto sensu, i.e. religiously revered gods in 
their lifetime.115 
Thus the emperor possessing numinousity, remained human throughout 
his life, even on the highest level of his exaltation, although, as it will be 
demonstrated, a human representing divine substance.116 In Roman think-
ing, the entry to the pantheon of certain abstract notions (e. g. Concordia, Pax, 
Salus) might have served as an analogy with the consecratio following the 
emperor s death.117 The veneration of the living and the deceased emperor are 
two more or less clearly separable mechanisms, because the deceased emperor 
became de iure god by the act of consecratio,118 hence he was entitled to the 
divus attributum-which, though it contained a kind of distinction between the 
eternally venerated gods and the people who became, or were declared divine 
after their death, as it is pointed out by Servius,119 this distinction was bearing 
grammatical rather than cultic relevance.120 The numen attributed to the ruler-
because it is an independent concept-cannot be considered identical with 
the ruler's genius although, considering its origins, it incorporates some of 
its aspects.121 At the same time, to a certain extent, it can be related to the 
hellenistic, eyergetes image of the ruler, which can be regarded as being one of 
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the sources of the Roman cult of the emperor. Nevertheless, the most important 
point remains that mentioning the numen of the ruler they invariably meant a 
special supernatural force and reality and if,-as Cicero mentions it as well122-
the unified, consenting Senate can possess numen, than the living princeps can 
possess numen as well. The fact that it possesses numen, a numinous force, 
does not necessarily mean-at the same time not so much by virtue of the 
consecratio but rather the as a result of the unconscious associations evoked 
by the rites surrounding his person-that he would become a numen, i.e. a 
divinity. By the fact that the numen Augusti was cultically venerated already 
during the life of the princeps, it was not primarily Augustus 's person that 
partook of religious hommage, but the numinous, manaistic force, the numen 
praesens, manifested for his subjects through his person.123 At the same time, 
establishing the precise borderline causes difficulty because although it is true 
that Augustus did not become divus in his lifetime, he accepted the title Divi 
filius after Caesar, who became Divus Iulius in the year 42 ВС.124 It is in 
perfect accordance with the above that Augustus was first given the right to 
wear the wreath of the triumphator during all his public appearances,125 
then, in the year 19 he obtained the privilege to wear the vestments of the 
triumphator in addition to the wreath, on the first day of each year,126 thus he 
could appear among his subjects as the image of Iuppiter Optimus Maximus 
of the Capitolium. According to Suetonius, the future greatness of the later 
Augustus was predicted to his father by a dyonisian augury in a dream when 
he saw his son invested with the ornaments of Iuppiter Optimus Maximus.127 
(It is worth noting that representing Augustus as Iuppiter was part of the 
private cult, but Servius knows of a statue of Augustus which represented the 
ruler in complete Appolonian vestments.128) 
Thus it can be legitimately inferred that religious and dynamistic ideas played 
a role in Octavianus's becoming Augustus in the year 27 ВС., because preceding 
him this epiteton had not been used for persons but only for sanctified things 
and cultic accessories, the word augusm originally meaning nothing else than 
the one that has been augmented,130 The construction august urn augurium first 
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occurs in the Annales by Ennius,131 on the textile made by Athene, described 
in Ovidius's Metamorphoses, twelve Olympian gods can be seen who are 
sitting on their thrones with augusta gravitate, i.e. in human form but with an 
authority in their personality that exceeds human measure.132 This expression 
can be encountered twice in connection with Hercules, who is recognised by 
Euander in Livius becuse of his supernatural character, his emanation, habitum 
formanque,m and who appears in a corresponding shape with the occasion of 
his rising to heaven in Ovidius as well.134 The poet explains the expression in 
accordance with the dynamistic connotations: "Sancta vocant augusta patres, 
augusta vocantur templa sacerdotum rite dicata manu. Huius et augurium 
dependet origine verbi et quodcumque sua Iuppiter auget ope."135 This denomi-
nation thus immanently carries within itself the substance standing beyond the 
human sphere, growing into the divine sphere, and, though this is not being 
defined each time the word is uttered,136 it exerts its influence going deeper and 
originating deeper than any definition by means of unconscious associations, 
it is not by chance that in order to illustrate this Altheim quotes Vitruvius's 
address to Augustus: divina tua mens et numen, imperátor Caesar.137 A reference 
to the same creative act can be found in Suetonius when he says that the glory 
of permanent fame, the gift of the immortal gods will be received by those who 
increased the power of the Roman people from the smallest to the greatest 
measure.138 Thus the word augustus derives from the verb augere, and is 
cognate with the term augurium, synonymous with sanctus, and even more 
with the expression sacer,139 which receives its character from the sanctification 
performed by the sacerdos (see also sacer-dare).m However, the sanctification 
could be carried out only by a person, the augur, who had the numinous 
ability, the auctoritas to increase the тапа.ш 
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Considering the Roman concept of religio one must place great emphasis 
on the experience of numinousity to reflect its special relationships, as C. G. 
Jung (based on Otto Rudolf's views142) defines religion as a dynamic (i.e. full 
of dynamos-see also the identifiability of the concept of numen with the Greek 
dynamos) existence or influence affecting the human subject from the outside, 
getting possesion over him.143 The main characteristic of the archetype can 
be found precisely in its numinousity because the archetypal situations and 
images generate an emotional and temperál overcharge, thus eliciting the 
feeling of tremendum maiestatis from the conscience. Jung defines the origin 
and gist of the mana as the archetype being present in the collective un-
conscious, which appears as a person possessing power and authority, e. g. the 
hero and the godman:144 It is in complete harmony with this that the operation 
of the numinosum seizes and dominates the human subject, the subject being 
rather the victim of this operation than its originator, thus it is independent of 
the subject's will.145 
It is worth taking a quick glance at how the concept of impérium is related 
to the concept of numen, and the concept of auctoritas augmenting and 
expressing the capacity of numinousity by its creative function even on the 
level of historical reality. It could be seen that the religious and military leader 
(both functions being fulfilled in the beginning by the rex in Rome) posesses 
mana-'ds he activates the archetype of the divine leader and that of the hero on 
the level of the collective unconscious.146 His mana enables him to increase the 
fertility of the land, as it can be seen from ethnological examples. According to 
this in Wagenvoort's interpretation imperare originally did not mean anything 
else but to call to life, to fertilise, as the general-who ordered (imperabat) his 
soldiers to attack an enemy camp-conjured up, created the force necessary to 
carry out the mission with the help of his magic words, thus he draws the 
conclusion that the impérium is nothing else than the ability of creating and 
transmitting a mysterious power.147 Köves-Zulauf mentions as a specificity of 
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this: „the particular interest of the issue, not to be discussed in great detail 
here, is that par ere (to bear) is a typically feminine word, wheras impérium 
was exclusively possessed by men."148 
Without endeavouring to thoroughy explain this phenomenon let proceed 
again from C. G. Jung 's definition of the Mana-Persönlichkeit, according to 
which it is nothing else than the archetype of the power-possessing man 
figure dwelling in the collective unconscious which dominates the conscious 
personality and takes over the autonomuos power and value of the anima, and 
later, the identification with this figure creates the idea of possessing the mana 
of the anima.149 By this, although the consciuous did not prevail over the 
unconscious, it integrated the power of its representative, the anima to such 
an extent that the possibilty of a more direct connection between the ego and 
the unconscious was created, through which the ego aquired the identification 
with its ideal which exercises higher power, the one posessing the power of the 
mana, the außergewöhnlich Wirkungsvoll, thus becoming a wana-personality.150 
Thus one becomes a leader capable of evoking the archetype of the possessor 
of power, one who has the ability in the strictest sense of the word to create, 
to bear-this ability is designated by the typically feminine word imperium-
certain ideas of power in others by virtue of his harmonious relationship with 
the anima. (The leader living in disharmony with the anima also evokes the 
archetype of the manaistic personality, in his subjects, but precisely due to this 
disharmony, by which the power of the anima prevails over him, he becomes 
destructive, he cannot appropriate the impérium that is creative-this creativity 
being also shown by the word's etymology.) 
Augustus achieved the stability of his legitimation by the superior handling 
of the associational points connected to the auctoritas, the impérium and the 
numen, with the help of transferring the formation called-to use Max Weber's 
formula-charismatic legitimation into the construction called traditional legiti-
mation. The numen Augusti compositum organically fits into the Roman religious 
system, as on the one hand it evokes in the subjects the concept of the numen, 
the divine presence and dynamistic operational mode, on the other hand it 
evokes the augus, the numinous experience of the charismatic leader, possessing 
the augmenting, creative ability, the mana. Köves-Zulauf s characterisation 
constitutes a convenient parallel, giving a synthesis of the Roman religion's 
relationship with language: „Therefore, Roman religion is the religion of 
148
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discipline, of repression, of anxiety, not of eliberated relief, as the Greek ... 
From here ensues the neurotic relationship of Roman religion with speech."151 
As it could be seen it is not only the Romans' relationship with speech that 
is relatively neurotic, but also their general relationship with the numinous 
experiences of religion, as their relationship with the above analysed archetypal 
phenomena is basically negative, refusing. This should not necessarily be the 
case as „ the archetype is in itself neither positive nor negative but a morally 
neutral numen that becomes good or bad only as a result of its collision with 
the conscience."152 It is precisely this neurosis inherent in Roman religion, 
constituting its most basic part that is used by the reigning power-so as to ensure 
its unquestionability-with the elevation of the concept of authority to numinous 
regions, generating the feeling of tremendum maiestatis. 
151
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A Short Review of the History of the Hungarian 
Privatization 
Abstract. This article is intended to give a short synopsis on the history of the Hungarian 
privatization, which has not been fully finished yet, but the most important aims however have 
been accomplished. As this issue is rather a complex one, having also legal and economic 
nature, one cannot avoid providing a short historical introduction from legal and economic 
aspects. Therefore the author also outlines the most significant elements of the changes in the 
system of the Hungarian ownership at the beginning of the 1990s, which can be featured as the 
transaction from planned economy into market-economy. 
After the introduction the author describes the most important steps of the Hungarian 
privatization, which can be summed up as follows: (i) stage of spontaneous privatization 
(1985-1989); (ii) stage of state-controlled privatization (1990); (Hi) stage of state-"directed" 
privatization (1990-1991); (iv) stage of privatization under the SPA/-programmes (1991-
1992); (v) stage of self-privatization (1992-1995); (vi) the "third" regulation of privatization, 
strategic privatization (1995-). 
The author also pays attention to the analysis of the relevant legal rules, which are or used 
to be in effect regulating privatization. The author also highlights that the law of Hungarian 
privatization cannot be thoroughly studied without taking into consideration the economic 
goals and economic characteristics of Hungary, as well. 
Keywords: law and economy, Hungarian law, company law, law of privatization, history 
of privatization. 
The present study is intended to provide a brief summary of the history of 
privatization in Hungary, without pretending to be exhaustive in several respects. 
One of the primary reasons lies in space limitations, for a historically rather 
prolonged process of over 15 years, abound in complicated economic, legal 
and political interrelationships, cannot be described on a few pages except 
in no more than scanty outlines.1 Privatization in Hungary has not yet been 
Junior research fel low, Institute for Legal Studies, H-1014, Budapest, Országház u. 
30., Hungary 
E-mail: adambooc@hotmai l .com 
' For a rather detailed exposition of the process privatization in Hungary between 
1989 and 1997, see in particular Mihályi, P.: A magyar privatizáció krónikája, 1989-1997 
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completed entirely even today, although there is no doubt that a very important 
stage thereof has been closed. As was pointed out by Tamás Sárközy, private 
ownership had encompassed about 85% of the national wealth by the turn 
of the millennium.2 At the time, the completion or conclusion of privatization 
can be seen as a question of current politics when the present study is being 
written. This complexity of problems has practically been on the agenda ever 
since the coalition government of Socialists and Free Democrats was formed in 
2002, and it has received even greater emphasis since the change in Prime 
Ministers early in the fall of 2004, which involved another shift in government 
in accordance with the rules governing the Hungarian constitutional organiza-
tion of the State. This will be treated in a later section of my study. 
In consideration of what I have set out above I can not but seek to outline 
the most essential aspects of privatization in Hungary and to sum up the main 
provisions of the relevant legislative enactments. From this it follows, furthermore 
that the present study will not be concerned with certain economic consequences 
of privatization. Although it is true that certain economic effects of privatization 
have long been felt, some of the longer-term economic implications should be 
expected to come into the open in times ahead.3 
A statement to this effect may even be made nolente-volente in respect to 
the subsystem of law. The dumping of economic regulations in the early 1990s 
obviously reflected the impact of the period as well as of the circumstances 
in which the relevant legislative provisions were adopted. The upshot of all this 
made itself felt at the level of legislation or legal practice in the space of a few 
years. In some questions or concrete legal cases, however, such as litigations 
connected with privatization, the legislative provisions adopted at the time 
continue to have significant effects and may even today exert a fundamental 
influence on certain legal relations between subjects at law of economic life. 
(A Chronicle of Privatization in Hungary, 1989-1997), Budapest, 1998. For a history of 
privatization in Hungary up to 1993 in English, see in particular Frydman, E.-Rapaczynski, 
A.-Earle, J. S. et alii: The Privatization Process in Central Europe, vol. I. Budapest -London-
New York, 1993. 95-145. 
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bályozása (The Transformation of the Hungarian Property Regime and the Hungarian 
Regulation of Privatization). In: Török, G. (ed.): A tulajdonjogi rendszer változásai a XX. 
század végére (Changes in the Property Regime by the End of the 20th Century). Budapest, 
2001. 70. 
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The history of privatization in Hungary so far can be periodized from several 
aspects. Perhaps the possibility of a periodization in a historical perspective is 
not yet at hand, because the necessary long-term view does not yet exist for 
objective reasons. At any rate, privatization in Hungary can be divided into 
the following periods, it being understood that the different periods are well 
characterized by the main legislative provisions adopted in the particular 
periods, notably 
1. stage of spontaneous privatization (1985-1989); 
2. stage of state-controlled privatization (1990); 
3. stage of state-"directed" privatization (1990-1991); 
4. stage of privatization under the SPA (Short for State Property Agency 
(Hungarian AVÜ, short for Állami Vagyonügynökség)-programmes (1991-
1992); 
5. stage of self-privatization (1992-1995); 
6. the "third" regulation of privatization, strategic privatization (1995-). 
Evidently, other periodizations of privatization are equally possible, and, 
as it has been indicated, the researcher of a later period will also be able to 
discover other relevant momentous stages of privatization. However, before 
I examine the different stages of privatization through an interpretation of the 
relevant legislative provisions, it appears appropriate to discuss the causes 
underlying privatization and to point up the basic conditions thereof. 
I I . 
As it is known, the turn of 1948 made Hungary a part of the so-called eastern 
or people's democratic bloc. Apart from the rather short-lived Council Republic 
of 1919, there was introduced in this country a form of government practically 
without any tradition. As it was stated in the Constitution of 1949, Hungary 
became a People's Republic, which survived down to the proclamation of the 
Republic in 1989. The people's democratic form of government followed the 
Soviet-type political system and was based on a single-party State. For the 
present consideration, it means above all that the State's unity as owner and 
public power was consummated, which is to say that national property meant 
state property in the first place. Emphasis is deserved in this respect by original 
Art. 4 of the Constitution (Act XX of 1949), reading as follows: 
"Art. 4. (1) In the Hungarian People's Republic the bulk of the means of 
production is owned as public property by the state, by public bodies or by 
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cooperative organizations. Means of production may also be privately 
owned. 
(2) In the Hungarian People's Republic the force directing the national 
economy is the state power of the people. The working people gradually 
dislodge the capitalist elements and consistently build up a socialist system 
of the economy." 
A relevant provision concerning property relations is also contained in Art. 6, 
which reads as follows: 
"Art. 6. The mineral resources, the forests the waters, the natural sources of 
power, the mines, the large industrial enterprise, the means of communi-
cation such as railways, road, water and air transports, the banks, the postal, 
telegraph and telephone services, the wireless, the state-sponsored agricultural 
enterprises such as state farms, machine stations, irrigation works and the 
like are the property of the state and of public bodies as trustees for the 
whole people. All foreign and all wholesale trade is carried on by state 
enterprises, all other trade is under state supervision." 
At the same time the Constitution recognized property acquired by labour 
(para. 1 of Art. 8), but Art. 8 (2) provided that private enterprise and private 
property must not prejudice the public interest. From this it appears plastically 
that private property merely receives, in point of fact, subsidiary recognition 
and that, contrary to the centuries-old development traceable to Roman law,4 
the economic and social order of the one-time People's Republic reflected an 
effort to grant a privileged status to public or state property.5 Recognition of 
property acquired by labour also implies the necessity of examining the origin 
of property. Nor is it accidental that the socialist legal order often contrasts 
personal property with private property, a concept embracing things capable of 
ownership by private persons.6 
4
 As it is known, Roman law was basically grounded on private property, and this state-
men t can be deemed to be true even if one considers that, at the time of its emergence, 
R o m a n property cannot naturally be identif ied with the property concept of modem times. 
See in particular Diósdi, GY.: Ownership in Ancient and Preclassical Roman Law. 
Budapest , 1970. 
5
 For an analysis of the socialist constitution, see in particular Bihari, О.: A szocialista 
államszervezet alkotmányos modelljei (Constitutional Models of the Socialist State 
Organization). Budapest , 1983. 
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This property regime is basically noticeable in the Civil Code (Act IV of 
1959) as amended several times. The category of the law of things is relegated 
to the background under the regime covered by the Civil Code.7 Property in 
socialism is postulated as a relationship between people rather than between 
people and things. This is likewise revealed by the structure of the Civil Code, in 
which the law of persons is followed, as the third part, by the law of property 
rather than the law of things. It should be stressed that the same arrangement 
prevailed in the other socialist countries, as well. In Bulgaria, for instance, the 
Property Act of 1951 (Zakon za sobstvenosta) contained similar regulations, 
while similar principles were formulated by the Czechoslovak Civil Code of 
1964 (Obcansky Zákoník).8 This solution is, to some extent, contrary to the 
regime governed by the Pandectist codes in the narrower sense; under it, the 
rights in rem play a fundamental role as rights of a person in his own things or 
in things of others.9 
In conjunction with this it is necessary to refer to the fact that commercial 
law or some parts thereof (company law, law of securities, law of competition, 
etc.) practically ceased to be applied. The Commercial Code (Act XXXVII 
of 1875) formally remained in effect and retained a certain role until the adoption 
of the new Act on the Law of Associations, as will be discussed at a later stage. 
Of course, non-application of the legislative provisions relating to commerce 
7
 The Civil Code borrowed the concept of personal property from the Soviet 
Constitution. Original Articles 92 and 93 of the Civil Code provide the following: 
"Art. 92. (1) Goods directly serving or promoting the satisfaction of citizens' personal 
needs (family homes, furnishings and articles for personal use, etc.) are personal property. 
(2) Assets belonging to household plots, serving the purpose of auxiliary farming are 
also personal property. 
(3) The law may determine the size of dwelling-houses that can be personal property. 
Art. 93. The owner may make free use of his personal property for the satisfaction of his 
personal needs." 
Although the Civil Code id Hungary's first code of private law, mention is deserved by 
the fact that the Draft Private Law of 1928, which did not c o m e into force, commanded 
much attention on the part of courts. See in particular Hamza , G.: Az európai magánjog 
fejlődése. A modern magánjogi rendszerek kialakulása a római jogi hagyományok alapján 
(The Development of European Private Law. The Emergence of Modem Private-Law 
Systems on the Basis of Roman-Law Traditions). Budapest, 2002. 176-177. 
8
 See Hamza, G.: Die Entwicklung des Privatrechts auf römischrechtlicher Grundlage 
unter besonderer Berücksichtigung in Deutschland, Osterreich, der Schweiz und Ungarn. 
Budapest, 2002. 184 and 227. 
9
 See in particular Lent , F.-Schwar, К. H.: Sachenrecht. Ein Studienbuch. München, 
1976. 3 - 5 . 
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greatly hindered the process of legislation on economic matters at the beginning 
of the 1990s. 
It stands to reasons that the Socialist state organization based on public 
property intended to create the economic possibilities for that property regime. 
It should be stressed that this was done in some measure on the basis of the 
principle of filius ante patrem, since nationalizations had partially started as far 
back as 1945. On 17 March 1945 there was issued a Government Decree on the 
land reform. On 6 December 1945 a decision of the National Assembly took 
coal mines and electricity works into public ownership. In terms of figures this 
means that before 1945 private property had a share of about 60% in the sphere 
of production, whereas in 1988 the share of state property was about 92,9%, 
thanks, among others, to the nationalizations effected in the 1940s and the 
1950s.10 
A role in shaping the structure of industry was played, along with nationa-
lizations, by the fact that during the said period, in the late 1940s and the early 
1950s, the State itself formed numerous large enterprises, which were held by 
the State. According to the contemporary legislative enactments, the founder 
of a state enterprise was the competent sectoral ministry, and the foundation 
document of the foundation document of the state enterprise was also signed 
by the sectoral minister himself. This period saw the foundation of several 
enterprises, which are still operating, are not naturally state-owned any more, 
but were later transformed or privatized.11 The contemporary structure of the state 
enterprise was, of course, a true reflection of the prevalent economic concep-
tions, under which Hungary was to become a big power in heavy industry. Even 
if that did not come to pass, it may be said that the large enterprise structure 
became a determinant element of the Hungarian economy, or the people's economy 
as it was called at the time. 
The Hungarian agriculture was collectivized, also on the Soviet model, 
practically as the result of forcible entry into cooperative farms. Politics thought 
cooperative land ownership to be temporary, on the understanding that the final 
goal was to be complete nationalization, the adequate form of which was the 
state farm. The law of cooperatives, their structure and the transformations in the 
10
 Mezey, B. (ed.): Magyar jogtörténet (History of Hungarian Law), Budapest, 1996. 198. 
' ' To give an example in the field of the building industry, the public buildings construction 
company was such an enterprise in overground construction. After the systemic change it 
became a public buildings construction corp. and today it is known as European Construction 
Corp. 
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wake of the systemic change will not be discussed in the present study, as they 
are not closely related to our topic.12 
The system of economic direction was based on plan instructions, which is 
to say that one can speak of a planned economy which-now a commonplace-
had no particular regard for the needs and challenges of the market. It may 
nevertheless be said that certain forms of privatization, the so-called sponta-
neous privatization, had emerged as early as the 1980s. However, one should 
go back to 1968, the year of the introduction of the new economic mechanism, 
for an explanation. Without giving a detailed analysis of that mechanism here 
and now, I cannot fail to emphasize that the new economic mechanism went 
munch further than the command economy did to make allowance for profit 
orientation, enterprise autonomy and market coordination.13 Although the 1970s 
witnessed a certain degree of recession after the introduction of the economic 
mechanism, the larger measure of enterprise autonomy can be presumed to 
have contributed to the creation of possibilities for future privatization. 
It is Decree No. 28/1972. (IV. 3.) of the Minister of Finance and Act VI of 
1977 that can be said to have shown the first signs of enterprise autonomy in the 
domain of law. The Decree of the Minister of Finance was concerned with 
economic associations operating with foreign participation and allowed western 
enterprises to establish associations as a kind of joint venture with Hungarian 
enterprises on Hungarian territory. The suitable legal form was represented, 
mutatis mutandis, by the limited liability company and the joint stock company14 
as covered the Commercial Code of 1875 referred to above. On the other hand, 
Act VI of 1977 dealt with enterprises. While in its original version that Act 
provided for the sectoral direction of state enterprises and laid emphasis on 
supervision by the founding organization, it regulated in detail the respon-
sibilities of the directors of state enterprises and the participation of workers in 
direction. Art. 27 (3) of the Enterprises Act contained an extremely important 
provision on enterprise assets: 
12
 A concise overview of the Hungarian law of cooperatives is provided by Mrs. Domé, 
GY.: A szövetkezetek jogi szabályozásának múltja, jelene és jövője (The Past, Present and 
Future of the Legal Regulation of Cooperatives). Veres-emlékkönyv (Essays Presented to 
Veres), 1999. 79-93 . 
13
 For a summary see Frydman, R.-Rapaczynski, A.-Earle, J. S. et alii; op. cit. 95-96. 
For some legal questions of the new economic mechanism, see Feszti, N.-Tamás, L.: Az új 
gazdasági mechanizmus polgári jogi vonatkozásainak néhány problémája (Some Problems 
concerning the Civil-Law Aspec t s of the New Economic Mechanism) . Studia Iuridica 
Auctoritate Universitatis Pécs Publicata 54 (1969), 3-36. 
14
 See Sárközy, T.: A magyar tulajdoni rendszer... op. cit. 75. 
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"Art. 27. (3) The enterprise shall be responsible for its obligations with the 
assets entrusted to and managed by it." 
The creation of a certain degree of financial independence is to be interpreted 
in close relationship with the provisions of Act III of 1974 on Foreign Trade, 
which stated this: 
"Art. 13. In the interest of building its foreign market organization an 
enterprise entitled to engage in foreign trade may, within the limitations 
established by law, appoint delegates abroad, employ a foreign natural or 
legal person as commercial representative, set up a representation, a branch 
or an office, found an enterprise or obtain enterprise interests abroad." 
As it can be seen, this Act allowed state enterprises to acquire a right of its 
own to carry on foreign trade and, in given cases, to operate a representation 
abroad. In addition to implying numerous career opportunities, the permission 
to engage in foreign trade not only involved participation in economic activities 
abroad, but also contributed significantly to the development of enterprise 
autonomy, which can therefore be seen as a precondition for future privati-
zation as well.15 
III. 
By the early 1980s Hungary had witnessed the emergence of a special economic 
order, owing to a considerable degree of national indebtedness at one extreme 
and, at the other, to the rise of what Tamás Bauer called neither a planned nor 
a market economy, as was also embodied in numerous legislative provisions. 
On the one hand-at the level of small undertakings-this was manifested 
in the adaptation of the civil-law society, as known to the Civil Code, to 
economic activity, a dogmatically not too fortunate solution, for the civil-law 
society was not basically destined to serve economic purposes. This form of 
civil-law society clearly reminds us more of the limited partnership or the 
general partnership, which can be regarded as the traditional partnerships 
15
 For A summary of legal regulations on foreign trade, see Vattay, GY. (ed.): A külkeres-
kedelmi tevékenység jogi kézikönyve (A Legal Handbook of Foreign Trade Activities). 
Budapest, 1991. For a summary of enterprise law of that time, see Sárközy, T.: A szocialista 
vállalatelmélet jogtudományi alapjaihoz (To the Juridical Foundations of the Socialist 
Enterprise Theory). Budapest, 1981. 
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covered by commercial law. It is to be mentioned that, from 1978 onwards, 
artisans-three of them at the most-had been permitted to form general partner-
ships, but no scope was left for cooperation between other forms of association 
(e.g. silent partnership). Clearly enough, all this was far from confirming to 
the basic constitutional principle of economic undertaking. 
On the other hand, introduced by Law-Decree No. 15 of 1981, the business 
partnership represented a special form of economic cooperation. It was allowed 
to consist of not more than 30 members or employees, but it could be considered 
to be a genuine form of small undertaking.16 A great number of business partner-
ships had been formed until the adoption of the first Act on economic 
associations, and it was only the second Act on economic associations (Act 
CXLIV of 1997) which required the business partnership or the business 
partnership operating with the liability of a legal entity to be transformed into a 
general partnership within two years from the entry into force of the Act, while 
entitling it to be transformed into some other economic association, too.17 
The contemporary legislation of the greatest importance to the large enterprise 
structure was Law Decree No. 23 of 1984. which introduced a significant reform18 
by allowing establishment of the self-governing enterprise with an enterprise 
council and the workers' general meeting, these organs being even competent 
to appoint the director, who also had a considerable say in the composition of 
the said bodies, so that this arrangement led to a notable interaction of the 
posts involved, that is to say that a momentum for a kind of symbiosis between 
them was generated by the law itself. One might as well say with some 
simplification that the enterprise council performed several such functions 
as were referred to the competence of the highest organ in the case of an 
economic association.19 
16
 On its entry into force the old Associations Act included provisions on the business 
partnership, while repealing Law-Decree No. 11 of 1985. 
17
 Art. 300 (3) of Act CXLIV of 1997 on Economic Associations contains the follow-
ing provision: "By modifying its contract of association within two years f r om the entry 
into force of this Act. the business par tnership or the business partnership operating with 
the liability of a legal entity may cont inue to operate as a general par tnership, or the 
business partnership shall be transformed into another economic association. If it fails to 
do so, the Registry Court shall declare it to be defunct." Also see Lenkovics, В.: A szocia-
lista vállalkozási formák polgári jogi kérdései (Civil-Law Questions of the Socialist Forms 
of Undertaking). Budapest, 1983. 
18
 The full title of the Law-Decree is law-Degree No. 23 of 1984 instructing economic 
organizations to engage in specific economic activities. 
19
 For example, Art. 8, para. 1 (a), of the Decree enforcing the Enterprise Act provides 
that the enterprise council is entitled to aspect the balance sheet of the enterprise, which is 
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From the foregoing one may draw the conclusion that, owing precisely to 
the aforementioned structural elements and reforms, the Hungarian economy 
was not prepared for privatization, for an economic transformation, in as small 
a measure as the other people's democratic states of the eastern bloc were. As 
against the Balkan people's democratic countries or the Soviet Union, for 
instance, it was Poland and one-time Czechoslovakia that could be regarded as 
such "socialist reformer countries" (Tamás Sárközy).20 
As compared with Western European or American privatizations, privati-
zation in Hungary certainly exhibits a specific feature in that there was a need 
here not only for privatization, but, on the one hand, for the appropriate transfor-
mation of the enterprises to be privatized and, on the other, for a simultaneous 
settlement of economic issues by high-level legislation, notably for a fundamental 
economic legislation as well.21 Relying on a graphic description by Tamás 
Sárközy, one can detect a significant difference between efforts to privatize 
the shares of British Petrol by, e.g., introducing them in a stock exchange or 
in a market with an otherwise significant purchasing power, or to subject to 
privatization, for example, a State Hair-Dressing Enterprise in a society that is 
not based on the primacy of private property and hence not markedly rich as 
regards its broad segments. 
Although one should pay heed to the thesis-like statement that privatization 
is to be construed as termination of state ownership in favour of non-state 
owners (namely that privatization involves a change on owners),22 adoption of 
the first institutionalized measures called for a legislative enactment on associations. 
The first Associations Act (Act VI of 1988 on Economic Associations, the old 
Associations Act) created the institutional frameworks necessary for effecting 
the otherwise spontaneous privatizations not controlled by the State.23 
typically a responsibility or right that, in the case of an economic association, must be 
conferred on the highest organ. 
20
 For a summary of privatization in Central and Eastern Europe, see Sándor, I.: Privati-
záció Közép- és Kelet-Európában (Privatization in Central and Eastern Europe), in: Czuczai, J.: 
A magyar privatizáció alulnézetből (Privatization in Hungary f rom Bottom-View), Budapest, 
1994. 177-236. 
21
 For privatization in Western Europe, see in particular Sándor, I.: Privatizáció Nyugat-
és Kelet Európában (Privatization in Western and Eastern Europe), in: Török, G. (ed.): A 
tulajdoni rendszer változásai... op. cit. 46—70. 
22
 See Sárközy, T.: A privatizáció joga Magyarországon (1989-1993) [The Law of 
Privatization in Hungary (1989-1993)]. Budapest, 1993. 48. 
23
 It may be mentioned as a point of interest that the Commercial Code (Act XXXVII of 
1875)-with the exception of its provisions on commercial bonds and warehouse transactions-
was repealed by the old Associations Act. 
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The old Associations Act-just as Act CXLIV of 1997 on Economic Associ-
ations, which succeeded it-rests on a dualist concept, meaning that the forms 
of economic association are regulated by legislative provision in a manner 
different from regulation by the Civil Code, or the Code of Private Law.24 
What the old Associations Act sought to establish was a system differing from 
that created by the former socialist legislation in a socialist state organization 
then still existing.25 The changing needs of the economy and, not least, the 
requirements of the changed international political environment 
"... made a case for an enterprise system resting on the following pillars: the 
freedom of economic undertaking and of association; economic units based on 
a shareholders' system, notably associations, cooperatives, individual under-
takings and firms, and other units (e.g. state enterprises, non-profit companies, 
subject to duly differentiated rules)."26 (quoted from Ferenc Mádl) 
At the same time, the first version of the old Associations Act imposed 
some additional restrictions. For example, a natural person was not entitled to 
form a one-man joint stock company, or associations in exclusively private 
ownership were allowed to employ not more than 500 workers. Of course, it 
became relatively quickly possible for these restrictions to be sidestepped by 
founding several one-man limited liability companies, each employing 500 
workers separately. Foreign investors were similarly accorded appropriate 
possibilities, coming to find themselves in the same position as Hungarian 
entrepreneurs. It is to be noted that for only one year up to 1 January 1990, 
namely after the entry into force of the old Associations Act, the joint permission 
of the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Trade was required for an 
economic association to possess foreign property in excess of 50%.27 
24
 On the question of the monist and dualist concepts, see in particular Vékás, L.: Az új 
Polgári Törvénykönyv elméleti előkérdései (Theorical Preliminary Questions of the New 
Civil Code). Budapest, 2001. 38-74. 
25
 The old Associations Act came into force on 1 January 1989, when Hungary was 
characterized by the one-party system and the fo rm of government was the people ' s 
republic. As mentioned earlier, the Republic was proclaimed on 23 October 1989. 
26
 See Mádl, F.: Állam és gazdaság. Forradalom a jog útjain a Közép- és Kelet-európai 
országokban (State and Economy. Revolution Treading the Paths of Law in the Central and 
Easten European Countries). Budapest, 1997. 52. 
27
 Art. 8. (1) of the old Associations Act stated the following: "The joint permission of 
the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Trade shall be required for the foundation of an 
economic association mostly or entirely in foreign ownership, for transformation into such 
association, and for acquisition of a majority share by foreigners, such permission to include 
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It should be stressed that in 1988 a separate Act (Act XXIV of 1988) was 
passed on foreign investments in Hungary. The Act sought to promote inter-
national economic cooperation and to encourage inflows to Hungary of foreign 
working capital. It is still in effect and contains highly relevant provisions in 
respect of, e.g., companies in customs-free zones. 
In view of the foregoing it can be stated that the old Associations Act 
had created the particular institutional frameworks required for the switch to a 
market economy, since it was familiar with the most fundamental forms of 
association, such as general partnership, limited partnership, merger, joint 
venture, limited liability company, and joint stock company.28 (It should be 
underlined that, unlike the German law of association, the Hungarian law of 
association is unfamiliar with the concept of "partnership limited by shares".) Of 
course, the old Associations Act was not by itself sufficient to adequately regulate 
all economic legal relations as there was a need for legislation on the money 
market, registry procedure and bankruptcy as well. All of the related norms had 
to be elaborated within a rather short period of time, considering the need for a 
relatively rapid regulation appropriate to the specific requirements of the econ-
omy, and, owing to the nature of the socialist economic order, the said legislative 
provisions had previously been absent from the Hungarian legal system.29 
Act XIII of 1989 on the transformation of economic organizations and 
economic associations (Transformation Act) was the first legislative enactment 
more closely related to privatization. On the one hand, it allowed transforma-
tion of the formed small undertakings (e.g. business partnership) into economic 
associations and, on the other, it left room for large enterprises to be transformed 
into an economic association, chiefly joint stock company or limited liability 
company. It could not yet be regarded as an ex asse privatisation Act, since it 
did not ordain privatisation of state property, which has proved to be an essential 
element of privatisation, but created a kind of possibility for privatization. At 
the same time it was particular useful to spontaneous privatization, which 
a permit of the foreign exchange authority. The permission shall be deemed to be granted if 
the application was not rejected within 90 days of its submission." 
28
 See Gábor, F. A.: The Quest for Transformation to a Market Economy: Privatization 
and Foreign Investment in Hungary. Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 24 (1991), 
269-303. 
24
 In connection with bankruptcy proceedings, currently governed by Act XLIX of 
1991, it should be noted that Law-Decree No. 11 of 1986 on the Liquidation Procedure 
contains elements of bankruptcy law for the most part, but exhibits peculiar features in 
several aspects. That enactment was amended on a comprehensive scale by Law-Decree 
No. 26 of 1988. See Miskolczi Bodnár, P . -Török , G.: A magyar csődjog alapjai (The 
Foundations of the Hungarian Law of Bankruptcy). Budapest, 20002. 85-90. 
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means above all privatization not controlled by the State and preceding state-
controlled privatization. The main beneficiaries (not within the meaning of 
positive law) of such privatization were the chief executives of certain state 
enterprises, who relied on the aforesaid legal frameworks (i.e. the old Associa-
tions Act and the Transformation Act) for having a state enterprise or some more 
valuable parts thereof (e.g. immovables, means of production) transferred from 
state to private ownership. All this was naturally coupled with numerous 
abuses and disproportions. It is not by chance that in 1990 the question of 
spontaneous privatization came into the focus of internal political life, with 
consideration to be given both to its advantages (spontaneous termination of 
state ownership) and to its disadvantages (possible bargaining away of state 
property). All these considerations called for a halt to spontaneous privati-
zation and for its replacement with state-controlled privatization. 
Before reviewing the positive-law rules of privatization it is appropriate to list, 
using Tamás Sárközy's terminology, the three methods of privatization by 
legal transactions, i.e. by reliance on other than peremptory rules of law: 
(a) privatization by sale of state property; 
(b) privatization by partial transfer of state property to associations; 
(c) privatization by complete transformation of state enterprises into economic 
associations.30 
a) This method was, in point of fact, already applied in part by way of 
spontaneous privatization. The question of how the problems of value and 
proportion manifested itself is a different point. This method is also known 
to institutionalised privatization, but sale above a certain value limit is subject 
to notification. 
b) Partial transfer of state property to associations virtually means that a 
state enterprise and another person jointly establish a new economic entity, 
whose initial assets are contributed in part by the other person and in part by 
the enterprise. In this case the enterprise secures non-cash contribution, i.e. 
physical assets, while the other partner makes a financial contribution. Thereby 
a part of the enterprise property (means of production, immovables, etc.) 
becomes the property of the new enterprise, while the enterprise acquires in its 
place a business share or shares, depending on the form of association. This 
is called privatization by contribution. Clearly, it is equally possible for the 
30
 See Sárközy: A privatizáció joga... op. cit. 53. 
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enterprise to eventually provide a know-how as a contribution. In this kind of 
privatization the other partner was very often a foreigner making the financial 
contribution, whereby a joint venture was actually set up. It is easy to see why 
this form of privatization was of particular advantage to the foreign partner, as 
in this way the foreign partner was able to become a member of a completely 
new economic association, behind which there stood a state enterprise as owner. 
Hence he did not have to face any of the many problems likely to arise in 
purchase of an old firm (e.g. long-standing litigation, other debts, obligations), 
and the need for an audit of the due diligence type was also eliminated. At the 
same time, cases were rather frequent in which the former state enterprise 
transferred a considerable part of its employees to the new economic asso-
ciation. It was very salutary to do so, for, on the one hand, the trade unions did 
not protest against that avenue of privatization, while, on the other hand, the 
other partner could be sure that the new association had a pool of suitable 
professional personnel at the time of starting business. This allows the conc-
lusion that through such arrangement the foreign partner not only participated 
in privatization, but practically purchased a market, since he was able-with 
a new association possessing in a given case a team of tried and tested 
professionals and appropriate means of production-to participate in the Hungarian 
market and eventually even to quickly occupy a decisive position on the 
market.31 That phenomenon might also naturally lead to a depletion of the state 
enterprise or actually duplicate the enterprise, since the state enterprise and the 
new association established with the assistance of the other partner were in a 
position to operate concurrently.32 
c) This procedure can be considered in effect, as the first step to privatization, 
for, normally, it had not yet led to a full privatization of the state enterprise, 
but did, upon transformation, enable an external entrepreneur or investor to 
acquire part of the enterprise's shares or business share. An important provision 
on this point is contained in Art. 19 of the Transformation Act, reading: 
"Art. 19. (1) Transformation of a state enterprise operating under the general 
management of the enterprise council and the workers' general meeting 
(delegates' meeting) shall be conditional on the requirement for the amount 
of the stated (initial) capital of the future economic association to exceed 
by at least 20% or by one million forints the amount of the enterprise assets 
as shown in the balance sheet and for the external entrepreneurs to obtain a 
31
 It is a different matter that eventual acquisition of the market in this way could also 
pose problems related to the law of competition 
32
 See Sárközy: A privatizáció joga... op. cit. 60. 
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share in the association to the amount of the surplus assets, such surplus to 
be charged against the stated (initial) capital. 
(2) The business share (shares) of the economic association formed 
upon transformation of a state enterprise shall, in proportion of the share to 
the stated (initial) capital, pass into the ownership of the external entrepre-
neurs mentioned on para. (1). 
(3) Transformation of a state enterprise operating under supervision 
by state administration, other state economic organization, an enterprise 
of a legal person and the external entrepreneurs obtaining a share in the 
association." 
Upon transformation, the newly established economic association is obviously 
general successor in title to the enterprise transformed. Thus, in the case of self-
governing enterprises, external entrepreneurs are entitled, subject to specified 
financial conditions, to obtain a share in the association to the extent of surplus 
assets. This is the case of privatization by increase of capital, the core and 
substance of which lies in the requirement for the enterprise transformed to 
automatically obtain larger capital as the result of privatization. As it is stated in 
Art. 19. (3) above, if a state enterprise is under supervision by state administra-
tion, namely it is not a self-governing enterprise, transformation is permissible 
without the participation of an external entrepreneur. In such a case the enterprise, 
now obviously operating in the form of association, remained in state ownership, 
a step practically preparatory to privatization. The possibility was naturally there 
for numerous borderline cases to arise. During the period under discussion it was 
possible, for instance, for a state enterprise to continue operating with the 
structure of a state enterprise, but to be entered in the trade register and to receive 
a register number. This was of importance chiefly in the case of enterprises 
engaged in considerable foreign trade, for the foreign partner, when making an 
international contract, expected that the state enterprise should also have such 
parameters, including a trade register number, as an economic association had. 
It should be emphasized that the aforementioned Transformation Act 
contained an important provision also in respect of the local self-government 
authorities then councils). Art. 21. (1) reads as follows: 
"The business share (shares) equal to 20% of the enterprise assets as shown 
in the balance sheet, falling to the enterprise out of the stated (initial) 
capital of the economic association formed upon transformation of a state 
enterprise operating under the general management of the enterprise council 
and the workers' general meeting (delegates' meeting), shall be due to the 
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state property management agency, while the business share (shares) equal 
to the value of the inner-city land as shown in the balance sheet of the 
enterprise in the process of transformation shall be due to the local council 
of competence by the locus of such land. No exception from this provision 
on land may be made in the agreement mentioned in Art. 17. (3)." 
As is expressed in the above provision, the shares (business share) equal to the 
value of the inner-city land as shown in the balance sheet of the enterprise in 
the process of transformation are due to the local council of competence by 
the locus of the land, that is, to the actual predecessor in title of the local self-
government authority, the implication being that the enterprise property was 
virtually deemed to be the property of the people, so the councils predicated 
the expectation that the land used by the state enterprise should pertain to the 
competent council. For that matter, this is one of the explanations why the local 
self-government authorities, too, became owners as a result of the privatization 
of numerous large enterprises.33 
It should be noted that there had been formulated several other conceptions 
in connection with privatization. Among them it was the idea of property voucher 
or note, or of people's share, which would have served to involve large segments 
of the population in privatization by way of quasi gratuitous grant. Though not 
large segments of the population, the workers' collectives were indeed enabled 
to participate in privatization by means of the so-called workers' shares,34 a 
special arrangement on the American model being the Employee Part-Owner 
Programme.35 
Also, a special method of privatization was the use of compensation 
vouchers, which, dogmatically, was reprivatization in the first place, as it was 
intended to enable one-time owners to regain their proprietary status.36 
33
 The present study does not discuss questions concerning privatization of the property 
of self-govnerment authorities. On this topic see in particular Török, G.: Az önkormány-
zatokat a belterületi földek után megillető járandóságok kiadásával kapcsolatosan felmerült 
jogviták (Legal Disputes about Allocations Due to Self-Govemment Authorities for Inner-
City Land), in: Török, G. (ed.): A tulajdoni rendszer változásai... op. cit. 111-157. 
34
 The rules on workers' shares were laid down in Art. 244. of the old Associations Act. 
It is to be mentioned that the new Associations Act uses the concept not only of workers ' 
share (Art. 187), but also of workers' business share (Arts. 145-146), thereby leaving 
35
 See in particular Act XLIV of 1992 on the Employee Part-Owner Programme. That 
Programme was intended to ensure workers' ownership chiefly on the model of the 
American ESOP. 
36
 The present study is not concerned with a description of compensation processes. On 
the constitutionality of compensation, see Sajó, A.: A részleges kárpótlási törvény által fel-
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The first step toward institutionalised privatization can be said to have been taken 
by Act VII of 1990 on the State Property Agency (SPA) and on the Manage-
ment and Utilization of the Property Pertaining to It. The SPA functioned as a 
budget-dependent organ, its basic purpose being to separate the functions of 
the State as owner and public power. Its primary responsibility was to manage 
the state property pertaining to it.37 It was directed by an 11 member Board 
of Directors, while operative management was entrusted to the managing 
director. The decisions of the Board of Directors were binding on the managing 
director. 
In my view, the goals of setting up the SPA are excellently summed up by 
the Handbook of Privatization, which was published in 1993. The Handbook 
summarized the activities of the Agency and served as a practical guide to 
investors intending to participate in privatization: 
vetett alkotmányossági kérdések (Constitutional Issues Raised by the Partial Compensation 
Act). Állam és Jogtudomány, No. l ^ t of 1992. 190-209. For a concise summary in English 
of the compensat ion processes, see Koppányi, Sz.: Summary of the Most Important 
Issues of the Hungarian Nationalisation of the Industry after World War II, and of the 
Compensation after the Transformation of Regime, with Particular Respect to Foreign 
Ownership. Collega. No. I of 2002. 17-24. 
37
 Act VII of 1990 defined the concept of property pertaining to SPA in the following 
wording: 
"Art. 7. By virtue of this Act there shall belong to the State Property Agency, 
a) out of the assets of state enterprises and other economic organizations transformed 
into economic associations under the Transformation Act, 
aa) any business share and any share that did not pass into the ownership of external 
entrepreneurs, in the case of enterprises, trusts and other state economic organizations that 
operated under supervision by state administration; 
ab) business shares (shares) equal to 20% of the state assets as show in the balance sheet, 
falling to such essets out of the stated (initial) capital: the portion determined by agreement 
(Art. 17. /3/ of the Transformation Act); and the business shares (shares)-not affecting the 
right of sale-which the economic association may retain for the purpose of sale under Art. 
23. (1) of the Transformation Act. In the case of state enterprises that operated under the 
general management of the enterprise council and the workers' general meeting (delegates' 
meeting); 
b)the property which, operating in economic associations not subject to subpara, (a), was 
owned by the State prior to the entry into force of the Transformation Act and is still owned 
by the State at the date of entry into force of this Act; 
c)the assets remaining in state ownership after the liquidation of state economic organi-
zations and any such state property as is transferred to the SPA by separate statute or decision 
of Parliament." 
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"The declared goals of setting up the SPA were 
- to separate the functions of the State as owner and public power; 
- to create appropriate tools and organizational frameworks for the imple-
mentation of the property reform; 
- to estimate the market value of state property; 
- to strengthen the position of the State as owner with a view to protecting 
state property and consistently implementing the State's privatization 
policy; 
- to ensure control over the process of spontaneous privatization in keeping 
with the short- and long-term interests of society; 
- to devise the most suitable forms of operating state assets; 
- to facilitate the operation of state property on the basis of capital interest 
and the selection of suitable owners; 
- to promote implementation of the economic strategy, including reduction 
of the state debt."38 
The Act laid down the rules of property management and tenders. An outstanding 
role in the latter question was played by firms specialized in privatization, 
which participated in the process of tendering jointly with representatives of 
SPA and the given enterprise subject to privatization. The specialized firms 
sought to make use of foreign experience on the one hand and to realize their own 
ideas on the other. Adaptation to Hungary of foreign schemes of privatization 
met difficulties for the reasons set out above, while the specialized firms had 
little domestic experience. There were found several special solutions even under 
this scheme of arrangement. Thus, there were cases, in which the specialized 
firms themselves wanted to obtain a share in the property of privatised 
companies, but such plans were not supported by the SPA Board of Directors. 
Under the terms of Act LXXIV of 1990 (Minor Privatization Act), which 
was adopted in the fall of 1990 on privatising the property of state enterprises 
engaged in retail trade, public catering and consumer service, the process of 
privatization affecting the related businesses had run its course by the end of 
1994. In several cases the Act allowed the former operators of businesses covered 
by the Act to privatise the business units operated by them. 
Privatization was taking place under the Spa programmes during 1991. An 
obvious effect on privatization was exerted by the legislation on compensation 
(Act XXV of 1991 on partial compensation, with a view to settlement of 
18
 See Mrs. Ferencz, Földváry К. (ed.): Privatizációs kézikönyv az Állami Vagyon-
ügynökség tevékenységéről (Handbook of Privatization on the Activities of the State 
Property Agency). Budapest, 1993. 13-14. 
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property relations, for damage unjustly caused to citizens' property) and by the 
Concessions Act (Act XVI of 1991 on the privatization of use). A significant 
influence on privatization was similarly borne nolente-volente by Act XLIX of 
1990 regulating liquidation, bankruptcy proceedings and final settlement, as 
sizable state property passed into private ownership during the liquidation of 
state enterprises. 
The year 1992 was of paramount importance to legislation on privatization, 
as Act LIII of 1992 on the management and utilization of entrepreneurial 
property permanently remaining in state ownership, Act LIV of 1992 on the sale, 
utilization and protection of property temporarily remaining in state owner-
ship, and Act XV of 1992 amending the legislative enactments on the entre-
preneurial property of the State were passed in that year. 
Act LID of 1992 determined the enterprises that were to remain permanently 
in state ownership. Government Decree No. 126/1972. (VII. 28.) on economic 
organizations permanently remaining, wholly or in part, in state ownership 
under authority of the Act specified the range of economic organizations within 
the said category.39 Act LIII of 1992 founded the State Property Management 
Corp. (AV RT) to manage the property permanently remaining in state owner-
ship. The ÁV RT. was a one-man, state-owned joint stock company, which, 
unless otherwise provided by law, was subject to the rules of the old Associations 
Act. It was directed by the Board. Its task was to transform enterprises perma-
nently remaining in state ownership into economic associations and to exercise 
proprietary rights (a kind of property management). Chapter V of the Act laid 
down detailed rules for the transformation of state enterprises. 
Act LIV of 1992 governs the utilization of property temporarily remaining 
in state ownership. Its scope of application can most easily be defined on the 
basis of Art. 2, which contains a negative definition: 
"Art. 2. This Act shall not apply to 
a) property subject to Act LID of 1992 on the management and utilization 
of entrepreneurial property permanently remaining in state ownership; 
b) those of treasury assets whose utilization for purposes of undertaking 
is excluded by separate statute; 
c) those assets-covered by Act XXXIII of 1991 on transfer of certain 
state-owned assets to the ownership of self-government authorities-which 
3 9 1 mention by way of example that at the time the Decree was adopted the Hungarian 
Oil Industry Corp. (MOL), IKARUS Vehicle Manufacturing Corp. and the like belonged to 
this category of organizations. For that matter, the size of state property was likewise 
determined by the Decree. 
134 ÁDÁM BOÓC 
will become the property of self-government authorities after completion of 
the procedure by the property transfer committee; 
d) the property of the Hungarian National Bank, the State Development 
Institute, and the Centre of Banking Institutions." 
As it can be seen, the treasury property remained outside the scope of property 
capable of privatization. The property temporarily remaining in state owner-
ship was still amenable to management by SPA. The Act laid down the rules 
for the transformation of enterprises into economic associations. The highest 
decision-making organ of SPA was the 11-member Board of Directors, and 
operative management was entrusted to the managing director. The proprietary 
rights in respect of property covered by the Act were exercised by SPA, its 
function being to carry out privatization. 
The related enactments may summarily be called Status Acts, and it should 
be stressed that those of the state enterprises which were not terminated by 
final settlement or liquidation were required by the Act to be transformed into 
joint stock companies or limited liability companies within three years, while 
the companies permanently remaining in state ownership were managed by the 
national holding, the ÁV Rt. as a "giant with feet of clay" (Péter Mihályi).40 
However, this legislative package did not fully clarify the relationship be-
tween AVÜ (SPA) and AV Rt. The latter branched out the former, while the 
abovementioned Privatization Acts contained no provisions on e.g., transfer of 
property between the two organizations. 
In 1994 there was a change of government in Hungary; the first, right-wing 
coalition formed after the systemic change was replaced by a socialist-liberal 
coalition, with the Hungarian Socialist Party as its leading party and with the 
Alliance of Free Democrats as its second member. The Government pursued 
the definite goal of ending the parallel operation of AV Rt. and ÁVÜ as well 
as of creating a set of legal conditions for the privatization of large public 
utility companies and commercial banks. Legislative preparatory work for the 
implementation of these goals began right after the government had been 
formed. Consultations and preparations, not free from political disputes, finally 
resulted in the adoption of Act XXXIX of 1995on the sale of entrepreneurial 
property in state ownership, which is still in effect (Privatization Act). 
The Privatization Act set up the State Privatization and Property Management 
Corp. (ÁPV Rt.) to carry out privatization and disbanded ÁVÜ and ÁV Rt. Its 
Art. 9 provides that ÁV Rt. must be renamed ÁPV Rt. as from the entry force 
40
 For an evaluation see in particular Mihályi: A magyar privatizáció... op. cit. 163-
194. 
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of the Act, while Art. 10 dissolved ÁVÜ and conveyed its rights and obliga-
tions to ÁPV Rt. under the rules of universal legal succession. APV Rt. is a 
one-man joint stock company possessing registered and not negotiable shares. 
(Subject to the exceptions made by the Act, ÁPV Rt. is governed by the 
provisions of the Associations Act as basic underlying rules.) It is owned by 
the State. Its foundation document was approved by the Government on 17 June 
1995. Its collegiate management is entrusted to the Board of Directors composed 
of 9 to 11 members, while its operative management is the responsibility of the 
general manager. 
The Privatization Act lays down detailed rules for privatization and regulates 
various techniques of privatization. Along with the traditional methods of 
privatization, the Act is familiar with preferential privatization techniques, 
which are the following: 
- instalment sale; 
- sale with reservation of ownership (privatization leasing); 
- buyout by senior executives and employees; 
- facilities for acquisition of property by employees; 
- start-up credit; 
- Employee Part-Owner Programme. 
As it is also indicated by the designations, the privatization leasing is not 
the classical leasing, but sale with reservation of ownership, which is, for that 
matter, rather common in business transactions.41 
Of course, the Privatization Act is similarly aware of the concept of permanent 
state ownership. As regards temporary utilization of property incapable of 
privatization at the time of the adoption of the Act, there is a possibility open 
to making three types of contract for property management, notably 
- contract of agency to preserve the value and substance of property; 
- contract for work, labour and materials to achieve specified returns 
(dividend, acquisition of interest); 
- portfolio contract, including the right of alienation and the obligation to 
achieve a specified increment of property 42 
The Annex to the Privatization Act identifies the associations operating with 
a share in the property of companies in permanent state ownership, indicating 
41
 On privatization leasing see in particular Novotni, Z.: Technika vagy jogügylet? 
Gondolatok az un. privatizációs lízing koncepcióról (Technique or Legal Transaction? 
Thoughts about the So-Called Concept of Privatization Leasing). Magyar Jog, No. 4 of 
1993. 220-224. 
42
 See Articles 6 2 - 6 9 of the Privatization Act. 
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the proportion of state property and the minister or organ exercising the rights 
of state membership (shareholder's rights). 
VI. 
It may be stated in summary that one cannot disregard either the legal and 
economic issues or the political aspects of privatization. Since the summer of 
2002 power in Hungary was been again held by a socialist-liberal government 
coalition, and completion of privatization is practically a question of current 
politics. All this is evidenced, furthermore, by the fact that on 5 December 
2004 a referendum was held at the initiative of the Workers' Party and with 
effective support from the opposition. One of the questions put to the vote was 
an eventual halt to the privatization of hospitals.43 The referendum was 
unsuccessful, because neither question received identical answers from at least 
25% of citizens entitled to vote. The turnout amounted to over 3 million voters 
representing 37.5% of all citizens having the right of vote. It should be stressed 
that the votes were only a few ten thousand short to oblige Parliament (a 
specificity of referendum) to adopt a decision prohibitive of privatization in 
public health. 
From the foregoing it follows that the full and definitive conclusion of 
privatization and presumably the dissolution or transformation of the instruc-
tions of privatization are still some time away, albeit it is equally unquestionable 
that certain strategic measures of privatization in Hungary have already been 
implemented. I trust that this study of mine has succeeded in outlining the 
history thus far of privatization in Hungary, describing the background to and 
the reasons for privatization, and highlighting the major wellsprings of related 
efforts that will help to draw some conclusions-with due attention also paid to 
certain international experiences-concerning the determinant tendencies for 
future action as well. 
43
 The other question submitted to the referendum-the dual citizenship of Hungarians 
living beyond the borders- is irrelevant to the present topic. 
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Professor Gábor Hamza's Inaugural Lecture at the 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences 
On the 6th of October 2004 in the main lecture hall of the Hungarian Academy 
of Sciences the inaugural lecture was delivered by Chair Professor Gábor Hamza, 
Head of Department of Roman Law at the University „Loránd Eötvös" Budapest, 
corresponding member of Hungarian Academy of Sciences, on „The Classifi-
cation (divisio) into „Branches" of Modem Legal Systems (Orders) and Roman 
Law Traditions". 
The session was opened by Ádám Török, Chairman of the Section of Eco-
nomics and Legal Science of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. The Chairman 
presented the professional career of Professor Hamza. He draw the attention of 
the distinguished audience to Professor Hamza's achievements in the domain 
of Roman law, history of law and comparative law. Professor Török also 
pointed out Gábor Hamza's exceptional contribution to the legal science both 
as an author and editor, acknowledging also his achievements in fostering the 
international relations in his capacity as member of a number of international 
scholarly societies. 
Professor Hamza started his inaugural lecture with emphasizing the contem-
porary significance of Roman law traditions. He pointed out that the idea of 
classification (divisio) of the Roman legal system (legal order) originated in 
ancient Greek philosophical thinking. He also emphasized that the classification 
i.e. partition (divisio) of ius civile is in no relation with the present day classi-
fication of the legal order into various branches of law, in particular in the civil 
law jurisdictions. The notion of the ius civile, comprising originally the entire 
legal order of the Roman State, had multiple meanings, since the ius civile 
regulated all areas of the legal order of the Roman State and of legal relations 
arising between its citizens (cives Romani). In the later period of the Roman res 
publica, along with the ius civile appeared, interpreted as a counterpart of it, the 
ius praetorium (ius honorarium). 
Senior Assistant Professor, Reformed University „Károli Gáspár", Faculty of Law 
and Political Science, Department of Roman Law, H-1042 Budapest , Viola u. 2—4. 
E-mail: t amasno ta r i@yahoo .de 
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Professor Hamza referred to Cicero who already considered the equal 
ranking of the ius civile and the ius praetorium. In the classical period of Roman 
law the ius civile merged with the ius praetorium. This merger i.e. the lenghty 
process of fading away of the distinction was due in particular to the fact that the 
ius praetorium lost its role as a vehicle of the renewel of the legal order. Since 
then ius civile has become a synonym of ius privatum including law of persons, 
family law, real rights, law of obligations and law of successions as opposed to 
the ius publicum consisting „in sacris, in sacerdotibus, in magistratibus" (D. 1, 
1, 1 , 2 - Ulpianus). On the basis of this distinction between ius publicum and ius 
privatum, it is obvious that this divisio has significance exclusively from the 
point of view of the iurisprudentia. This is due to the fact that this divisio is 
more a classification than a definitio. 
Professor Hamza pointed out that the notion of the Roman ius privatum 
was not identical with the notion of the private law (droit privé, diritto privato, 
der echo civil, Privatrecht, etc.) of the contemporary legal orders. The same is 
holding true for the notion of the Roman ius publicum in relation to the notion 
of the public law (droit public, diritto pubblico, derecho publico, öffentliches 
Recht, etc.) of the contemporary legal orders. This difference is due to the fact 
that the Roman notions of the ius privatum and the ius publicum originated 
in totally different social and economic circumstances. Gábor Hamza drew 
attention to the fact that this divisio was not merely a theoretical one but 
reflected adequately Roman reality. He mentioned in this regard, as an example, 
the acquisition of property. In the case the State acquires property, the method 
of acquiring ownership differs from the modes of acquiring property in the 
relationship between citizens (cives Romani). The State does not need to use as 
a mode of acquiring ownership either the mancipatio or traditio. In contradis-
tinction to the Roman legal order (ius civium Romanorum or ius Romanum) 
in contemporary legal orders the State can be subject of private law related 
relations. He emphasized that in ancient Rome the ius privatum did not 
regulate State related relations. He pointed out that only certain delicto were 
part of the Roman criminal law as an autonomous „branch of law", since the 
delicto privata (for instance theft [furtum]) constituted part of private law. The 
crimina (delicto publica, for instance parricidium and perduellio) belonged to 
the ius publicum. This was in contradistinction to the prevailing view, according 
to which modem criminal law is part of public law. This view, however, can not 
be regarded as a generally held one, because in the French doctrine criminal 
law (droit criminel) belongs to the sphere of private law (droit privé). 
Gábor Hamza mentioned that for the Roman jurisconsults the divisio of the 
legal system into branches was merely a form of scientific classification with-
out any practical significance. The distinction made by Ulpianus is by no means 
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of theoretical nature. He emphasized again that this divisio is rather a form of 
general classification rooted in the Greek philosophical thinking. He placed 
particular emphasis on analysing the famous dispute between the two out-
standing Glossators, Placentinus and Azo Portius, taking place in the second half 
of the 12th century. According to Placentinus ( t 1192) who first clearly separated 
the legal system into ius privatum and ius publicum, considered these two 
„branches of law" as duae res i. e. real existing things. Azo heavily opposed this 
idea, developed by Placentinus, insisting on the necessity of keeping the unity 
(unitas iuris) of the legal order. Since he was convinced about the necessity 
of the unity of the legal order, he rejected the „diversitas rerum vel persona-
rum", pointing out that the separation of the ius publicum from the ius 
privatum could exclusively assume the function of orienting lawyers. 
In the next part of his presentation, Professor Hamza drew the attention to 
the structure of the Codex Iustinianus emphasizing that the last three books (Très 
librï) of this Code contained exclusively public law related edicta i.e. consti-
tutiones of the Roman emperors. Of particular significance from the viewpoint 
of the development of the public law is the subsequent interest towards the Très 
libri both by the Glossators and Commentators. Andrea Bonello da Barletta 
(c 1190-1273), the highly-reputed follower of the Bologna School, Professor 
of the University of Naples (the first State university) founded by emperor 
Frederic II in 1224 made the first comments on the Très libri. His comments 
regarding their nature were on halfway between glossa and summa. He also 
mentioned the Glossa of Marino da Caramanico written between 1270 and 
1278 patterned after the Glossa ordinaria of Accursius, in which Marino da 
Caramanico is dealing with the Très //bri.mmmmm Gábor Hamza pointed out 
that Bartolus de Saxoferrato (1313/14-1357) also commented in a number of his 
tractatus (for instance in the Tractatus repraesaliarum, Tractatus de tyrannia, 
Tractatus de regimine civitatis, Tractatus de statutis) public law related matters. 
Bartolus commented all parts of the Corpus Iuris Civilis including a number 
of questions relating to public law. In those treatieses (tractatus) the outstanding 
Commentator dealt with such extremely important matters as the relation be-
tween State Gmperium) and ecclesiastical power (sacerdotium). 
Gábor Hamza emphasized in the following part of his presentation that the 
non-existant divisio into „branches" of the legal order in ancient Rome did not 
constitute a hindrance of the development of the ius publicum. The author also 
emphasized that, in particular in Germany, the representatives of the public 
law (öf fent l iches Recht) availed themselves of the concepts and terminology of 
the ius privatum (Privatrecht). This is holding true also for the outstanding 
specialists of the öffentliches Recht, pertaining to the Pandectist legal science 
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during the XIXth century. It deserves mentioning that Paul Laband and Georg 
Jellinek were equally versed in both private and public law. 
Most representatives of the public law science in Germany in the XIXth 
century, for example Georg Jellinek, were familiar also with the private law. 
This explains why they so often approached the institutions of public law from 
the viewpoint of private law, using private law concepts and terminology. 
Dealing with the English jurisprudence, Gábor Hamza first noted that Sir 
Thomas Erskine Holland considered private law as „the only typically perfect 
law" in his work Elements of Jurisprudence published in 1880. Referring to 
Frederic William Maitland, he cited the following passage of the English author: 
„Our whole constitutional law seems at times to be but an appendix to the law 
of real property", taken from Maitland's Constitutional History of England, 
published posthumously in 1908. This phrase is caracteristic of what outstanding 
significance English authors attributed to real property, refusing the idea of the 
divisio of the legal order into branches. Mentioning deserves the idea of Sir 
John Salmond, the highly-reputed New-Zealand lawyer. His view relating 
to the divisio of the legal order was similar to that of Ulpianus, since he also 
regarded public law (ius publicum) consisting „in sacris, in sacerdotibus, in 
magistratibus". Salmond furthermore, like Ulpian's view, did not attribute any 
practical importance to the divisio into „branches" of the legal order. 
In the French legal doctrine Léon Duguit, following Ulpian's concept, under-
lined in his work Traité de droit constitutionnel the relative nature of the divisio 
of the legal system into public (droit public) and private law (droit privé), 
emphasizing that the idea lying behind this divisio served exclusively the purpose 
of classification. Referring to a number of examples, the lecturer proved that the 
Roman Law did not know the separation between public and private law as it 
is believed today. He pointed out, in compliance with the idea of Azo, the danger 
of this separation. The division is hardly able to provide any contribution to the 
adequate interpretation and the development of law, since it contains i.e. 
invokes the danger of the disintegration of the legal system. 
Dealing with the reflection of the divisio into „branches" of the legal order 
in the field of legal education, he emphasized that legal education both in 
middle ages and modem times was based on the sources (fontes) of law, rather 
than on the „branches" of the legal system. He mentioned in this regard the 
Faculty of Law of the University of Halle, founded by the Prussian State as a 
Reformuniversität in 1694. In Halle the four Chairs (professorships) were based 
on the fontes iuris (Decretalis, Codex, Pandectae, Iustitutiones). 
At the end of the session Ádám Török solemnly presented the diploma of 
corresponding membership of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences to Professor 
Gábor Hamza. 
1216-2574 / USD 20.00 
© 2005 Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest 
A C T A J U R I D I C A H U N G A R I C A 
46, Nos 1-2, pp. 141-147 (2005) 
BOOK REVIEW 
László Blutman: EU-jog a tárgyalóteremben. Az Előzetes döntéshozatal 
[EU Law in the Court Room. The Preliminary Reference Procedure], Budapest, 
KJK-Kerszöv, 2003. pp. 506. 
This very first monograph on a special institutional question follows some twenty 
years after the first monograph on European Community Law was published in 
Hungary.1 
Blutman's book has arrived at just the right moment, subsequent to the 
recent accession of Hungary to the European Union. The situation now is such 
that Hungarian judges can (and sometimes must) make preliminary reference 
to the European Court of Justice requesting its interpretation and decision 
concerning the validity of acts of Community institutions. When deciding 
cases before them, they are now obliged to follow the judgement of the 
European Court. This procedural relationship, which is the only one between 
the courts of the Member States and the Court of Justice, is of great importance 
in terms of principles, but likewise forms part of the every day practical 
activities of the judiciary. The rules of procedure themselves demand inter-
pretation, and from numerous aspects this has already taken place. Any major 
study in the field must offer simultaneously a theoretical approach and a guide 
for practitioners. This dual objective requires an author to position himself so 
as to the present different points of view. The theoretical approach requires 
complexity and details, whereas the practitioner often prefers simplification, 
with the focus on knowledge that is applicable in every day life. Another 
feature of duality stems from the fact that the procedure comprises part of the 
Community legal system and at the same time the legal order and practice of 
the Member States, though the roles it plays in them are far from being the 
same. In the Community legal order, the preliminary reference procedure serves 
the uniform application of Community law, while the national courts are 
embedded in the national legal system and must decide on the litigation before 
them. Moreover, such a book has to describe, analyse and interpret a system that 
is undergoing constant transformation. 
1
 Mádl, F.: Az Európai Gazdasági Közösség joga (The European Community Law) . 
Budapest, 1974. 
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It might appear extremely difficult to meet all these requirements, but in 
the even of success the result will be a work of great value both in theory and 
in practice. Is this the case with Blutman's book? Yes. The reasons are not too 
difficult to discover. Two highly appreciated studies on the topic by practising 
lawyers2 will have served as starting points for the author in his own research, 
focused on the case law of the Court of Justice. His deep analysis of the related 
case law is exemplary for authors worldwide and in itself a very important 
scientific contribution. The reports of the 2002 Helsinki conference dedicated to 
the preliminary ruling procedure must have furnished additional raw material 
for a comparative perspective.3 
Blutman has a particularly strong aptitude for systematic analysis and 
explanation. His method, greatly demanding in terms of intellectual energy, 
offers much help to the practitioner. At the same time, it leads to a large number 
of new findings and furnishes an abundance of ideas for theorists of law or 
sociologists of law to develop. On the other hand, the reader sometimes has the 
feeling that the system overrides the story and that the huge amount of know-
ledge would have deserved more courageous consequences. 
In the following, the contents of different chapters will be considered. 
The first chapter is an introduction, in a very narrow sense of the term, which 
makes the book useful even for readers who are not familiar with the law of the 
European Union. It may be presumed that mainly judges will be the readers. 
(This means that points of particular importance for litigants and their lawyers 
occupy only second place.) The sources of law, the main legal principles 
involved in the judicial application of law, and a concise presentation of the 
Community judicial system provide an adequate basis for further studies. 
Chapter 2. Under the title "General questions of the preliminary ruling 
procedure", the book affords good selection of international public law and 
national laws that exhibit some similarity with Art. 234. procedure, what the 
book is really about.4 This presentation is very interesting; however, as these 
2
 Anderson, D. W. K.-Demetriou, M.: References to the European Court. London, 2002 ; 
Dauses, M. A.: Das Vorahentscheidungsverfahren nach Articel EG-Vertrag. München, 2 nd 
edition, 1995. Translated into Hungarian in 2000. 
3
 Colloque à Helsinki: "Le renvoi préjudiciel à la Cour de just ice des Communautés 
européennes, 20 et 21 mai 2002." 
4
 As Blutman himself states, Art. 234 reflects the very essence of the book. The text of 
the Art. reads as follows: 
The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning: 
- the interpretation of this Treaty; 
- the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of the Community and of the 
ECB; 
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procedure are not naturally interrelated, the only benefit is that we become 
aware of the non-uniqueness of the European Community procedure. 
It further becomes clear that Art. 234. is far from the only EU-law rule 
under which this kind of procedure can be initiated. While these provisions by 
no means have any particular theoretical or practical importance, the reader 
soon senses that things are not always as simple as they first might appear. The 
real question of the first chapter concerns the conditions of the admissibility 
and the competence of the Court to answer questions. The author agues that there 
is a difference between the two, but the practical relevance of this finding 
remains extremely limited, because the Court itself does not seem to differentiate 
in its jurisprudence. 
The reader is also given the basic meanings of the terms such as rule of 
law, interpretation, control of validity, the court or tribunal of a member State, 
necessity and the procedure before the national court, as well as the effect of 
the preliminary ruling. 
Chapter 3. The detailed analysis begins here. The very well-structured pre-
sentation proves that legal acts which can be interpreted or placed under the 
control of legality are much broader than might be conceived after a first 
reading of Art. 2324, relating to the Treaty and the legally binding acts of the 
Community institutions and the European Central Bank (the regulations, the 
directives and the decisions). According to the case law of the European Court 
of Justice, not only the different types of international treaties, but also the 
national rules referring to the text of the Community law and the non-binding 
acts (recommendations) of the Community institutions are open to scrutiny or 
interpretation under this procedure. 
Chapter 4. In chapter, the author considers the "behaviour" of the European 
Court of Justice from various aspects: when answering questions on compatibility 
between Community law and national law; the demarcation between inter-
pretation and application; the difference between interpretation and fact-finding; 
and the different techniques of interpretation. 
The Court does not have formal jurisdiction under Art. 234. to answer 
questions on the compatibility of Community law and national law. However, it 
- the interpretation of the statutes of bodies established by an act of the Council , where 
those statutes so provide. 
Where such a question is raised before any court or t r ibunal of a member State, that 
court or tribunal may, if it considers that a decision on the quest ion is necessary to enable it 
to give judgment, request the Court of Justice to give a ruling thereon. 
Where any such question is raised in a case pending b e f o r e a court or tribunal of a 
member State, against whose decision there is no judicial r emedy under national law, that 
court or tribunal shall bring the matter before the Court of Just ice . 
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furnishes a "useful answer" that allows the national court to be able to solve 
problems of this nature appropriately. While Art. 234. is perfectly clear in this 
respect, the problem of interpretation (the competence of the European Court of 
Justice) versus application (the national court is empowered) arises with some 
frequency in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice. Blutman 
suggests a typology of the attitude of the Court in this field: The European Court 
of Justice reaches a final conclusion in the case (application); makes general 
statements, but statements which allow only one solution; and the general 
statements form the basis of the application of the facts of the particular case 
before the national court (interpretation). 
As concerns interpretation, the question of the methods of interpretation 
applied by the Court arises quite naturally. How is the answer to the question 
arrived at? Here the author does not enumerate the classical methods of 
interpretation as is so often done in the literature. He suggests that these 
methods are sometimes meaningless: the procedure whereby the Court chooses 
between them remains unclear, and it would therefore be more useful to consider 
the "points of orientation". He proposes a number of points, such as the text of 
the norm, the objective of the norm, the spirit of the rule, the system and 
construction of the rule which contains the norm to be interpreted, the will of the 
law maker, the preamble of the norm, the founding treaties, and the previous 
judgements of the Court. 
Nevertheless, after this stimulating exercise, the reader is provided with 
all the "classics": textual, historical and systemic interpretations. Surely the 
comparative law method (with special regard to the laws of the Member 
States) would have deserved mention.5 
Finally, this chapter analyses the principles of interpretation, from which 
the sui generis meaning of the Community legal terms and the consequences of 
the multilingual nature of the Community law require special attention. 
In the preliminary ruling procedure, primarily the national court produces 
the facts of the case. However, the Court of Justice is also allowed to gather 
facts, and the parties and persons contributing observations may also acquaint the 
Court with new facts. Despite this, it seems that all such facts may only 
complement those produced by the national court, even when the question of 
their well-foundedness arises. 
Chapter 5. This chapter offers a very detailed description of the limits of the 
review of the validity in this procedure, with an account of how the question of 
5
 For recent literature, see: Lenaer ts , K.: Interlocking Legal Orders in the European 
Union and Comparative Law. International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 52, 
2003, 873-906. 
BOOK REVIEW 145 
validity is raised before the national courts, and the related problem of the interim 
measures. 
In a comparison of the similar jurisdictions of the Court under Arts. 230. 
(review of the legality) and 234, a consideration of the aspect of the principle 
of effective judicial protection of the private parties would have been useful. In 
the view of the Court of First Instance, Advocate General Jacobs and a number 
of legal writers, the European Court of Justice offers a very narrow inter-
pretation of (potential) private applicants. The Court justifies its position by 
stating that there is an indirect route via Art. 234. to question the validity of 
a normative Community measure, referring a preliminary question to the 
European Court of Justice. This argument is not entirely free of problems. (In 
the present state of national laws, this way is open only when there is a national 
act whose breaching will to cause an individual be brought to the national 
court. In the absence of such an act, or the willingness of the national judge to 
refer the question to the European Court of Justice, this mechanism can not 
provide a solution.) In the light of the recent case law of the European Court of 
Justice, the difference between the two can hardly be attributed to the normative 
or individual nature of the act in question. 
The presentation of the legal basis of the invalidity would perhaps have been 
better placed under the basic characteristics of the legal instrument in general. 
Chapter 6. What does "the court or tribunal of a Member State" mean under 
Art. 234? Belonging to a Member State is not always self-understandable. The 
Court has admitted questions from a court in a non-EU member country, 
because the Community law forms an integral part of the law of the territory in 
question. The Benelux Court has also been accepted. As concerns the notion 
"court" itself, the Court of Justice has created a relatively complicated situation. 
On the one hand, it has put forward a system of criteria to be fulfilled by a body 
serving a court or tribunal for Art. 234. On the other hand, these criteria are not 
particularly clear, and the Court itself does not seem very rigorous in applying its 
own test. 
The first attempt to establish the test was made in the Vaassen case,6 
whereas legal writings (and sometimes the Court itself) tend to cite the Dorsch 
Consult7 as leading case,8 though this is formulated in rather general terms, and 
obviously strives for a quasi-complete catalogue of the criteria. Accordingly, 
6
 61/65, G. Vaassen-Göbbels v. Management of the Beamtenfonds voor het Mijnbedrijf 
[1966] ECR 261. 
7
 C-54/96, Dorsch Consult Ingenieurgesellschaft m b H v. Bundesbaugesellschaft Berlin 
mbH [1997] ECR 1-4961. 
8
 See Anderson-Demetriou: op. cit. 32., Craig-de Burca: EU Law. Oxford , 2003. 436. 
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consequent adherence to the "Vaassen criteria" in Blutman's text is somewhat 
disturbing.9 
A meticulous analysis of the related case law is somewhat counter-productive 
here: the final conclusion may readily be reached that each of the criteria may 
be neglected by the Court, so that overall there are no true criteria. Against this 
background, we can be very happy with the systematic overview of the 
Hungarian legal system clarifying the position of the different bodies, and their 
eligibility or not to refer preliminary questions to the European Court of Justice. 
Chapter 7. The question of admissibility. The Treaty stipulates that the 
Court is not allowed to answer any question put before it, even though this may 
be related to the interpretation or the validity of Community law. Blutman suggests 
that it is convenient to distinguish the condition stated in the Treaty (the answer 
must be "necessary" for the judgment to be given) and the conditions forged 
in the case law of the Court (the question must not be a general or hypothetical 
one, it must be related to the case before the court, the dispute must be genuine, 
and the procedure in the course of which the question was raised has not ended). 
As concerns the usefulness of the answer, the case law reveals that the 
Court denies an answer only when the necessity can not be adequately 
identified because of deficiencies in facts or legal basis, or if it is proven that the 
answer is manifestly not necessary for a judgement to be given. (It is regrettable 
that this part is not illustrated with concrete examples, such a deficiency 
commonly arises when preliminary questions are formulated by "absolute 
beginners".) The dispute is not a genuine one when the parties create a legal 
relation in order to start a litigation procedure. In general, the Court does not 
consider whether the litigation is genuine. This is only a matter of concern for 
it if there are signs suggesting that it is faced with apparent litigation. 
If the materials of the case do not afford sufficient evidences concerning the 
necessity of the preliminary ruling, the referring court must produce adequate 
information and justification. At this point, Blutman follows the evolution of the 
case law. 
The hypothetical question arises when the question is based on facts which 
do not feature in the particular case. 
Once again, for "beginners" it would have been useful to recall that the 
Court will refuse to provide an answer if the question relates to a national 
measure not related to Community law. 
4
 On this point, we d isagree with Blutman and consider that the reasoning of the Act 
is more appropriate. Blutman L.: Az eljárási törvények ú jabb módosítása és az uniós jog 
(The Recent Amendment of the Procedural Acts and EU Law). Európai Jog, 2003. 5. 18-19. 
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Chapters 8 and 9. The right to refer and the obligation to refer. 
Under the title "Right to refer, the book treats a number of questions of 
practical importance for Hungarians, and particularly the courts. 
Chapter 10. The reference from a procedural point of view. 
For practitioners, this may be the most valuable chapter of the book. The 
comparative analysis and the precise interpretation of the Hungarian rules in 
force are also of interest for theoreticians. 
The criticism concerning the Hungarian rules on appeal against the order to 
refer or against the refusal to refer appear highly convincing. This is likewise so 
with the exclusion of appeal in the one-tier procedures. At the end of such a 
procedure, the first court adjudicating on the matter is at the same time the final 
court to decide; hence if the law excludes the right to appeal against the order 
denying the reference for a preliminary ruling, the possibility of a judicial 
review of the fulfilment of the obligation to refer will be excluded. 
Chapters 11 and 12. The legal effect of the preliminary ruling. 
At this point, Blutman is in open debate with the reasoning of Act XXX of 
2000, which lays down that the preliminary rulings have an erga omnes 
effect. This statement certainly necessitates some precision. The case law of the 
European Court of Justice clearly demonstrates that only one point is certain: 
the preliminary ruling is obligatory for the referring court. The erga omnes 
effect in the event of rulings on validity also seems to be accepted. The rulings on 
questions of interpretation have the necessary authority for the national courts in 
the Community to refer to them. In cases of doubt or disagreement , however, 
the national court is obliged to make reference to the European Court of Justice. 
As far as the temporal effect is concerned, in both situations the ex tunc effect 
is the general rule. The rules governing the limitation of the ex tunc effect 
are also established. The legal certainty and the extremely severe financial 
consequences make the Court willing to limit the retroactive effect of its rulings. 
It is extremely important that the Court does not include persons who have 
introduced an action in order to assert their rights. 
A number of annexes are attached to the main text. Annexes 2 (Note for 
guidance on references by national courts for preliminary rulings), 3 (The 
preliminary ruling procedure before the European Court of Justice) and 4 (a 
specimen Order for Reference) should be particularly useful for practising law-
yers. As far as the table of cases is concerned, it would have been helpful to 
supplement the numerical index with an alphabetical one. The reader may also 
have welcomed a complete bibliography at the end. 
Ernő Várnay 
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A T T I L A R Á C Z * 
Remodelling the System of Legal Protection in Hungary 
Abstract. The study presents how the system of legal protection since the turn of the 1980s 
and 1990s, as a consequence of the changed international, political and economic circumstances, 
has been transformed in Hungary according to the requirements of a modern constitutional 
state. Giving information on the relevant historical-legal antecedents in Hungary, the then 
arising practical exigencies and different recently applied models in Western democracies, 
taken as starting points during the elaboration of the reform, the pros and cons of the latters, 
the study analyses the solutions introduced at the time of the change of the political-economic 
regime, their later developments, as well as the present-day system of legal protection in 
Hungary, making mentions of problems, too, which arise in some respects even nowadays. 
Taking all these into account, a comprehensive information is given in the study on the 
establishment of the Parliamentary Commissioners for Civic Rights and of the Constitutional 
Court in Hungary, on the prosecutor's (procurator's) offices and courts of justice, focusing 
on the relating constitutional principles, their organisation, competences, guarantees of 
independence and staff problems alike. 
Keywords: administration of justice. Constitution, Constitutional Court, judges, judicial 
independence, judicial organisation, national round-table negotiations, National Council of 
Justice, ombudsman. Parliamentary Commissioner for Civic Rights, prosecutor's (procurator's) 
offices 
Introduction 
Since the turn of the 1980s and 1990s, the transformation of the system of legal 
protection according to the requirements of the constitutional state has featured 
as a distinguished goal of the reform of the state establishment, primarily 
following the declaration made at the Patty Conference of the Hungarian Socialist 
Labour Party (MSZMP) on the necessity of the review of the Constitution in 
search for an answer to the conditions of the increasingly critical economic 
situation that generated social discontent, to the restricted democratic rights 
and freedoms and to the Soviet "perestroika" more favourable to Hungarian 
state sovereignty. Thereby, not only research that kept the modernisation of 
state establishment in view for several years gathered impetus, but the preparation 
of drafting the new Constitution commenced in an institutional framework, as 
Professor of Constitutional Law, Institute for Legal Studies of the Hungarian 
Academy of Sciences, H - 1 0 1 4 Budapest, Országház u. 30. 
E-mail: racz@jog.mta.hu 
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well, particularly as pursuant to the M T Resolution 2022/1988 (HT. 7) passed 
in August by the Council of Ministers.1 That work encompassed all areas of 
constitutional regulation, in which the reform of the framework and functioning 
of legal protection was inevitably highlighted. In fact, simultaneously with 
drafting the Constitution, the establishment of a new organ of legal protection, 
i.e. of the Constitutional Court was anticipated under the Amendment of the 
Constitution of 1989 adopted on 10th January, 1989 on the grounds of the 
position taken by the Party Conference. Furthermore, the problem of the overall 
framework of legal protection was also dealt with under government documents 
framed during the preparation of the Constitution that drew on its interim 
results. Thus the option of instituting the spokesman for civic rights (ombuds-
man) in the framework of legal protection was first proposed in an official form 
in the document issued by the Ministry of Justice on 30th November, 1988 titled 
"Conception of the Regulation of the New Constitution of the Hungarian 
People's Republic". The draft titled "The Principles of the Regulation of the 
Constitution of Hungary" was prepared by the Ministry of Justice on 30th 
January, 1989 and the respective Resolution was adopted by Parliament on 9th 
March, furthermore, instead of the Draft Act on the Constitution, which was 
not framed for political reasons, the scope of the "qualified" transition was 
also delineated by the Draft Act amending the Constitution elaborated by the 
Ministry of Justice on 29th May, 1989 and tabled by the Government on the 
motion of the Political Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Labour Party 
(MSZMP) amongst opposition endeavours that gained ground. 
The prerequisites of the actual political-economic transformation directed 
up to that time by the "state party" were created on 10th June, 1989, when an 
agreement concerning the commencement of substantial political negotiations 
was concluded by the MSZMP, various social organisations and movements 
and the Opposition Round-Table. In this process, at the National Round-Table 
Negotiations a trilateral consensus was reached concerning the fundamental 
issues put on the agenda of the discussions on the systems of political, 
economic and social institutions. According to the agreement concluded on 21st 
June, the consensus concerned also areas of the framework of legal protection, 
' See, especially, the introductory essay of Géza Kilényi for Egy alkotmány-előkészí-
tés dokumentumai (The Documents of Draf t ing the Constitution). Kísérlet Magyarország új 
Alkotmányának megalkotására, 1988-1990 (Efforts at Draf t ing the New Constitution of 
Hungary, 1988-1990). Kilényi G. (ed.). Research Center for Political Sciences, Budapest, 
1991. See further, Holló, A.: Az államjogtól a jogállamig (From State Law to a State Based 
on the Rule of Law). Published by the Foundation Promoting Political Culture, Budapest, 
1993. 
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for instance, the topical formulae of the Amendment of the Constitution and 
issues related to the Constitutional Court. 
Following from the above, the adoption of the new Constitution was 
temporarily removed from the agenda and the Government also withdrew the 
bills with the content covered in the course of the trilateral negotiations. The 
Parliament in its Session of 27th June did not put the discussion of the Draft Act 
amending the Constitution of 29th May or of the Draft Act on the Constitutional 
Court on its agenda. With regard to the documents on the Amendment of the 
Constitution and on the Constitutional Court mentioned above, the common 
standpoint was formulated primarily at an expert level in work committees 
in fierce discussions often motivated by political concerns and interests.2 
Standpoints which according to the closing Agreement of 18th September 
of the National Round-Table Negotiations held between 13th June and 18th 
September, 1989, were realized in draft bills as well. Under the political agree-
ment, the Government recognised these as its own proposals and subsequently to 
not so much content-based as formal modifications, submitted to Parliament.1 
After a short debate, the supreme Hungarian representative body passed them 
with minor amendments in October, 1989. 
The "constitutional revolution" had not been completed as pursuant to 
the comprehensive Amendment of the Constitution under Act XXXI of 1989. 
First of all, the adoption of Acts to implement the Amendment of the Constitution 
was still necessary, which was accomplished in 1989 and within 3-4 years 
following 1990 as a result of the work of democratically elected parliaments. 
Subsequently, however, further reformulation, readjustment and development 
of several constitutional institutions were even at that time imperative by reason 
of the inevitable improvisation, inaccuracy and non-availability of practical 
experience implicated in the urgency of the Amendment of the Constitution 
and of law-making as well as the rapidly changing social-political conditions. 
Despite relevant attempts and owing to the non-agreement between parliamentary 
parties, Hungary has failed to frame a new Constitution, whereas our constitu-
tional framework has been completely reorganised and reinforced. According 
to the requirements of a constitutional state based on the rule of law, the 
framework of legal protection has also been transformed. In the course of the 
2
 See, Halmai, G.: Az 1949-es alkotmány jogállamosítása (The Reformulation of the 
Constitution according to the Rule of Law). In: Bozóki, A.-Elbert, M. et al. (eds.): A rend-
szerváltás forgatókönyve. Kerekasztal-tárgyalások 1989-ben (The Dramaturgy of the Political 
Transformation. Round-Table Negotiations in 1989). Vol. 7. Alkotmányos forradalom (Cons-
titutional Revolution). Essays. Új Mandátum Publisher, Budapest, 2000. 180. and following. 
3
 See, Holló: op. cit., 109. 
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political transformation, two new bodies of legal protection have been established, 
too, namely, the institution of the ombudsman and the Constitutional Court. 
Owing to the changes, the framework of legal protection today bears comparison 
in all its dimensions even at an international level. This holds true despite the 
fact that the reasonableness of several solutions, either sustained throughout 
the political transformation or newly adopted, has been challenged up to now. 
In the followings, we shall explore what the above exactly imply with respect 
to the institutions of the ombudsman, the prosecution, the judiciary and the 
Constitutional Court, which belong to the constitutional framework of legal 
protection. 
The Establishment of the Institution of the Ombudsman (Parliamentary 
Commissioner) in Hungary 
The Institution of the Parliamentary Commissioner originates in Scandinavia 
and looks back on a past of two centuries. According to the Swedish model, 
it gained ground in other Scandinavian countries primarily following the 2nd 
World War and in several Western European countries (e.g., in England, France, 
Austria, Spain) following the 1960s and 1970s. Moreover, we can assert that 
the introduction of the institution of the Parliamentary Commissioner was 
put on the agenda on other continents and has been spreading all over the 
world. 
Basically, two factors account for the apparent prevalence of the institution 
of the Parliamentary Commissioner. Primarily, it is considered to be an 
appropriate form of the extension of parliamentary control over the executive 
power, but its establishment has also created an additional guarantee for the 
protection of citizens' rights. 
The traditional forms of function of the parliament are not appropriate for the 
control of the legality of particular procedures of applying the law by authorities. 
Albeit the representatives place great emphasis on the settlement of the 
complaints of their constituents, even if the settlement of individual and group 
complaints distracts them from performing their "express" representative duties. 
Therefore, as a result of the delegation of power to promote to solve individual 
and group grievances to the Parliamentary Commissioner, not only the 
supervisory power of Parliament will be construed as more comprehensive, 
but representatives will also be exempted from the task of attending to the 
complaints of their constituents. 
The establishment of the institution of the Parliamentary Commissioner is 
further justified by the consequent extension of guarantees for increased 
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protection of the rights and lawful interests of citizens, even if independent 
judicial review of the legality of administrative decisions is available in every 
case. Nevertheless, the instrument of judicial remedy is perforce incomplete. 
Generally, courts cannot secure remedy if the officials of the respective 
authority resort to offensive abuse, fail to make a decision within the prescribed 
or reasonable period, do not institute proceedings in an arbitrary manner within 
their discretionary powers, perchance take arbitrary measures or decisions. In 
case of such abuses, if the procedure is otherwise lawful, courts do barely have 
the power to proceed, since the authority resorts to arbitrary measures only 
within the scope of law. For instance, the law allows that the authority in a 
given group of cases made either an affirmative or a negative decision within 
its discretionary powers, and on these grounds it may grant the request of 
one party and dismiss that of the other without a recognisable reason. Similar 
inconsistencies may appear in the system of remedies not only in adminis-
trative, but also in judicial, prosecuting or other procedures by authorities or 
quasi authorities. In such cases, with regard to judicial independence, except 
for court proceedings, intervention by the Parliamentary Commissioner (in 
certain cases by commissioners attached to other organs, such as, e.g., the Head 
of State or bodies of local self-government), being independent of the organs 
of applying the law is deemed to be a supplement and an effective instrument 
of the increased protection of civil rights and lawful interests. 
At the tum of the 1980s and 1990s, the establishment of the institution of the 
Parliamentary Commissioner was necessitated by similar reasons in Hungary, as 
well. The document issued on 30th November, 1988 by the Ministry of Justice 
with the title "Conception of the Regulation of the New Constitution of the 
Hungarian People's Republic", based on foreign examples and Hungarian research, 
referred to the necessity of the establishment of the institution ("spokesman for 
civic rights"), in case the competence of the prosecution (independent of the 
executive power, i.e. the administration) to exercise full legality supervision 
would be substantially transformed (narrowed) or abolished. Consequently, a 
largely similar scope of duties could be delegated to the power of the ombuds-
man. This conception was reaffirmed under the Resolution of Parliament 
adopted on 9th March 1989 on the Principles of the Regulation of the Consti-
tution of Hungary. 
The Draft Act of 29th May, 1989 amending the Constitution did not set 
forth the establishment of the institution of the Parliamentary Commissioner. 
However, the establishment of the institution was highlighted again at the 
National Round-Table Negotiations that commenced in June, whereas at that 
time it was not directly attached to the transformation of the scope of power of 
the prosecution. Finally, according to the agreement, the Constitution should 
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stipulate an authorisation for the establishment of the institution of a general 
ombudsman and of special parliamentary commissioners at a later date. Such 
independent institutions could be, e.g., the Parliamentary Commissioners for 
Data Protection, Environmental Protection and for Protection of Minorities, 
who would proceed in matters concerning national minorities.4 
According to the Round-Table Agreement, the comprehensive Amendment 
of the Constitution of 1989 provided for the establishment of the institution 
of the "Parliamentary Commissioner for Civic Rights". Accordingly, the 
Parliamentary Commissioner for Civic Rights shall be responsible for the 
investigation or initiating the investigation of cases involving irregularities 
related to constitutional rights he has become aware of and initiating general 
or specific measures for their redress. Proceedings by the ombudsman may be 
initiated by any citizen in the cases specified by law. The Parliamentary 
Commissioner shall be elected by Parliament based on the proposal of the 
President of the Republic. The Parliament may also elect special commissioners 
for the protection of specific constitutional rights. The Parliamentary Commis-
sioners shall submit an annual report on their activities to Parliament. The 
detailed rules concerning Parliamentary Commissioners shall be set forth 
under an Act of constitutional force. Later, Act XL of 1990 amended the 
constitutional provisions by specifying the institution of the Parliamentary 
Commissioner for the Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities as responsible 
for investigating or initiating the investigation of cases involving irregularities 
related to the rights of national or ethnic minorities he has become aware of 
and initiating general or specific measures for their redress. According to 
this amendment, in a remarkable way, the competence of the Parliamentary 
Commissioner would have been exercised by a body consisting of one repre-
sentative of each national and ethnic minority, who were to be proposed on 
the motions of national and ethnic minority organisations by the President of 
the Republic and elected by Parliament. This solution was primarily promoted 
so that national and ethnic minority rights could be enforced, since the 
autonomous representation of national and ethnic minorities had not been 
granted in Parliament and according to the reasoning of the draft amendment, 
the authority of the Parliamentary Commissioner to protect minorities may 
even be considerably broader and more efficient than those of the MPs. Later, 
however, as pursuant to Act LXXIII of 1994 amending the Constitution, the 
4
 See: Bozóki, A.-Elbert , M. et al. (eds.): A rendszerváltás forgatókönyve. Kerek-
asztal-tárgyalások 1989-ben (The Dramaturgy of the Political Transformation. R o u n d -
Table Negotiations in 1989). Vol. 6. Documents. Ed., introduction and notes by Kalmár, 
M.-Révész , В. Új Mandátum Publisher, Budapes t , 2000. 618. 
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amendment above providing for the establishment of the quasi "representative" 
body designated to protect national and ethnic minority rights was repealed. 
Subsequently, the person of Commissioner to protect minorities too, shall be 
elected with a qualified majority vote by Parliament on the proposal of the 
President of the Republic as pursuant to the Amendment of 1990. Besides, since 
the Act with constitutional force as a special type of Acts ceased to exist in 
1990, the detailed rules concerning Parliamentary Commissioners was to be 
specified under a qualified majority Act of Parliament. Accordingly, this was 
accomplished on the adoption of Act LIX of 1993 on the Parliamentary 
Commissioner for Civic Rights, which was supplemented by Act LXXVII of 
1993 on the Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities, furthermore, by Act 
LXIII of 1992 on Personal Data Protection and Publicity of Data of Public 
Interest with respect to the still acting Commissioner for the Rights of National 
and Ethnic Minorities as well as Commissioner for Data Protection; the Com-
missioner for Data Protection having even special powers exceptionally as 
an authority. Following their election in 1995 for a term of 6 years, the 
Parliamentary Commissioners, who may be once re-elected, started their work. 
The considerations of the supporters of the introduction of the institution have 
been justified by the fact that the independent parliamentary commissioners 
subjected exclusively to the Constitution and other law have proceeded in 
their offices to common content. The favourable judgement of their operation 
manifests itself in the recurrent claim for the establishment of further offices of 
special commissioners, too, in favour of more efficient protection of consti-
tutional rights drifting into the focus of general attention. 
According to the Constitution and Act LIX of 1993, the Parliamentary 
Commissioner for Civic Rights shall be competent to exercise its supervisory 
or controlling power in all cases, if, in consequence of the proceedings of any 
authority or an organ performing public service or its decision made (measure 
taken) and/or of the omission of measures a person's constitutional (fundamental 
or "human") rights have been injured or if its direct threat obtains, provided that 
the person concerned has exhausted the available administrative legal remedies 
(except for the judicial review of an administrative decision as pursuant to a 
later amendment) or provided that no legal remedy has been secured. With 
regard to determining the scope of competence of the Commissioner, the 
following aspects are, however remarkable: 
- Concerning its application, Article 29 of the original text of the Act 
specified the scope of organs that qualify as authority and are subject to the 
authority of the Commissioner. Later, however, the Constitutional Court stated 
in its Decision of 7/2001 (III. 14.) that in some aspects the definition was vague, 
since it was not unambiguous, which organs the supervisory power of the 
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Commissioner exactly encompassed. This contradicts the principle of legal 
security that grounds a state based on the rule of law. In view of that, several 
points of the definition were annulled by reason of unconstitutionality, which 
called for a more accurate regulation of Article 29 under Act XC of 2001, 
according to which an authority, that the competence of the Commissioner 
pertains to, is an organ performing public administration, an organ exercising 
its competence of public administrative character, the armed forces, the policing 
organs, the national security service, the investigating authority including the 
public prosecutor's office performing prosecution investigation, local self-
governments and national or ethnic minority self-governments, a public body 
operating on the basis of obligatory membership, a notary public, the county 
court bailiff and the independent court bailiff. Nevertheless, in respect to the 
application of the Act, the Parliament, the President of the Republic, the 
Constitutional Court, the State Audit Office, the court, the Office of the Public 
Prosecutor, except for the prosecuting authority that accomplishes prosecution 
investigation, shall not qualify as authority. 
- The power of supervision of the Parliamentary Commissioner for Civic 
Rights encompasses only the activities or omissions of authorities and organs 
performing public service concerning the exercise of constitutional rights. It 
shall not encompass the entire activity of the supervised organs, such as the 
case in respect of, e.g., public administration in some countries. Its supervision 
necessarily pertains, first of all, to the operation of public administration, so far 
as it interacts with a great number of citizens on a daily basis. Nevertheless, 
we may assert that its basic agency is the protection of fundamental rights, 
rather than the external supervision of the executive power or of public 
administration. 
- The Commissioner is responsible for the elimination or the prevention 
of the injury of fundamental constitutional rights. As a consequence, it super-
vises mainly the lawfulness of the operation of different organs. In its scope 
of constitutional authority, however, it is entitled to intervene in any case of 
irregularities concerning the enforcement of constitutional rights he has 
cognisance of even if it does not directly infringe any legal rule. Consequently, 
it may examine, and according to the established practice it has done so, whether 
the authority within its discretionary powers had proceeded in a consistent 
manner and in good faith. In its procedure, the authority may not pursue any 
objective other than it has powers and competence for; it may proceed on an 
objective and impartial basis with respect to the relevant circumstances in the 
case concerned. It shall make a decision adequate for the peculiarities of the 
case within a reasonable period even if this period is shorter than the period 
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specified by law. Human dignity shall at all times be respected in the course of 
the proceedings by the authority.5 
The institution of the Parliamentary Commissioner for Civic Rights is related 
to Parliament. Nevertheless, it is not expressly an organ of Parliament exercising 
supervision or control, at least not in the sense as it is in several countries 
(e.g., England and France), where, according to the rule, the investigation of 
the complaints of citizens may be initiated by their representative or senator 
in Parliament. In Hungary, those concerned may directly initiate proceedings 
by the Commissioner in cases subject to its scope of supervision, who shall 
examine the filed petition and proceed to investigate the case on a mandatory 
basis unless the irregularity mentioned in the petition, according to the judge-
ment of the ombudsman, is of small importance. Otherwise, the Parliamentary 
Commissioner is entitled to proceed in order to reveal and terminate any 
irregularity concerning constitutional rights ex officio on any or without notifi-
cation, too. 
As in other countries, the Parliamentary Commissioner does not have, as a 
rule, powers to redress the revealed irregularity. According to the nature of the 
irregularity, he may, for instance, resort to the following "soft" measures that 
can by no means be considered insignificant by reason of the great publicity his 
activity entails: initiate that the organ incurring the irregularity terminated it, or 
recommend redress of the irregularity to the supervisory authority. The 
Parliamentary Commissioner may initiate that the competent public prosecutor 
lodged a prosecutor's protest. If in the course of proceedings, the Commissioner 
forms a grounded suspicion of perpetration of a disciplinary or petty offence, 
he may, whereas if he forms that of a criminal offence, he shall initiate the 
corresponding process. He may initiate that the Constitutional Court instituted 
proceedings. So that the irregularity shall be avoided in the future, the Com-
missioner may recommend that the organ authorised to make law or norms 
amends, repeals or frames a legal rule or any normative legal instrument. 
Eventually, the Commissioner shall notify the Parliament of the revealed 
irregularity or request its investigation in his annual report, or, if the irregularity 
is extraordinarily massive, in the interim period. 
5
 See, e.g., Report of the Parliamentary Commissioner for Civic Rights and its General 
Deputy on their activity in the period of Is1 January-ЗТ1 December, 1998 submitted to 
Parliament. In: Hungarian Official Gazette, II./79/1999. 18. 
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The Organisation and Functions of the Prosecution's (Procurator's) 
Offices 
Following the bourgeois transformation, the system of prosecution on the 
European continent was in general established as subordinated to the executive 
power (Government, Minister of Justice), and, according to the French model, 
it was strictly centralised and performed duties almost exclusively related 
to criminal procedures (accusation, public prosecution at court) so that the 
uniformity of prosecution could be ensured. Such prosecution was established 
in Hungary following 1871, as well. Lately, in view of the requirement of 
impartial criminal investigation, issues such as guaranteeing the independence of 
prosecution, loosening its attachment to the executive and constraining the 
directive power of the superior authority in the centralised system have all been 
stressed. Nevertheless, the system of prosecution is still generally a levelled, 
hierarchical structure attached to the executive power. Apart from duties related 
to the prosecution, it secondarily or exceptionally attends to civil procedural or 
administrative duties. The scope of duties of the prosecution does not include, 
in principle, the supervision of the legality of public administration. In several 
countries, similar duties are performed by the institution of the Parliamentary 
Commissioner, which is independent of the executive power. 
Following 1917, in Russia or the Soviet Union the system of prosecution 
established, with respect to its organisation and functions, was different from 
the solutions adopted in Western Europe. After 1936, the strictly centralised 
prosecution was separated from public administration and it was organised 
not as a member state, but as a federal organisation dependent exclusively on the 
supreme federal organ of representation. This principally promoted centralisation, 
which was instrumental to the uniform enforcement of federal law on the whole 
territory of the federation. This organisational construction was also sub-
stantiated by the fact that the prosecution was constituted as not only responsible 
for criminal and partly civil procedures, but also for the so-called general 
supervision of legality, so, accordingly, it supervised both the lawful operation 
of state, social and economic organs and the legality of the activities of citizens. 
Nevertheless, the prosecution controlled principally the lawful functioning 
of public administration. Therefore, the consequential assurance of the effective-
ness of Acts and other law required that this duty was performed not by an 
organ related to, but by one that was independent of public administration. 
This solution, which guaranteed the "external" supervision of administration, 
could, in principle, also provide some protection for citizens seeking legal remedy 
against abuses by administrative authorities, particularly in an era when any 
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instrument of the judicial contest of administrative decisions was virtually 
completely revoked. 
Following 1945, the system of the prosecution in Eastern-European countries 
was transformed according to the Soviet model. As pursuant to the Constitution 
of 1949, a centralised, hierarchical and independent prosecution system was 
established in Hungary after 1953, as well, which was subordinated exclusively 
to the supreme organ of representation. Besides, the scope of duties of the 
prosecution included the tasks connected with criminal procedures (the 
supervision of legality of investigations, accusation and prosecution in court 
proceedings, the supervision of legality of the implementation of penal measures), 
as well as partly tasks connected with civil procedures, furthermore, the 
prosecution's office was specifically responsible for the general supervision of 
the observance of the law. No substantial change was effected later in the legal 
status of prosecution, although, owing to partial amendments in the meantime, 
the scope of the general supervision of legality was restricted. After 1972, 
the responsibilities of the prosecution ceased to include the supervision of 
the legality of economic activities, and after 1990, owing to the introduction 
of new methods of supervision, the supervision of local self-governments 
(councils). However, as pursuant to the currently effective Act V of 1972 
(and its Amendments) on Prosecution, the supervision of legality exercised 
by the prosecution shall pertain even today to legal rules, other norms, general 
regulations and individual decisions applying the law of organs of state 
administration under the level of Government. Furthermore, it pertains to 
decisions of non-judicial organs settling legal disputes, to decisions of business 
and other organisations concerning relations of employment and those of 
membership in co-operatives, as well as their measures with general effect 
issued when enabled by law. In this scope, omission also shall be subject to 
supervisory procedures ex officio or upon notification. In case of infringement 
of law, redress by the public prosecutor is not admissible (except in cases of 
petty offences), however, he may initiate that the competent organisation 
terminated or prevented the infringement of the law. In case of the availability 
of legal conditions, e.g., the prosecutor may lodge a protest with the organi-
sation that infringed the law or with its superior organ (organ that performs 
legality supervision on behalf of the state). Furthermore, the prosecutor may 
lodge a complaint with the director of the organisation so that the illegal practice 
or the infringement of the law in the form of omission was terminated, or in 
case the risk of future infringement of the law obtains, he may lodge an 
admonition in the interest of its prevention, etc. 
With respect to its organisational structure and functions, the prosecution 
has not changed fundamentally since the "socialist" transformation, in spite 
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of the fact that its possibility and claim has been asserted and recurrently 
highlighted since the years of 1988-1989. Based on research, this, as an 
alternative, was formulated under the document titled "Conception of the 
Regulation of the New Constitution of the Hungarian People's Republic" of 
30th November, 1988 and under the Resolution of Parliament adopted on 9th 
March, 1989 on the Principles of the Regulation of the Constitution of Hungary. 
However, the conceptions concerning transformation were not recognised 
either by the Draft Act of 29th May, 1989 amending the Constitution or by 
the agreement concluded at the National Round-Table Negotiations,6 and, as 
a consequence, were not adopted under the comprehensive Amendment of 
the Constitution of 1989, either. However, with reference to conceptual-
professional considerations, the demand for such a transformation recurrently 
manifested itself in the endeavours of successive Governments after the free 
elections in 1990. According to the more or less prevalent models adopted 
in Western Europe, the motive of these endeavours was to integrate the 
prosecution into the organisational structure of the executive power and to 
subordinate it to the supervision and authority of the Minister of Justice in 
Hungary, as well. This could promote that the Government contributes to 
framing policy concerning penal law not only by the submission of bills, but 
by drawing on the powers of the prosecution. This is possible all the more 
because the extension and the establishment of other "external" safeguards for 
the legality of administration (quasi general introduction of administrative 
jurisdiction, introduction of the institution of the ombudsman) supersede 
the so-called general legality supervision by the prosecution that would sub-
stantiate the sustenance of the prosecution as independent of the executive 
power. The realisation of these endeavours, which requires an Amendment of 
the Constitution, has, however, so far been met by the resistance of the successive 
oppositions that feared the excessive strengthening of the Government, although, 
forceful conceptual and professional reservations have also had bearing on 
such a tum of events. It has been raised, e.g., that in case of the adoption of 
that solution, the penal proceedings preceding the judicial phase, except for 
some measures, would not be subject to "independent", external control, it would 
be completely subordinated to the executive power which, without the introduc-
tion of adequate "counterbalances", would threaten the assurance of the 
legality of criminal procedures. Therefore, following the model adopted in 
other countries, the institution of the investigating judge and in a relatively 
(>
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wide scope that of subsidiary private accusation should be introduced. Further-
more, the consideration has been raised that the extension or establishment 
of various safeguards of legality promoting the "external" supervision of 
administration may not fully substitute the "general" supervision of legality 
exercised by the prosecution that substantiates the independent system of 
prosecution. It cannot be replaced by the extension of administrative jurisdiction, 
since it is inadmissible in cases specified by law, and, we cannot disregard the 
option that an organ independent of the administration may initiate legality 
proceedings ex officio, since no party will take action if the decision infringes 
the law in his favour. The supervision exercised by the prosecution cannot be 
fully replaced by the powers of the Parliamentary Commissioner for Civic 
Rights, either, since the Commissioner may intervene exclusively by reason of 
the injury of constitutional rights, not by reason of the unlawful operation of 
state administration in general. Therefore, if the prosecution was subordinated 
to the Minister of Justice by terminating its power of the general supervision of 
legality, similarly to the solutions adopted in other countries, the Parliamentary 
Commissioner for Civic Rights should be authorised to perform the legality 
supervision of the "entire" state administration, in the scope of which he could 
safeguard the enforcement of constitutional rights, too. 
The Reorganisation of Jurisdiction 
Based on previous research, the conception issued by the Ministry of Justice 
on 30th November, 1988 related to drafting the new Constitution of the Hungarian 
People's Republic, already referred to all aspects that had great significance 
with respect to the development of jurisdiction in the course of political trans-
formation. The core issues of reform endeavours thenceforth and following 
the adoption of the Resolution of Parliament of 9th March, 1989 on the Principles 
of the Regulation of the Constitution of Hungary were the following: more 
consistent assurance of the constitutional principle of the judicial administration 
of justice, reinforcement of the unity of judicial organisation, enforcement 
of democratic jurisdiction with respect to realities, furthermore, universal 
establishment of guarantees for judicial independence. These endeavours were 
barely asserted under the Draft Act of 29th May, 1989 amending the 
Constitution, however, quite obviously, they were highlighted again at the 
National Round-Table Negotiations in relation to the constitutional regulation 
of the state establishment, so far as the restriction of the powers of special 
courts and the extension of guarantees for judicial independence was concerned. 
However, the actual reform commenced only subsequently to the comprehensive 
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Amendment of the Constitution of 1989 and was accomplished later, via the 
adoption of further amendments and Acts implementing the Constitution. 
The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789 in France 
proclaimed that any society in which guarantees for rights and the separation 
of powers are not secured does not have a Constitution. The first European 
Constitutional Charter of 1791 (of France) that adopted the Declaration as its 
integral part set forth that judicial power pertains to the judges. Whereas, the 
requirement of the separation of powers in further French and Western European 
constitutional development evolved into the requirement of the division and 
counterbalance of powers, this hardly affected the constitutional requirement 
that jurisdiction should be exercised by courts. Furthermore, the principle was 
also set forth under the constitutions of European socialist countries, although, 
together with the conception of the unity of state power. They could not 
disregard the general requirement that jurisdiction must pertain to the power of 
the courts, since it is exclusively the particular organisation and procedures of 
courts circumscribed by guarantees, which ensures that the administration of 
justice shall be exercised in a lawful and impartial manner. Both the original text 
of the Constitution of 1949 and the effective Constitution of Hungary set forth 
the principle of the judicial administration of justice, too. 
We cannot fail to mention that the monopoly of courts to administer justice 
has never and nowhere prevailed with full consequence. For practical purposes, 
(e.g., expeditiousness, economising, knowledge of facts and locality, relieving 
courts) other organs have also attended to administering justice. Such a situation 
developed in Hungary, too. Nevertheless, so that the constitutional principle of 
the judicial administration of justice could be more consistently enforced, 
Economic Adjudicatory Commissions were dissolved in 1972 (their competence 
was taken over by ordinary courts) and, in the course of political trans-
formation, the competence of non-judicial organs administering justice was 
more overtly restricted. The so-called social administration of justice (social 
court 's adjudication) was declared unconstitutional in 1991, then, the work of 
Labour and Co-operative Adjudicatory Commissions was also terminated in 
1992. However, even recently similar quasi judicial organs have also been 
operating, such as the Public Procurement Adjudicatory Commission to adjudge 
unlawful or disputed cases pertaining to public procurement. Administrative 
organs shall proceed in certain scopes of actions, primarily in procedures 
initiated by reason of petty offences. Arbitration shall be admitted in economic 
legal disputes and other scopes of cases recognised by law, etc. Thus despite 
the restriction of the competence of jurisdiction of non-judicial organs, e.g. 
in Hungary, we still can't posit as a fact in practice the exclusive judicial 
monopoly of jurisdiction. Although, we admit exceptions that are unproble-
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matic with regard to their narrow scope and guarantees, we can assert that the 
Constitution does not contain even today either reference to their admission or 
stipulate limitations on the authorisation of non-judicial organs to administer 
justice, furthermore, it does not specify a main rule concerning the admissibility 
of the judicial review of the decisions of these organs. 
The requirement of equality before the law implies the enforcement of 
equality before jurisdiction. This postulates that the cases of subjects of law, 
i.e., legal entities and natural persons shall be adjudicated by the same organs, 
and that provisions of law shall be rendered uniform interpretation by the 
organs of jurisdiction. In the judicial organisation that is safeguarded by the 
establishment of a unified system of courts. Consequently, in different consti-
tutional systems all cases pertaining to courts shall be adjudicated, in principle, 
by courts of the same type and organisation, and all courts shall be linked on 
the grounds of powers of appeal-review and through the guarantees of the 
uniform interpretation and application of law. 
Following the bourgeois transformation, the functioning of extraordinary 
courts, and special courts which establish privileges or manifest discrimination 
and are organised on the basis of social, national-ethnic or religious distinctions, 
have always been inadmissible on consolidated constitutional grounds. In 
Hungary, such courts had not obtained in the period preceding the political 
transformation, either, whereas, similarly to other countries, specialised 
courts, such as Labour Courts and Military Tribunals had operated in a narrow 
scope in specific proceedings. However, in favour of the reinforcement of 
the unity of judicial organisation, the conception issued by the Ministry of 
Justice on 30th November, 1988 related to drafting the Constitution took the 
sustenance of Military Tribunals into consideration, then the Resolution of 
Parliament adopted on 9th March, 1989 on the Principles of the Regulation of 
the Constitution promised both the dissolution of Labour Courts and narrowing 
the scope of competence of Military Tribunals. At the National Round-Table 
Negotiations, the Opposition Round-Table maintained that Military Tribunals 
could function exclusively for the state of defence. In the transition period, the 
urgent dissolution of Military Tribunals and Prosecution is inevitable with 
respect to guarantees.7 Finally, in the course of the political transformation, 
Labour Courts have been operative until recently, whereas for times of peace, 
Military Tribunals were dissolved as pursuant to Act LVI of 1991 amending 
Act IV of 1972 on the Courts, and since that time military justice has been 
administered by the military panels operating at the appointed County Courts 
or the Metropolitan Court in Budapest and at the High Court in Budapest. 
7
 Ibid. 99. and following. 
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Despite the functioning of Labour Courts established in counties and 
Budapest, the organisation of courts may be deemed to be unified. Judicial 
competence is concentrated at ordinary courts with general scope of jurisdiction. 
Generally, the courts that may proceed to administer justice are the Local 
Courts, County Courts or the Metropolitan Court of Budapest, the High Courts-
three of which were established on 1st January, 2003, supplemented by two 
further ones on 1st July, 2004 as pursuant to Act LIX of 1997 amending the 
Constitution proposed under the Resolution of Parliament of 9th March, 1989 
on the Principles of the Regulation of the Constitution of Hungary-and the 
Supreme Court. The judicial system is headed by the Supreme Court that shall 
assure the uniformity of administration of justice by the courts. 
Since the adoption of constitutional charters, safeguarding the democracy 
of jurisdiction has featured as a distinct constitutional endeavour, which, in 
times of epochal revolutionary changes, necessitated the election of judges for 
definite terms, moreover, the involvement of lay assessors into jurisdiction. 
Whereas, in periods of political consolidation, the reasonableness of the 
observance of such democratic principles for themselves would usually be 
challenged and the meticulous enforcement and application of democratically 
adopted law deemed to be the major standard of democratic jurisdiction. 
Therefore, the system of the filling up the posts of judges must comply with 
the requirement of judicial independence and competence. The involvement of 
lay-assessors was also challenged on the grounds of its being in different cases 
a mere formality from the outset. 
In several countries, based on the considerations above, the appointment of 
judges for an indefinite period has been instituted as opposed to the election of 
judges for a definite period, even if the election of judges is known even 
nowadays in a certain scope, e.g., in some member states of the U.S. and also 
in Switzerland. In Hungary, the system of the election of judges as pursuant to 
the original text of the Constitution of 1949, the exercise of which by the organs 
of representation was prescribed under its implementing rules, was never 
enforced, since the offices of judges used to be filled by way of appointment in 
a broad scope for a long time. As a matter of fact, the institution of the election 
of judges was stipulated under the Amendment of the Constitution of 1972, so 
that the judges were elected by the Presidential Council of the People's 
Republic, composed of 21 MPs, for an indefinite period. In the course of the 
political transformation, the comprehensive Amendment of the Constitution of 
1989 dissolved the Presidential Council functioning as a collective Head of 
State and its role was taken over by the one-man Head of State. Thence, the 
system of the appointment of judges for an indefinite period after a three years' 
probationary period has positively prevailed. The President of the Republic is 
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authorised to appoint the judges. Unarguably, their appointment for an indefinite 
period creates better conditions for the enforcement of judicial independence. 
It is also beyond doubt that in case sufficient guarantees are provided, the 
appointment system as opposed to the contingency of election facilitates the 
selection of judges with adequate training. The way of selection to various 
major offices of the judiciary sometimes may be different, e.g., according to 
a more recent provision, the President of the Supreme Court is elected by 
Parliament for a period of 6 years. 
So far as people's participation is concerned, the formerly general partici-
pation of people's-assessors in adjudication on the first instance was confined 
to a narrower scope in Hungary as well as other countries after the 1960s. 
According to experience, the involvement of lay-judges incurred substantial 
expenses, whereas it barely promoted more meticulous adjudication. On account 
of their low performance, the involvement of lay-judges was mere formality, 
since the expectation that "practical experience" and the expertise of lay-judges 
could support adjudication, except for certain groups of cases, was rather 
chimerical. On the contrary, it was the selection of the unfit that prevailed 
in the system of the selection of lay-judges, i.e., not the most suitable persons 
were selected, but those, whose absence f rom the workplace caused the least 
disturbance. Even in such a case mustering the required number of lay-judges 
would be a recurrent problem by reason of disinclination to participate. These 
factors led to the solution that beyond labour adjudication the involvement of 
lay-judges was restricted to those (groups of) cases in which the participation 
of expert lay-judges could in fact promote reaching a more technical and 
considerate decision, furthermore, lay assessors could counteract the faults 
entailed by routine in the scope of judicial discretion, particularly in serious 
penal cases. Because according to sociological surveys, the attention of the 
professional judge in the panel is focused primarily on the act of the perpetrator, 
whereas that of lay-judges concentrates on the person of the perpetrator. 
These facts influenced the Conception issued by the Ministry of Justice 30th 
November, 1988 in the course of drafting the Constitution and the Resolution of 
Parliament on the Principles of the Regulation of the Constitution of Hungary, 
too, both of which proposed that the new Constitution confined the involvement 
of non-professional judges in jurisdiction exclusively to those cases specified 
by law. However, it was only later that the "reversal" of the constitutional rule 
pertaining to adjudication by lay-judges or "reducing" the institution in view of 
reality was provided for under Act LIX of 1997 amending the Constitution. As 
it is known, according to the former text of the Constitution, courts administered 
justice through panels consisting of professional judges and lay-assessors, even 
if Acts could provide for exceptions. According to the effective Constitution, 
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"Non-professional judges shall also participate in judicature in the cases and in 
the manner prescribed by law." This provision theoretically also facilitated 
the institutionalisation of jury trials, which, however, devoid of a compelling 
legacy, would amount to hardly any sense in Hungary, primarily because jury 
trials undermine the constraints imposed by the law of evidence, furthermore, 
this solution, by way of making an artificial distinction between decisions on 
matters of fact and on legal questions would in fact transfer the responsibility to 
lay-judges of making autonomous decisions on questions, too, which in fact 
require significant legal expertise, such as the qualification of the act in penal 
cases. 
Guaranteeing judicial independence is a fundamental constitutional principle 
of the judicial system. Following Anglo-Saxon antecedents, its legal bases 
were established by the first modern constitutional charters, which instituted 
guarantees primarily to prevent the removal of judges from office. Later, the 
general rule according to which "judges are independent and subjected only 
to the law" has been adopted by constitutions mainly according to the model of 
the (German) Constitution of Weimar of 1919. Following 1936, this rule for 
propagandistic reasons was introduced into European socialist constitutions, 
among others into the Hungarian Constitution of 1949, as well. Nevertheless, 
this principle as a rule was not enforced until the 1960s and 1970s by reason 
of frequent intervention into the work of the judiciary, in spite of the fact 
that several legal guarantees existed for safeguarding judicial independence. 
Subsequently, external political influence on judicial administration of justice 
slackened, nevertheless, it became obvious that the democratic transformation 
of social-political conditions and the extension of legal guarantees for judicial 
independence were necessary for the elimination of legal-political encumbrances 
of enforcement of judicial independence. In fact, the democratic changes taking 
place in 1989-1990 and the transformation of the system of structural and 
personal legal guarantees of judicial independence established universal grounds, 
which facilitated that the judge endowed with human and professional dignity 
accomplished his/her duty in an independent, impartial and unprejudiced manner. 
In democratic political systems, in which the exertion of influence upon 
the work of the judiciary is deemed inadmissible, the enforcement of judicial 
independence is safeguarded by a comprehensive system of structural and 
personal legal guarantees. Structural legal guarantees have been instituted so 
that accessibility of adjudicating judges can be precluded via the establishment 
of the relationship of courts with organs that supervise adjudication, guarantee 
the unity of law, administer courts or perform other duties. Legal guarantees 
related to the person of the judge facilitates that the judge, so far as his/her 
personal existence (career) as a judge is concerned, does not have to fear adverse 
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consequences, if he fails to recognise unlawful intervening attempts, that he/she 
shall not be exposed to unwelcome harassment, and that he/she can avert 
situations of incompatibility that may affect his/her work. With respect to these 
factors, following the political transformation in Hungary, several far-reaching 
changes have taken place. In the followings, we shall outline those we deem to 
be most important: 
- The issue whether MPs in Parliament could address questions to the 
President of the Supreme Court concerning all matters pertaining to his scope 
of competence was already a subject of dispute at the National Round-Table 
Negotiations.8 With respect to judicial independence, this option was eliminated 
as pursuant to the comprehensive Amendment of the Constitution in 1989. 
- In view of the text of the Draft Amendment of the Constitution of 29th 
May, 1989, the standpoint according to which the President of the Supreme 
Court shall not be accountable to report on the work of the Supreme Court to 
Parliament was formulated at the National Round-Table Negotiations. That 
took effect as pursuant to the comprehensive Amendment of the Constitution 
in 1989. 
- The document issued by the Ministry of Justice on 30th November, 1988 
on the Conception of the Regulation of the New Constitution of the Hungarian 
People's Republic was the first one to propose in an official form that the 
system of the judicial administration, by way of the reinforcement of the 
competence of autonomous judicial bodies or setting up new ones, should be 
reconstituted so that its functioning (guaranteeing the material and personnel 
conditions of the administration of justice) could not be an instrument of inter-
vention into issues of content in the administration of justice. The significance 
of judicial self-government and, for instance, the necessity of the establish-
ment of the National Judiciary Council was emphasised also under the Resolution 
of Parliament of 9th March, 1989 on the Principles of the Regulation of the 
Constitution of Hungary. The comprehensive Amendment of the Constitution 
of 1989 disregarded that issue, however, the systematic establishment of the 
self-government of courts commenced as pursuant to the Amendments of 
Act IV of 1972 on the Courts in the course of the legislation of the 1990s. 
The competence of the Minister of Justice to supervise the general functioning 
of courts was terminated under Act XLII of 1989, whereas Act LXVII of 1991 
legalised the operation not only of the Plenary Session of the Supreme Court, 
Divisions of the Supreme Court and county-metropolitan courts, but of new 
bodies of judicial self-governments (county-metropolitan judiciary conferences, 
county-metropolitan councils of judges elected by the judges out of the judges 
8
 Ibid. 87. and following. 
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and the National Judiciary Council), too, which had a major role in formulating 
the decisions concerning the administration of courts. However, it was Act LIX 
of 1997 amending the Constitution that entailed a complete "breakthrough" 
concerning the administration of courts, according to which the central 
administration of courts shall be exercised by the National Council of Justice 
as the successor of the National Judiciary Council. As pursuant to Act LXVI 
of 1997 on the Organisation and Administration of Courts that replaced Act of 
IV of 1972, it's chaired by the President of the Supreme Court and its members 
are: 9 judges (elected for a term of six years by the delegate conference of the 
judges), the Minister of Justice, the Attorney General (Prosecutor General), the 
Chairman of the Hungarian Bar Association, and two MPs appointed by the 
Budgetary and Financial as well as Constitutional and Justice Committees in 
Parliament. Its decisions are reached by majority vote. Simultaneously, the 
authorisation of the Ministry of Justice to administer courts was terminated in 
an unequalled manner among European states, which led to the full autonomy 
of courts in the scope of administration. This solution obviously promoted the 
prevention of potential exertion of external pressure on judicial administration 
of justice, even if it could accommodate several irregularities, since this way, 
among others, the scope of responsibility of the Government did not pertain 
to the keeping in operation of courts, the management of problems related to 
finances, infrastructure and staffing any longer. With regard to the fact also 
that according to the Amendment as pursuant to Act XLVI of 2002, the 
Government shall table to the Parliament the proposal for the annual budget 
of the courts framed by the National Council of Justice without modifications. 
- In the course of constitutional changes, the reinforcement of personal 
guarantees for judicial independence was of necessity also highlighted. The 
Conception of the Ministry of Justice issued on 30th November, 1988 
emphasised, e.g., that the Constitution had to stipulate that the judges could be 
exempted, suspended, transferred from office or discharged with pension 
against their will exclusively upon the proposal of the competent judicial self-
government body, on the grounds stipulated by the respective law. That was 
the starting point for the Resolution of Parliament adopted on 9th March, 1989 
on the Principles of the Regulation of the Constitution of Hungary, too. 
Eventually, that was substantiated by the respective provision of the Constitution 
reformulated under the comprehensive Amendment of the Constitution of 
1989 that stipulated "Judges may only be removed from office on the grounds 
and in accordance with the procedures specified by law." Then, at the beginning 
of the 1990s, the Amendments of Act of 1972 on the Courts introduced a more 
and more meticulous reformulation of the grounds and the procedure in view 
of judicial independence, however, it developed into a system of guarantees 
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"devoid of defects" as pursuant to Act LXVI of 1997 on the Organisation and 
Administration of Courts and to Act LXVII of 1997 on the Legal Status and 
Remuneration of Judges and their further amendments. The latter enumerated 
the possible grounds for the exemption of judges, among others such as those on 
account of which the judges may be exempted from office even against their 
will. These reasons may be recognised without reservations, are generally 
circumscribed objectively and determined without the possibility of discretion 
(e.g. grounds for exemption may be that the judge has reached the retirement 
age of 70). In such cases, a proposal for the exemption of a judge shall be tabled 
by the National Council of Justice to the President of the Republic for taking 
decision after it has received the opinion of competent bodies of judicial self-
government. However, it is remarkable that in case the reason for exemption is 
circumscribed by law with "vague" legal concepts that substantiate discretion, 
the proposal for exemption may be drafted on condition that prior guarantees 
have been exhausted. Namely, if the judge has become permanently incompetent 
for the fulfilment of his office, the President of the County (Metropolitan) Court, 
of the High Court or of the Supreme Court shall demand in writing that the 
judge resigned from his office. In case the judge fails to comply, in a medical 
case his state of health shall be examined, in case a professional ground 
obtains, an anticipatory evaluation of his work shall be ordained. In a case of 
the establishment of professional incompetence judicial review is admissible. 
It is only afterwards that the National Council of Justice, considering the 
opinion of the competent body of judicial self-government, too, may submit 
the proposal for the exemption of the judge from office. 
The Establishment of the Constitutional Court 
The necessity of guaranteeing the protection of the Constitution has been on the 
agenda since the adoption of the first modern constitutional charters. What has 
been assigned special significance was to ensure the prevention or elimination of 
the breach of the Constitution with respect to law-making, since the application 
of unconstitutional legal rules may lead to massive breaches of the Constitution. 
In the course of development, in several countries various organisations or 
mechanisms were institutionalised to ensure the exercise of a prior and a posterior 
norm control, so that the constitutionality of law could be guaranteed. Among 
the solutions adopted with respect to a posterior norm control, the most 
efficient were those, which, for instance, endeavoured to promote the review 
of unconstitutional legal rules, not via the framework of law-making, but via 
impartial, independent organs, the courts. 
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It is remarkable that in modern legal systems, the system of judicial concrete 
norm control has been established since the Marbury v. Madison Decision of the 
U.S. Federal Supreme Court in 1803, according to which all courts have the 
power to examine the constitutionality of the relevant statute in a particular case 
and if it is found unconstitutional, it shall not be applied in that case. Such cases 
then usually reach supreme courts via appeals, thus the final judgement 
concerning the applicability of the law is made either by the Supreme Court of 
the member state, or in cases pertaining to the federal Constitution, by the 
Federal Supreme Court. This court shall not make a decision on the annulment 
or repeal of any law with a general effect, however, a peculiarity of the 
American legal system is that any legal rule that is found unconstitutional with 
respect to a case shall become dead letter. Unless the Constitution is amended or 
the court modifies its standpoint, it may not be applied by courts any longer. 
In U.S. law, the principle of "stare decisis" is generally recognised, which 
means that it is mandatory for lower courts to adopt the precedent established 
by a higher court. Throughout the development of law on the European continent, 
e.g., in Hungary during the period between 1869 and 1949, there were 
opportunities for reviewing the constitutionality or lawfulness mainly of decrees 
in the process of application of the law by courts, as well. However, devoid of 
the direct binding force of precedents, the system of judicial concrete norm 
control manifest in setting aside the application of unconstitutional legal rules 
proved to be hardly applicable without the injury of the uniform application of 
the law and legal security. For the consequential assurance of the constitutionality 
and lawfulness of legal rules, such a solution was needed that facilitated that 
organs independent of any other organs, i.e. courts could make decisions on 
the annulment or repeal of unconstitutional legal rules abstractly with general 
binding force. 
Disregarding the fact that in some countries ordinary courts (e.g. in a certain 
scope in Switzerland) or administrative courts (e.g., in France with respect to 
decrees) have been authorised to exercise abstract norm control, in the Post-
2nd World War decades, more and more countries followed the model of the 
Constitution of Austria of 1920, so far as independent constitutional courts 
have been authorised to perform that duty, because the judicial review of 
legislation was considered a function of law-making, rather than of juris-
diction. Ordinary and administrative judges have competence for jurisdiction 
and "implementation" of law. In continental Europe assigning judges the task 
of lawmaking (at least "negative" lawmaking), which is an indisputably political 
task, would have contradicted their professional training, way of thinking and all 
prevalent traditions. Featuring the courts that administer justice as politically 
involved bodies would not have been a propitious choice with respect to public 
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opinion. The requirement of the division of state powers could also have 
affected the establishment of independent constitutional courts in the sense that 
constitutional judicature should not result in the concentration of powers at 
courts administering justice. Besides, in several countries the expectation to set 
up a new, higher and distinguished body also substantiated the establishment 
of a separate constitutional court, which in the field of the control of the 
government may be authorised not only to review the constitutionality of legal 
rules, but also to perform other tasks, such as holding high-ranking state officials 
responsible (so-called "state judicature"), and pronouncing judgement in case of 
conflicts between supreme state bodies, state units in federal states, etc. 
The Hungarian constitutional system established in 1949, similarly to other 
socialist countries, did not institute the possibility of judicial review of Acts 
and other legal rules. It was particularly the competence of judicial organs to 
decide on the constitutionality of Acts that was deemed inadmissible. This 
conception was theoretically based on the principle of authorisation the 
supreme body of state-power and representation of the people for the exercise 
of all powers, i.e., if an extra-parliamentary body had the competence to decide 
on the constitutionality of various Acts of Parliament, this body would 
overreach the competence of the Parliament and violate the principle of the 
sovereignty of Parliament. However, there were practical reservations also 
concerning constitutional jurisdiction, first and foremost, that its establish-
ment could become "an impeder of revolutionary legislation". As a consequence, 
the legislative organs within the scope of their law-making power could decide 
on the annulment or amendment of law deemed to be unconstitutional or 
unlawful. Neither did the comprehensively amended Constitution of 1972 
change that situation, which, for instance, specifically stipulated that Parliament 
and the Presidential Council are responsible for guaranteeing the observance of 
the Constitution. Nevertheless, the law-making bodies (or their supervisory 
bodies) did not exercise de facto norm control, apart from some exceptions 
concerning local council law-making, although, its urgency became more and 
more apparent, firstly, in view of the volume of the effective and constantly 
amended legal materials of 10-20 thousand pages requireing to correct at least 
inevitable faults of regulation techniques and secondly, of meeting demands 
concerning constitutionality certainly asserted after 1980. This conveyed the 
idea that for the professional promotion of the work of law-making bodies 
competent to exercise norm control, a so-called Council of Constitutional 
Law attached to the Parliament should be established that was not competent 
to terminate unconstitutionality, however, it could initiate that law-making 
bodies with competence reviewed a legal rule or a normative legal directive in 
case their unconstitutionality was established. In its own scope of competence, 
172 ATTILA RÁCZ 
it could only stay the implementation of unconstitutional provisions of a 
legal rule or of the directive with the exception of Acts, law-decrees and general 
norms of interpretation binding courts set forth by the Supreme Court. This body 
set up as pursuant to Act II of 1983 amending the Constitution and to its 
implementing Act I of 1984 consisted of 11-17 members, who were mostly 
MPs and other public figures [generally experts of (constitutional) law] and 
were elected by Parliament for one parliamentary term. In case of the 
establishment of unconstitutionality, it could proceed on its own initiative or 
on that of authorised state bodies, state officials, among them MPs, supreme 
national organs of social organizations, national organs representing interests 
of state economic organizations and organs of co-operatives. The direct 
initiation of the procedures by those, who had positive claims or were positively 
interested in the review of the constitutionality of legal rules, was not allowed. 
However, besides these limitations on competence and procedure, what 
accounted for the fact that the Council of Constitutional Law could barely 
perform its mission, was primarily the mistrust of the leading political and 
state organs, which were "offended" by reason of the control exercised over 
their law-making activity, which restrained the actual operation of the Council 
of Constitutional Law. Throughout its f ive-year operation with eleven board 
sessions, the Council put issues of constitutionality on its agenda ten times and 
unconstitutionality was established on merely five occasions.9 Thus, by the 
second half of the 1980s, it became manifest that the amplified review system 
of the constitutionality and lawfulness of legal rules still based on the decision-
making power of legislative bodies was barely working and the system of norm 
control was quite inoperative without providing guarantees for independent 
proceedings. Which explains why in the midst of highly variable political 
circumstances the Constitution as amended by Act I of 1989 referred to the 
establishment of a Constitutional Court authorised to annul unconstitutional 
legal rules and normative legal directives with the exception of Acts. 
In the course of drafting the new Constitution, the document issued by the 
Ministry of Justice on 30th November, 1988, the Resolution of Parliament 
adopted on 9th March, 1989 as well as the Draft Act of 29th May, 1989 
amending the Constitution all took into account that a Constitutional Court 
will be part of the new constitutional system. In case unconstitutionality is 
established by the Constitutional Court, it shall have the power to suspend the 
enforcement of Acts until an opposing qualified majority decision is reached by 
Parliament, furthermore, to annul legal rules of lower rank. The question, 
however, whether citizens should be allowed to initiate proceedings by the 
9
 See, Holló: op. cit., 15. and following. 
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Constitutional Court, and if so, in which cases, has been left open. Reasonably, 
these were the issues concerning the Constitutional Court in the new 
constitutional system, on which the various standpoints most powerfully clashed 
at the National Round-Table Negotiations following the withdrawal of the Draft 
Acts amending the Constitution and on the Constitutional Court in June. The 
Opposition Round-Table consistently maintained that the Constitutional Court 
should have the power to annul unconstitutional Acts also and that any citizen 
could initiate proceedings for the review of legal norms with the potential 
introduction of filtering mechanisms.10 Basically, this conception was affirmed 
subsequently both under the comprehensive Amendment of the Constitution of 
1989 and under Act XXXII of 1989 on the Constitutional Court implementing 
the Constitution. As pursuant to these Acts, the Constitutional Court could start 
its work on 1st January, 1990. 
The Constitutional Court, as pursuant to Act LXXIV of 1994 amending 
the Constitution, consists of 11 Judges. The Judges of the Constitutional 
Court, who may be once re-elected, shall be elected for a term of 9 years by 
Parliament with a qualified majority vote of the MPs. The members of the 
Constitutional Court are independent and their decisions shall be made 
exclusively in compliance with the Constitution and other law. In cases 
specified by law, they proceed at plenary sessions or in three-member boards. 
The Constitutional Court exercises a prior and a posterior norm control 
and also proceeds in public law disputes as pursuant to the Constitution or 
other law. For instance: 
- The Constitutional Court shall implement review of Acts adopted by 
Parliament prior to promulgation upon the motion of the President of the 
Republic; the Procedural Rules of Parliament upon the motion of Parliament; the 
unconstitutionality of international agreements before their conclusion upon the 
motion of Parliament, the President of the Republic or the Government. (Until 
the Amendment of 1998, it also had the power to review the constitutionality of 
bills on the motion of Parliament, of its standing committee, or of fifty MPs.) 
- The classical powers of the Constitutional Court include a posterior review 
of the unconstitutionality of legal rules and norms for state direction other than 
legal rules. Uniquely among European countries, the Hungarian Constitutional 
Court shall be authorised to do so on the petition of anybody without being 
personally concerned. The circumscription of this form of petition, which 
anybody is entitled to resort to, by the introduction of "filtering mechanisms" 
10
 Bozóki, A . -E lbe r t , M. et al. (eds.): A rendszerváltás forgatókönyve. Kerekasztal-
tárgyalások 1989-ben (The Dramaturgy of the Political Transformation. Round-Table 
Negotiations in 1989). Vol. 6. op. cit., 169. and following. 
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has been recurrently proposed, however, it is obvious that the petitions of 
citizens seeking redress by reason of injury via unconstitutional legal norms 
may not be precluded by the introduction of such mechanisms. As a matter of 
law, as a result of a posterior norm control, the Constitutional Court could fully 
or partly annul the unconstitutional norm (Acts included). Norm shall generally 
lose its validity on the day of publication of the decision on its annulment, 
however, the Constitutional Court may stipulate its annulment or inapplicability 
in a specific case on a different date, so far as that is substantiated by the interest 
of security of law or of the particularly important interest of the party who 
initiates the proceedings. The Constitutional Court shall always provide for 
the review of criminal procedures concluded with a final decision based on 
the application of an unconstitutional norm, in case the convict has not been 
exempted from adverse consequences, and if from the annulment of the provision 
applied in the proceedings resulted either in the reduction or dispensing with the 
penalty or the measure, or in immunity from or limitation of liability. 
- The Constitutional Court shall examine ex officio or on the motion of state 
organs specified by law, officials in high public offices or any MP, whether any 
legal rule or norm for state direction other than a legal rule contradicts an 
international agreement promulgated by a Hungarian legal rule. 
- The Constitutional Court shall consider constitutional complaints, which 
those concerned are entitled to file in by reason of the injury of their consti-
tutionally guaranteed rights on condition that the injury of their rights was 
incurred by the application of an unconstitutional legal rule and that they have 
already exploited all available instruments of legal remedy or they are not 
granted other instruments of redress. In such cases, the Constitutional Court shall 
annul the applied unconstitutional legal rule or its provision. If it simultaneously 
establishes the inapplicability of the legal rule in a particular case, there is an 
opportunity for remedy in the particular case that substantiates constitutional 
complaint so that the competent judicial or administrative organ which proceeds 
may not apply the unconstitutional norm when considering the case of 
available extraordinary remedy. 
- If the Constitutional Court ex officio or on any motion establishes that 
the law-making body has failed to fulfil its duty of law-making deriving 
from legislative authorisation and that has incurred unconstitutionality on 
the grounds of omission, it shall summon the body to perform its duty by 
determining the deadline. 
- The Constitutional Court as a "court of competence" - apart from courts -
shall make decisions concerning conflicts of competence arising between state 
organs, between local self-governments and state organs, furthermore, between 
local self-governments. 
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- The Constitutional Court, on the motion of state organs and officials in 
high public offices prescribed by law, shall officially interpret the provisions 
of the Constitution abstractly. 
- The Constitutional Court may proceed in further scopes of power specified 
under the Constitution and other Acts, for instance, if certain conditions 
stipulated under the Constitution obtain, it shall make a decision concerning 
the impeachment of the President of the Republic. 
In a summary, we may assume that during the political transformation the 
trustworthy legal prerequisites of protection of the Constitution and of review 
of unconstitutional law have been formulated in Hungary via the establishment 
of the Constitutional Court and the meticulous definition of its structure and 
competence. Moreover, the new democratic political system did not impose 
again actual restrictions on the fulfilment of duties of the Constitutional Court 
set forth under the Constitution and other law, despite the professional-political 
disputes concerning its work. That is also manifested by the fact that in 
recent years, according to the figures of 2002, the Constitutional Court, in 
compliance with its main duty, annulled several legal norms, among them 139 
Statutes and statutory provisions deemed as unconstitutional." These 
account for the fact that the development of constitutional law has reached a 
new phase, in Hungary, too, where the provisions of the Constitution have 
been transformed from "constitutional common decencies" into real, legally 
sanctioned rules of conduct. 
11
 Az. Alkotmánybíróság által alkotmánysértőnek minősített törvények, illetve 
törvényi rendelkezések (Statutes and Statutory Provisions Declared as Unconstitutional 
by the Constitutional Court). Xeroxed Manuscript, Legal Department of the Office of 
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The epoch of the ingeniously simple conception of the universe, offered by 
classical physics, seems to have been waning for long. For our reality can be 
pictured from Newton to almost today as consisting of sets of particles, bound 
together to an endless interconnection by the chain of causality or quasi-causality. 
Albeit this image had been temporarily shaken by thermodynamics a century 
ago, a kind of its replica, broken down to elementary particles this time, re-
emerged as restored again, with material aggregates re-organised at a molecular 
or atomic level. Well, until we could believe in material entities and their given 
interrelations as suggested by a naturalistic human approach to basic things, we 
had also an easy job in law. We could perceive rules with a mechanism destined 
for their enforcement in it, which in our intellectuality could be integrated into 
an all-comprehensive causality as an independent active force. 
By today, our reference points taken for granted so far as secure have been 
shattered. Consequently, law is no longer for us what it used to be. Its supposed 
solidity has disappeared and started to slip out of our hands like sand. It is no 
mere chance that topical subjects for professional interest and research of the 
type "law and. . . " have started to appear a few decades ago (first linked to such 
obvious blocks as "society" and "economy", and then, as "logic", becoming 
more sophisticated by linkage to "language", and arriving finally at "culture", 
"patterns of thought" and "communication"), to such an extent that nowadays 
interest and research sometimes seem to take exactly opposite a direction. We 
no longer study the environment around law in order to explore it more com-
pletely (through more contexts of it). Instead, we focus our examination on 
the latter, that is, on the "and . . . " elements, hoping to acquire more profound 
knowledge perhaps also about law if we start out from them. This is how the 
living culture (fomenting also its corresponding ideal of order) is getting into 
our primary sphere of vision as the factor conditioning the law (instead of the 
reified view of mere rules); and the very thought of a rigidly formal, conceptual 
application, reduced to some merely mechanical logicism, is on the way of 
being replaced by the very idea of human problem-solving, pondering in a 
responsible way and eventually aiming at an optimum and disciplined balancing 
among mostly contradictory interests and values, through channelling the entire 
process to given paths. 
All this has not left the chances of comparison unaffected either. It could 
indeed even strengthen its historical dimension, just because forms of thought 
apparently obsolete, or made esoteric and often forgotten, could in result of 
this become current again, supporting kinds of search for a way out. 
(1 Comparative Law and the Comparative Study of Legal Traditions) By 
transcending the limits legal positivism has set for itself, the law's internal 
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self-description is replaced by a description within an external (socio-historical 
or sociological or cultural anthropological) framework. Confronted today, 
on the threshold of the new millennium, with the recurrent job of rewriting 
textbooks inspired by the pattern of René David's classic Les grands systèmes 
de Droit contemporains, one is faced with a dual choice: either to accept 
David's loosened positivism by overviewing various legal families or to take 
a wider socio-historical framework as a starting point. According to trends 
having evolved so far, opting for the second alternative offers again two paths 
to choose from: either grounding one's approach by the underlying culture, as 
the law's natural medium, or, by unfolding the roots of various (legal) cultures, 
one starts investigation through (legal) traditions themselves. 
Summarising the valuable results of several decades devoted to comparative 
study in a novel global synthesis, H. Patrick Glenn, lecturing on comparative 
Civil Law and Common Law at McGill University in Montreal, undertook the 
task of surveying and philosophising upon the various traditions having survived 
and still living in our diversified legal world.' In fact, he mapped out the typi-
fiable legal civilisations alive today in some co-existence with one another. On 
completion of a largely comprehensive analysis, his expressed purpose was to 
consider the strength of traditions underlying legal arrangements as parts of 
the intellectual treasure and social experience of mankind, their ability for 
change, renewal and association with other traditions, on the one hand, and the 
sustainability of their diversity, the synergy of traditions formed by different 
sorts of logic in both their development and functioning, on the other. 
The opus, awarded the Grand Prix of the International Academy of Com-
parative Law in 1998, captivatingly rich in ideas with countless enlightening 
discourses and conceptual developments relating to partial issues as well (not 
only processing the abundance of literature as well as data on law, development 
of ideas, diversity of cultures, etc., but also elaborating them analytically), also 
offers a uniquely fascinating piece of reading. The reader may find a most 
integrative presentation of the kinds of law and legal thinking in the overview 
of the Chthonic, Talmudic, Civil Law, Islamic, Common Law, Hindu, and 
Asian legal traditions. All this is done in a way worthy indeed of its subject, 
essayistically and impressively, at the same time in a charmingly philosophical 
engagement, so that the reader rejoices to encounter the finest virtues of 
English legal historical writing, showing not merely the law's irreducible 
cultural historical embeddedness but also the collective impact of intellectual 
Glenn, H. P.: Legal Traditions of the World: Sustainable Diversity in Law. O x f o r d -
New York, 2000. 
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and moral traditions in the doctrinal and practical, belief-laden and values-
focussed problem solving. 
At the same time, the suspicion may arise that it is primarily in the author's 
essayism and his challenging way of opening stimulating new vistas that the 
old positivistic description of legal families expands to the treatment of legal 
traditions. His developments are, no doubt, integrated into one unified view. 
Starting from the analysis of tradition as such, taken as the originary source 
of inspiration and framework of imagination, the book introduces traditions 
underlying the various arrangements of law as case studies (worth of a mono-
graphic consideration in themselves), to arrive at a thorough pondering upon 
the commensurability and sustainability of diversity. The venture is novel on 
the whole but without the force convincing that he has actually surpassed the 
culturally grounded historico-comparative ideal at work behind the style of 
positivistic description linked already to René David's one-time endeavour. 
The introductory and concluding chapters assess the force of traditions with 
powerful accents. However, his intention of drawing a panorama presenting 
all the diversity of legal arrangements in our present world as derived from 
identified legal traditions does not reveal characteristics of traditions that could 
not be traced back to what we commonly call legal families. All in all, his 
captatio benevolentiae interest in identifying legal cultures as traditions and 
categorising the diversity of legal arrangements as differing traditions may 
hold the promise of a truly remarkable innovation, albeit the question of how 
and in what respect, why and with what results he innovates is not answered. 
More precisely, the job is tacitly left to the drawing of the evolutionary map of 
the diversification of legal development, which will however keep silence even 
in the (more implied than manifest) criticism of the category of 'legal family'. 
Moreover, also the issue whether or not legal tradition is a synonym of legal 
culture and how they are related is left unanswered. 
(2 'System', 'Family', 'Culture', and 'Tradition' in the Classification of Law) 
After all, what conceptualisations do we recourse to when we speak about the 
world's legal systems in general and their various groupings in particular?1 
1
 It is indicative of the general uncertainty about methodological foundations that 
when the classifying characterisation of phenomena is at stake, taken as unfolding from a 
given substance and perceivable in varying forms, of social constructions gradually con-
ceptualised as mutually related members of the same entity, growing from the millennium-
long co-existence and mutual impact of in-themselves merely historical accidentalities, it 
may be considered as a new realisation-as, e.g., in Husa, J.: Legal Families and Research 
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The distinction of 'system of law' and 'legal system' spread over (in English-
language literature, first of all) after the emphatic separation of positivistic and 
sociologistic approaches. 'System of law' seems to refer rather to the nor-
mative stuff seen in its mutual correlations (mostly as a textual aggregate, or at 
least as derivable from the textuality, of positivations, regulations and official 
expectations), while 'legal system' is to focus on the functioning (actually 
assessed as a usually coerced) whole. (It is to be noted that expressed in common 
terms, this does not imply other theoretical message than the conceptual duality 
of 'law in books' and 'law in action', once proposed by American pragmatic 
legal sociology.2) Due to the notion of system, both 'system of law' and 'legal 
system' do differ from ' law' [or 'droit' or 'Recht', but not 'a law' or 'the law'] 
in that law as a whole in one organised unity is emphasised by them. Or, they 
are certainly not used to describe either optional fragments or partial manifes-
tations of the law. However, the categorial distinction between these possessive 
and attributive expressions has not become widespread beyond English 
professional usage. (In Hungarian, 'jogi rendszer' [standing for 'legal system'] 
sounds quite artificial and is therefore less used than 'jogrendszer [ 'system of 
law'] and 'jog' ['law'] itself, taken almost as synonyms.) This may be the reason 
why both (as 'les grands systèmes de droit ' , and 'the major legal systems') can 
appear as a most widespread generic sense, without telling in the textbooks 
themselves anything more about the specific motive of why opting for the one 
or the other expression as the right title. 
The term 'legal family' ['Rechtskreis'] has fortuitously become integrated 
into our scholarly language,3 as it suggests a kind of resemblance and related-
ness (albeit not specified in detail), which is mainly (but not exclusively) based 
on common origins. It is no mere chance that 'legal family' is neutral descriptive 
a notion, assuming no special dynamism or activity about its subject. This 
arose as a key word in the movement of comparative law, searching for an 
intermediary classifying category between the individual (domestic) arrange-
ments and their total aggregate in the mapping out of the world's laws (once 
formed in history or still extant). Therefore, in itself it suggests hardly anything 
more than the term 'family resemblances' do in linguistic philosophical 
in Comparat ive Law. Global Jurist Advances, vol. I. 2001/3 . 4-that , at the most, a 
proposition of a Webeiian ideal type can be achieved at all. 
Pound, R.: Law in Books and Law in Action. American Law Review, vol. 44. 1910/1. 
3
 E.g., Kötz, H.: Abschied von der Rechtskreislehre? Zeitschrift für Europäisches 
Privatrecht, vol. 6. 1998. 493-505 . 
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analysis:4 certain similarities factually common to varied entities, inter-related 
in one way or another. Accordingly, 'legal family ' is a category of law in so 
far as specific distinguishing features [differentia specifica], suitable for classi-
fication [classificatio] amongst various legal orders, are to be emphasised.5 
In contrast, the term 'legal cultures' ['cultures juridiques', 'Rechtskulturen '] 
stands for an operative and creative contribution, through social activity rooted 
in underlying social culture, to express how people experience legal phenome-
non, conceived as a kind of objectified potentiality, how and into what they 
form it through their co-operation, how and in what way they conceptualise it, 
and in what spirit, frame and purpose they make it the subject of theoretical 
representation and operation. At the beginning, it was sociological interest that 
brought the conceivability of such an interest into jurisprudential thought. 
As the first step, sociological jurisprudence described the entire process by 
concluding to Taw in action' as discerned f rom Taw in books ' , 6 then juris-
prudential analysis revealed the "enchantment" and "transformation" between 
the end-poles, to characterise law as a factor and medium of exerting influence 
f rom the point of view of its operation mechanism, i.e., its specific make-up 
and way of functioning, that is, as expressed figuratively, its "thinking" and 
"logic".7 Accordingly, in an exclusively descriptive sense, confined to the 
value-free factuality of sociology, it can carry any general or particular (e.g., 
professional) ideology and conceptual culture (presuppositions, sensitivity, 
diversity), as well as determination, skills and professional socialisation within 
its "world outlook". Thus, dedicated to the mere description of underlying 
conditions, conceptually it lacks any developmental or derivational perspective, 
excludes comparison and evaluation, as much as even eventual regression or 
4
 Cf., e.g., Bambrough, R.: Universals and Family Resemblances. Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society, vol. LXI. 1961. 207-222 . 
5
 For more in details, cf. Varga, Cs.: Theatrum legale mundi avagy a jogrendszerek 
osztályozása [Theatrum legale mundi, or the classification of legal systems]. In: Szilágyi, 1. 
H.-Paksy, M. (eds.): Liber Amicorum: Studio Z. Péteri dedicate (Studies in Comparative 
Law, Theory of State and Legal Philosophy). Budapest, 2005. 219-244. 
6
 The definition by Van Hoecke, M. and Warrington, M.: Legal Cultures and Legal 
Paradigms: Towards a New Model for Comparative Law. The International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly, vol. 47. 1998. 498 is quite insufficient, because characterising law as 
culture merely by reference to the social practice by the legal community is stuck at the 
conceptualisation of Roscoe Pound. 
1
 In one of its first formulations, "cognitive structure" in Legrand, P.: European Systems 
are not Converging. The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 45. 1996. 5 2 -
81, especially at 60 , and in his subsequent works, more and more definitely taking it as an 
entire established "mentality". 
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degeneration. As opposed to such a sociological sense, its cultural anthropo-
logical understanding stems from the idea of some common social origin; and 
by gradually (historically and professionally, i.e., in a Luhmanni&n sense, 
differentiating^) narrowing this-taking legal culture as a general mode of 
thinking, underlying world-view, motivation and purposefulness, as well as 
skills-, it arrives at a given (state of) professional culture. At the same time, 
this sense presupposes a certain amount of dynamism with the mechanism of 
effects in mutual relations in reverse directions. On the other hand, the part 
always remaining the component of a broader whole, legal culture too is 
inevitably embedded in the general social culture, being formed in interaction 
with it. On the other, the parts and the integrating whole are themselves the 
momentary issue of a complex total movement with varying potentialities of 
evolutionary derivation and connection, and, as such, can be evaluated in the 
light of their originally decisive qualities as showing, as the case may be, even 
degeneration and defection. There is a feature common to them all, namely, 
that 'legal culture' addresses not so much law but the social intellectuality 
underlying (as a usual expectation towards) law, in the spirit of which legal 
phenomena at any time happen to emerge and get used in both theory and 
practice. Or, 'culture' builds a bridge between man's desanthropomorphising 
objectivations and his increasingly socialising ideology, taking the former back 
within the realm of the specifically human.8 
'Legal tradition' as a concept can be interpreted exclusively within legal 
culture.9 Tradition is the awareness of an earlier inherent pattern of culture, 
taken as the source of and inspiration to community identification, with the 
8
 For its contrasted understandings, cf., from Varga, Cs.: [Comment to The Notion of 
Legal Culture.] In: Feest, J .-Blankenburg, E. (eds.): Changing Legal Cultures. Onati, 1997. 
207-217. [Onati Pre-publications-2.-reprinted as Comparative Legal Cultures: Attempts at 
Conceptualization. Acta Juridica Hungarica, vol. 38. 1997/1-2. 53 -63 . ] as well as 
Összehasonlító jogi kultúrák? [Comparative legal cultures?]. Jogtudományi Közlöny, vol. 
LVI. 2001/10. 409 -416 , both reflecting upon the disciplinary choice raised by the differing 
paths of Varga, Cs. (ed.): Comparative Legal Cultures. Aldershot, Hong Kong, Singapore, 
Sydney and New York, 1992. [The International Library of Essays in Law & Legal 
Theory: Legal Cultures 1.] and Gessner, V.-Hoeland, A.-Varga, Cs. (eds.): European 
Legal Cultures. Aldershot, Brookfield (Vanderbuilt), Singapore and Sydney, 1996. 
[Tempus Textbook Series on European Law and European Legal Cultures I.], respectively. 
9
 At a conceptual level, this was already pointed out by Merryman, J. H.: The Civil 
Law Tradition: An Introduction to the Legal Systems of Western Europe and Latin 
America. Stanford, 1969. 2, where he states that legal traditions correlate legal systems to 
the cultures whose partial expressions they are, and place the notion itself into a cultural 
perspective. 
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demand for continuity as an encouraging or justifying power. Thus, 'legal 
tradition' itself is relational a concept, the issue of a specific relation. For 
tradition as such is neither a piece nor an aspect of the past. Moreover, in itself 
it is not longing for external or internal certainty, nor a search for confirmation 
or showing a way out. It is just the encounter of the two sides involved, 
notably the selection of a segment of the past or the qualification of a feature 
attributed to it, in order that the present, viewed from a future's perspective, 
can be linked to the past as worthy of continuation, because of the latter's 
inherent values. By the way, exactly in the manner of a fact that can only be 
»established«,10 tradition can only be referred to, providing that we need and 
thereby we can also realise its extended impact and axiological continuity. 
Accordingly, there is not much use proclaiming that, for example, "chthonic 
societies did not function in terms of culture. They functioned in terms of 
tradition."11 For in addition to logical inclusion, the two poles represent 
conjunctivity in reciprocity, which simply excludes any disjunctivity. Or, in 
a more sophisticated formulation, all we can claim is that indeed, in some 
societies there has been (or was) a culture of cultivating tradition, while in 
others-perhaps-something else is (or was) practised. 
Consequently, the bare fact that the comparatist undertakes the thorough 
investigation into the Legal Traditions of the World scarcely means anything 
more or else than-correctly-identifying, as a feature rather typical exactly of 
law, a special adherence to past patterns (in a way sometimes reified up to 
the extreme, through erecting wholly artificial-artefactual-formalisms and 
automatisms, at times guaranteed by expressly alienating mechanisms). And the 
very circumstance that implementing culture exactly this way we are "failing 
to identify any particular factors that can be seen to be making a difference"12 
may only imply that the notions of culture and tradition present law in the 
medium and perspective of the consciousness of man's social action. 
Well, in such broad outlines, the culture of the observance of traditions is 
an uninterrupted creative process, in the course of which the recognition of 
human necessity will select, with a force normative to the entire community, 
from the store (dead in itself) of lessons drawn from the past.12 And this tells 
10
 Cf. Varga, Cs.: Theory of the Judicial Process: The Establishment of Facts. 
Budapest, 1995. 
11
 Glenn: op. cit.. 66. 
12
 Cotterrell, R.: The Concept of Legal Culture. In: Nelken, D. (ed.): Comparing Legal 
Cultures. Singapore-Sydney, 1997. 20. 
13
 "Things [. . .] do not speak [. . .] so a particular receptivity is called for in learning of 
the past f rom its capture in things." Glenn: op. cit., 7 .-"Tradit ion is never acquired, it is 
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us about the roots of thinking rather than about its eventual outcome, as in 
point of principle it does embrace the factors breeding change in continuity 
too.14 Or, tradition is not a passive medium but the social construction of man 
(in constant building as his second nature), in which he contextualises his 
uninterrupted creative presence on the terrain of his self-identity within the 
boundaries of his self-discipline in the dual pressure of continuance and change.15 
For exactly this reason, it serves as the final basis for any comparison and judge-
ment. Therefore no further foundation is required. Whatever shall be regarded as 
a criterion, its acceptance can only be ensured by the culture of tradition.16 
(3 Different Traditions, Differing Ways of Thinking) The survey in question 
has offered a more comprehensive picture of various legal families and their 
underlying legal cultures owing to the fact that the author himself has been 
primarily interested in the exploration of the ways of thinking operating the 
legal arrangements concerned. How does the power of tradition manifest itself 
in those various legal cultures? 
In chthonic regimes, the priority of collective interest over the individual 
one with emphasis upon consensus (instead of enforcement) had developed a 
always being acquired." Wieseltier, L.: Kaddish. New York, 1998. 259.-"Law is essentially 
a tradition, that is to say something which has come down to us f ront the past". Simpson, 
A. W. В.: Invitation to Law. Oxford , 1988. 23.-"Tradit ions are not self-created; they are 
consciously chosen [.. .]. We tend, therefore, to choose that which sui ts our present needs" . 
Thapar, R.: Tradition. In: Thapar, R.: Cultural Transaction and Early India: Tradition and 
Patronage. Delhi, 1994. 23. 
14
 It is "procreative of change" {Friedrich, С. J.: Tradition and Authority. New Y o r k -
Washington-London, 1972. 39. [Key Concepts in Political Science.]}, as "legal tradition is 
not conservative in principle" {Atias, Chr.: Présence de la tradition juridique. Revue de la 
recherche juridique, vol. 22. 1997. 387.} 
15
 It is no mere chance therefore to describe it as rétroprojection, because in tradition 
"we choose what we say determines us and we present ourselves as heirs of those we have 
made our ancestors". Munoz, L.: The Rationality of Tradition. Archiv für Rechts- und 
Sozialphilosophie, vol. 67. 1981. 197 et seq., quote on 203. Consequently, in it "The past is 
mobilized to invent a future" Tourraine, A.: Pourrons-nous vivre ensemble? Egaux et 
différents. Paris, 1997. 49,-This explains its proximity to social self-identity. For according 
to the classical outline of sociology, "above all it is the idea that it has of i tself ' which is 
constitutive of society [Dürkheim, É.: The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life. London, 
1915. 422.], which, in present-day view, is mostly rooted in connections suitable to 
comparison. Glenn: op. cit., 31 -33 . 
16
 "There is no view from nowhere, no possibility of judgment f r o m without a tradition, 
in reliance on ultimate, non-traditional criteria." Glenn: op. cit., 43. 
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pattern of thought that operates in concrete terms bound to situations.17 It is not 
to be used as a weapon by anyone,18 all the less since the ch ie fs "power" is 
hardly more than his ability of encountering consensus, if only because his 
"power" can only be asserted until successful in fulfilling this very job. 
In contrast, legal arrangements with similarly early roots but inspired by 
divine revelation face the dilemma of how to bridge the gap between the 
historically unique and closed source of the law and its use extended over 
changing challenges of a number of millennia and civilisations. Therefore their 
basic issue is whether or not their "gate is closed",14 that is, whether there are 
techniques available to allow some degree of openness, loosening and re-
consideration, in order to comply with the new challenges. This is why the 
question emerges: what role can logic, if at all, play in this? Whether or not, 
can the concreteness of various cases (as opposed to abstraction, characteristic 
of any theoretical reasoning) appear in it? Does it offer any room for human 
hesitation, pondering upon the merits of the underlying situation, as well as for 
the clash of opinions and for the moment of responsive decision, normatively 
projected from the personal stand taken by the judge as the master of the case? 
And, to begin at the beginning, may any idea of a personified creator-divinity 
(legislator in law) become exclusive in such laws, whose will is to be explored 
and executed as the only source of the law? 
On the European continent, this very pattern of legal thought, drawing on 
divine inspiration in origins, conceived of law as a contractual form (following 
the openly postulated philosophico-political concept of social contract, presuming 
the tacit establishment of a political connection), that is, as the expression of 
' Glenn: op. cit., 67, note 43. Cf. Ong, W.: Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing 
of the World. London-New York, 1982. 51-52. 
l 8 M'Baye , K.: African Conception of Law. In: Zweigert, K . -Drobnig , U. (eds.): Inter-
national Encyclopedia of Comparative Law. Vol. II. Tübingen-The Hague-Paris, 1975. 
138-139. 
1 4
"The Talmud was never comple ted ' -wr i tes Steinsaltz, A.: The Essential Talmud. 
New York, 1976. 4 7 - , for what was ever put d o w n in it covers both the past and the 
entirety of future. Or, "Of course every interpretation that ever will b e was known at Sinai, 
was intended by God". Holz, В. W . (ed.): Back to the Sources: Reading the Classic Jewish 
Texts. New York, 1984. 15.-For a similar presupposition by Islamic law, cf., e.g., Hallaq, 
W. В.: Was the Gate of Ijtihad Closed? International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 
16. 1984. 3 - 4 1 , what is expressly confirmed by Rahman v. Begum (1995) 15 BLD 34 in 
Bangladesh (Glenn: op. cit., 187, note 157.) . -Hindu legal thought does not even raise 
the issue as it relies on the al l -comprehensive cultural pract ice of the communi ty , 
experiencing a continuity, instead of mere abstractions and barely human formalisations. 
Glenn: op. cit., 270. 
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someone's will, derived (or logically concluding) from an official source, f rom 
the Roman Empire to modern exegesis. For, on the one hand, there are cultures 
implementing logicism (based on the axiomatic ideal of mos geometricus), as, 
for instance, the Civil law. On the other hand, there are cultures precautious 
of logic, otherwise speaking, of processing textual representations of the law 
as theoretical propositions in an epistemological context, as premises to 
conclusions to be drawn with logical necessity. In cultures with religious 
traditions and advances in logification as a scientific ideal in the background 
(e.g., Jewish and Islamic ones), the field of logic may turn to be a less 
emphatically relevant sphere of legal thought, not to let a thoroughly human 
definition with logically justifiable generalisations through individual applications 
replace the originary divine determination. As we can strive for exploring 
divine intentions at the most, without being entitled to close them back into a 
categorial certainty, the solution of moral and legal issues remains necessarily 
a human dilemma in such cultures, by far not excluding the equally defendable 
conceivability of differing opinions. In secular cultures, in which law is either 
conceived of as part of the natural world order (e.g., in the Far East) or taken as 
the value-centred harmonisation of justifiable human reactions (as e.g., in the 
Common Law), the emphasis is not on a complete and gaplessly comprehensive 
foresight but on the optimum solution of conflicting situations in everyday life. 
It is precisely in the gift of human casual problem solving that they experience 
the mystery of order, the presumption of human righteousness as well as the 
trust placed in that careful examination of past instances (taken as a closed 
set or assessing their actuality in the light of the historical particularity of the 
past challenges) may indeed contribute to the shaping of the future, without 
predetermining and anticipating, by way of past patterns, its present and coming 
course and incidentalities. 
These are different cultures of thought, sometimes-in addition to under-
lying traditions-with no specific religious, geographical or meteorological 
conditions, levels of development or organisations of production (etc.) in the 
background to explain their actual differences. At the same time, as to their 
out-put, the respective outcomes may prove to be largely commensurable or 
(as in Civil Law and Common Law contrasted) even similar, while both the 
normatively frameworking in-put and the set of operations taking place in the 
black box of the specifically juridical elaboration of the case-complying 
with the official expectations accepted in the given culture (as asserted by 
the prevailing ideology of the legal profession)-may differ from one another, 
bearing witness to diverging routes. 
How is all this possible? And what is it that takes actually place in law, 
irrespective of any appearance and alleged formal definition? How are then our 
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expectations towards unambiguity, safety, foreseeability and also calculability 
fulfilled? Or, putting it exaggeratedly, on the last resort is it law at all that 
works under the name of the law, through the agents of law? Or, perhaps, do 
we merely relieve the arbitrary moment of our irreducibly final power to reach 
a decision to some tolerably viable measure through various mediations (called 
'law' in all-covering social institutionalisation), by channelling it upon definite 
paths and routes? 
(4 Different Expectations, Differing Institutionalisations in Law) Well, what 
turns out about all this in the examination of various legal traditions? 
First of all, the burden to be borne by the legal set-up is different in differing 
civilisations. Where law is part of the community life, it serves for the benefit 
of the community. Where it is integrated into the salvation history cementing 
a whole society together, it is not even featured as distinctive. Therefore the 
debates, formalisations, divisions to "rites" in law are hardly purporting any-
thing more than the ones in theology or moral philosophy. Otherwise speaking, 
the law is not differentiated: what it demands is demanded by the overall 
normativity, and that what fulfils it is not simply outer conformity (exhausted 
by the mere restraint from infringements) but a genuine human incentive 
implementing its spirit, prompted by inner initiative. At the beginning, this was 
the feature of all regimes of law, never questioned in chthonic and Asian laws, 
and continued in Hindu, Jewish and Islamic laws up to the present day,20 with 
only Civil Law and, then, Common Law, breaking away from it in historical 
time, reviving the common Roman tradition differently. Remarkably, all along 
this break correlates with the spread of the individualistic view of society 
and, at a later time, with the growingly fetishising and assertive deduction of 
rights out of the body of the law-which, it is to be noted, will appear in 
English law by the 20th century for the first time.21 
Classical Jewish jurisdiction is from the outset built on the parties reconciling 
themselves to the decision to be made, as declared in advance. This is why no 
20
 In Sanskrit, there is no word for 'law', and what the so-called Laws of Manu concern 
is only the smaller part of Hindu life to be formed from inner ethical motivation [a'tma 
tushti].-In Jewish law, halakhah [do not act outside the law] is necessarily complemented by 
the expectation of aggadah [to act inside the law].-In Islam, acts recognised as compulsory, 
rewarded, indifferent, disapproved and forbidden are distinguished f rom the outset. Glenn: 
op. cit., 26, 96 and 185-186. 
21
 Lawson, F. H.: »Das subjektive Recht« in the English Law of Torts. In: Lawson, F. H.: 
Selected Essays. Vol. I. Amsterdam-New York, 1977. 176 et seq., especially on 179-182, 
as well as Samuel , G.: »Le droit subjectif« and English Law. Cambridge Law Journal, vol. 
46. 1987. 264 et seq., especially on 267-286. 
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doctrine of legal force has developed, as the parties, if discontented, may as 
well go to the court again. At the same time, the decision is addressed only to 
them, so no decision is published or collected. As a result, neither law-reporting 
nor precedential reference to earlier decisions is known in it. This way, judicial 
reasoning is mostly fully adjusted to the conflicting situation, to the very facts 
of the case.22 
In Islamic law, a specific culture of chain-references were to develop in 
order to give the Prophet's historically finite manifestations a force providing 
orientation under changing conditions and jurisdictions.23 Although the Muslims 
have had a highly developed logic in philosophical and scientific reconstruc-
tion, they could only recognise such canons of judicial argumentation which 
were to prevent the law from further extension through human generalisation, a 
danger that under the plain pretext of logical generalisation would be diverting 
from the Prophet's divine revelation, obviously not permissible with respect to 
the Divine Word.24 
As to the roots of Continental law-'siamo tutti Bartolisti",25 or, on the final 
account, we are all committed to refining and continuously adapting one single 
idea (organised as a school) from the almost unlimited depth of the store of 
techniques and potentialities developed by the Romans-, it is of utmost interest 
to realise that, as the author writes, "For centuries, those who wrote the glosses 
on Roman law seemed more Talmudic than civilian. They were more interested 
in questions [quaestiones] than answers; more interested in accumulating 
opinions than choosing among them; more interested in debate than action." 
For "Questions are more important than answers (which may change); under-
22
 Glenn: op. cit., 92-93, as well as Jackson, В.: Jewish Law or Jewish Laws? Jewish 
Law Annual, vol. 8. 1988. 25. 
23
 Let us quote a typical chains of hadith: "According to Bukhari (chapter 30, tradition 
26) »Abdan related to us [saying]: Hisham related to us saying: lbn Sirin related to us from 
Abu Huraria f rom the Prophet [ . . . ] that he said [ . . . ]« ." Doi, A. R. I.: Shari'ah: The Islamic 
Law. London, 1984. 24 et seq. 
24
 Opposing even analogical reasoning, seen as leading to more general ru les and 
categories which would allow subsequent deduction or subsumption, this b e i n g an 
objectionable "expression of human initiative". Weiss, В.: The Spirit of Islamic Law. 
Athens-London, 1998. 67-68. Cf. also Makdisi, J.: Formal Rationality in Islamic Law and 
the Common Law. Cleveland State Law Review, vol. 34. 1985-1986. 97 et seq. 
25
 Rattigan, W.: Bartolus. In: MacDonell, J . - a n d Manson, E. (eds.) Great Jurists of the 
World. London, 1913.45. 
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standing is more important than coherence; social contact is more important 
than precision".26 
However, it is exactly in this circle, the medium of practice-bound 
rationalising confrontation with distinctively legal problems, that a culture 
rooted in the recognition that "The Form is the Message"27 had once arisen, 
having spread over the European continent and then also among those 
Southern American (and, to some extent, even Far Eastern) cultures which in 
modern times became affected by the impact of Latin and German-language 
civilisations. And the centuries of polishing work by the same glossators and 
their successors would form-out of the inherent lack of any idea of systemicity 
and even of conceptualisation in Roman law2 8-a strictly conceptual system, 
with notions in fact empty but indispensable for their technical class function, 
like the principle of equality, which ordains what is considered "similar" to 
what is taken as "similar", however, without providing for the actual or legal 
criteria of "similarity" (while if the law had provided for it, the provision itself 
would obviously-conceptually-render the principle pointless and perfectly 
redundant).29 
It is typical that where the law is identified with the observance of Divine 
commandments (as in Jewish and Islamic law) or serves as the casual declaration 
of what the law is (as in Anglo-Saxonic law), there is no appeal.70 Or, the 
Anglo-Saxon law transmits the ancient uses of Roman tradition to the British 
Isles: a jury instead of lay index, judge instead of an instructing praetor, a writ 
instead of edictum allowing a procedure; moreover, Inns next to a church, just 
as madhahib near the mosque. Everything is but a procedure: writ construed as 
an artificially erected pigeon house with holes providing an action form which 
does allow a certain type of proceedings to be commenced. This is to say that 
each and every issue in law had once been expected to fit into any one of the 
(all in all) 50 writs around 1250 and about 75 writs around 1850 (until their 
abolition in 1932), and exclusively in terms of the selected writ.71 No remedy, 
no wrong: legal quality, that is, qualification of an action in terms of the law 
26
 Glenn: op. cit., 123 and 128. It must have been this approach shared in many ways 
about which Engl ish legal history wrote that "What the judgment was, nobody knew and 
nobody cared". Plucknett, T. F. T.: Early English Legal Literature. Cambridge, 1958. 104. 
27
 Daube, D.: Ancient Jewish Law: Three Inaugural Lectures. Leiden, 1981. 
28
 Cock Arango, A.: El Derecho Romano se f o r m o a base de realidades objetivas no 
por teorias о sistemas. In: Studi in onore di Vincenzo Arangio-Ruiz• Napoli, 1953. In 
particular 31. 
29
 Westen, P.: The Empty Idea of Equality. Harvard Law Review, vol. 95. 1982. 537. 
30
 Cf. Glenn: op. cit., 92. 
31
 Maitland, F. W.: The Forms of Action at Common Law. Cambridge, 1954. 5. 
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can at all be done only provided that a proceeding is available to elaborate it in 
the closed store of writs codified previously. Thus, substantive law does not 
even appear;22 the decision will be made by the laic jury; and the judge-with 
his "artificiall reason"22 (embodied by the law's professionally developed 
doctrine)-is only authorised to examine whether or not all this complies with 
the action form. So, law is confined to procedure to such an extent that even 
basic terms like formalism, casuistry and logic will gain additional meaning in 
classical English law. On the one hand, "In the common law, no one knew 
what law the jury applied, yet the jury functioned in a highly formal setting." 
On the other, "The process was necessarily casuistic, since it disposed of cases, 
but cases did not make law and cases were therefore not in conflict." Or, the 
actual decision will necessarily remain outside the law, and its merits, treated 
as mere factuality, outside logic. This is why Common Law has been "floating" 
up to the present day,24 in the verbal culture of which even questions whether a 
'rule' of decision is predisposed and if yes, whether a 'norm' can be formed 
out of the 'rule', have never been clarified.25 
(5 Different "Rationalities", Differing "Logics") If and in so far as we accept 
that rationality itself is by far not more than one of the many traditions,26 
moreover, that it is a "mistake [...] to suppose that there is or must be a single 
22
 For "whatever substantive law existed was hidden by it, »secreted« in its 
»interstices«"-writes H. S. Maine in his Dissertations on Early Law and Custom (Lectures 
delivered at Oxford). London, 1883. 389. 
23
 "Equity and Lawes, an artificiall Reason and Will" in Hobbes, Th.: Leviathan... 
London, 1651. The Introduction [ www://oll.Libertyfund.org/Texts/Hobbes/ ]. 
34
 It is only the ju ry ' s decision to have a legal force without, however, affect ing the law 
or rendering it unchangeable. Glenn: op. cit., for the quotations, 60, note 17, and 235 and 
233, as well as, for the note above, 219. 
35
 Cf., f rom Varga, Cs.: Kodifikáció az ezredforduló perspektívájában [Utószó a má-
sodik kiadáshoz]. In: Varga, Cs.: A kodifikáció mint társadalmi-történelmi jelenség. 2"d  
amended, enlarged ed. [of Codification as a Socio-historical Phenomenon. Budapest, 
1991.] Budapest, 2002. 379^103, in particular at 390-391. (available also as a Codification 
à l 'aube de troisième millénaire. In: Wachsmann, P. et al. (dir.): Mélanges Paul Amselek. 
Bruxelles, 2005. 779-800. ) and, in theoretical outlines, Szabály és/vagy norma; avagy a 
jog fogalmiasíthatósága és logizálhatósága. In: Szabó, M. (ed.): Regula iuris: Szabály 
és/vagy norma a jogelméletben. Miskolc, 2004. 23-30. [Prudentia Iuris 22.] [forthcoming 
as Rule and/or Norm, or the Conceptualisability and Logifiability of Law. In: Schweig-
hofer, E.-Liebwald, D.-Angeneder , S . -Menze l , Th. (eds.): Effizienz von e-Lösungen in 
Staat und Gesellschaft: Aktuelle Fragen der Rechtsinformatik. Stuttgart, 2005.}. 
36
 Popper, K.: Toward a Rational Theory of Tradition. In: Popper, K.: Conjectures and 
Refutations. 3rd ed. London, 1969. 
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(best or highest) perspective f rom which to assess ideal rationality"37 and 
therefore, in the end, we also have to admit that "different types of logic and 
semantics may be appropriate in different contexts and for different theories",38 
then we have-based upon the normative foundations of the order in question 
and the terms we are bound by-either to presume its regulatory completeness 
(assuming the informality of the decision taken after the consideration of the 
case, weighing, balancing and pondering upon its merits, by recognising its 
unrepeatable complexity), or to resort to a reductive procedure (in the expectation 
of safety in law and of the guaranteed repetition of the complexity of its cases). 
The former counts with the undiscernible and unclosed variety of sources and 
approaches (with varying aspects and methodologies, normative criteria and 
types of argumentation taken in the judicial assessment), while the latter pre-
selects from all them-by officially codifying and thereby also closing-that 
what it can then derive, as a logical inference, therefrom in its axiomatism, as 
necessarily concluding from its premises. Reductive procedure presupposes a 
deductive logic which, if failed in practice, may pass over just into its opposite, 
namely, its stochastic, statistical or perhaps probability-based substitution by 
some fuzzy logic at the most. In case of the presumption of completeness, 
logic (taken in its mathematical ideality) will either be simply considered non-
applicable or take on polyvalent forms, uninterpretable from an axiomatic 
point of view as operating with more than two values, thereby transcending the 
dichotomy of true and false, lawful and unlawful, by wedging in intermediate 
values that induce logical uncertainty). 
In addition, it is to be noted that classifying judicial argumentation onto the 
domain of "practical reasoning" has turned out to be a master model for 
ousting adjudication in law from the notional sphere of "application" (with the 
underlying idea of logical "deduction") in present-day Anglo-American theo-
retical reconstruction which, just like the theory of "argumentation" proposed 
by Chaïm Perelman in Continental law some decades ago, puts the whole 
process in a logically uninterpretable range.39 
37
 Dennett, D. C.: Darwin's Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life. New 
York . 1995. 502-505 . 
18
 Pearce, D.: Roads to Commensurability. Dordrecht, 1987. 9. 
34
 "Practical reasoning [ . . .] is a reasoning in transition. It aims to establish, not that 
some position is correct absolutely, but rather that some position is superior to some other. 
It is concerned, covertly or openly, implicitly or explicitly, with comparative propositions"-
wri tes Taylor, C.: Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity. Cambridge 
(Mass.) , 1989. 72. It is defined by Jonsen, A . -Tou lmin , S.: The Abuse of Casuistry: A 
History of Moral Reasoning. Berke ley-Los Ange les -London , 1988. 341. as fol lows: 
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How do then such alternative solutions appear in the various ancient regimes 
of law? 
For example in Jewish law, the simultaneous recognition of diverging (and, 
ultimately, contradictory) standpoints with the exclusion of any systemicity 
exhausts the entire culture of the practice of reasoning to such an extent that 
the Talmud itself would appear as if "many texts and many authors [...] spoke 
[...] all at once" still with opacity. "It's just in there somewhere." Apparent self-
reproach may even describe it as "a terribly frustrating book [...:] everything is 
fascinating [. . . , but ...] nothing can be trusted".40 Accordingly, "preference for 
a concrete rather than an abstract terminology" permeates it, with 'contract' 
lacking general features of a type41 and categories used in figurative sense rather 
than as a conceptual class delimitation. As if the forgotten wisdom were 
embodied therein: axiomatic thought with no reference to reality, with its self 
offered as its exclusive subject, and without any validity whatever beyond it.42 
In Islamic law, the 'doctrine of diversity' [ikhtilaf] comes to the forefront, 
with the acceptance of hadith which may recognise both parts of a logical 
contradiction as simultaneous Divine inspiration, since "Difference of opinion 
[...] is a sign of the bounty of God."43 
Finally, in Hindu law, "no precise definition", deduction or inclination for 
systématisation can be found either. For if everything and everyone shares in 
Brahman as the creator of the world, then commonness within the everlast-
ingly given totality cannot be segmented simply by segregation, moreover, not 
even the appearance of any accomplished change could be more than sheer 
illusion.44 
All in all, ancient cultures (involving the Far-East) presuppose polyvalent 
logics in human matters, which can therefore regard any differentiation, extreme 
"Practical reasoning in ethics is not a matter of drawing formal deductions from invariable 
axioms, but of exercising judgment- that is, weighing considerations against one another" . 
40
 Glenn: op. cit., 98. The last quotation by Goldenberg, R.: Talmud. In: Back to the 
Sources, op. cit., 157. 
41
 Elon, M. : Contract. In: Elon, M. (ed.): Principles of Jewish Law. Jerusalem, 1975. 
247. 
42
 "[T]he great advantage of employing such models, as opposed to abstract concepts , 
lies, inter alia, in the ability constantly to supervise the validity of methods of demonstra-
tion [...]. [Ajbstract thought [...] cannot be def ined except by use of similarly abstract 
terms, we can never know whether they constitute a departure f rom the subject or are still 
relevant." Steinsaltz: The Essential Talmud, op. cit., 147. 
43
 Glenn: op. cit., 325. 
44
 Diwan, P.: Modern Hindu Law: Codified and Uncodified. Allahabad, 1958. 1. 
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formulation, polarisation or discreteness in either objects or ideas exclusively 
as an artificial outcome of human intervention. 
(6 Mentality in Foundation of the Law) The change of emphasis in comparative 
interest is obviously striking here as most of the data, explanations and 
contemplations, abundant in this excellent overview, are focussed on ways of 
thought rather than on institutions. Or, mentalities are at play within this context 
which, staring in wonder at (by experiencing) the world, also provide institu-
tional answers in responding to challenges for survival. Well, institutionalisation 
is already half a way to formalisation. Final consummation is provided by 
the axiomatism in codification-be it of posited law or of doctrine (taken as a 
mentally structured representation behind i t ) - , when law is projected as a 
systemic aggregate of logically arranged abstract conceptualities. In a systemic 
perspective, not even institution as such can any longer be conceived of as 
a casual or routinised product of practical problem-solving: as an abstract 
formula, it is at the same time the mentally concretised representation of further 
conceptual abstractions. Well, comparative law in its classical understanding 
was the product of exactly such a scheme, born to pin the various purely 
logified conceptual abstracts of law to its map with the requirements of taxonomy, 
formed originally for the classification of nature in natural history.45 
In sum, all the issues we have discussed within the conspectus of Legal 
Traditions of the World are focussed indeed on the human dilemma of practical 
problem-solving within the various cultures of order, in the interest of societal 
survival. This is at work in the way of raising issues in respect to the ordo, in 
reacting to them, in the search for conceivability and appropriate technique for 
this, in institution-building through standing practice and planning, in inventing 
and operating instruments, willy-nilly breaking away from the historical idea 
expressed in law yet desirably remaining within its circle of ethos-to such an 
extent that we could even say with some exaggeration that this is the motor, 
and everything else is just a cloud of dust... 
Of course, we know that civilisatory development produces divides, structures 
and differentiations in formalisation, with a success to launch also mechanisms 
with an effect dehumanising to such a depth that we may well feel even our 
creative thinking to have become mostly reactive in so far as merely filling the 
frameworks set by established forms. 
Considering ourselves and the gardens we cultivate, it is to be seen that 
preserving, collecting and publishing of judicial decisions, utilising and referring 
45
 Firstly applied to real (living) objects in nature by Linne [Linnaeus], C. von: Systema 
naturae. [1735.] London. 1956. 
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to arguments suitable to found them in an authoritative way, setting up an 
official expectation toward the justices to decide on (with administration of 
justice becoming a freely accessible state service) and making it available 
that a repeated consideration of the case will be done in appeal-all these are 
relatively new and particular developments, characteristic mostly of Western 
culture. The achievement of legal doctrine, abstracting general claims for the 
individual out of the body of laws, from which a general status can arise 
through ordaining civic rights ['subjektive Rechte'] to given circles of persons, 
is also a product of modem Western world. The English legal culture is just about 
to get started assimilating (more or less and controversially) to Continental 
culture in logifying law, by at least understanding the Continental requirement 
to identify conceptualities in law that can be referred to as a source and carrier 
of the law, upon the basis of which the reduction (i.e., separate homogenisation, 
taken as deduction in justification) of the judgement in law to formal operation(s) 
is conceivable at all. Or, we can see that although Descartes' and Leibniz' 
Utopia of formal rationalisation may have generated movements and efforts, it 
could lead neither to all-comprehensive development nor to the elimination of 
other traditions based upon non-formal rationalisation with the exclusion of 
contradictions. As a conclusion, we can scarcely tell more: our problems may 
strike us as new, most of them are nevertheless still old-rooted ones. 
Therewith we have arrived back to man who humanises his existence by 
creating culture as a second nature for and around him, to which he draws 
strength from his tradition. This includes, among others, a search for the source 
of law through its refined deep structure, the awareness of which and the best 
possible preservation of the diversity of its civilisatory forms is a never ending 
task for us, indispensable for any orientation in general and for substantiating 
decisions to be taken at historical crossroads in particular. 
(7 Question Marks in the Definition of Subject for Theoretical Research in 
Law) Comparative historical inquiries usually approach potential subjects 
of their analyses with certain experience in the background and open for receiving 
new ideas, and suggest classification schemes in result of their investigations 
only-e.g., for answering the question of what (and in what sense) can (or is 
worthwhile, founded, or reasonable in an analytical framework, or self-enforcing 
enough, to) be regarded as law in a given cultural anthropological situation or 
in official proceedings. However, in a quite artificial theory-building (based 
upon an approach to law it is to propose for introduction), given concepts are 
assumed (hypostasised or presumed) which then are treated as an axiomatic basis-
i.e., as accepted without empirical evidence-throughout the entire theoretical 
construction. 
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We know that some weaker or stronger normativity prevails in our language 
usage and, especially in conceptual thinking, we reconstruct and thereby also 
construct what we only wanted to cognise from close-by. Yet, there does seem 
to be a difference between the results of an analysis aimed at drawing 
comparative-historical experiences, on the one hand, and of a merely conceptual 
analysis, confined to rationalising conventionalisations according to certain 
pre-set ideas (dogmas or prejudices), on the other. This is especially manifest 
both in the separation of these two attitudes and their results, usually excluding 
the chance of any mutual interaction, and in the similarly differing ways of how 
a critical stand can work (or usually works) in them. For the former surveys, 
evaluates and groups facts by listing data of field studies or by referring to a 
wealth of literature. In contrast, the latter arrives, practically with no reference 
to sources, from certain philosophical generalisations at other (further) philo-
sophical generalisations. Any factual argument or evidence on behalf of the 
former runs off the latter from the outset as ephemeral (exceptional and 
negligible) or as irrelevant. All the former can have is some influence on the 
public opinion, forming the dominant paradigm in the long run as organised 
into an overall effect; as the latter mostly gives voice to or reflects upon this 
(or, sometimes, proposes a theory aimed at replacing-by changing-it). The 
internal debates of the former are usually arranged to dispute upon facts and 
their possible interpretations (e.g., what criteria are likely to result in sensible 
outcomes in separation of the law's variety in systems, cultures and traditions). 
In contrast, the latter-approaching, as much as it can, the axiomatic ideal-either 
proposes an amendment to, or version of, the prevailing system, or rejects 
it, from a position (of another system) outside (and negating) the system in 
question (e.g., the one-time ideological criticism between socialist and non-
socialist ("bourgeois" or "reformist") legal theories mutually negating each 
other, or present-day so-called deconstructionism, unmasking-either in the spirit 
of a radical hermeneutics with anarchic extremism or by some (feminist, white, 
etc.) division, aiming at historical rehabilitation-thousand-year-old arrangements 
as guises of mere routine or sophisticated oppression. 
Present-day globalising tendencies are probably of an uneven effect in various 
fields. Anyway, despite several attempts at mediation, these two attitudes seem 
to further strengthen themselves, and-curiously enough-samples of theoretical 
construction, aimed at merely conceptual (re)conventionalisation, can today 
transform into independent forces wandering all around: perhaps once drawn 
from English analytical tradition and subsequently organised into an American 
political philosophical conceptual construction, they may now arrive in 
continental Europe as a theoretical explanatory framework. Within their new 
frame, they certainly gain a new domain of meanings, because their contextual 
LEGAL TRADITIONS? 197 
presupposition has in the meantime changed, f rom an English pre-under-
standing that identifies law as a casual declarability of what rules are at play, 
into a Civil Law conception, taking law as a system of norms, with utmost 
conceptualisation in logical generalisation. 
The path of scholarship is obviously free. However, in order to be able to 
assess the applicability and commensurability of its various trends and claims, 
it is still important to raise awareness of their tacitly received foundations in 
their underlying legal conception. 
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Following several revisions, Act XIX of 1998 on Criminal Procedure (herein-
after: ACP), which includes reform ideas and institutions, came into force in 
Hungary on 1 July, 2003. The amendments also affected the completion of 
the investigation, which the present study purports to introduce, elucidate and 
examine. 
Conduct (Completion) of the Investigation 
On the Conduct (Completion) of the Investigation in General 
It is predominantly forensic science that deals with the completion of the in-
vestigation. The successful exploration of criminal offences depends primarily 
on the applied criminal technique and tactics, whereas ACP promotes thorough 
Lecturer, University of Pécs, Faculty of Law, H-7622 Pécs , 48-as tér 1. 
E-mail: fenyvesi@ajk.pte .hu 
200 CSABA FENYVESI 
and expeditious exploration essentially through framework rules, which provide 
for the basic requirements, the methods and temporal scope of the investigation, 
for the attendance of those concerned and of official witnesses, as well as for 
safeguarding its order. Furthermore, these framework rules pertain significantly 
to two major official acts (measures or decisions) taken in the course of the 
investigation, i.e., to the announcement of well-founded suspicion concurrently 
with the interrogation of the accused, and to the suspension of the investi-
gation. 
A meritorious explication of the completion of the investigation would 
equal a brief summary of criminalistics. This has already been accomplished 
by the author and his colleagues in the criminalistic studies textbook compiled 
within the framework of the Pécs Criminalistic Workshop." 
Essentially, the law of criminal procedure provides merely framework rules, 
therefore, the successful completion of the investigation hinges predominantly 
on professional, i.e., criminalistic training and disposition. The process of 
revelation, which includes disclosure and justification, cannot be formulated 
in legal norms, compliance with which could automatically guarantee the 
effectiveness of investigation. 
Investigations are intellectual and practical activities involving specific data 
and versions conducted in order that past events can be adequately revealed. 
Within their scope 
- primarily interrogations of witnesses and the suspect are earned out, 
- in case of so-called crimes with scenes inspections of the scenes, in case 
of crimes not connected to scenes house-searches are deemed most 
significant, 
- the role of experts specified in different branches of (mostly natural) 
sciences and professional knowledge is growing most rapidly. Their 
involvement secures that traditional exploration and investigation is 
expanded by the possibility of multidisciplinary decoding and application 
of information, 
- the most intricate area is the so-called secret collection and obtainment 
of information, as well as the effective use of its results, 
- the most timely problem is the elaboration and reinforcement of inte-
grated criminal investigation, which is also effective against organised 
crime. 
Whether investigations have basic principles is an interesting question. 
Investigation is part of the criminal procedure, therefore, the general principles 
1
 Tremmel, F . -Fenyves i , Cs . -He rke , Cs.: Kriminalisztika Tankönyv és Atlasz 
(Criminalistics Textbook and Atlas), Budapes t -Pécs , 2005. 
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of the ACP are essentially and eventually normative in the course of the in-
vestigation, whereas, contradiction and publicity, i.e., verbalism or directness, 
which we consider important, however, was not specified under the act, can 
prevail rather fragmentarily. At the same time, the requirements of expedi-
tiousness and meticulousness, as well as of flexibility have been emphasised. 
In the course of completion of the investigation, the criminal offence and 
the person of the perpetrator shall be disclosed, moreover, the means of 
evidence shall be specified and secured. The facts of the case shall be explored 
to such an extent that the prosecutor can decide whether to arraign (Para. 2 of 
Section 164). We must supplement this by stating that in our view, the interest 
of the exploration of the real facts of the case, which, according to the principle 
of material defence, also includes extenuating facts and mitigating circum-
stances (Para. 1 of Section 28), requires that all legal and expedient measures 
are taken without delay, therefore, the investigation can also be conducted with 
respect to a misdemeanour related to the criminal offence. Thus, the breadth of 
exploration shall be adequate for making a decision on arraignment, that is, it 
has to substantiate a decision on arraignment and further decisions made by 
the prosecutor. According to the intention of the lawmaker, the main task of 
the investigation is not the obtainment and collection of lawful evidence, but 
assuring that the authority entitled to make a public arraignment is adequately 
informed concerning whether an arraignment can be made in the given case. 
In this context, the dominus litis legal standing of the prosecutor is undoubtedly 
reinforced by the fact that Paragraph 2 of Section 28 of ACP positively 
provides that "the prosecutor conducts or has an investigation conducted in 
order to establish whether the conditions of the arraignment obtain". 
Thus, according to the conception of the ACP, the nature and function of 
the investigation is mainly exploratory. Investigations should be expeditious 
and in accord with exploration, the basic task of the investigative authority, 
primarily the police. Therefore, the act promotes the centuries-long "common-
place" of criminology, that successful exploration has a crime-preventive effect. 
Consecutively, following the expeditious exploration, the prosecutor can prove 
the facts of the indictment in a contradictory environment at an independent, 
impartial court that regards due process of law and all the basic principles. 
Thereby, the shift of emphasis to the phase of judicial proceedings as the 
substantial scene of holding one criminally responsible, which is expedient in a 
state under the rule of law, is realised. 
Unfortunately, the practical experience so far does not reflect this tendency. 
A definite indication of this is that neither the volume of investigation by the 
investigative authority, nor the rather impressive number of investigators has 
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decreased. Furthermore, the number of prosecutors, who can be considered 
crucial figures of the reform, has not increased, either. 
The completion of the investigation, however, involves not a sheer obtain-
ment of evidence, but a more comprehensive and complex collection of data, 
since evidence itself frequently needs to be found, almost "discovered". Further-
more, the investigative authority shall take the procedural steps and the related 
coercive measures necessary for holding the perpetrators responsible. 
As pursuant to Section 178 of ACP, following the commencement of the 
investigation, "other data-collection activities" by the investigative authority 
may include "sounding" in a criminalistic sense, which implies disclosure, 
registration and collection of data with penal and forensic relevance. To 
accomplish this, the authority can use data management bases as resources 
(e.g., road traffic, real estate registration, criminal records, records of the co-
ordination centre against organised crime, criminal records and records of the 
co-ordination centre against organised crime), may "infiltrate" these according 
to the method of "screening" investigation developed by forensic science. The 
authority may request documents and data from any entity, therefore, it may 
apply to state, civil, business and self-government organs, foundations and 
public bodies. Furthermore, it may request an investigation and damage 
adjustment from the party entitled, may inspect the scene, may consult an 
expert counsellor and check the data obtained. With the help of the photos 
obtained, it may select a person or an object, as well as request information 
about the person or object represented and may carry out secret collection of 
information that is not subject to the permission of the court. With the prose-
cutor's permission, the authority may even involve a cover investigator as 
pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Section 178, and may request data that cannot be 
denied (if the nature of the case substantiates that, but not in general) from the 
tax authorities, media bodies, medical institutions, from bodies managing data 
that qualify as banking secrets, securities secrets, counter secrets and other 
business secrets as well as from the prosecution and penal data centres as 
pursuant to Paragraphs 2 - 3 of Section 178/A. If the prosecutor intends to use 
the result of the foregoing data collection activity of the investigative authority 
as evidence, then the report about this as documentary evidence shall be attached 
to the documents of the investigation. 
Besides the above, the prosecutor and the investigative authority, concur-
rently with taking the minutes, may consult an expert counsellor during the 
specific investigative steps, if special expert knowledge is necessary for finding, 
obtainment, collection or registration of the means of evidence or for the 
provision of information. The polygraph, the psycho-physiological means or 
method of interrogation well-known in criminalistics has been specified as 
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special expertise, if it is used with respect to the accused (Paras. 1 -2 of Section 
182). 
In our view, the legal formulation of sounding constitutes a great step 
forward in the legal application of the latest achievements of modern 
criminalistics, criminal technique and tactics and in the effective combination 
of the operative and the open, lawful investigative activity in general. 
The completion of the investigation, which involves a multi-level series of 
tasks, is not boundless, it has temporal constraints. The investigation shall be 
conducted within the shortest possible time f rom the time it was ordered and 
shall be concluded within two months. If the complexity of the case or some 
insurmountable obstacle makes it necessary, the deadline of the investigation 
can be extended 
- by the head of the local prosecutor's office by two months, 
- by the county prosecutor for as long as one year from its commencement, 
- by the public prosecutor beyond one year. 
Guarantees are provided against the unreasonable prolongation of the case, 
that is, the decision on the extension of the term of the investigation shall be 
mailed to the accused and the defence counsel, who may resort to legal remedy 
against it. We note here that according to the general rules, the decision on 
the extension should also be mailed to the aggrieved party, since it contains 
provisions regarding him, as well. 
However, if the investigation is conducted against a particular person, 
the extension, including the term of the continuation of the investigation, may 
encompass at most two years from the announcement of incrimination (Para. 2 
of Section 176). This temporal constraint indeed urges the investigative authority: 
the lawmaker endeavoured to limit the prolongation of procedures and of 
accusation by powerfully pressing the investigative authority. Certain law 
applying organs consider the above regulation in contradiction with the statutes 
of limitations, since according to their assumption, thus, holding responsible on 
the merits might fail in connection with certain criminal offences, especially 
in case of protracted investigations requiring especially complex, wide-scale 
examination. According to our view, this needs to be surmounted by criminal-
tactical means, namely, the investigative authority will decide on the time of the 
announcement of incrimination, in case of people who are not in detention. In 
other words, the multitude of evidence needs to be collected in advance and 
the well-founded suspicion will be announced afterwards. In case of the accused 
in detention, charges shall be announced within 24 hours due to detention, 
primarily to preliminary arrest, therefore, it is a legal requirement to proceed in 
an anticipatory manner. That is, more energy, attention and apparatus need to 
be devoted to these cases. 
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When the prosecutor conducts an investigation, the deadline of the investi-
gation can be extended 
- by the head of the prosecutor's office by two months, 
- by the superior prosecutor by one year from the date it was ordered 
(Para. 3 of Section 176). 
The supervision of the investigative authority, which works independently, 
is supported by the institution of the so-called prosecutor's stepped-up super-
vision (hereinafter: PSS), which is exercised by the prosecutor, if 
- the factual or legal judgement of the case, or proving that a criminal 
offence obtains is complex, 
- he has experienced a significant violation of the law, default, or a 
circumstance threatening the success of the investigation in the course 
of the investigation, 
- six months have passed since the coercive measures limiting the 
personal freedom of the suspect were ordered, 
- one year has passed since the commencement of the investigation 
against a particular person (Para. 2 of Section 176), 
- the investigation is conducted by reason of a criminal offence that is 
punishable with imprisonment of over ten years, 
- the court has pronounced a witness in the case especially protected, 
- the court has given permission that a cover investigator is employed in 
the case, 
- he deems it necessary for whatever other reason [Points a-h of Section 
37 of Public Prosecutor's Directive No. 11/2003 (hereinafter: PPD)]. 
Within the framework of the PSS announced to the investigative authority 
in writing, the prosecutor examines the documents requested for submission, 
gives instructions with deadlines for the execution of investigative activities, 
defines the scope of the investigation, specifies the evidence to be obtained 
with deadlines, the demonstration procedures and the investigative activities to 
be conducted, gives directions with respect to the conclusion of the investiga-
tion, if the facts have already been disclosed in a manner that is suitable for the 
decision of the case on the merits (Section 38 of PPD No. 11/2003). 
Safeguarding order is also necessary for the completion of the investiga-
tion. For this purpose, the investigative authority 
- may remove those from the scene, whose presence impedes the procedure, 
- may impose a disciplinary penalty on anyone disturbing the order of the 
procedure, 
- may obligate anyone to stay on the scene of the investigation so as to 
promote the investigation and may impose a disciplinary penalty on 
anyone who violates this obligation (Para. 3 of Section 185). 
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The ACP guarantees a specifically limited publicity as an exception in 
the course of the completion of the investigation on the one hand for those 
concerned, on the other hand by the potential involvement of official witnesses. 
As pursuant to Sections 184-186, attendance of the specific investigative 
activities by those concerned is permitted. Accordingly, the defence (counsel) 
(as well as by or in lieu of him, the candidate) can be present 
- at the interrogation of the suspect defended by him, 
- at the confrontation held with the participation of the suspect defended 
by him (as a special form of interrogation), 
- at the interrogation of the witness motioned by the defence counsel or 
the suspect defended by him, where he may ask questions directly of 
the person interrogated at the end of the interrogation. 
However, exercising this right may not impede the interrogation of the 
suspect or the witness. 
The issue of the admissibility of the attendance of the interrogation of the 
witness by the defence counsel has led to heated debates in the special litera-
ture of the last ten years. According to Ákos Borai, the regulation with general 
effect pertaining to all witnesses (characteristic of the 90s) significantly 
decreases and threatens the effectiveness of criminal investigation, since it 
guarantees too extensive scope of rights for the defence counsel in the 
preparatory phase. The author of the present study reinforced this by adding 
that it is an unparallelled solution even by international standards, since for 
instance in France, a country with considerable background in criminal pro-
cedures law, the attendance of the first interrogation of the suspect by defence 
counsels (but not the interrogation of witnesses) has been permitted since 
ls l January, 2001. That is not required either by the European Court of Human 
Rights from the member states, or by the Hungarian Constitutional Court. 
According to Mihály Tóth, the lawmaker did not endeavour that either, 
however, the admissibility of the defence counsel 's presence during the 
interrogation was interpolated and introduced into the former regulation during 
the debate of the bill. The arguments of the other side, mainly of practising 
lawyers, have been that this entitlement can be deduced from the necessity of 
balance, and at the same time it promotes the work of the investigative 
authorities, since it admits direct questions and motions on the part of the 
defence, thus works against the prolongation of the procedure. 
The lawmaker has chosen an in-between solution: the defence counsel can 
be present only at the interrogation of witnesses motioned by the defence. This 
shall be connected to a real act, that is, in case of a witness not interrogated 
yet, the motion must be admitted regardless of by whom, when and how the 
witness was summoned previously. We cannot identify with the view that 
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attaches primacy to the preliminary measure of the authority, such as the 
issuance or mailing of a writ of summons, since this cannot be checked given 
the deficiencies of official registration and the possibility of the issuance of 
short-notice writs of summons and would substantiate continuous disputes and 
legal remedies for the subjects of the defence, which does not serve the interest 
of fair criminal procedures. 
Another factor that might substantiate disputes is how precise and custom-
ised the motion should be. Our view is criminalistically grounded in this issue, 
as well: if the person can be identified without being named specifically, e.g., 
the bookkeeper of the limited liability company, then this shall be a valid 
motion for the interrogation of the witness, which establishes the defence's 
entitlement to participation during the interrogation of the witness. 
Based on incorrect interpretation of the law, there emerged a view in practice 
that the defence counsel cannot be present at a confrontation, where a witness 
not proposed by him is "posed opposed to" the defendant. This contradicts the 
basic principle of defence, since confrontation is a special form of interrogation, 
at which the defendant is entitled to his defence counsel and his presence shall 
be guaranteed by all means in a state under the rule of law. This is also 
substantiated by Paragraph 3 of Section 184 of ACP, which permits that the 
suspect in custody meets his defence counsel before his interrogation. 
Not only the defence counsel, but the aggrieved party and the accused are 
also permitted to attend 
- the inteiTogation of experts, 
- the inspection of the crime scene, 
- the attempt at demonstration, 
- the introduction for recognition, 
- the inspection of the scene in a criminalistic sense, which the act defines 
as interrogation on the scene. 
The notification of the listed concerned parties may be neglected, if the 
delay would entail risks. Otherwise, those present at the investigative activities 
may make comments, put forward motions and ask questions of the experts. 
What qualifies as an entitlement on one side is an obligation on the other 
side, therefore, the investigative authority shall notify those, who are entitled 
to attend, which in certain cases might be a rather high number of persons. 
Since in cases with several defence counsels only the so-called head defence 
counsel shall be notified, the situation has become somewhat simpler. 
The investigative activity may also be attended by a person completing his 
professional practice as a full-time undergraduate student at the faculty of legal 
sciences of any university, provided that it is permitted by the prosecutor and 
the investigative authority and that the suspect, the witness or the aggrieved 
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party present have given their written consent (Para. 5 of Section 184). With 
regard to the equality of university degrees, limiting attendance to full-time 
undergraduate law students is unreasonable, since getting acquainted with the 
procedures has the same significance for postgraduate and distance-learning 
students. A conciliatory solution for that is, and we emphasise that in other cases, 
as well, that even though the main rule for the attendance of investigative 
activities is that besides the prosecutor, a member of the investigative authority 
and the recorder only those can be present, whose presence is permitted by law, 
the secondary or auxiliary rule is that it is the official conducting the investigative 
activity that decides who may be present apart from those who are obligated or 
entitled to. The decision of the official is not unlawful, if besides complying 
with the regulation of attendance, he allows the participation of other persons 
expressly for investigative or criminal-tactical puipose, and if thereby he does 
not jeopardise the efficiency of the procedure. Such persons may be a teacher, 
a psychologist or a defence counsel, etc. 
The interrogation of a foreign citizen as an accused or witness may be 
attended by the consular officer of the respective state, who, with the exception 
of the case of periculum in mora, shall be notified in the beginning and sub-
sequently, if he requests that. In a similar way, as pursuant to a provision 
promulgated under the act, a member of the authority of the respective foreign 
state shall be notified of any procedure conducted vis-a-vis a foreign citizen as 
suspect or of any criminal offence committed to the gravamen of a foreigh 
citizen. The provision that a member of the investigative authority of a foreign 
country may be present at an investigative activity as pursuant to a separate 
statute or international agreement, also refers to the internationalisation of 
criminal investigation. We also add that according to our view, this provision 
is applicable not just to the authorities of states, but to interstate authorities, 
e.g., the Interpol, Europol, as well (Paras. 5 - 6 - 8 of Section 184). 
The right to attendance is closely related to the right to view documents, 
since the attendants who were present (and those who could be present by law) 
can view the documents drawn up in their presence. Besides, the suspect, the 
defence counsel and the aggrieved party may view the expert opinion and, if 
that does not infringe the interest of the investigation, other documents, as well. 
According to the defence counsels' general experience, apart from a few 
cases related to road traffic, there has been practically no case in practice, 
when viewing the documents by the defence "would not have infringed the 
interest of the investigation", in other words, the officials of the investigative 
authority do not risk handing over even the not ominous documents for viewing. 
Consideration on the merits in this area hardly obtains, if it does, that is by all 
means a sign of high professional standards. 
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The right to view documents, thus indirectly the right to attendance is 
related to the right to copying documents, as the accused and the defence 
counsel are entitled to receive copies of the documents they can view accord-
ing to the requirements of data protection. Unfortunately, the effective legal 
regulation seems unconstitutional according to the detailed arguments of the 
author of the present essay,2 since as pursuant to separate legal regulation 
[Joint I M - B M - P M Decree No. 10/2003 (V. 6.)] the copies to be provided for 
the defence are subject to a duty fee equivalent to 100 HUF/page to be paid in 
the form of fee stamps. This violates the constitutional regulation of defence 
and the principle of the presumption of innocence, furthermore, unreasonably 
encumbers the preparation of the defence and efficient pleading that meets 
European standards. This regulation is unlawful, even if exemption f rom 
payment of charges in the criminal procedure (obtainment of copies of docu-
ments free of charge) is possible similarly to the exemption in the civil 
procedure, since this affects only a very limited circle, i.e. homeless accused 
and accused with a per capita income below the prevailing widow's pension, 
which was equivalent to 22,800 HUF in 2004, whereas the requirement of 
efficient defence prevails in the case of every accused. As a recent and correct 
achievement, the reimbursement of the duty fee by the state has been admitted 
in case of the acquitted accused since 1 July, 2003 as pursuant to a separate 
legal regulation [Joint I M - B M - P M Decree No. 26/2003 (VII. 1.)] 
A further problem is that, unfortunately, the court cannot proceed ex officio, 
only at the respective request of the defence, although it can decide on the 
acquittal of the accused without the motion of the defence. 
According to the framework rule under Section 183, the investigative authority 
designates an official witness at 
- the inspection of the scene, 
- the attempt at demonstration, 
- the introduction for recognition and in four further cases, namely, 
- seizure, 
- house-search, 
- body-search, 
- the introduction of the minutes taken at the interrogation of an illiterate 
person 
2
 The author submitted a motion of complaint to the Consti tutional Court by reason 
of the unconstitutionality of the liability to pay fees for copies, however , the motion has 
not been dealt with yet. See fu r ther details, Fenyvesi , Cs.: A védőügyvéd (The Defence 
Lawyer). Budapes t -Pécs , 2002. 106, 199. 
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either ex officio or upon the motion of the accused, the defence counsel or of 
the person concerned with the inspection of the scene, or of the person affected 
by the seizure, house-search or body search, or of the illiterate person, unless 
there is an insurmountable obstacle. 
The cases listed above are essentially unrepeatable procedural activities, there-
fore, the involvement and presence of official witnesses attending voluntarily 
(nobody can be forced to co-operate) has a warranting significance. The task of 
the official witness is to certify the conduct and result of the investigative 
activity, at which he was present. Therefore, the official witness shall be informed 
about his rights and obligations before the investigative activity commences: 
he may make comments about the investigative activity, which shall be 
included in the minutes. Those who are concerned with the procedure or are 
unable to apprehend and certify what they sense, or those who are officials 
of the investigative authority or do not undertake to co-operate may not be 
official witnesses. Other members or employees of the authority can only act as 
official witnesses, if there is an insurmountable obstacle to designating another 
person. 
The ACP does not exclude the possibility of engaging official witnesses 
at other investigative activities. In our opinion, the decisive reason for the 
involvement of official witnesses in further cases may also be the unrepeatable 
character of (irreversibility) of the investigative activity, such as the interroga-
tion of a dying aggrieved party, setting a trap or interrogation on the scene. 
An amendment adopted in 1999 annulled the solution, which proved rather 
bureaucratic in practice, according to which two official witnesses had to be 
engaged ex officio in the above mentioned cases. The present situation is 
exactly the opposite, since the involvement of official witnesses is obligatory 
only at the initiative or request of the parties listed, and even then, of only one 
witness. Obviously, there are no obstacles to designating two or more official 
witnesses, if the conditions above prevail, for instance, if the house-search is 
held in a real-estate with several rooms or several flats. 
The Announcement of Well-founded Suspicion and the Interrogation 
of the Suspect 
The announcement of well-founded suspicion is quite a significant stage in the 
completion of the investigation, since up to this moment the investigation has 
been conducted by reason of an act (in rem), but from this stage against a 
particular person (in personam), as well. From this moment, the legal standing 
of the accused is established, etc. 
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As we have mentioned with reference to the two-year period, significant 
tactical alternatives obtain in the timing of the announcement of the well-
founded suspicion. We need to avoid by all means that it takes place too early 
or too late. In the former case, the accused can influence the direction of the 
investigation easier (can even take it to an impasse or drag it out for two years 
without substantial investigative results), whereas in the latter case, the danger 
increases that several investigative activities prove superfluous, since the accused 
either confesses or defends himself along a completely different version from 
the presumed one, etc. Further tactical alternatives are the scheduling of the 
announcement of the well-founded suspicion of several criminal offences and 
allowing that time lapses between the announcement of suspicion and the 
detailed interrogation. 
Beyond the general regulation, the specific mles pertaining to the announce-
ment of well-founded suspicion and to the interrogation of the accused are 
specified under Sections 179 and 180 of ACP: 
Para 1. of Section 179: If on the basis of the data obtained, a specific 
person can be well-foundedly suspected of the commission of a criminal offence, 
the prosecutor or, unless the prosecutor directs otherwise, the investigative 
authority shall interrogate the suspect as pursuant to Sections 117—118. The 
suspect in custody shall be interrogated within 24 hours. The deadline shall be 
calculated from the moment the suspect was brought before the investigative 
authority. 
Para. 2: At the commencement of the interrogation, the suspect shall be 
informed about the substance of the incrimination with reference to the 
pertinent regulations. 
Para. 3: The suspect shall be warned that he may choose a defence counsel 
or request that a defence counsel be appointed. If the participation of a defence 
counsel in the procedure is obligatory, the attention of the suspect shall be 
called to the fact that if he does not authorise a defence counsel within three 
days, the prosecutor or the investigative authority will appoint one. If the suspect 
declares that he does not intend to authorise a defence counsel, the prosecutor 
or the investigative authority will appoint one promptly. 
Para. 1 of Section 180: No question that implies the answer or includes a fact 
not yet proven or implies a promise incompatible with the law shall be asked 
of the accused. 
Para. 2: Without the consent of the suspect, the testimony may not be 
examined by means of a polygraph. 
The following questions arise in connection with the quoted sections: 
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a) What does the announcement of the well-founded suspicion have to 
contain? 
b) What does it not have to contain and what must it not contain? 
c) What does the suspect have to be warned about and how? 
d) From when and until when may or must the suspect be interrogated? 
e) How is the testimony recorded? 
ad a) The announcement of suspicion shall contain the most significant 
elements of the historical facts of the case and behaviour imputed to the 
accused (place, time, aggrieved party, method of commission) and its classifi-
cation under the Penal Code of Hungary. 
ad b) It does not have to contain either the legal facts of the case or the 
minor details of the historical facts of the case, since these may have special 
relevance f rom an interrogation-tactical aspect, and absolutely no reference to 
evidence has to be made. Well-founded suspicion can obtain without lawful 
evidence at disposal and it is exactly the concealment of missing or already 
obtained evidence that may have further interrogation-tactical potential. 
ad c) Not only the Miranda-warning included under Paragraph 2 of Section 
117 is obligatory, but the instruction about the choice of the defence counsel 
and the right of objection (legal remedy), as well. These warnings and the 
suspect's statements shall be included in the minutes, while the Miranda-warning 
shall be signed by the suspect separately in the course of the investigation. 
The suspect does not have to be warned separately that he is not obligated to 
tell the truth. Furthermore, it would be completely incorrect to warn him that 
he has the right to lie. 
If the investigative authority wishes to use a polygraph as a means of 
interrogation, then the accused shall make an according statement included in 
the minutes. Without his consent, the testimony may not be examined by 
means of a polygraph. 
ad d) The earliest the suspect at large may be interrogated is right sub-
sequently to the announcement of the well-founded suspicion, and the latest 
before the announcement of the conclusion of the investigation. Only the 
suspect in custody shall be interrogated within 24 hours. 
ad e) The testimony of the suspect (accused) shall be recorded in a report or 
the minutes. The report shall be signed by the proceeding official of the 
authority, whereas every page of the minutes shall be signed by the suspect 
(and the witness). If the suspect declines to sign, this circumstance as well as 
the indication of its reason shall be recorded in the minutes. 
Even though framing the testimony of the suspect in a report is permitted 
under Section 168 of ACP to expedite exploration, in our view, this is not an 
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auspicious solution apart from exceptional cases. Inclusion of the testimony in 
the minutes is more expedient, reassuring and definitely advisable from a 
criminal-tactical viewpoint. 
Neither the minutes, nor the report or the actual interrogation may involve 
a question asked of the accused that 
- implies the answer, 
- includes the statement of a fact not yet proven, 
- implies a promise that is incompatible with the law. 
In the first case, unjustifiable influence by the authority would not lead to 
a voluntary, personal testimony of the accused, whereas in the third one, a 
certain testimony or statement is expected from the accused in return for favours 
(e.g., the termination of confinement or mitigation of the circumstances of 
confinement, more favourable judgement of the act, etc.), therefore, both can be 
positively rejected. Our standpoint is not this positive in the second case, which 
represents a form of tactical "bluff ' , instances of which are enumerated and 
supported by criminalistic literature in great numbers. It is difficult to set the 
borderline of the legality of tactical bluff, which was attempted under the 
ACP. In practice, legality may be supervised to a certain extent by precisely 
including the investigator's questions in the minutes. If, subsequently, the 
question is classified as inadmissible, then the answer to it shall be regarded as 
unlawful evidence, and the same pertains to the other two groups of questions, 
as well. 
These prohibitions are valid for the interrogation of witnesses, as well, in 
that case even the questions that imply "guidance" are precluded under Section 
181. This regulation suggests that in the case of the accused, guidance is 
admissible, whereas in the case of the witness, it is not. We cannot identify 
with this conclusion, since influencing, guiding, hinting and promising ques-
tions are not admissible in either case. 
The Closure of the Investigation 
Decisions Made upon the Closure of the Investigation 
As we have expounded with respect to the preliminaries of the conduct 
(completion) of the investigation before its commencement, when a memorandum 
on the refusal of the denunciation or on ordering the investigation is drawn up, 
in a similar way, essentially two types of decisions on the merits can be made 
after the completion of the investigation as its closure, namely, on the one 
hand a negative decision on the merits that terminates the investigation, on the 
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other hand a positive decision on the merits that concludes the investigation 
(proposal for arraignment). 
The reasons and methods of decisions on the termination of the investi-
gation are mostly the same as those of the decisions on the refusal of the 
denunciation, therefore, we are going to summarise the important points by 
focusing on the differences. However, we'll have to deal with the introduction 
of the documents and the conclusion of the investigation in detail. 
If we examine the text of the ACP from a decision-centred viewpoint, we'l l 
find that the refusal of the denunciation at the commencement of the investi-
gation is dealt with in detail, whereas the order of the investigation only in 
brief. As opposed, in connection with closing the investigation, the rules 
concerning termination have been summarised in a comparatively shorter 
manner, while the conclusion of the investigation has been rendered quite a 
detailed specification. 
Termination of the Investigation 
According to Paragraph 1 of Section 190, the prosecutor may terminate the 
investigation with a decision 
a) if the act is not a criminal offence, 
b) if the commission of a criminal offence cannot be established on the 
basis of the data of the investigation and no result can be expected from 
the continuation of the procedure, 
c) ifit was not the suspect that committed the criminal offence or, if on the 
basis of the data of the investigation it cannot be established that the 
criminal offence was committed by the suspect, 
d) if a reason that excludes culpability can be established with the exception, 
if the issuance of an order of compulsory therapy seems necessary, 
e) due to the death of the suspect, limitation or pardon, 
f ) for other reason that abolishes culpability prescribed by law, 
g) in the event of the absence of a request for prosecution, postulate or 
denunciation, and these cannot be attached, 
h) if the act has been finally adjudged including the case under Section 6 
of the Penal Code, 
i) if two years have passed since the commencement of the investigation 
against a particular person {Para. 2 of Section 176). 
Besides an almost complete coincidence with the grounds for the refusal of 
denunciation under Sections 174-175, the difference at the locutions that 
imply a so-called deficit of evidence is manifest. As pursuant to ACP, the 
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refusal of denunciation is substantiated by the absence of a criminal offence 
and of suspicion, whereas in the event of the termination of the investigation 
quite a significant differentiation is made with respect to the grounds. On the 
one hand, a new element in connection with the absence of a criminal offence 
is that according to the result of the investigation, it is not the suspect that 
committed the criminal offence. In that case, mostly a "relative" decision on 
the termination of the investigation is made, since it is only the investigation 
vis-a-vis the accused that is terminated, whereas the investigation in the basic 
case is continued and may be concluded. 
On the other hand, unlike the case of the absence of suspicion, which upon 
the refusal of the denunciation may pertain to the criminal offence, not to the 
person of the perpetrator, in the event of the termination of the investigation 
the absence of evidence and its three instances, types may be substantively 
established. All three instances mean primarily that there is no evidence or 
there is little evidence to establish that 
- a criminal offence has been committed, or even if the commission of the 
criminal offence has been proven, 
- who it was committed by, or if the well-founded suspicion has been 
announced, 
- it was committed by the suspect. 
With the increase in criminality (in the last ten years 450-600 thousand 
criminal offences have been reported annually), the number of decisions 
terminating the investigation has reached a figure of several hundred thousands 
in Hungary (a proportion of 60-70 p.c.), as well. Most of these cases are termi-
nated on grounds specified in the second instance. In these cases with an 
unknown perpetrator the phrase that the investigation has reached an "impasse" is 
adequate. 
We must call the attention to the fact that the prosecutor, as the person 
directing the investigation, has a general entitlement to terminate the investi-
gation, whereas in simpler cases, the investigative authority exceptionally also 
has this entitlement as pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Section 190: 
The investigative authority has an entitlement to terminate the investigation 
in cases defined under Points a), e), g) and h) of Paragraph 1 as well as if 
culpability is excluded by incompetent age [Point a) of Section 22 of the Penal 
Code], The decision that terminates the investigation shall be forwarded promptly 
to the prosecutor by the investigative authority. 
The termination of the investigation does not hinder that the investigative 
authority continues the procedure is the same case. Therefore, these negative 
investigative decisions on the merits are not final, whereas the ACP attaches 
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some binding force to the termination of the investigation, since it provides 
that the continuation of the procedure is admissible on the following grounds: 
Para. 2 of Section 191: The continuation of the procedure can be ordered 
by the prosecutor, and if the investigation was terminated by the prosecutor, 
by the head prosecutor. If the suspect was reprimanded according to Section 71 
of the Penal Code, the decision terminating the investigation shall be annulled 
by the prosecutor or the head prosecutor. 
Para. 3: If no complaint was made against the termination of the investiga-
tion, or the head prosecutor did not order that the investigation be continued, 
subsequently this can be ordered only by the court against the person that the 
investigation had been terminated before. 
Para. 4: If the court has turned down the motion for the continuation of the 
investigation, the submission of a repeated motion for the continuation of the 
investigation on unchanged grounds is inadmissible. 
Para. 5: With the exception of the cases under Paragraph 5 of Section 82, 
the investigation or its continuation may be ordered by the competent prose-
cutor in the case of those against whom the denunciation was refused as pursuant 
to Paragraph 1 of Section 175, or the investigation was terminated as pursuant 
to Paragraph 1 of Section 192. 
In the event of the continuation of the procedure following the termination 
of the investigation, the investigative deadlines shall be valid again mostly by 
disregarding the decision on termination. For the continuation of the procedure, 
the annulment of the decision on the termination of the investigation is only 
necessary in cases, when the investigation was terminated with the reprimand 
of the accused. The reason for this is that the decision that terminates the 
investigation with a reprimand states that the accused has committed a 
criminal offence and such decisions may have further consequences under 
labour law and civil law. Furthermore, we must note that the investigative 
judge is implied by the judge that orders the continuation of the investigation. 
The most common reason for termination is the absence of evidence 
specified under Point c), but the investigation can be continued unconditionally, 
in case new evidence emerges. Therefore, in practice, the majority of decisions 
on the termination of the investigation are implicit decisions suspending the 
investigation (since the investigation is "terminated" until new evidence 
emerges). 
The general rules of the termination of the investigation also prescribe 
that the criminal expenses are defrayed by the state, whereas the suspect is 
obligated to bear costs that are incurred by his default (Para. 3 of Section 191). 
The accused, the defence counsel, the aggrieved party, the denunciator and 
the party that submitted a request for prosecution shall be informed simultane-
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ously about the decision. These parties are entitled to legal remedy. If the 
superior authority adjudging the complaint of the aggrieved party dismisses 
it, the aggrieved party may proceed as a secondary accuser at court. 
A special form of the termination of the investigation is the so-called 
termination combined with an "investigative bargain" and the one with a cover 
investigator. The ACP contains several pertinent provisions under Section 192: 
Para. 1: In case a well-founded suspicion of the commission of a criminal 
offence obtains, the prosecutor or the investigative authority with the prose-
cutor's permission may terminate the investigation, if the person who can be 
suspected of the commission of the criminal offence with well-founded reason 
co-operates by contributing to the proving of the case or another criminal case 
to such an extent that the interest of national security or criminal investigation 
related to co-operation is more significant than the one related to the necessity 
of the enforcement of criminal law by the state. 
Para. 2: In case a well-founded suspicion of the commission of a criminal 
offence obtains, the prosecutor shall terminate the investigation with a decision, 
if the cover investigator, who can be suspected of the commission of a criminal 
offence with well-founded reason (Para. 2 of Section 178), has committed the 
offence during the accomplishment of his official task in the interest of the 
criminal investigation, and the interest of the criminal investigation is more 
significant than the one related to the necessity of the enforcement of criminal 
law by the state. 
Para. 3: The investigation may not be terminated as pursuant to Paragraphs 
1—2, if the person defined under Paragraph 1 or the cover investigator can be 
suspected with well-founded reason of the commission of a criminal offence 
involving the wilful taking of another person's life. 
Para. 4: In case the investigation is terminated as pursuant to Paragraphs 
1-2, Paragraphs 3-5 of Section 175 shall be applied accordingly. In this 
instance, the termination of the investigation shall not hinder the subsequent 
continuation of the procedure in the same case (Section 191). 
As the quoted law manifests, the lawmaker considered these two unique 
cases of opportunism very carefully. In the former case, the proceeding authority 
essentially concludes a specific agreement with the perpetrator, as a result of 
which due punishment is not enforced by the state, whereas in the latter one, a 
member of the authority, while concealing his identity and goal, commits a 
criminal offence in view of the higher interest of criminal investigation and 
thus shall be exempt from criminal liability. The careful consideration by the 
lawmaker encompassed both the organisational safeguards (e.g., a bargain is 
admissible on condition that the prosecutor appointed by the public prosecutor 
has guaranteed a preliminary approval), and the rightful interest of the 
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aggrieved party (i.e., compensation, etc.), and last but not least, aspects of data 
protection and confidentiality (requisites of an incomplete decision, etc.). 
We consider the regulation on the one hand a fault of drafting, since the 
mechanical repetition of ten or so lines of the text would be a fault in itself 
(pleonasm, cf. Paras. 1 -2 of Section 175 and Paras. 1 - 2 of Section 191), on 
the other hand, in our view, the imperative investigative activities should be 
carried out with respect to all criminal offences. By reason of this or of the 
completion of procedural activities that include the registration or securing of 
evidence and traces already at disposal, in this context only the termination of 
the investigation already commenced is applicable, whereas the refusal of the 
denunciation is not. 
The Conclusion of the Investigation 
In a narrower sense, the conclusion of the investigation is in effect not a formal 
decision, just a verbal statement registered in the minutes or in a written 
notification about the fact of the conclusion of the investigation. In a broader 
sense, however, the conclusion of the investigation, that is, the positive closure 
of the investigation is an investigative phase constituted by several moments, 
such as notification about the introduction of documents, the introduction of 
documents with motions and interim decisions, forwarding the documents of 
the investigation to the prosecutor. 
The investigative situation is similar to that of the announcement of well-
founded suspicion, when no separate, formal decision on the declaration as 
suspect (accused) is made, either, but it is only the occurrence of this as a 
verbal statement that shall be recorded in the minutes of the interrogation. That 
is, in both cases informal, verbal statements are made, however, the announce-
ment of the well-founded suspicion is usually followed by other moments 
(detailed interrogation, etc.), whereas the announcement of the conclusion is 
usually preceded by other moments (introduction of documents, supplemen-
tation of the investigation, etc.). 
Section 193 contains the following provisions concerning the introduction 
of the documents of the investigation: 
Para. 1: Following the completion of the investigation, the prosecutor or, 
unless the prosecutor directs otherwise, the investigative authority shall hand 
over the bound documents of the investigation to the accused and the defence 
counsel in a room designated for this purpose. The suspect and the defence 
counsel shall be facilitated to get acquainted with all the documents (except 
for the classified material) that substantiate the potential arraignment. 
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Para. 2: The suspect and the defence counsel shall be notified of the 
deadline of the introduction of documents and the suspect in custody shall be 
brought forward by the deadline at his request. The suspect and the defence 
counsel may propose that the investigation be supplemented, can make other 
motions and comments, and may request copies of the documents. The suspect 
shall be warned about this entitlement. 
Para. 3: The motion of the suspect or the defence counsel shall be adjudged 
by the prosecutor or the investigative authority. 
Para. 4: The suspect and the defence counsel shall be entitled to view the 
documents under Para. 1 following the deadline of the introduction of documents, 
as well. 
Para. 5: If the procedural activity under Paragraph 1 was completed by 
the investigative authority, the documents shall be forwarded to the prosecutor 
within 15 days following its occurrence. 
Para. 6: Following the completion of the procedural activity under Paragraph 
1, the aggrieved party shall be notified that he can view the documents of the 
investigation and exercise other rights he is entitled to in the course of the 
investigation. 
This procedural activity does not involve the presentation of the materials 
of the investigation by the authority, since the authority shall not present their 
contents, but shall hand them over and let the party entitled to get acquainted 
with the documents view them. In other words, it is not the presentation, but 
the introduction of the documents that takes places, and as we have seen, the 
quoted section of the ACP secures quite a broad scope of rights for the subjects 
of the defence. At the same time, the subjects of the defence are not obligated 
to exercise these rights, since at a subsequent stage, in the judicial proceedings 
they will be entitled to unlimited exercise of rights of attendance, viewing 
documents, making motions, etc. Therefore, it is reasonable to exclude the 
request for certification in connection with the default of notification about the 
introduction of the documents. Upon the introduction of documents, the bound 
original documents shall be handed over for study by the suspect and the 
defence counsel, which they can do under supervision and they shall not be 
impeded in doing so. Attention must be paid that the suspect does not modify 
or falsify the text of the documents, that he does not destroy or damage 
documents or means of evidence during the introduction. He shall be warned 
about that. The suspect and the defence counsel may take notes. The notes 
containing data that constitute state or service secrets are to be handled in a 
closed, separate envelope beside the documents. 
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The motions about the supplementation of the investigation must usually be 
adjudged instantly and detailed minutes shall be taken about the introduction 
of the documents. As Section 194 of ACP provides, 
(1) According to Paragraph 1 of Section 193, the minutes of the handing 
over of the documents of the investigation shall include 
a) the list of the documents handed over to the suspect and the defence 
counsel, the time of the commencement and the end of the intro-
duction, 
b) the motions and remarks of the suspect and the defence counsel, 
c) if the suspect or the defence counsel does not exercise their right 
guaranteed under Paragraph 1 of Section 193, then this fact. 
As the quoted section manifests, in the event a motion is made for the 
supplementation of the investigation, the procedure can take two directions: if 
the authority admits the motion (even following an objection), then a repeated 
introduction of the documents will take place related to the supplemented 
materials of the investigation. If, however, the motion has been turned down 
and that as a measure (without a decision) has been included in the minutes, 
the conclusion of the investigation shall be announced immediately. If an 
objection has been put forward against the measure turning down the motion, 
then upon its dismissing decision it shall be mailed to the prosecutor. 
As a closing moment of the introduction of documents, the conclusion of 
the investigation shall be announced in a verbal form and recorded in the 
minutes. Upon this announcement, the criminal offence that according to the 
data of the investigation the suspect committed shall be named with reference 
to the pertinent section of the Penal Code. 
If, however, the defence does not attend the introduction of the documents 
at all, instead of taking the minutes, this circumstance shall be registered in the 
documents. At the same time, the suspect and the defence counsel shall be 
notified about the conclusion of the investigation, as well as the documents 
shall be forwarded to the prosecutor with a motion for arraignment within 15 
days of the conclusion of the investigation. 
Therefore, no formal decision shall be made on the announcement of the 
conclusion of the investigation. As a unique measure that is reflected in the 
minutes of the introduction of documents or in the separate written notification 
in case of the complete default by the defence. The motion for arraignment 
does not imply a formal decision, either, as it includes merely reference to the 
forwarding of documents and the proposal itself, without the summary of the 
case. 
The deficiencies of former regulations pertaining to the aggrieved party are 
remedied by the provision that gives opportunity for the aggrieved party (at 
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short-notice even in the case of the institution of proceedings) to view 
documents (after the defence has already viewed them, that is, within the 
specified mailing deadline of 15 days) and exercise his rights. The authority 
shall notify both the aggrieved party and the defence about its place and time. 
Non-appearance shall not hinder continuation, however, further written notifi-
cation or information will not be mailed afterwards. 
The aggrieved party may exercise his rights via his legal representative or, 
in the event of his death, the party proceeding as his heir shall be entitled to 
view documents. The surviving spouse of the deceased aggrieved party merely 
under this title or the person authorised by the spouse shall not be entitled to 
proceed so, since they do not have locus standi (Court Decisions No. 416/2001 
and 483/2000). 
Closing Ideas in Lieu of a Summary 
The basic objectives of the new, "reform" criminal procedures law included 
the shift of emphasis from the phase of the investigation to that of the judicial 
proceedings. In view of that, the lawmaker endeavoured to render the investi-
gation more flexible and expeditious, whereas did not waive thoroughness and 
the comprehensive requirements of exploration. It is difficult to satisfy this 
"double bind"2 in the shadow of the increasing and ingravescent criminality. 
In the following years, law applying organs and their practice will decide, 
whether the lawmaker's intention has proved effective and whether practice 
can follow theory. 
3
 On the "double b ind" , see fur ther , Fenyvesi, C s . - H e r k e , Cs . -Tremmel , F.: Új ma-
gyar büntetőeljárás (The New Hungarian Criminal Procedure) . Pe'cs, 2004. 398. 
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In order to be able to examine the topic set down in the title, a definition of 
humanitarian intervention valid for the period of traditional international l aw-
that is to say, the era between the 17th century1 and the adoption of the Charter 
of the United Nations (UN) in 1945-has to be constructed. Since such definition 
does not stand, and has never stood at disposal in positive international law, 
it has to be assembled with taking into account the contemporary body of 
opinion concerning humanitarian intervention, with special regard to the 
common or at least repeatedly emerging elements of various descriptions. It 
may be observed that the opening remark speaks of a definition "valid for the 
period of traditional international law". It is because I am deeply convinced that 
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humanitarian intervention cannot be accurately described by one single de-
finition with respect to both the traditional and the current era of public inter-
national law.2 This is attributable to a number of factors. For instance the legal 
environment surrounding intervention on grounds of humanity was substan-
tially altered following the adoption of the UN Charter, as a consequence of 
which it-being a forceful measure-almost entirely left the domain of the 
principle of non-intervention and entered that of the prohibition of the use 
of force. Furthermore, the legal terminology meant to describe it has also 
changed, not to mention a number of modifications in the very content of the 
phrase, such as the widening of the group of potential subjects of intervention 
with certain international organizations, or the broadening of its possible 
grounds with the fundamental guarantees of international humanitarian law 
applicable to armed conflicts not of an international character. 
Having considered the relevant literature of those days,3 the definition of 
intervention on grounds of humanity applicable to the pre-Charter period can 
be formulated as follows: humanitarian intervention was a dictatorial inter-
ference involving the use of force, but not qualifying as war, carried out as a 
last resort and free from selfish motives by one or more civilized states against 
another state in absence of the consent or request thereof, with a view to coerce 
it to cease the grave and widespread violations of fundamental freedoms and 
human rights of its own nationals. 
A few supplementary remarks are nevertheless necessary to shed more light 
on the special features of humanitarian intervention, and to make the content of 
the definition perfectly clear. First of all, the use of force for humanitarian 
purposes was generally considered a last resort, which could be utilized only 
after all other, non-violent measures had failed. Other requirements or obli-
gations, however, did not really emerge vis-à-vis the intervening states. Thus 
the norms of the law of war restricting the right of belligerents to freely choose 
the means and methods of warfare reached a level of development on which 
one can perceive them as a substantial constraining factor only after 1899, near 
the end of the period under consideration. Let us not forget either that these 
norms governed situations of de iure war,4 but-as it will be thoroughly dis-
The creation of a definition of humanitarian intervention embracing both major 
periods of international law is, of course, not impossible. I am merely saying that it would 
inevitably be ei ther inaccurate, or too vague. 
1
 It would be excessive to enumerate here all of the sources consulted. Nevertheless, 
they can be found in the footnotes below. See especially infra, notes 12-13, 16. 
4
 Cf. Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of W a r on Land, The Hague, 
29 July 1899, Article 2; Convent ion for the Adaptat ion to Mar i t ime Warfare of the 
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cussed later on-intervention was a category distinct from war. In relation to the 
means and methods of forceful measures short of war only the inherently limited 
nature of these actions, some arguably surviving remnants of the natural 
doctrine of just war as well as rationality and expediency could pose actual 
boundaries. 
Notwithstanding the fact that some of the authors of the period adopted this 
method,5 I do not see any reason for the independent treatment of intervention 
on grounds of humanity and intervention on grounds of religion, provided that 
the latter was not carried out as a manifestation of religious intolerance, but to 
suppress religious persecution. Even though these two kinds of intervention 
should not be discussed separately, they were not totally identical either, that is 
to say, the scope of humanitarian intervention must not be restricted to the 
enforcement of the freedom of religion. The relationship between them was a 
relation of a part (intervention on grounds of religion) to a whole (humani-
tarian intervention), as the blatant denial of the freedom of religion regularly 
brought along a violation of other human rights, as well. 
It may be observed that the definition above speaks of "civilized states" as 
the sole subjects of international law having been able to carry out a humani-
tarian intervention in the past. Despite that the distinction of civilized and 
uncivilized nations appeared fairly seldom in the relevant works,'1 I consider 
the inclusion of this condition well founded for three reasons. Firstly, the 
"civilized-semi-civilized-uncivilized" partition was an axiomatic principle of 
traditional international law that academics may not necessarily have wished to 
reaffirm repeatedly. Secondly, the genuine subjects of international law were 
civilized states, so its rules could not have granted a right of intervention to 
semi-civilized or uncivilized nations. Thirdly, the attribute "civilized" is used 
exclusively in connection with states carrying out the intervention; a contrario 
a target state could have belonged to any of these three categories. It would be 
Principles of the Geneva Convention of August 22, 1864, The Hague, 29 July 1899, Article 
11 ; Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies 
in the Field, Geneva, 6 July 1906, Article 24; Convention Relative to the Opening of 
Hostilities, The Hague, 18 October 1907, Article 3. 
1
 See e.g. Bonfils, H.: Manuel de droit international public. 7th edition (P. Fauchille 
ed.), Paris, 1914. 203; Phillimore, R. J.: Commentaries upon International Law. 3rd edition, 
Vol. 1, London, 1879.618. 
6
 See e.g. Martens, F. F.: Völkerrecht. Das internationale Recht der civiUsierten 
Nationen. (C. Bergbohm ed.) Vol. 1, Berlin, 1883. 301-302; Werner, R.: A természetjog, 
vagy bölcseleti jogtudomány kézikönyve. Összehasonlító tekintettel a tételes jog intézkedé-
seire [Manual of Natural Law, or of Philosophical Legal Science. With Comparative 
Regard to Measures of Positive Law], Vol. 2, Pest, 1869. 338. 
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a mistake to restrict the circle of target states to the group of semi-civilized and 
uncivilized countries, since the theoretical possibility of a humanitarian 
intervention against a civilized state was equally present although such action 
was almost certainly not carried out in practice. (Civilized states usually resorted 
to "humanitarian representations" in their relations with one another.) In 
addition, international lawyers of the period would not have devoted so much 
attention to the question of the legality of humanitarian intervention if it had 
been applicable only against semi-civilized or uncivilized nations, which could 
not fully enjoy the protection afforded by international law, particularly the 
principle of non-intervention. 
It may be noticed that the definition contains nothing regarding issue of 
legality, because I believe that the classification of an intervention as humani-
tarian did not automatically bring about its lawfulness. In other words, humani-
tarian intervention was not a legal title of absolute value. The following sections 
are meant to elaborate on this particular issue. 
Customary law was undoubtedly the dominant source of public international 
law in the pre-Charter period. It is therefore obvious that the legality of past 
humanitarian interventions has to be examined in the framework of contem-
poraneous customary law in the first place. As commonly known, this source 
of international law is composed of two segments. The objective element of 
customary law is state practice (consuetudotdesuetudo, diuturnitas, usus),1 in 
addition to the subjective element, the so-called opinio iuris sive necessitatis.8 
7
 "State practice means any act or s tatement by a State f r om which views about 
customary law can be inferred; it includes physical acts, claims, declarations in abstracto 
[...], national laws, national judgments and omissions." Akehurst, M.: Custom as a Source 
of International Law. British Yearbook of International Law 47 (1974-1975), 53. Several 
authors, however, challenge the practical importance of in abstracto declarations. Cf. e.g. 
Thirlway, H. W. A.: Internationa1 Customary Law and Codification. Leiden, 1972, 58. 
8
 For an examination of traditional international law, one obviously needs the 
"traditional" concept of opinio iuris: "Traditionally, opinio juris was discussed not from 
the point of view of law-creation but from that of law-application. Its primary funct ion was 
to draw a distinction between legally binding customary norms , on the one hand, and 
other social norms, particularly moral norms and comity, on the other, in the process of 
ascertaining and applying international law. T h e traditional interpretation of opinio juris 
was also developed under the strong influence of various natural law theories according to 
which practice does not create legal obligations but simply reflects the already existing 
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One can speak of an existing norm of customary law exclusively in case of a 
parallel coexistence of these two segments, both with respect to the past and 
the present. Consequently, a proof of relevant practice is not at all equivalent to 
an evidence of customary law. If a right of humanitarian intervention had ever 
been a part of customary law, a sufficient state practice as well as the adjacent 
opinio iuris can and should be revealed. 
The state practice appears to be provable, although it may well be subject 
to debate how many of the most frequently cited instances qualified as a 
genuine humanitarian intervention. (This is to a great extent due to the 
absence of consensus on the notion of humanitarian intervention.) Diplomatic 
representations in connection with the actual recourses to force further render 
the existence of relevant state practice possible, since the usus is established 
not only by physical actions but also by other conducts. It cannot be denied, 
however, that the 19th century state practice comprised of a handful of instances, 
and even less can be said about the first half of the 20th century. Instances of 
humanitarian intervention during the 19th century were earned out almost 
exclusively by the European Great Powers against the Ottoman Empire-the 
sole, yet rather questionable, exception being the action of the United States in 
Cuba in 1898.9 There is therefore a great deal of subjectivity in determining 
if this seemingly sporadic practice suffices as usus. On the other hand, the 
international community of states was extremely small at that time, thus one 
may find that, in fact, a relatively large number of its members participated in 
these interventions. As for concerns relating to the alleged infrequency of 
ones. In the framework of this approach, opinio juris was def ined as a feeling or belief that 
practice corresponds to an already existing legal obligation." Danilenko, G.: Law-Making 
in the International Community. Dordrecht-Boston-London, 1993. 99. The International 
Court of Justice perceived opinio iuris in a similar manner in the Case concerning the North 
Sea Continental Shelf. See North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany v. 
Denmark) (Federal Republic of Germany v. Netherlands), Judgement of 20 February 1969, 
I.C.J. Reports 1969, para. 77, at 44. 
4
 The most frequently mentioned occurrences are the fol lowing: Greece (1827-1830) , 
Syria (1860-1861), Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Bulgaria (1877-1878), Cuba (1898), 
Macedonia (1912-1913). The Cuban action was perhaps the only humanitarian inter-
vention, if seen as such, which was carried out by one civilized state against another. 
Admittedly, Article VII of the 1856 Peace Treaty of Paris permitted the Sublime Porte "to 
participate in the advantages of the Public Law and System (Concert) of Europe" , but the 
practical significance of this solemn declaration proved even at that time rather negligible. 
Cf. e.g. Phillimore: op. cit., 635. This list, however, can be considerably extended, if one 
includes non-violent interventions, as well. See e.g. Grewe, W . G.: Epocher der Völker-
rechtsgeschichte. 2nd edition, Baden-Baden, 1988. 577-579; Stowell, E. C.: Intervention 
in International Law. Washington D.C., 1921. 63-277. 
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actions, they might be considerably resolved with referral to an opinion, 
according to which "[t]he number of States taking part in a practice is much 
more important than the number of separate acts of which the practice is 
composed, or the time over which it is spread".10 For that reason, it is not 
impossible that an adequate state practice of humanitarian intervention existed-
the real question is whether or not international law permitted it. 
The question of opinio mn's-although not resulting in a direct and coherent 
debate-set scholars of international law against one another even in the period 
under deliberation. Certain statements of politicians, which might serve as an 
evidence of legal belief, could provide a guideline for the determination whether 
a state perceived its action as an exercise of a right, but it would be unwise to 
draw conclusions of universal validity solely f rom such pronouncements. I am 
convinced that the analysis of the legal literature of that time "as subsidiary 
means for the determination of rules of law" is perhaps the most expedient 
method. The technique to be applied for this purpose is relatively simple, and 
is basically the same as the one adopted earlier for the construction of the 
definition of humanitarian intervention. In case the overwhelming majority of 
eminent authorities of "civilized nations", who were most probably in know-
ledge of state practice and opinio iuris, supported a right of intervention on 
grounds of humanity, then we have reason to believe that this category was 
indeed in line with the norms of customary international law, and vice versa. 
The summary of opinions derived from the most influential works on inter-
national law leads, however, to a somewhat astonishing result: teachings of 
international lawyers do not give a definitive answer to the question. It can be 
observed that nearly as many outstanding figures considered humanitarian inter-
vention lawful as those who expressly rejected it; not to mention the significant 
group of authors, who-due to the cautiousness or vagueness of their opinions-
stood somewhere between the two extremes." 
Within the framework of a brief enumeration, one may mention, inter alia, 
the following international lawyers-including, for the sake of interest, a few 
representatives of Hungarian legal doctrine-among those who considered 
humanitarian intervention lawful: Johann С. Bluntschli, Edwin M. Borchard, 
László Buza, Carlos Calvo, Charles G. Fenwick, István Kiss, Fjodor F. Martens, 
10
 Akehurst: op. cit., 14. 
11
 For an opposing statement, according to which "a majority of writers accepted the 
idea of a lawful humanitarian intervention", and only a "substantial minori ty of scholars" 
re jected this view (although its legal i ty under cus tomary law is still debatable), see 
Beyerlin, U.: Humanitarian Intervention, in Bernhardt, R. (ed.): Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law. Vol . 3, New York-London , 1982. 212. 
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Antoine Rougier, Ellery C. Stowell, Pál Tassy, László Vincze Weninger, Rudolf 
Werner, John Westlake, Henry Wheaton and Theodore Woolsey.1- Naturally, 
all of them defined the notion of humanitarian intervention in a more or less 
divergent manner. Nevertheless, I believe that it does not deprive their 
consensus of its value, because in spite of the differences, the basic conception 
remained the same. The lawfulness of humanitarian intervention was clearly 
ruled out, for instance, by István Apáthy, Henry Bonfils, János Csarada, 
August W. Heffter, Albert Irk, Franz von Liszt, Karl Melczer, Paul L. E. 
Pradier-Fodéré, Leo Strisower, Karl Strupp and Gyula Thegze.13 Manouchehr 
Ganji also added the famous philosopher, Immanuel Kant to this group,14 but 
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Weninger, L. V.: Az új nemzetközi jog [The New International Law]. Budapest , 1927. 101 
(although he might be inserted in the third group, as well); Werner: op. cit. 338; Westlake, J.: 
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to tell the truth, John Stuart Mill can likewise be included, although some of 
his thoughts approximated the interventionist approach.15 For various reasons, 
views expressed by the following authors can be inserted in neither of the 
categories above: William E. Hall, Thomas J. Lawrence, Lassa Oppenheim, 
Pitman В. Potter, Robert J. Phillimore and Percy H. Winfield.16 
For the previously applied method of revealing the 19th century opinio 
iuris regarding humanitarian intervention has led to a controversial outcome, 
one might make an alternative attempt to derive legality from the natural 
doctrine of bellum iustum, because the phrase "iustum" had referred not only to 
a war having been just, but also to the fact that it had been in conformity with 
the "necessary law of nature". The phenomenon qualified today as a grave and 
widespread violation of human rights was once, under the doctrine of just war, 
one of the just causes of war. It appeared in works of such classics as Francisco 
de Vitoria, Francisco Suárez, Alberico Gentili and Hugo Grotius.17 We may 
reasonably believe that-parallel to the development of the "voluntary law of 
nations"-this iusta causa seceded from the gradually eclipsing natural 
doctrine of bellum iustum and ultimately gained independence within positive 
international law as intervention on grounds of humanity. Based upon this 
assumption, it may be concluded that the lawfulness of humanitarian inter-
vention under customary international law was a result of the outlasting of one 
of the segments of just war. This train of thoughts seems prima facie plausible. 
However, it should not be overlooked that approximately at the turn of the 
18th and 19th centuries, simultaneously to a presumed recognition of such 
15
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actions by positive law, the principle of non-intervention emerged as a corner-
stone of international law. In light of this, the survival of legality of a just war 
for altruistic purposes in the form of a right of humanitarian intervention appears 
extremely dubious.18 
The principle of non-intervention could not affect the outlasting lawfulness 
of humanitarian intervention only if the latter possessed the quality of a right 
of intervention, in other words, if it was an exception to the major rule of 
prohibiting nature. The list of these rights of intervention can be drawn up on 
the basis of the legal literature of the period, whereas state practice offers only 
but a few certain and helpful pieces of information in this regard. Acceptable 
rights of intervention, however, differed from author to author, not to mention 
those scholars who automatically denied the very existence thereof.14 To sum 
up, in order to derive a customary right of humanitarian intervention from the 
survival of the above-mentioned element of bellum iustum, it has to be proven 
primarily that the prohibition of intervention-one of the most fundamental norms 
of the post-Westphalia world order-did not affect this continuity. To facilitate 
that, the fairly controversial coexisting legal literature has to be consulted, 
with the intention of illustrating whether or not the indispensable opinio iuris 
was present concerning the actual existence of this particular right of inter-
vention. In other words, one inevitably has to face our starting, yet definitely 
unanswerable question at the end of an analysis focusing on the survival of 
bellum iustum, as well. 
It is inappropriate to restrict the scope of examination to customary law, 
and to the communis opinio doctorum. A limited number of international 
treaties providing for a state party to respect specific human rights-mainly the 
freedom of religion-of its own subjects might also be of interest. Merely upon 
the basis of state practice it may appear that in case of a violation of these 
human rights by the obliged state, the other parties enjoyed some sort of a right 
of intervention, sometimes even a right of armed intervention, the principal 
function of which was to enforce the fulfilment of obligations undertaken in 
the treaty.20 This right of armed intervention seemingly manifested itself as a 
18
 The restrained tone of Emeric de Vattel, for example, reflects this uncertainty. Cf . 
Vattel, E., de: Le droit de gens ou principes de la loi naturelle. Appliqués à la conduite et 
aux affaires des nations et souverains [Law of Nations; or, Principles of the Law of Nature, 
applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns]. (C. G. Fenwick transi.), 
Vol. 3, Washington D. C„ 1916. Introd. 22-23, at 8, II. IV. 54-55, at 131. 
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 Cf. Martens: op. cit., 299. 
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 The most important treaty stipulations with regard to the relevant 19th century state 
practice were perhaps the following: Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Turkey and 
Russia, Kutchuk-Kainardji, 21 July 1774, Articles VII-VIII, XIV, XVI-XVIII ; Peace 
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sanction or a treaty guarantee, and was a particularly "popular" and often 
invoked ground in the practical implementation of instruments envisaging a 
free exercise of religion for Christian minorities living under the rule of the 
Sublime Porte. Unquestionable is the fact that states parties to such agreements 
indeed intervened militarily on some occasions, but the humanitarian nature 
and legality of their action did not follow automatically. Especially not in light 
of the fact that the treaties incorporating human rights provisions did not contain 
explicit clauses for a right of armed intervention, should a breach of the 
instrument occur. Notwithstanding, I consider the problem worthy of thorough 
deliberation, chiefly in view of Manouchehr Ganji's well-known theory on the 
common features of past humanitarian interventions, which directly linked 
these actions to treaty stipulations containing the obligation to respect the 
freedom of religion.21 
Traditional international law recognized several rights of intervention in 
connection with international treaties. The first group of these rights-formulated 
in abstracto or for a specific event-originated directly f rom the text of a treaty, 
thus any action in invocation thereof was to be seen as a lawful exception to 
the principle of non-intervention, due to the consensual nature of the agreement.22 
Nevertheless, the majority of authors discussed these expressis verbis stipulated 
rights of intervention either in the context of the restoration of a sovereign, a 
government or of constitutional order, or- in more general terms-emphasized 
only the requirement of consent by the target state. With such special 
content, this set of rights is obviously inadequate for the demonstration of the 
lawfulness of intervention on grounds of humanity. This is, however, not the 
sole argument to hamper the successful continuation of the examination. Any 
right of intervention provided for in a treaty carries with itself an inherent 
contradiction. The essence of intervention-including humanitarian intervention-
is coercion, whereas the most important feature of a treaty, at least in this regard, 
is consensus: an intervention based upon a treaty provision is, therefore, a 
paradox. 
Treaty between Great Britain, France, the Ot toman Empire, Sardinia, and Russia, Paris, 30 
March 1856, Articles VI I I - IX; Treaty between Great Britain, Austria-Hungary, France, 
Germany, Italy, Russia and Turkey, Berlin, 13 July 1878, Articles XXIII, LXI-LXII . 
21
 See Ganji : op. cit., 37. 
" See e.g. Apathy: op. cit., 109; Buza: Szabadság és beavatkozás a nemzetközi jogban, 
op. cit. 2; Bluntschli: op. cit., 267; Csarada: op. cit., 178; Lawrence: op. cit., 118; Liszt: op. 
cit., 66; Oppenheim: op. cit., 184; Strisower: op. cit., 114; Strupp, K.: Theorie und Praxis 
des Völkerrechts. Ein Grundriß zum akademischen Gebrauch und zum Selbststudium. Berlin, 
1925. 29. For a critical evaluation, see Stowell: Intervention in International Law, 4 3 8 -
446. 
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A further right of intervention relating to international treaties served as a 
sanction beyond the texts of treaties, but likewise served the fulfilment of 
violated treaty obligations. As Oppenheim stated: 
"Thus, thirdly, if a State which is restricted by an international treaty in its 
internal independence or its territorial or personal supremacy, does not 
comply with the restrictions concerned, the other party or parties have a 
right to intervene."22 
Disturbing as it may sound, most of the contemporaneous experts did not 
even mention this right of intervention: perhaps they deemed its existence self-
evident, or examined it under a different heading, for instance that of reprisal. 
The quotation above does not offer a definitive answer as to the relationship 
between the right at issue and the category of reprisal. It seems that Oppenheim 
simply treated a reprisal applicable in the wake of a breach of a treaty as a 
separate right of intervention. If this assumption is correct, it may be concluded 
that an intervention sanctioning a violation of a treaty obligation to respect 
human rights was almost certainly lawful; in addition, it could be classified 
simultaneously as humanitarian intervention. It has to be kept in mind, however, 
that the international legality of the resort to force in this particular case was 
a result of an accidental overlapping of the normally distinct categories of 
humanitarian intervention and armed reprisal, but not a clear evidence of the 
lawfulness of the former under customary law. 
This statement begs the explanation why humanitarian intervention could 
not be equalized with armed reprisal and categorized as a permissible measure 
under traditional international law. Since a reprisal presupposes a violation of a 
norm of international law, one must first answer the question, whether or not 
such violation occurred, if a state trod the fundamental rights of its nationals 
under foot during the period concerned. In order to be able to answer this 
question, a brief preliminary examination of a standard legal relation in the field 
of human rights has to be carried out, which mainly focuses on the following 
problem: Towards whom did states undertake the obligation to respect human 
rights already in existence? Towards their nationals only (per se obligation), 
or-besides them-towards other states, as well (inter se obligation)?24 In the 
23
 Oppenheim: op. cit., 183. See also Phillimore: op. cit., 568. 
24
 According to András Bragyova, the undertaking of human r ights obligations 
establishes a per se obligation, not an inter se one, because "the state obliges itself towards 
i t se l f ' . (Translation mine.) He further adds that the lack of a substantive international right 
or obligation does not rule out the existence of certain procedural rights or obligations on 
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latter case, a violation of human rights inevitably would have injured not 
only the individuals but also the other states; consequently each and every 
humanitarian intervention would have been an armed reprisal. This is, as the 
conditional voice suggests, a less tenable assertion. It seems more defendable 
that in absence of an express stipulation, other states did not receive any rights 
from the undertaking of an obligation to respect human rights. Therefore, a 
violation of these rights could not have injured subjects other than the 
individuals-in other words: an intervention on grounds of humanity in favour 
of them could not be characterized as a reprisal. There is only one exception 
imaginable to this major rule. If states concluded a treaty in which they 
established an inter se human rights obligation-that is to say, they undertook 
the observance of human rights towards one another, as well-, the atrocities 
injured both the individuals and the other parties. Should the treaties previously 
mentioned be seen as such instruments, any breach of them produced an 
unintentional overlapping of humanitarian intervention and armed reprisal. 
The correctness of this allegation is also supported by the fact that human 
rights were within the domestic jurisdiction of states during the pre-Charter 
era, and became of international concern solely by insertion into international 
agreements. 
Given the extreme, sometimes even chaotic diversity of the pre-Charter 
science of international law, it is not surprising that there was a third position, 
as well. According to this view, the treaties referred to above directly provided 
for a right of intervention for other parties even in absence of specific stipula-
tions and independently from customary law, should a breach take place. As 
Percy H. Winfield wrote: 
"The provision for a future intervention is either express or, more commonly, 
implied, and in either case must take effect as the secondary or sanctioning 
right necessary to secure the maintenance of the rights and duties conferred 
or imposed by the treaty."25 
the side of other states, in case of a v io la t ion of these r ights . See Bragyova , A.: Ala-
pozhatók-e az emberi j o g o k a nemzetközi jogra? [Can H u m a n Rights Be Based upon 
International Law?], Állam- és Jogtudomány 32 (1990), 100-101, 103-104. 
Winfield: op. cit., 158. Winfield ment ioned, among others, Articles LXI and LXII of 
the 1878 Treaty of Berlin, although none of these stipulations provided for a right of armed 
intervention. On the contrary. Article LXI only contained the verb "superintend", whereas 
Article LXII merely recognized a right of Powers to "official protection" by diplomatic or 
consular agents. Evidently, none of these guarantees can be identified as a right of armed 
intervention. It is true that diplomatic protect ion often took a violent form during the 19th 
century, but its beneficiaries were the nat ionals of the intervening state. T h e group of 
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Furthermore, Winfield believed that if an intervention was "not otherwise 
righteous", then an agreement to carry it out could neither be considered to be 
in conformity with international law, similarly to the provisions of municipal 
law.26 (The phrase "not otherwise righteous" was presumably a referral to 
customary law.) Disregarding the previous conclusions, one therefore has to 
examine a further hypothesis in which a treaty could incorporate a right of 
intervention even in an implicit manner. 
I feel it necessary to state at the very beginning that-at least in my opinion-
even the starting point suffers from serious legal and logical defects; beyond 
the fact that the concept of a right of intervention originating from a treaty, per 
se, appears to be a paradox. The recognition of "implicit" or "inherent" treaty 
provisions in general (irrespective of the subsequent theory of inherent powers 
in the law of international organizations) is based upon the blurring of boundaries 
between customary and treaty law. Had the parties really wished to secure this 
"sanctioning right", they most likely would have done it explicitly. If states did 
not include such possibility, it was because they either did not want to provide 
for it, or it was superfluous to do so, as it had been present and applicable 
under customary law anyway. It is a scarcely acceptable submission that, even 
though a treaty stipulates nothing in this regard, a right of intervention exists, 
moreover, it stems from the document itself. 
Should one nevertheless adopt the idea of a right of humanitarian inter-
vention emerging somehow from a treaty, there are two ways to derive its 
lawfulness under customary law. On the one hand, it might be possible that the 
provisions of relevant treaties merely reflected coexisting customary law. On 
the other hand, it cannot be ruled out either that it was the norm of customary 
law, which came into existence as a result of treaty provisions. The latter 
presumption is as reasonable as the first one, given that the majority of inter-
national agreements being discussed was concluded between the Great Powers 
of that time-influential states, whose actual interventions might have had an 
immense impact on the evolution of customary law. The thought of a treaty 
provision to become a norm of customary law is widely accepted even 
nowadays (although it cannot be presumed in general): 
individuals entitled to protection by diplomatic or consular agents under Article LXII of the 
Treaty of Berlin, however, encompassed all natural persons-irrespective of their nationality-
on the territory of the Ottoman Empire. 
26
 See ibid., 159. For a different view, see Strisower: op. cit., 114-115. 
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"Just as a series of bilateral treaties concluded over a period of time by 
various States, all consistently adopting the same solution to the same 
problem of the relationships between them, may give rise to a new rule of 
customary international law, so the general ratification of a treaty laying 
down general rules to govern the future relationships of States in a given 
field has a similar effect."27 
Humphrey Waldock, however, added an important remark, according to 
which the norms created this way "acquired their authority as general rules of 
international law... from the State practice, not from the treaties themselves".28 
This pattern of establishment of customary law is not always unambiguous and 
possible. The Permanent Court of International Justice, for example, referred 
to it in the case of the S. S. Lotus: "Finally, as regards conventions expressly 
reserving jurisdiction exclusively to the State whose flag is flown, it is not 
absolutely certain that this stipulation is to be regarded as expressing a general 
principle of law..."29 Both of the theoretical ways mentioned above seem 
rational, but-and my concluding observation in this connection is as follows-
they necessarily turn out to be of no use, as none of them by-passes the problem 
of customary law, particularly the difficulties concerning the demonstration of 
opinio iuris. 
For the sake of completeness, it should also be examined whether or not 
humanitarian intervention had ever belonged to the "general principles of inter-
national law recognized by civilized nations",30 and was thus a lawful measure. 
Firstly, it has to be noted that several problems emerge in relation to this task 
owing to the actual character of general principles of law not being unequivocal. 
Do they originate from the common principles of domestic law, or are they 
special principles of international nature meant to fill the gaps in international 
law? It can also be a subject of debate whether these principles of law represent 
surviving segments of natural law, or their content has to be sought for and 
27
 Thirlway: op. cit., 59. See also Brownlie, I.: Principles of Public International Law. 
6th edition, Oxford, 2003. 12-13; International Law Association: Report of the Sixty-Ninth 
Conference. London, 2000. 753-765. 
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 Waldock, C. H. M.: General Course on Public International Law. Recueil des Cours 
106 (1962-И), 41. 
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 The S.S. Lotus (France v. Turkey), Judgement No. 9, 7 September 1927, in Hudson, 
M. O. (ed.): World Court Reports. A Collection of the Judgements, Orders and Opinions of 
the Permanent Court of International Justice. Reprint of the edition of 1935, Vol. 2, 
Buffalo, 2000. 41-42. 
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 For a detailed analysis of this topic, see Herczegh, G.: General Principles of Law 
and the International Legal Order. Budapest, 1969. 
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interpreted only in the framework of positive law. Not to mention the question 
pertaining to the identity of those actors empowered or bound by the general 
principles of law: is it the states generally, or the courts that apply them? (It 
needs to be underlined that in the period under deliberation the recognition of a 
general principle of law by "civilized nations" was an essential condition, not 
an anachronistic phrase, as it is held to be nowadays.) 
Supposing that the general principles of international law directly empower 
or bind states-and they did so in the past, as well-it has to be examined first, if 
there was a gap in law concerning the problem of humanitarian intervention, 
which could have left room for an invocation of these principles.31 In my view, 
the result can only be a negative one: the fact that an indisputable conclusion 
can be drawn neither from treaty law, nor from customary law is not equal to 
the existence of a gap in law. 
It is fair to say that, according to the dominant position in the science of 
international law, a referral to the general principles of law is in fact an 
application of certain domestic legal principles by way of analogy on the 
international level. Bearing this circumstance in mind, and recalling that 19th 
century European and American legal literature in essence adopted a positivist 
approach, one can readily derive that the general principles of international law 
could hardly ever serve as a basis for the lawfulness of interventions on grounds 
of humanity. Naturally, an adequately backed up judgement could be made 
only after a thorough study of domestic laws of one-time civilized nations; never-
theless I strongly doubt that there have ever been common, well-established 
legal principles in the legal systems of the countries concerned which could 
provide a proper ground for even a distant analogy. Since this task goes far 
beyond the scope of the present study, we should confine ourselves to the 
application of indirect arguments. 
The best imaginable theoretical combination for the lawfulness of humani-
tarian intervention would be the one according to which the general principles 
of law are and were specific international principles with a content taken from 
natural law. Thus, the principles of natural law, including the requirement of 
31
 The following opinion is worth recalling at this point: "Es gibt ferner auch negatives 
Völkergewohnheitsrecht. Negatives Völkergewohnheitsrecht entsteht, wenn die überein-
st immende, von Rechtsüberzeugung getragene Staatenpraxis davon ausgeht , daß ein 
bestimmter abstrakter Rechtssatz des Völkergewohnheitsrechts nicht besteht. Ein solcher 
Rechtssatz des Völkergewohnheitsrechts hat insbesondere die Funktion, den Rückgriff auf 
die Analogie, auf allgemeine Rechtsgrundsätze und sonstige subsidiäre Rechtsquellen des 
Völkerrechts auszuschl ießen." Bleckmann, A.: Zur Feststel lung und Auslegung von 
Völkergewohnheitsrecht. Zeitschrift für ausländisches Öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 
37 (1977) ,511. 
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justice, invoked by authors in the 17th and 18th centuries could have been 
applied to legalize humanitarian intervention. The positivist literature, however, 
did not support this assumption, and therefore it is futile to deal with it in 
detail. Such ideas have never been common in past and present legal literature, 
which also undermines the applicability of the general principles of law in this 
case. In the knowledge of heated debates regarding the lawfulness of humani-
tarian intervention, any truly applicable general principle is most likely to have 
received much more attention by international lawyers. 
Finally, it is advisable to take a look at the so-called ins ad bellum, that is 
to say, the "sacred" right to resort to war. lus ad bellum was one of the most 
fundamental attributes of state sovereignty in the pre-Charter era, providing a 
right for states to engage in war for nearly any reason.32 Nonetheless, this is 
an oversimplified formulation of the true meaning of ius ad bellum. In reality, 
this right was subject to a number of limitations: for instance, it was to be 
exercised always as a last resort and required an appropriate casus belli-be that 
genuine or alleged. The catalogue of causes of war was extremely subjective, 
but it typically embraced the right of self-preservation, which on the other 
hand, usually included the category of intervention. Let us not forget that in 
this period the latter involved interventions carried out by force of arms, as 
well, which could barely be distinguished from a war at first sight. For this 
reason, one may easily come to the conclusion that humanitarian intervention, 
being an exercise of ius ad bellum, was lawful. This statement, however, hardly 
corresponds to the truth. As commonly known, war and intervention were 
actually two distinct and independently treated categories, even though they 
occasionally overlapped in literature.33 Intervention, including its armed mani-
festation, was dealt with under the rubric of the law of peace and was seen as a 
measure short of war, unlike war, which was discussed within a different 
framework and was defined as follows: 
" "War , as a means of law-making and law-enforcement, is therefore a necessary 
institution of current international law." Buza, L.: Háború és nemzetközi jog [War and 
International Law]. 1943. 3. (Translation mine.) "The recognit ion of wa r as an inter-
national legal relation, however, does not at all depend on its legality or illegality. The 
group of persons that chooses it as means is determining the legality or illegality of war. 
(This is the most interesting feature of self-help.)" Weninger: op. cit., 298. (Italics omitted. 
Translation mine.) 
33
 The following remark by Lawrence clearly illustrates both the reason for this over-
lapping and the two categories being separa te from one another: „Further, the cause which 
just i f ies intervention must be important enough to justify war . " Lawrence: op. cit., 118. 
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"Der Krieg als Erscheinung des internationalen Lebens, ist ein Zustand, der 
von Seite mehrerer einander gegenüberstehender Staaten darauf gerichtet ist, 
daß jede Partei die andere durch allgemeinen wechselseitigen Eingriff in 
ihre Güter behufs Durchsetzung eines gewissen Zweckes überwinde. [ . . . ] 
Der Zweck des Krieges ist gewiß nicht in den Kriegsakten beschlossen. 
Aber der eigentümliche, rechtliche Gegensatz des Krieges gegenüber dem 
Friedenszustande, dem Zustande ohne Krieg, liegt in den Kriegsakten, in 
dem dem Kriegszustande entsprechenden Verhalten, darin, daß solche Akte 
vorgenommen werden, um den Zweck des Krieges zu erreichen."34 
War was therefore a peculiar "state", or in other words, a special legal 
relation, in the framework of which each belligerent as well as the neutral states 
acquired certain rights and duties.35 War was neither an objective category, nor 
synonymous with the use of force. It could be established exclusively with a 
special intent (animus belligerendi), therefore the existence of a de iure war 
was dependent on a subjective decision of the belligerents.36 This will was as a 
rule reflected in the declaration of a state of war, and it could not be deduced 
simply from objective circumstances reminiscent of war, such as the appli-
cation of armed force by states against one another, the widescale loss of 
human life, or significant damage to property. Consequently, several forceful 
measures not requiring such intent-for example armed reprisal, embargo, 
pacific blockade, self-defence, and armed intervention-could not be properly 
classified as war.37 Furthermore, under ius ad bellum, the waging of war was 
entirely lawful (moreover, war occasionally appeared as an extra-legal pheno-
menon in some of the treatises), whereas intervention, irrespective of a few 
exceptions known as rights of intervention, was generally prohibited. Finally, 
war was comprehensive and unlimited with regard to both its goals and its 
means, whereas intervention was more of a limited nature in all respects. As a 
result, the lawfulness of intervention on grounds of humanity cannot be drawn 
from the ius ad bellum. 
34
 Strisower: op. cit., 4 -5 . 
35
 Cf. Liszt: op. cit., 282. 
36
 Cf. Meng, W.: War, in Bernhardt. R. (ed.): Encyclopedia of Public International 
Law. Vol. 4, New York-London, 1982. 284. 
37
 Cf. Westlake, J.: International Law. Vol. 2, Cambridge, 1907. 2. See also Farer, T. J.: 
Law and War, in Black, C. E.-Falk, R. A. (eds.): The Future of International Legal Order. 
Vol. 3, Princeton, 1971. 15, 23-24; Strisower: op. cit., 6 - 7 . 
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I I I . 
The legality of past humanitarian interventions has to be examined in the 
context of the principle of non-intervention rather than under the heading of 
war. This statement brings us to yet another field worthy of examination: the 
lawfulness of humanitarian intervention in the light of international treaties 
concluded during the first half of the 20th century adversely affecting the 
previous legality of war, namely the Covenant of the League of Nations, the 
Pact of Locarno and the Kellogg-Briand Pact. 
The overwhelming majority of articles in the Covenant of the League of 
Nations contain the word "war". There is no particular reason to believe that 
the content of this terminus technicus fundamentally changed during the years 
of World War I in a way that it came to encompass hostile measures short of 
war, including armed intervention. Arguing a maiori ad minus, one might 
claim that the gradual outlawing of war had an impact on the lesser category of 
intervention, which thus became totally illegal. However, the relationship 
between war and intervention was not a relation of a whole to a part, since they 
were, as it has already been noted, separate categories. 
The principle of efficiency may also seem to strengthen the idea of a 
comprehensive ban on the use of force: it might be argued that the inter-
pretation of "war" in the Covenant in accordance with its strict legal sense would 
have hampered the most important aim of the League, namely "to promote 
international co-operation and to achieve international peace and security".38 
The rightness of this opinion is being contested by two circumstances. Firstly, 
"war" has always been a technical term that must be interpreted and applied in 
observance of this nature, regardless to the international instrument in which it 
appears. Secondly, as Hersch Lauterpacht mentioned, the early draft of the 
Covenant had originally contained the word "force", but it was subsequently 
replaced by "war" in the final version of the text.34 This change, unless it was 
motivated by stylistic considerations, presumably veils the effort of states to 
preserve a substantial segment of their freedom of action by resorting to an 
expression bearing a much more restricted meaning. 
38
 Covenant of the League of Nations, preamble . For the text of Covenant, see Treaty 
of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, Versailles, 28 June 
1919, Part I, in Grenville, J. A. S.-Wasserstein, B. (eds.): The Major International Treaties 
of the Twentieth Century. A History and Guide with Texts. Vol . 1, London-New York, 
2001. 100-105. 
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 See Lauterpacht, H.: "Resort to W a r " and the Interpretation of the Covenant 
During the Manchurian Dispute . American Journal of International Law 28 ( 1934), 49. 
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The provisions of the Covenant concerning war apparently had divergent 
interpretations even in those days: many were convinced that the effects of 
the partial renunciation of war comprised all forms of the use of force. 
Interestingly enough, some organs of the League also adopted this position,40 
although the states themselves were clearly hesitant to construe "war" in a 
broad sense.41 Lauterpacht maintained that this phrase could be interpreted in 
three ways: broadly, to include "all measures of armed force"; narrowly, as a 
description of a state of war; and in line with a "specific meaning", positioned 
somewhere between the two extremes. He further stated that: 
"Resort to war" may be deduced constructively f rom the recourse to armed 
force, but it is not synonymous with the use of armed force. [.. .] It merely 
means that the Covenant does not indiscriminately and automatically 
render illegal all acts of armed force. But it means also that it authorizes 
the finding and treatment as illegal of such acts of force as members of the 
League may wish to treat as such, having regard to the nature of the case, 
to general political considerations, and to their attitude toward the idea of 
collective enforcement of peace."42 
This renowned expert of international law seemingly did not think that the 
Covenant outlawed all forms of the use of force: due to its vague wording, the 
determination and sanctioning of war was basically dependent on the actual 
political will of states. Article 10 of the Covenant was the sole provision, 
which arguably reflected an intention to prohibit every forceful measure: 
"The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against 
external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence 
of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of 
40
 For instance, the Assembly of the League adopted a resolution in its s ixth session 
in 1925, which stated that all aggressive wars were and remained prohibited. S ince this 
resolution was not a formal amendment to the Covenant, its significance was merely of 
moral and political nature. Cf. Wehberg, H.: Die Völkerbundsatzung. 3rd edi t ion, Berlin, 
1929. 95. Furthermore, in August 1921, the International Blockade Commi t t ee of the 
Assembly interpreted the expression "resort to war" in the Covenant as "under tak ing of 
armed action". See Stone, J.: Aggression and World Order. A Critique of United Nations 
Theories of Aggression. London, 1958. 29. 
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any threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise upon the 
means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled."43 
Humanitarian intervention, prima facie, appears to fit in the notion of an 
"external aggression" against the "existing political independence" of a state, 
even though a violation of "territorial integrity" is incompatible with the humani-
tarian nature thereof. (Noteworthy is the fact that the expressions "territorial 
integrity" and "existing political independence" stood in a conjunctive relation 
(and), not in a disjunctive one (or) as in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the UN Charter. 
It may allow an interpretation, according to which Article 10 was applicable 
only in case of an aggression against both the political independence and the 
territorial integrity of a member, which would obviously shove humanitarian 
intervention out of the scope of the provision.) A generally recognized and 
legally binding definition of aggression did not come into being in the period 
between the two World Wars. Drafts as well as bi- or multilateral treaties 
were nevertheless adopted containing elements of the notion of aggression, 
according to which all forms of armed intervention was to be seen as an act of 
aggression. Among these instruments a draft prepared by the Soviet Union in 
1933 was of outstanding importance, which, in spite of its subsequent failure, 
served as a basis for several bilateral agreements.44 This draft overtly renounced 
acts of aggression, including the use of force in cases of "alleged malad-
ministration", "possible danger to life or property of foreign residents", 
"revolutionary or counter-revolutionary movements, civil war, disorders or 
strikes", and as "religious or anti-religious measures".45 
If the term "external aggression" bore a similar meaning in the context of 
the Covenant, then interventions on grounds of humanity were presumably 
unlawful, although Article 10 did not state it explicitly. However, this 
reasoning is extremely speculative, as the drafts and treaties referred to above 
were concluded well after the entry into force of the Covenant, and carried the 
43
 Covenant of the League of Nat ions , Article 10. (Emphasis added.) 
44
 In the period between 1926 and 1937, the Sovie t Union concluded a series of 
treat ies on non-aggression in order to prevent its isolat ion. For instance, the Soviet-
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marks of the ensuing development of international law.46 Furthermore, judging 
from its wording, Article 10 probably laid down only a general rule-in addition 
to the creation of an obligation of collective defence-, leaving the details to be 
elaborated on by other articles of the Covenant dealing with collective 
security. Finally, as Hans Wehberg pointed out, each member state had a right 
to determine "nach bestem Wissen und Gewissen",47 whether or not an external 
aggression existed. 
The Covenant did not offer a definitive solution to the legality of humani-
tarian intervention, even if one-groundlessly-perceives such actions as a 
segment of the category of war. Although it declared war or a threat of war "a 
matter of concern to the whole League", the mechanism meant to avert war 
was reserved exclusively for inter-state disputes "likely to lead to a rupture". If 
such controversy occurred, members of the organization were obliged to 
"submit the matter either to arbitration or judicial settlement or to enquiry by 
the Council", with a possibility in the latter case of a referral of the dispute to 
the Assembly of the League.48 Without going into a detailed introduction of the 
procedure of dispute settlement, one may raise the embarrassing question: 
Could there be any dispute-in the traditional meaning of this technical term-in 
the course of events leading to a humanitarian intervention? The answer seems 
to be negative. The question of human rights as well as the treatment of 
nationals-with only but a handful of exceptions elevated to the international 
level by international treaties, such as the protection of minorities or the 
abolition of slavery-was to be found in the domain of exclusive domestic 
jurisdiction of states.49 Demands were naturally formulated by the intervening 
46
 There existed, however, t reat ies of non-aggression that s ignif icant ly deferred f r o m 
the Soviet draft . See e.g. Ant i -War Treaty of Nonaggression and Conciliation, Rio de 
Janeiro, 10 October 1933, preamble , Articles I—II. T h e content of " w a r of aggression" 
was not detailed in the treaty, b u t - i n the light of a contextual interpretat ion of Articles I 
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territorial questions. For an English translation of the text, see Ant i -War , Nonaggression 
and Conciliation, Treaty between the United States of America and Other American 
Republics. U.S. Treaty Series, No. 906. 14-18. 
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Nuremberg Race Laws being within its domestic jurisdict ion. See Ermacora , F.: Art icle 
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states calling for a respect of human rights prior to the use of force, but-as a 
result of the above-mentioned status of fundamental rights-these represen-
tations could be classified as "soft" interventions rather than disputes. It is also 
remarkable that the concept of dispute never really became manifest in the 
relevant literature. 
This conclusion will only be partially altered if it is held that a dispute 
"likely to lead to a rupture" could indeed take place prior to an intervention 
concerning the respect for human rights, and could have been submitted for 
settlement to arbitration, to judicial settlement, or to enquiry by the Council. 
Due to the obligation to respect the exclusive domestic jurisdiction of states, it 
is doubtful that the Council could have actually dealt with the matter: 
"If the dispute between the parties is claimed by one of them, and is found 
by the Council, to arise out of a matter which by international law is solely 
within the domestic jurisdiction of that party, the Council shall so report, 
and shall make no recommendation as to its settlement."50 
It was for the Council to determine what formed part of domestic juris-
diction, but it was not required to examine this issue ex officio, therefore any 
invocation of domestic jurisdiction took the form of an objection on the side of 
the state concerned. The basis of such decision by the Council was whether 
international law had a norm prescribing a state to perform a particular behaviour 
under given circumstances.51 What is more, the Covenant set a considerably 
strict condition for the application of the clause cited, as the matter must have 
been "solely" within the domestic jurisdiction, not "essentially" as under Article 
2, paragraph 7, of the UN Charter.52 
Resorting to the dispute settlement mechanism envisaged by the Covenant 
did not guarantee the actual prevention of war. States merely undertook the 
obligation of averting war in certain cases, so there remained a number of 
opportunities to wage war lawfully. The most evident reservation of ins ad 
bellum was incorporated in Article 15, paragraph 7, of the Covenant: 
30
 Covenant of the League of Nations, Article 15, paragraph 8. For a similar conclusion, 
see Murphy, S. D.: Humanitarian Intervention. The United Nations in an Evolving 
World Order. Philadelphia, 1996. 59. 
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"If the Council fails to reach a report which is unanimously agreed to by 
the members thereof, other than the Representatives of one or more of the 
parties to the dispute, the Members of the League reserve to themselves 
the right to take such action as they shall consider necessary for the 
maintenance of right and justice."53 
This was, however, not the only gap in the system of collective security.54 
A recourse to war was legal in the following cases, as well: if a dispute was 
solely within the domestic jurisdiction of states; if the arbitration or the 
judicial settlement was not concluded within a reasonable time, or the Council 
failed to present its report within six months after the submission of the 
dispute; if either of the parties to the dispute did not comply with the award by 
the arbitrators, the judicial decision or the report of the Council, and the three-
month cooling-off period expired; and-although it was not mentioned expressly 
in the Covenant-in exercise of the customary right of self-defence.55 In addition, 
the Covenant sought to avert war only between members of the League. If non-
members were also involved in a debate, they must have been "invited to 
accept the obligations of Membership in the League for the purposes of such 
dispute, upon such conditions as the Council may deem just".56 
The utmost one can state with certainty regarding the relationship of the 
Covenant and humanitarian intervention is that such actions were, or rather 
would have been, unconditionally of interest to the League of Nations: 
"It is also declared to be the friendly right of each Member of the League to 
bring to the attention of the Assembly or of the Council any circumstance 
whatever affecting international relations which threatens to disturb inter-
national peace or the good understanding between nations upon which peace 
depends."57 
53
 Covenant of the League of Nat ions , Article 15, paragraph 7. 
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The Treaty of Mutual Guarantee between Germany, Belgium, France, Great 
Britain, and Italy-Annex A to the Pact of Locarno-is typically considered an 
important milestone in the process of the total renunciation of war, although its 
restricted scope and the limited number of parties make it appear less 
significant for the purposes of an analysis aimed at the drawing of conclusions 
of universal nature. In Article 2, Belgium and Germany as well as France and 
Germany mutually undertook that they "they will in no case attack or invade 
each other or resort to war against each other". This provision, however, 
recognized three exceptions: the exercise of the right of legitimate defence; 
actions in pursuance of Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations; 
and measures resulting from a decision by the Assembly or by the Council of 
the League, or in accordance with Article 15, paragraph 7, of the Covenant, 
provided in the latter case that the resort to force was merely a response to an 
attack.58 The inclusion of "attack" and "invade" rendered the treaty an instru-
ment more progressive than the Covenant in the field of the renunciation of the 
use of force, and in all probability ruled out the chance of a lawful humani-
tarian intervention between the states concerned. 
For various reasons, neither the Covenant nor the Pact of Locarno strove 
to impose a comprehensive and universal prohibition on the waging of war, 
unlike the Treaty on the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National 
Policy-commonly known as the Kellogg-Briand Pact-signed in Paris, on 
August 27, 1928. The treaty is surprisingly short and formulates the general 
ban on war in one single sentence: 
"The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare, in the names of their 
respective peoples, that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of 
international controversies and renounce it as an instrument of national 
policy in their relations with one another."54 
Similarly to the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Kellogg-Briand 
Pact did not contain specific provisions concerning armed intervention, including 
humanitarian intervention. In support of the assumption that the Pact did not 
affect the lawfulness, if any, of intervention on grounds of humanity, one 
should simply recall the arguments detailed with respect to the Covenant. The 
58
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treaty outlawed war, not the use of force. Furthermore, it merely renounced war 
"as an instrument of national policy", but a humanitarian intervention, per 
definitionem, had to be free from selfish motives and direct national interests. 
However, due to the issue of human rights being within the domestic juris-
diction of states, it is dubious if the use of force for humanitarian purposes 
classified as war could be an instrument of international policy, and as such, a 
measure arguably not prohibited by the Pact. 
As the treaty was meant to achieve a total prohibition of war, it is more 
likely that the phrase "war" contained therein embraced not only war in a 
formal sense, but also any use of military force against another state.6" It was 
the conclusion reached, for instance, by Ian Brownlie in the 1960s, who 
claimed that there had been only two implicit exceptions to the comprehensive 
renunciation of force: self-defence and measures taken in accordance with 
Article 16 of the Covenant.61 At first sight, this assertion is unquestionably 
convincing, but it does not seem to be unambiguously supported by past and 
present international lawyers. It has to be acknowledged that the number of 
contemporaneous authors accepting the lawfulness of humanitarian inter-
vention apparently decreased after World War I, but academics usually refrained 
from declaring all forms of the use of force illegal under the Kellogg-Briand 
Pact. For example, as Ferenc Faluhelyi stated a year after the conclusion of the 
treaty: 
"It appears worthy only of a remark that the statement of news articles, 
which emphasize in connection with the Kellogg Pact the total erasure of 
war from the dictionary of international law, is false. It is out of question."62 
60
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Josef L. Kunz expressed an essentially similar view in 1951, but he also 
gave the grounds for that: 
"But the admitted legality of self-defense and the delegation to each state 
of the right to be the only judge to determine whether the conditions of 
self-defense exist, make this Pact practically only a restatement of general 
international law. [. . .] Experience had shown that the Covenant and the 
Kellogg Pact, because of the aura of uncertainty hovering around the legal 
concept of "war", made it possible to wage "wars in disguise."63 
Slightly more than two decades after the undertaking of the solemn 
obligation at issue, Kunz articulated an exceedingly critical opinion on the Pact 
labelling it as a mere "restatement" of general international law. His point 
can only be understood if one treats the current regulation of self-defence in-
dependent from its status under traditional international law. In the pre-Charter 
period, self-defence was far from being the category with strict limitations as 
we know it today. On the contrary, its content was broad and vague, as a result 
of which it was often barely separable from self-preservation, self-help or 
other lesser categories, such as reprisal, necessity, and even intervention. In 
addition, it could afford a legal basis even for an offensive action, provided 
that the danger triggering the measure was "instant, overwhelming, leaving no 
choice of means, and no moment for deliberation", and the state exercising this 
right "did nothing unreasonable or excessive, since the act, justified by the 
necessity of self-defence, must be limited by that necessity and kept clearly 
within it".64 Under such circumstances, it is no wonder that in some of the 
attribute of sovereignty, that form of w a r becomes at last juridically devoid of what 
constituted its most serious danger-its legitimacy. [•••] Thus shall war as a means of arbitrary 
and selfish action no longer be deemed lawful." Extracts f r o m the speech of Aristide 
Briand, French Minister of Foreign Af fa i r s , to the Plenipotentiaries before Signing the 
Pact for the Renunciation of War, in The Paris Pact (Frank B. Kellogg pref.), 1934. 13-14. 
63
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contemporary treatises humanitarian intervention and self-defence seem to 
have overlapped. 
If the Kellogg-Briand Pact nevertheless outlawed humanitarian intervention, 
a dual regime was established-supposing, of course, that such interventions 
had been legal beforehand. As a consequence, this measure became unlawful 
for parties in their subsequent relations with one another, whereas in the 
relations of parties and non-parties as well as between non-parties, the 
customary law remained in force, whatever its exact content was. 
Conclusion 
Based on the pre-Charter literature, the definition of humanitarian intervention 
valid for the period of traditional international law can be worded as follows: 
dictatorial interference involving the use of force, but not qualifying as war, 
carried out as a last resort and free from selfish motives by one or more civilized 
states against another state in absence of the consent or request thereof, with a 
view to coerce it to cease the grave and widespread violations of fundamental 
freedoms and human rights of its own nationals. Surprising as it may seem, but 
the submitted definition does not contain any referral to the question of legality. 
The reason for that is fairly simple-humanitarian intervention was not a generally 
accepted legal title. 
To be able to draw a clear picture of the lawfulness of intervention on 
grounds of humanity in the pre-Charter era, the coexisting customary law has 
to be examined first. Having taken into account the relevant literature once 
again, it may be found that the teachings of international lawyers did not provide 
a definitive answer; moreover, nearly as many outstanding scholars considered 
humanitarian intervention lawful as those who explicitly rejected it. Similarly 
ambiguous results are reached following the analysis of rights of intervention 
based on treaty stipulations, a possible outlast of legality stemming from the 
doctrine of bellum iustum, the general principles of international law recognized 
by civilized nations, and the so-called lus ad bellum. Furthermore, as war and 
intervention were two separate categories of law, it is also extremely doubtful 
if the provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations, or the Kellogg-
Briand Pact affected the legality, if any, of humanitarian intervention. The 
Treaty of Mutual Guarantee annexed to the Pact of Locamo, however, appears 
to have gone beyond these instruments in this respect, but its restricted scope 
as well as the limited number of its parties considerably decreases its relevance 
for the puiposes of this study. 
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In sum, a definitive conclusion pertaining to the lawfulness or unlawfulness 
of humanitarian intervention can scarcely be drawn. Both extremes are verifiable, 
but neither is absolutely and undoubtedly correct. If I nevertheless had to make 
a judgement on this issue, I would say that the spirit of 19th century inter-
national law stood close rather to the legality than to the illegality of such 
interventions, but this spirit gradually altered during the first half of the 20th 
century. Thus humanitarian intervention could well be presumed lawful in the 
1800s, but this presumption turned to the opposite in the years between the 
two World Wars65: a conclusion which, if correct, has serious implications on 
theories striving to demonstrate the present customary lawfulness of humani-
tarian intervention on the basis of the survival of an alleged traditional right 
thereof. 
65
 "We must, however , admit that the presumption is normally against such action 
and in support of the rule of non-interference in the in ternal affairs of another state." 
Stowell . E.: Humanitar ian intervention. American Journal of International Law 33 
(1939), 734. (Emphasis added.) On the other hand, several authors of the post-Charter 
era have stated that humanitarian intervention had been lawful under traditional 
customary law. Cf. e.g. Glahn, G., von: Law Among Nations: An Introduction to Public 
International Law. 5th edition, New York-London , 1986. 160; International Law 
Associat ion: Report of the Fifty-Fourth Conference. T h e Hague, 1970. 5 9 8 - 9 9 , 611; 
Lill ich, R. В.: Humani tar ian Intervention: A Reply to Ian Brownlie and a Plea for 
Construct ive Alternatives, in Moore, J. N. (ed.): Law and Civil War in the Modern 
World. Bal t imore-London, 1974. 234-35 ; Reisman, W. M. -McDouga l , M. S.: Humani-
tarian Intervention to Protect the Ibos, in Lill ich, R. B. (ed.): Humanitarian Intervention 
and the United Nations. Charlottesville, 1973. 171. 
1216-2574/USD 20.00 
© 2005 Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest 
A C T A J U R I D I C A H U N G A R I C A 
46, Nos 3-4, pp. 249-259 (2005) 
T A M Á S N Ó T Á R I * 
The Scales as the Symbol of Justice in the Iliad 
Abstract. The idiom of the scales of justice is commonly known and widely used. Iustitia 
can frequently be seen in different representations holding scales in her hand. The scales as a 
means or a symbol of justice (justness) or the administration of justice can be encountered in 
various places in Greek literature, one of its earliest instances being the Homeric Hermes ' 
Hymn (Dikés talanta). According to these loci Zeus holds the scales of Dike, that is to say, 
the scales of justice in his hand. In the Iliad (23, 109-213) one may come across a scene 
presented in context, thus suitable for being more amply analysed, in which Zeus is 
pronouncing justice over the heroes using a pair of scales. In search of the meaning of Dikés 
talanta, this study tries to clarify the concept of law and justice (justness) in Homeric epic 
(I.), then by a structural (II.) and comparative analysis (III.) of certain lines of the weighing 
scene, decisive in the combat of Achilles and Hector, it formulates a few remarks on the 
origin and meaning of the concept of the scales of justice. 
One cannot claim that this idea of Egyptian religion had been transferred in its entirety 
into Greek thinking, but it is not surprising, as one can barely encounter an unaltered 
Egyptian borrowing in Greek mythological thinking. Nonetheless, some Egyptian influence, 
possibly with Cretan transmission, can be detected in the development of the Greek versions 
of psykhostasia and kerostasia. Pictorial as well as textual manifestations of such influence 
can be found on the one hand in vase-paintings, and on the other hand-undergoing a specific 
alteration of aspect in the form of kerostasia-in Homer, who paved the way for the scales of 
justice of Zeus and Iuppiter to become the symbol of Diké and Iustitia, and subsequently of 
the administration of justice itself. 
Keywords: scales of justice, dike, Homeric law, kerostasia 
The idiom of the scales of justice is well-known, its use is widely spread, 
Iustitia can frequently be seen with scales in her hand in different represen-
tations.1 The scales as the symbol of just ice and administration of jus t ice 
can be encountered in various places in Greek literature, one of its earliest 
instances can be found in the Homeric Hermes's Hymn (Dikés talanta).' Then, 
to mention only a few examples, this picture can be detected in Bakkhylides,3 
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 Cf. Lange, H.: Die Wörter Aequitas und Iustitia auf römischen Münzen. Zeitschrift 
der Savigny Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichts, Romanistische Abteilung, 60 (1940) 296. sqq. 
~ Rademacher, L.: Der Homerische Hermeshymnus. Wien, 1931. 213. 
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while in Theognis4 Zeus is measuring out richness and poverty with the help of 
a pair of scales. According to these loci Zeus is holding in his hand the scales 
of Diké.7 In the Iliad one can encounter a scene presented in context, thus 
suitable for being more amply analysed, in which Zeus is pronouncing justice 
over the heroes using a pair of scales. Searching for the meaning of Dikes 
talanta this paper will first try to clarify the concept of law and justice as it 
appears in the Homeric epic (I.), then, by the structural (II.) and comparative 
(III.) analysis of some lines of the weighing scene, decisive in the combat of 
Achilles and Hector, some remarks will be made on the origin and meaning of 
the concept of the scales of justice 
I. The word dike is traditionally derived from the root *deik of the verb 
deiknymi (to show, to point at, to explain, to testify); its basic meaning of 
direction, way, custom is completed with the meanings customary procedure, 
decision, resolution, trial, and law.6 (These two meanings, traditonally derived 
from each other are approached from a new aspect by Palmer, according to 
whom the meaning of signalling, custom, characteristic, particularity and the 
meaning decision, resolution, of the word diké, originally the borderline drawn 
between two litigant parties derived from the root *deik, developed parallelly, 
independently from each other so neither of these can be considered secondary, 
derived from the other.7) The primary meaning of the word diké-or in any case 
the one mentioned first-(generally in genitival and adverbial constructions) 
frequently occurs in the Odyssey as a quality, a particularity, a way of be-
haviour characteristic of a given group of people.8 It is also worth scrutinizing 
the other meaning of the word diké, which can be performed together with the 
examination of the verb dikadzein and the adjective dikaspolos 6 In this sense 
diké originally signifies a border or a dividing line, most often dividing two 
plots of land, which constitute the object of two persons' claims of ownership. 
4
 Theogn. 157. 
5
 Aisch. Ag. 250; Pers. 345. sk; Hik. 822. Cf. E. Wüst: Die Seelenwägung in Ägypten 
und Griechenland. Archiv für Religionswissenschaft, 36 (1939) 166. 
6
 Gonda, J.: AEIKNYM1: Semantische Studie over den Indo-Geimanische Wortel DEIK. 
Amsterdam, 1929. 224. sqq.; Gagarin, M.: „Diké" in the „Works and Days". Classical 
Philology, 68 (1973) 82. 
Palmer, L. R.: The Indo-European Origins of Greek Justice. TPhS Oxford, 1950. 
157. sqq. 
8
 Od. 4, 690-692; 11 ,216-218; 14,58-60; 18,274-275; 19,43; 19, 67-70; 24, 254-255. 
4
 Gagarin: „Diké" in the „Works and Days", op. cit. 83. 
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Naturally, this borderline can be either straight or curved,1" the meaning of the 
word dike, determining, dividing the parts of the litigants in a legal process, 
and thus deciding the matter of dispute, possibly developed f rom this fact." If 
they did not want to decide the dispute between two persons over a certain 
issue (over property, or over the blood money to be paid for the murder of a 
relative etc.) by violence (bié) but by way of peaceful decision (dike), but they 
could not reach a solution, which would satisfy both parties they could make 
appeal to an objective third person, who was not interested in the case, to make 
a proposal (dikadzein) for deciding the dispute. They could agree to solve their 
contradiction (dikaspolos) according to the opinion of a single person, or they 
could ask different persons for proposals for decision, and then to end the dispute 
by yielding to the solution most acceptable for both of them. So dike was the 
proposal for decision, at the same time diké was the whole contradictory 
process itself, although the society of the Homeric epoch probably did not 
know the compulsive force to constrain the individual to subject himself to 
diké}1 Two descriptions of such a procedure, in which, as the sources also 
demonstrate it, the oath naturally played an important role as well, can be found 
in Homer: one connected to the argument between Antilochus and Menelaus 
following the chariot race, risen over the primacy and the reward in the contest,11  
the second description of the legal procedure occurs in the description of 
Achilles's shield in the Iliad}4 As it becomes evident especially from the 
second locus the straightest dike does not necessarily have to coincide with 
the claims of either party-which might seem surprising at first sight because 
in the legal cultures based on Roman law a legal process had to end either with 
acquittal or condemnation l 5-because the essence of the Homeric trial most 
probably consisted of finding and implementing the most acceptable compromise 
with the help of the dikai.ib Whenever the verb dikadzein occurs in the active 
in the Iliad and the Odyssey}1 it always means deciding a certain case, its 
medial form dikadzesthai means the dispute, or representing a concrete case in 
10
 Palmer: op. cit. 159. 
" Gagarin: „Diké" in the „Works and Days", op. cit. 83; Gagarin, M.: Diké in the 
Archaic Greek Thought. Classical Philology, 69 (1974) 187. 
12
 Bonner, R. J . -Smith , G.: The Administration of Justice from Homer to Aristotle I. 
Chicago 1930. 46. sqq.; Gagarin: „Diké" in the „Works and Days", op. cit. 83. 
13
 II. 23, 540-554; 566-586. 
14
 II. 18, 497-508 . 
15
 Cf. Földi A . -Hamza G.: A római jog története és institúciói (History and Istitutes of 
Roman Law). Budapest, 2005. 153. 
16
 Gagarin: „Diké" in the „Works and Days", op. cit. 85. 
1 7 I I . 1, 540-543; 8, 427-431; Od. 11, 547. 
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the course of the dispute,18 the expression dikaspolos can be encountered in the 
sense of sentence passing judge.14 The basic interpretation of diké, meaning 
decision is corroborated by the Homeric loci, which designate diké as the 
portion to which somebody is lawfully entitled,20 at the same time, elsewhere it 
designates the legal process itself, the solving of particular contradictions 
peacefully,21 by way of legal disputes, in other places it signifies a whole chain 
of decisions, possibly the legal procedure en généralTwo further loci23 
testify that diké in the singular could mean a lawful procedure, a peaceful 
judgement.24 (As two basic meanings of the word diké are differentiated, this 
can also be done in the case of the adject ive dikaios and the adverb dikaiós, 
in most cases meaning proper conduct, in accordance with custom, or, in the 
negative meaning deviation from accepted behaviour,25 in some cases how-
ever, they designate lawful,2 '1 rule following procedure.27) 
At the same time, Diké as a divine being is Zeus 's daughter as well, thus 
being a so-called Person-Bereich Einheit, partaking of a certain kind of 
abstraction as well. The Person-Bereich thinking was for the ancient man a 
specific way of experiencing things in the course of which he experienced 
some physical reality (an object, a process or a state), and, at the same time, 
he experienced it also as a divine being.2 8 The thing and the divinity was 
designated by the same concept. Sometimes-because antique writing did not 
differentiate between the maiuscula and the minuscula-it causes great difficulty 
in textual tradition to decide whether to write fortuna or Fortuna in a given 
instance. Naturally, either form is preferred, the other is tacitly part of the 
concept and should be taken into account as well. Designating a concept with 
identical words would outwardly suggest juxtaposition, but in fact it shows the 
unity of the person and the field represented or function fulfilled by him or her, 
18
 Od. I I , 543-546: 12, 4 3 7 ^ 4 1 . 
14
 II. 1, 232-239 ; Od. Il, 184-187. 
20
 II. 19, 179-180. 
21
 II. 16, 541-543; Od. I l , 568-571. 
22
 Od. 3, 244. 242-245. 
2 3 / / . 16, 384-388; Od. 14, 83-84. 
~
4
 Gagarin: „Diké" in the „Works and Days" , op. cit. 85-86. 
25
 Od. 3, 52. 133; 14, 90; 18, 275; 18, 414 = 20, 322; 6, 120 = 8, 575 = 9, 175 = 13, 
201; 20, 294 = 21 ,312 . 
26
 II. 11, 832; 13,6; 19, 181. 
27
 Cf. Gagarin: „Diké" in the „Works and Days", op. cit. 86; Gagarin: Diké in the 
Archaic. . . op. cit. 188. 
28
 Pötscher, W.: Person-Bereichdenken und Personifikation. Literatur-Wissenschaft-
liches Jahrbuch. 19(1978) 229. 
SCALES AS THE SYMBOL OF JUSTICE IN THE ILIAD 253 
in which one or the other aspect comes to the fore.24 (It is problematic though, 
to what extent can the cult be considered a crucial proof of the fact that the 
given divinity was also experienced as a person, or, more precisely the lack of 
a cult does not prove that the personal component was missing f rom the given 
divinity. It is a widespread opinion that if a god did not have a cult, it is only 
an impersonal power, mana, thus belonging not so much to the religious 
sphere but rather to the magical one.30 Undoubtedly, the widespread cult with 
prayers, sacrifices, clergy and temples is a definite proof of a personal god-
image. However, the cult is not the only possible fo rm of expressing religious 
veneration and it is a question whether there was any need to consecrate separate 
temples for the gods who were experienced spectacularly and with intensive 
emotions. At the same time, in the case of certain gods, who were experienced 
by the Greeks and Romans as Person-Bereich Einheit, the cult was considerably 
widespread, e.g Zeus, who had been originally the Indo-European God of Sky 
and Rain, or the river Tiber-with the cultic name Tiberinus-or Ares.31) 
II. In the following I would like to expound briefly on the development of 
Greek soul-weighing in order to highlight the importance of scales in the 
course of the legal process. The dramatic climax of the twenty-second song of 
the Iliad is the description of Hector 's death. The heroes Achilles and Hector, 
preparing for the final combat have already gone round the Greek camp three 
times, then, when they reach the well for the fourth time, the following 
happens before the final combat ending in Hector's death takes place: 
Kai TOTE Sr) xphacia латцр ihirat VE тАХашта, 
éru Sè TÍOEI Svo tctjpE TavtpXcycoaj Oavároio, 
TI]V/uèv AxiXXrjom, TI)V8' "Екторош ínnoSápoto, 
ЁХке Sèpéaaa Xaßa'tw реле S' 'Екторош aïaipov fjpap, 
(pxeroS'eim 'AiSao Xínev Se é <Potßom 'AnôXXwvè1 
The scene is completely picture-like and unambiguous, it is only the dyo kére, 
measured by Zeus, i.e. the expression two kére that needs fu ther explana-
24
 Pötscher, W.: Das Person-Bereichdenken in der frühgriechischen Periode. Wiener 
Studien, 72 (1959) 24. 
10
 Pötscher: Das Person-Bereichdenken. . . op. cit. 26. 
11
 Pötscher: Person-Bereichdenken und Personifikation, op. cit. 219. 
32
 //. 22, 209-213. 
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tion. The view according to which kér would only mean dead soul, was 
categorically refuted by Malten. Malten, deriving kér from kéroion, calls it a 
harmful spirit, a malefic demon {Schadegeist).44 He does not connect it directly 
with the human soul, but he regards it as a general destructive force that can 
manifest itself in the form of a god, a human or an animal,35 according to the 
given situation.36 Similarly, the opinion according to which the kér would be 
only the synonim for human soul, psykhé is untenable, because comparing 
the description with pictorial representations to be discussed later, one can see 
that when in the vase-pictures Zeus is measuring the little figures representing 
the souls (psykhai) with the scales, the result of the measuring is contrary to 
the one known f rom the Iliad, namely the scale pan with the winner's soul 
descends and the one with the loser 's soul ascends.37 The idea that Zeus would 
measure malefic gods or harmful demons with the scales is likewise to be 
discarded, because although this meaning of Kére can be found elsewhere,38 
the deities are always powerful beings,34 so it would seem absurd to measure 
their ability to destroy a man or a héros.4" I think that we can find a plausible 
explanation for the conceptual pair Kér/kér in the idea of Person-Bereich Einheit. 
How is the Person-Bereich Einheit represented in this case? The Kér/kér means 
at the same time a destructive, harmful god (godess) as its personal component 
and it also includes its material aspects, i. e. a mortal force or energy. The 
human soul attacked by the deity Kér, also became kér, a substance permeated 
by destructive power, infected by corruption. So Zeus, in the course of the 
kerostasia, is placing onto the scales the souls who became possessed by Kér, 
and thus were transformed into kér themselves.41 
The kerostasia found in Homer-ultimately the weighing of souls transformed 
into kér-is based on a much earlier belief about soul-measuring, which becomes 
evident from the following. We have knowledge of a tragedy by Aeschylus 
entitled Psykhostasia and we have numerous vase-pictures on which we can 
see Zeus and Hermes placing souls onto scales. The Homeric epic gives a vivid 
33
 Roscher, W. H.: Ausführliches Lexikon der griechischen und römischen Mythologie 
II. Leipzig, 1884-1937. 1136. sqq. 
34
 Malten, L.: Ker. RE Suppl. 4. 883. sqq. 
35
 II. 18, 115=22, 365; IL 2, 352; 5, 652.= 11, 443; IL 3, 6. 
36
 Dietrich, B. C.: The Judgement of Zeus. Rheinisches Museum, 1964. 103. sqq. 
37
 Pötscher, W.: Schicksalswägungen. Kairos, 15 (1973) 61. 
3 8 / / . 12,326. 
39
 //. 18,534. 
40
 Pötscher: Schicksalswägungen. op. cit. 61. 
41
 Pötscher, W.: Moira, Themis und timé im homerischen Denken. Wiener Studien, 73 
(1960) 15. sqq. 
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description of the ideas that the ancient Greeks had of the human soul. The 
Odyssey calls the dead amenéna karéna 2 because they lack menos, the vitality 
characteristic of the living. The souls of the dead are flying about like bats,42 
they cannot be touched, just like shadows or dreams,44 and the psykhé is flying 
away like a bird.45 Archeological findings also corroborate this. The more ancient 
vase-paintings using black figures represent the human soul almost exclusively 
as a little winged figure, or, in some cases, without a wing.46 T h e transfor-
mation of kerostasia into psykhostasia only indicates the changing of the 
aspect of measuring. While in the course of psykhostasia it is the scale pan of 
the soul possessing more menos, thus being more powerful, more vital that 
descends and the scale pan of the loser, the weaker part ascends, in kerostasia 
this happens the other way round, because the soul penetrated with kér to a 
greater extent possesses less menos, it is precisely the lack of vital power that 
signifies the power and greatness of the destructive force (or, to use psycho-
logical terms, it shows how the death instinct overpowers the life instinct). The 
fact that the scale pan containing the soul condemned to die descends is also 
explained by the localization of Hades, the underworld.47 
In order to render the idea complete-and hopefully to c lear up some 
misbeliefs-here I would like to make some remarks on the role of Fate in 
Homeric thinking. Moira means part, share4 -Nielsson observes that the 
essence of the concept is given by the translation portion {Portion), because in 
time the concepts part (Teil) and share (Anteil) became somewhat abstract, 
though in the beginning they did not possess such abstract meaning. This is 
also shown by the loci of the Iliad and the Odyssey,4' where moira appears 
with the following meanings among others: a part of a god's rule over the 
world,50 a given period of time,51 the share received from the prey,52 a portion 
42
 Od. 10, 521. 
43
 Od. 24, 5. sqq. 
44
 Od. 11,205. 
45
 II. 16, 8 5 6 ; 2 2 , 3 6 2 . 
46
 Nielsson, M. P.: Geschichte der griechischen Religion I. München, 1968. 196; 
Waser, O.: Über die äussere Erscheinung der Seele in den Vorstellungen der Völker zumal 
der alten Griechen. Archiv für Religionswissenschaft, 16 (1913) 
47
 Pötscher: Schicksalswägungen. op. cit. 62. 
48
 Nielsson: op. cit. 362. 
49
 Eberling, H.: Lexicon Homericiim 1-11. Hildesheim, 1963. I. 1113. sqq. 
50
 IL 15, 195. 
51
 II. 10, 253. 
52
 II. 9, 318. 
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at a meal,52 or in the plural it can signify pieces of meat.54 The idea of Fate 
originates in the concrete share of luck (Lebensglück), one person 's moira is 
in close connection with that of another person, therefore the moira did not 
become an abstract concept of destiny. Fate, designated with moira is often 
represented as a person or persons, these are the godesses of Fate, the Moirai. 
Instead of personification it seems more adequate to regard this phenomenon 
as a Person-Bereich Einheit. The Moira/moira is also one of the concepts in 
which the personal and the physical spheres constitute an indivisible unity.55 
Although-as we could see-the presence or absence of the cult does not prove 
the lack of the personal component of the deity, in the case of Moira/moira the 
existence of the cult is proved.56 The number of Moirai is three, which 
originally only meant that several Moirai existed in Greek religious thinking, 
as in a more ancient stage of the Greek language the smallest number that 
could stand in plural, (plurális) was three due to the fact that in the respective 
period the language was aware of the dual (dualis) .5 7 Later, fol lowing the 
pattern of other divine trinities, their number was f ixed in three, and the role 
of each person (Klóthó, Lakhesis, Atrópos) came to be precisely determined. 
However, the relationship of the moira and Zeus as well as the moira and other 
gods is more essential and also causing more debate. The views appearing in 
the literature of the subject can be classified in three main groups: While one 
group is placing the moira below Zeus and the other above him, the represen-
tatives of the third group maintain that posing the question of subordination 
and superiority is not in accordance with Greek religious thinking. In their view 
the moira is a heterogeneous concept, perfectly separable from the gods, and 
the fact that the Moirai are godesses themselves did not cause disturbance in 
the Greek mythological world, which was completely lacking a logically 
constructed theological or dogmatic system.58 The gods guarantee order, so 
their role is more active than that of the moira, yet the moira is also a part of 
the order sustained by the gods. Thus in one sense Zeus and the gods stand above 
the moira, because they implement it, but in another respect the Moira/moira 
stands above the gods because it expresses the order that must be implemented 
by the gods. 
53
 Od. 3, 66; 8, 470; 14, 448. 
54
 Od. 20. 260. 
55
 Pötscher: Moira, Themis und timé i m . . . op. cit 103. 
56
 Roscher: op. cit. 3089. sqq. 
17
 Kühner, R.-Blass, F.-Gerth, В.: Ausführliche Grammatik der griechischen Sprache 
/ - / / . Hannover, 1890-1904. 1. 362. 
58
 Nielsson: op. cit. I. 364. 
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III. The vase-pictures representing soul-weighing deserve more attention, in 
these it is Hermes who regularly places the souls of the two heroes Achilles and 
Memnón onto the scales.59 (In some representations Zeus is also present but it is 
not him who performs the weighing. The two heroes can unquestionably be 
identified as Achilles and Memnón because their mothers Thetis and Eos are 
present in order to influence with their prayers the outcome of the weighing 
meant to decide the result of the combat.) The Aeschylean Psykhostasia 
mentioned before also deals with the combat between Achilles and Memnón, 
ending with the former ' s victory,60 but here the scales are not in Hermes ' s but in 
Zeus 's hands.61 If we take a quick glance at the Egyptian sources we can easily 
find similarities and analogies between Greek and Egyptian psykhostasia. 
The most mature and most precise description of Egyptian soul-measuring 
can be found in Chapter 125 of the Book of the Dead written in the time of the 
XVIII. dynasty (16th—15th century ВС.).62 According to this the other wordly 
judging-and the soul-measuring, constituting the object of the present analysis 
as part of this-was performed in the following way. Osiris sat on a throne in a 
huge hall, the hall of the two Maat-s,63 which was roofed by f l ames and the 
signs of Justice, in front of him were standing Anubis and the Homs-sons , and 
a beast combining the features of a crocodile, a lion, and a hippopotamus in his 
appearance, which had the task of devouring the defendant eventual ly found 
guilty in the verdict. The forty-two judges appointed by Osiris were sitting in the 
back of the hall (their number symbolising the number of the districts of Egypt), 
the scales on which the dead person 's heart was to be placed stood in the front 
part of the hall. The Godess of Justice (Maat) received the deceased person 
coming into the hall, whose heart was placed by Horus and Annubis in one of 
the scale-pans-while a feather or an eye was placed in the other (both being 
the symbols of maat ) - , then they weighed it to see whether it was lighter than 
justice. If the pointer did not move, the weighing was considered succesful, 
whereas if the pan containing the dead person's heart ascended, the beast 
devoured the culprit. The result of the weighing was noted down by Thot, the 
divine scribe, who later told it to Osiris. The dead person stepping into the hall 
made a negative confession, i.e. he denied commit ing the sins connected to 
the forty-two judges, offending the ethical codex of the Egyptians, and then 
34
 Roscher: op. cit. II. 1142. sq.; Wüst : op. cit. 164. sqq. 
60
 Wüst: op. cit. 165. 
61
 Plut. aud. poet. 17a 
62
 Erman, A.: Die ägyptische Religion. Berlin, 1909. 101. sqq.; Spiegel, J.: Die Idee 
vom Totengericht in der ägyptischen Religion. Glückstadt, 1935. 
63
 Morenz, S.: Ägyptische Religion. Stuttgart, 1960. 117. sqq. 
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enumerated the names of the judges.6 4 (During the confession the deceased 
person wishing to clear himself had to name and to greet the judge connected 
to the respective deed. So, for example he had to state that he did not commit 
injustice, robbery, he did not use force against anyone, did not steal, did not 
kill, and did not instigate anyone to do so. He did not cause damage to the 
temple or the gods, did not take away anything unlawfully from the sacrifices 
destined for them, did not commit adultery, did not fornicate, did not falsify 
the measuring device of grain, did not violate the borders of someone else's 
land, did not commit false measuring, etc. Naming these circumstances reveals 
a great deal about the ideas of the Egyptians about the maat-which can be 
parallelled from a structural point of view with the Greek themis or diké.) 
Let us consider now the paralells between the Egyptian Book of the Dead 
and the Greek vase-paintings (disregarding for the moment the fact that scales 
are used in both cases)!67 Both Thot and Hermes fulfil l in mythology the role 
of psykhopompos, the guide of souls in the underworld, both of them are so-
called literate gods, at the soul-weighing they are either performing the act or 
playing the role of the scribe. At the process both Osiris and Zeus are present 
as principal gods. It is hardly by accident that both in the vase-pictures and in 
Aeschylus Achilles is confronting Memnón, king of Aithiopia whose homeland 
was believed by Homer to be South-East from the Greeks. Presumably, the 
Greeks originally appropriated the idea of soul-weighing for Achilles 's combat 
with a hero whose homeland was thought to be close to the place where this 
belief had originated, and later-after integrating these elements into their own 
religious world-picture-they used it more freely and with a wider scope.66 
The fact that the symbolism of the scales of justice reached the islands of the 
Aegeian Sea very early, in the years 1500-1200 ВС., is proved by archeo-
logical discoveries as well. In a Mycenean grave-excavated by Schliemann-in 
which two women lay buried along with their babies, they found two golden 
scales in good condition. A butterfly can be seen on the upper part of each of 
their pans. Although many experts67 wished to consider these f indings only 
articles of personal use, it is probably not over-hasty to draw some further 
conclusions from the symbolism of the scales.68 As it was mentioned per 
tangentem before, the human soul was often represented by the ancient Greeks 
64
 Budge, E. A. W. : Egyptian Religion-Egyptian Ideas of the Future Life. London, 
1979. 130. sqq. 
65
 Wüst: op. cit. 167. sqq. 
66
 Wüst: op. cit. 168. 
77
 E.g. Fimmen, D.: Die kretisch-mykenische Kultur. 1924. 124; Wüst: op. cit. 167. 
68
 Diertich: op. cit. 121. 
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as a winged figure. It is not only at the Greeks, but also at the Germans and the 
Albanians that the so-called soul butterfly picture can be encountered.64 On a 
vase found in the Cyprian Encomy, dating from around 1300 ВС. according to 
Nielsson, two men are represented, who are standing on a chariot, facing 
another man holding a pair of scales, presumably Zeus.70 
With all these I naturally do not wish to mingle the Egyptian psykhostasia 
with the Greek one, as the differences between them are obvious. In Egypt the 
soul of every deceased person is placed on the scales of justice, the Greeks do 
so only with the souls of a few exceptional heroes, preparing to fight one another, 
and this happens while they are still alive. The Egyptian idea carries a moral 
content, whereas the Greek one decides and approves the-possibly morally 
justifiable-outcome of the fight.71 It seems worth taking a quick glance at the 
transformations and changes of aspect through which the kerostasia of the 
Iliad reached Roman literature. The most typical example for this can be found 
in the twelveth song of Virgil's Aeneid where the final combat between Aeneas 
and Turnus is described: "Iuppiter ipse duas aequato examine lances / sustinet 
et fata imponit diversa duorum, / quem damnet labor et quovergat pondéré 
letum. "72 The fata of the two persons are placed onto the scale-pans and 
whereas in Homer the reader is informed about the result of the weighing, in 
Virgil we can infer that the outcome was favourable for Aeneas only from the 
events on earth. 
So we cannot claim that this idea of Egyptian religion would have completely 
been transported into Greek thinking but this is not strange, as we cannot 
73 
encounter any unaltered Egyptian borrowing in Greek mythological thinking. 
At the same time, some Egyptian influence-possibly with Cretan transmission-
can be detected in the development of the Greek version of psykhostasia. 
The pictorial, as well as the textual proof/manifestation of this influence can be 
found on the one hand in vase-paintings, on the other hand-undergoing a specific 
alteration of aspect, in the form of kerostasia-it can be found in Homer, from 
whom directly leading to Zeus's and Iuppiter's scales of justice becoming the 
symbol of Diké and lustitia, and then the symbol of the administration of 
justice itself. 
6
" Waser: op. cit. 337. sqq. 
70
 Nielsson, M. P.: Homer and Mycenae. London, 1933. 267. sqq. 
71
 Cf. Malten, L.: Elysion und Radamanthys. Archäologisches Jahrbuch, 38 (1913) 35. 
sqq. 
72
 Verg. Aen. 12, 725-727 . 
73
 Dietrich: op. cit. 114. sqq. 
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Abstract. In this essay is analysed the conceptual relation between the common commercial 
policy (CCP) of the European Union and the Hungarian foreign trade law, illustrating the 
dynamic extension of the CCP and the character of the competences in this field. Moreover 
the reader can get an insight into the so-called "rest competences" of the member states. In 
consequence of the nature and logic of the CCP was induced the mostly deregulatory 
modifications in the Hungarian legal order and the functional alteration of the foreign trade 
administration of Hungary. The author highlights this complex question consisting of the 
required modifications of the international conventional engagements and the harmonisation of 
Hungarian foreign trade material and procedural law in relation to the accession. He comes to 
conclusion that Hungarian accession to the EU might even be advantageous and it opens up a 
new prospect. Therefore the Hungarian foreign trade administration and diplomacy have to 
recognise the opportunity within the framework of the decision-making procedures of the 
Community as an initiative canalizing and enforcing the interests of the Hungarian producers 
and other market participants in all cases, when any kind of intervention is necessary in the 
relation of the third states. 
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1. Introduction 
The interactions between states of the 'global world market ' are most l ikely 
to become more difficult and manifold in the next decade. However, among 
these t ies-which result in a stronger inter-dependence between countries-the 
interactions of external economy, especially the foreign trade interactions 
remain determinative presumably. Therefore it can be expected that the 
normative system regulating foreign trade processes should also be modified, 
in accordance with the conditions of the 'new world order' and the new needs. 
In case we would like to consider this topic f rom the aspect of the new EU 25: 
the starting point of the disquisition is the common commercial policy (CCP) 
Junior research fellow, Inst i tute for Legal Studies of the Hungar ian Academy of 
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and its normative base, Art. 133 of the Treaty establishing the European 
Community (TEC), but we try to concentrate on the specific segment of this 
problem. In the following will be introduced those questions, how can be 
implemented the common commercial policy from Hungarian point of view, 
particularly the necessary changes of legal framework of the Hungarian foreign 
trade after the EU's enlargement. 
2. The Functional Alteration of the Hungarian Foreign Trade 
Administration 
In relation to our accession to the EU, it is the transformation of the Hungarian 
foreign trade law, the effect of which was rather considerable already on the 
day when the Accession Treaty entered into force. The logic of the Hungarian 
Act III of 1974 On Foreign Trade was irreconcilable with our EU accession, 
since the common commercial policy requires an absolutely different activities 
by the national foreign trade administration and a different functioning of the 
foreign trade law itself. The new function is nothing else but the requirement 
of the application of the acquis commtnautaire. This means that by the day of 
the accession, the national foreign trade administration had to be transformed 
to be appropriate for the efficient implementation of Community law instru-
ments of the customs union and common commercial policy. From that date 
on, the Hungarian foreign trade administration is allowed to take autonomous 
measures only within a narrow compass, similarly to the administration of the 
other member states.1 
From this point of view, this change can be said to be outstanding. It is 
sufficient to think over that our export into other EU member states, and the 
import from those states-which forms a considerable part of the commerce 
crossing our borders-today, in reality, does not come under the ruling of the 
foreign trade law which is subordinated to the new function, but falls within 
the uniform internal market regulation. As a practical illustration of this 
function alteration, we can refer to the reformed Hungarian institutional system 
of customs authorities, the function of which is increasingly resembles a 
market-like service organisation, taking into consideration that the customs 
clearance of the import crossing the customs frontier of the EU can occur in 
any member state according to the general rules, but the state of the authority 
1
 See below: the possibility of derogation is only permitted in certain cases: usually in 
relation with special group of products (e.g. commerce of war supplies), or in special 
circumstances (e.g. crisis, natural catastrophe). 
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who executes the clearance is allowed to keep a certain proportion of the 
customs revenues.2 In a figurative meaning, the Hungarian customs authorities 
lost their 'monopoly', that is why, if the Hungarian budget intends to claim the 
above mentioned revenues, it has to establish and operate an administration 
system which-in relation to the authorities of the other states-can be considered 
as competitive.3 
3. The Cornerstone of the CCP: Exclusive Competence on the 
Art. 133 TEC 
Art. 133 of TEC contains general guidelines for the CCP, in fact it is the 
external trade policy of the European Union towards third countries. Or in an 
other approach: it is the external side of the economic and social policy of the 
European Union.4 The opinion of the European Court of Justice confirmed that 
CCP holds exclusive competence as regards trade in goods, but specified that 
member states and the Union share joint competence to deal with trade that 
does not involve goods.5 This 'exclusiveness'6 also includes the competence of 
2
 75% of the customs revenues will be the part of the EU budget, the member state is 
allowed to keep 25% in its own budget, but only to finance the maintanance of the customs 
admistrative system. The previous calculations expect a 60 billion Forint fall in revenue a 
year, http://www.vaminfo.hu/Art.s/vamunio.php (17/05/2005). 
3
 That is why it is unquestionable, that in the early days of the accession, the crashing 
of the domestic informatic customs management system did not inspire confidence. How-
ever, we can add that this is the way how the aspiration, which covers that customs 
clearance of import that enters the EU f rom the Far-Eastern markets should be executed by 
the Hungarian authorities and later they want to reach the receiving markets of the other 
states f rom Hungary as a regional logistic distribution centre, gets into the center e.g. of the 
Hungarian foreign trade diplomacy. 
4
 Ipsen, H. P.: Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht. Tiibingen, 1972. 815. 
5
 ECJ Opinion, No. 1/94, World Trade Organization, [1994] European Court Reports 
1-5267. See Pescatore, P.: Opinion 1/94 on Conclusion of the WTO Agreement: is there an 
escape f rom a programmed disaster? Common Market Law Review, 1999. 387-405 . 
6
 Generally for the EU ' s competences in the CCP see: Cremona, M.: Policy of Bits and 
Pieces? The Common Commercial Policy After Nice. Cambridge Yearbook of European 
Legal Studies, Vol. 4., 2001. 61-91., Griller, S.-Gamharter, K.: External Trade: Is There a 
Path Through the Maze of Competences? In: Griller, S . -Weidel , В.: External Economic 
Relations and Foreign Policy in the European Union. Vienna-New York, 2002. 66-111., 
Herrmann, Ch. W.: Common Commercial Policy after Nice: Sisyphus Would Have Done a 
Better Job. Common Market Law Review, 2002. 7 -29 . , Krenzler, H. G.-Pitschas, Ch.: 
Progress or Stagnation?: The Common Commercial Policy After Nice. E F A R , 2001. 291 -
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the European Union in relation to GATT/WTO.7 At this point, we can refer 
furthermore to the view formed after the Opinion No. 1/94 of the European 
Court of Justice, according to which the exclusive competence of the commercial 
policy only refers to the traditional area of regulations of the CCP, to the ones 
affecting trade. In the new fields of the ССР-such as trade of services-that 
gained increasing importance in the last decade of the previous century, the CCP 
has no exclusive competence. This idea has been transplanted into the primary 
law by the Amsterdam and Nice amendments of the founding treaties. 
Art. 133 (1) TEC lists several areas in which the CCP of the EU is to be 
applied, but this enumeration is non-exhaustive, i.e. intended only as illustrative 
and not as limitative.8 Regardless of the discussion on the substance of the CCP, 
two advising remarks concerning the list of commercial areas in Art. 133 (1) are 
justified. Firstly, the list clearly indicates that the EU derives its powers to take 
both autonomous (change of tariff rates and measures to protect trade) and 
conventional (conclusion of tariff and trade agreements) measures to implement 
its commercial policy from Art. 133. Secondly, changes in tariff rates must 
necessarily be made in accordance with the Treaty's Part 3, Title 1, Chapter 1, 
entitled 'The Customs Union', which again has to be enacted consistently with 
WTO provisions and international agreements concluded by the Union. 
The norm groups related to the CCP can be categorised as follows: (a) single 
import system, (b) single dxport system, and (c) system of international trade 
agreements. Essentially, the following comments can be made on these categories. 
a) It is a common-supposedly constant-experience that states try to provide 
the possible greatest protection for their own producers. This is true for the 
European Union, as well; the obvious methods are to regulate the import and 
to apply different safeguards to limit the competence of the foreign partner 
states on the market, and in consequence of this the majority of restrictions 
regards the relations of import. However, as time passed by, it was realised that 
the excessive import protection, the protectionism has negative consequences 
313., Neframi, E.: La politique Commerciale Commune selon le Traité de Nice. Cahiers de 
Droit Européen, 2001. 605-646 . The art of the CCP's exclusiveness has been pointed out 
also in the Hungarian literature, see Horváthy, В.: A kereskedelempolitika dinamikus értel-
mezése a közösségi jogban [The Dinamic Interpretation of the Commercial Policy in the 
Community Law]. Jogtudományi Közlöny, 2004/10. 
7
 „The Community has assumed the powers previously exercised by the Member States 
in the area governed by the General Agreement GATT' C-21 and 24/72 International Fruit 
Company v. Produktschap voor Groenten en Fruit, [1972] European Court Reports, 1219 
at para. 18. 
8
 See Opinion No. 1/78, International Agreement on Rubber, [1979] European Court 
Reports, 2871. 
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for all states and induces slower economic growth. Therefore, an international 
regulation (GATT) on import protection has been established, which is an 
international field of force with a significant impact on the import regime 
of the European Union, as well. Its regulation frame is changing, which is 
necessarily going to bear upon the refted regulation of EC Law. Hence it is 
also necessary to examine the related international law frames, by showing the 
Community regulations on customs, the system of administrative barriers, and 
the normative frames of the trade safeguards. 
More concretely, the most important type of measures in this category 
concerns the EU's Community Customs Code and Common Tariffs (CCT). The 
cornerstones are the Regulation on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and 
on the Common Customs Tariff,9 the Regulation establishing the Community 
Customs Code,10and the Regulation on its provisions for the implementation," 
completed with many regulations and directives which previously govern 
customs procedure and other administrative aspects of customs law. The other 
set of rules deals with the autonomous protective measures of the EU against 
the import arising from third countries causing damages to Community actors12 
or/and against unfair trade practices.13 
b) Increasing export is one of the main objectives of trade policy, there-
fore-unlike in the case of import-not the confinement, but the incentive is the 
most common ambition. Regarding the amount of relevant regulations within 
Community Law, there are significantly less regulations on export system than 
on e.g. the import regime. Most of the regulations relate to incentives: especially 
the topic of the subventions is of great significance, which is also well regulated 
9
 Council 2658/87/EEC Regulation of 23 July 1987 on the tar i f f and statistical 
nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff, and see also: Commission 1359/95/EC 
Regulation of 13 June 1995 amending Annexes I and II to Council Regulation (EEC) N o 
2658/87 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff, and 
repealing Regulation (EEC) No 802/80. 
10
 Council 2913/92/EEC Regulation of 12 October 1992 establishing the Community 
Customs Code. 
" Commission 2454/93/EEC Regulation of 2 July 1993 laying down provisions for the 
implementation of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 establishing the Community 
Customs Code. 
12
 See Art. 16 et seqq. of the Council 3285/94/EC regulation of 22 December 1994 on 
the common rules for imports and repealing Regulation (EC) No 518/94. 
13
 Council 384/96/EC regulation of 22 December 1995 on prohibition against dumped 
imports from countries not members of the European Community; Council 2026/97/EC 
regulation of 6 October 1997 on protection against subsidized imports f rom countries not 
members of the European Community. 
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by the international law within our scope.14 Still, there are regulations for the 
export confinement (e.g. regulation on the dual use products) but only with 
smaller significance. 
c) Numerous trade agreements in different commercial subjects and with 
various parties settled around the world were concluded by the European Union.15 
In the literature, the authors have come up with numerous systematizations 
and classifications of the EU's trade agreements. On the basis of the so-called 
'concentric circles theory'16 four types of the agreements can be distinguished: 
the innermost circle consist of the Agreement on thd European Economic 
Area, the second one of the European Agreements, thirdly the development 
associations17 can be mentioned, and the last circle comprises diverse forms of 
trade and co-operation agreements with countries in the Americas, Asia, Far-
East etc.18 
It has to be added that between the first and second circles the agreement 
on EU-Turkey relations must be mentioned which was in fact, based originally 
on a 'European Agreement', but today, extending this agreement, it already 
means a legal ground establishing the single bilateral customs union relation of 
the EU with third country. Stressing the importance of this fact, the EU-Turkey 
customs union consequently implies more than a normal European Agreement 
(second circle). 
14
 See above: in the import regime mentioned antisubvention action means the inverse 
measure of this. Viz. in a given case, against the E U ' s not allowed subvention can be applied 
antisubvention measure by a third country on the conditions of the import regulations of 
the country concerned. 
15
 For the whole system of trade agreements see: Directory of Community legislation in 
force Chapter 11.: Externa! relations. The document is accessible on the fol lowing page: 
http://www.europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/en/report/index_l l.htm 
16
 The theory was worked out by Verloren van Themaat former ECJ 's Advocate 
General. See: Kapteyn, P. J. G.-Verloren van Themaat , P: Introduction to the Law ot the 
European Communities. L o n d o n - T h e Hague-Boston , 1998. 3rd ed. 1328 et seq. The system 
of trade E U ' s agreements was summerized in the Hungarian literature by Balázs Péter first 
member of Republic Hungary in the Commis ion , see Balázs, P.: Az Európai Unió 
külpolitikája és a magyar-EU kapcsolatok fejlődése [The E U ' s Foreign Policy and the 
Evolution of the Relation EU-Hungary] Budapest , 2002. 
17
 A traditionally important part of the external relations of the European Union is the 
support provided for the developing countries. The evolvement of the common develop-
ment policy has been supported by the tendencies appearing f rom the 60s and by the 
increasing role of the developing countries. E lements of the EC-law, like GSP system, the 
former Lomé Convention and the its successional Cotonou Agreement (see below at para. 
6.2.a.) should be mentioned in this scope. 
18
 Ibid. 
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Finally, it is to be remarked that the second circle naturally also embraces 
the latest forms of the association agreements concluded in the preceding years 
which intend to set up in many cases not only the free trade between the EU 
and the country concerned but the fulfilling other objects as well (to stabilize 
an democratic political system, e.g. in the so called Stabilisation and Asso-
ciation Agreements14). 
4. Residual Competences of the Member States Relating to CCP 
4.1 It also appears that the above-mentioned function alteration can be derived 
from the exclusive character of the common commercial policy. This means 
that the exclusiveness of the commercial policy competences results in the fact 
that national authorities that possessed competence before the accession are 
deprived of their right to determine the framework of commercial policy and 
to issue measures after our accession. Naturally, this can be perceived in a way 
that this is the price of our accession to the customs union and the single market. 
Not to speak of the fact, that a considerable part of the commercial policy 
instruments - e.g. the commercial defensive measures - were applied by 
Hungary with low efficiency,20 this way the fact that the determination of 
commercial policy was transferred onto the level of a more active participant, 
namely the EU, might provide an essentially greater security for the Hungarian 
market. 
4.2 In the case of member states, the remaining competences only mean 
implementing authorities and, in a rather narrow circle, certain regulative 
'residual competences', as well. The commercial policy competences that can 
be exercised on the level of member states are the following: 
a) Originally in practice, and later in the parallel competence cases, proposed 
in the Opinion No. 1/94 of the ECJ. These cases, after the amendment of the 
19
 See Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communit ies 
and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Croatia, of the other part . 
Official Journal, L 026 28/01/2005. 1., Stabilisation and Association Agreement between 
the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the fo rmer 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, of the other part. Official Journal, L 084 20/03/2004. 13. 
20
 Since 1994 for instance there has been no example of any antidumping duty. As a 
reason for this, we can mention that in the multilateral global commercial scope, the ability 
of our country to enforce interest is rather insignificant. Otherwise, in certain cases, the 
compensation of the applied market protection measures or the retorsion imposed against it 
would have struck the domestic producers with serious consequences. 
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TEC are defined by the primary law. In these fields, the internal competences 
of the member states are established; e.g. in the subjects concerning the trade 
of certain services; 
b) The transposition into the national law of the rules of EC Law referring 
to this field, (if it is necessary); 
c) The fulfilment of obligations under EC law, e.g. determining the amount 
of the customs bond, or the establishment of the institutional framework 
(operation of customs authorities, etc.); 
d) Taking measures, referring to the third countries, if EC Law makes it 
possible, and if the measure is not under the effect of Art. 133; 
e) Similarly to delegation, the member states had the opportunity to 
maintain those commercial agreements that had been concluded in the 
transition period, namely before 1 January, 1970. For the prolongation of these 
agreements the delegation of the community is necessary in each case.21 This 
delegation is bound to the condition that the relationship of the member state 
maintained with the third country does not contravene the CCP; 
/ ) The so-called actio pro communitate, when the Community is unable to 
exercise its otherwise exclusive competence because of some sort of objective 
reasons (usually in the field of international law)22 and therefore in fact the 
member states stand up in the name of the Community; 
g) The determination of the import and export of arms, munitions and war 
equipment, if the applied measures do not have a negative effect on the 
competition within the common market in view of the products that are not 
explicitly for military goals (Art. 296 of the EC Treaty); 
h) The member states are allowed to apply temporary measures extensively 
in order to maintain the public order (e.g. in the case of war), this way they can 
deviate f rom the CCP - in principle, these measures might also affect the 
common market disadvantageously, if a member state can secure acceptance of 
21
 See Council 2001/855/EC Decision of 15 November 2001 authorising the automatic 
renewal or continuation in force of provisions governing matters covered by the common 
commercial pol icy contained in the fr iendship, trade and navigat ion treaties and trade 
agreements concluded be tween Member States and third countr ies . Official Journal, 
L320 05/12/2001 13. 
22
 As a historical example one may recall the special contact established between the 
EC and the Eastern-European-former 'Soviet Bloc ' -countr ies: because refusing the E C ' s 
legal personality by these countr ies in the 1970s, the technical agreements on field of the 
commercial policy were concluded between the country concerned and the member states 
(and not the EC) . Id est the exclusiveness of the competence apparently was in f r inged , 
but it was absolute necessary to arrive at an agreement . Kapteyn: op. cit. 1323. 
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these measures during the consultations with the other member states (Art. 297 
TEC); 
i) The literature22 mentions in this sphere measures that can be applied 
against other member states which are made possible by Art. 28 TEC. The 
measures issued in accordance with the legal interests based on the Art. 30 TEC 
and which do not require harmonisation,24 are valid to third countries, as well.25 
The above-mentioned cases do not mean that in the listed spheres the 
member states are able to maintain their regulative authority unconditionally, 
since each and every exception requires the individual delegation or the 
contribution of the Community,26 or in special cases the rest of the member 
states have the right to appeal against the measure of the member state at to the 
European Court of Justice.27 
However, the question is whether the residual competences can be consti-
tutive or their executive character only empowers them with declarative 
characteristics? From the above introduced list the character of the parallel 
competences,28 the subject out of the effect of Art. 133,29 the permitted 
exceptions,20 the restrictions affecting the commerce of war material.21 the 
measures taken on behalf of the public order22 seem to be self-evident: if a 
member state fulfils the special formal requirements (e.g. the contribution of 
the Community or the other member states), then the measure applied by it 
means an independent, constitutive practice of competence. However, the cases 
12
 See e.g. Hohmann, H.: Angelassene Außenhandelsfreiheit im Vergleich. Tübingen, 
2002. 218. 
24
 Ib. According to Hohmann, if harmonisation in this field shall be required, the 
member states lose their own regulatory competence. 
25
 Cf. with Council 2603/69/EEC Regulation of 20 December 1969 establishing common 
rules for exports, Art. 11.: „Without prejudice to other Community provisions, this 
Regulation shall not preclude the adoption or application by a Member State of quantitative 
restrictions on exports on grounds of public morality, public policy or public security ; the 
protection of health and life of humans, animals or plants ; the protection of national 
treasures possessing artistic, historic or archaeological value, or the protection of industrial 
and commercial property." 
26
 Paras, (b)-(f). 
27
 Paras, (g) and (h). 
28
 Para. (a). 
29
 Para. (d). 
30
 Para. (e). 
31
 Para. (g). 
32
 Para. (h). 
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of the actio pro Communitate33 have to be perceived as declarative, specific 
executive measures, since in this case the exclusive competence still exists 
on the level of the Community. The only difference is that the vindication 
becomes possible only by the above introduced intercalation of the member 
states. 
4.3 In the case of CCP the role of the direct enforcement-namely enforcement 
by the Community authorities-is less significant. In contradiction, we can 
speak of indirect enforcement when the enforcement of the Community law-in 
certain cases the CCP, as well-is accomplished through the bodies member 
states. One case of this is the above-mentioned para, (c), when during the 
implementation, the member state authorities directly apply Community law 
having direct effect, which means that the task of the member state legislator 
only expands to the establishment of the institutional system, while it is not 
necessary to transpose the Community law norm. As opposed to this, para, (b) 
covers the cases-considered to be exceptional in the CCP-when on the member 
state level the Community norm has to be transposed by a legislative act, that 
is, the latter will be applied by the local authorities through national law. 
As it has already been mentioned, the implementation of the CCP is an 
obligation of the member states,34 deriving from EC Law. This results partly 
from the supremacy doctrine of the EC Law35 and partly from Art. 5 TEC. In 
special cases, the European Court of Justice concretised the general formula 
of Art. 5. This way, referring to the CCP, the implementation contains the 
following obligations: 
- the national law has to indicate the enforcement authorities,36 which 
have to be created by the member states in a way that they are able to 
function effectively.37 
33
 Para. ( f ) . 
34
 The executional f ramework of the Communi ty Law in the earlier literature was 
assumed by Zuleeg (Das Recht der Europäischen Gemeinschaften im innerstaatlichen 
Bereich. Kölner Schriften zum Europarecht, 9, 1969), basing on this theory, Pescatore 
divided the execution and application of the EC-law in levels (Das Zusammenwirken der 
Gemeinschaftsrechtsordnung mit den nationalen Rechtsordnungen. Europarecht, 1970. 
307. et seq.) 
35
 Weatherhill , S . -Beaumont , P.: EC-law. 2nd ed., London, 1995. 307 et seqq. In the 
Hungarian literature to this subject see: Kende. T.-Szűcs, T.: Európai közjog és politika 
[European Public Law and Policies]. Budapest, 2002. 559. et seq.: Kecskés, L.: EU jog és 
jogharmonizáció [EU Law and Harmonisation of Law], Budapest, 2003. 368. 
36
 66/79. Amministrazione delle finanze dello Stato v. Salumi [1980] European Court 
Reports, 1237 
HARMONISATION OF THE HUNGARIAN LEGAL ORDER WITH THE EU'S... 271 
- provided that are more national authorities being responsible for the 
enforcement, the member states are obliged to circumscribe the powers 
of the different bodies.38 
- the enforcement authorities have to be put under effective supervision, 
- the measure of necessity has to be taken into consideration while 
creating the member state enforcement regulations, this means that only 
those norms have to be issued that are absolutely necessary for the 
effectiveness of the EC Law norm, 
- the member state authorities are obliged to apply the community regu-
lations, they cannot be subdivided, and there cannot exist any member 
state regulation that would effect the force of the community regulation 
• -JO 
in a unlateral way. 
5. The Order of Foreign Trade of Hungary after the Accession to EU 
5.1 It belongs to the traditional sovereign rights of the Hungarian Republic-
and derivable from the Hungarian Constitution, as well - that it influences the 
foreign trade and economy with appropriate legal measures, with the aid of 
administrational institutions. However, because of the above-mentioned reasons, 
and because of the fact that the EU also forms a customs union which has to 
operate properly, the member states are not allowed to practice their sovereign 
rights, which means that the guidance of the procedures occurs through 
harmonised and unified community means. 
However, the disbelief, according to which the transposition of the focal 
point of foreign trade and economy activities can be evaluated as a loss of 
sovereignty, has to be dispelled. It is more accurate to say that the Republic of 
Hungary did not lose its sovereignty after the accession to the EU in this field, 
but changed its mode of practice, and in the future, on behalf of our EU 
37
 See Hilf, M.: Möglichkeiten und Grenzen des Rückgriffs auf nationale verwaltungs-
rechtliche Regeln bei der Durchführung von Gemeinschaftsrecht. In: Schwarze, J. (ed.): 
Europäisches Verwaltungsrecht im Werden. Schriftenreihe des AEI. Band 14. Baden-
Baden, 1982. 71. Also the national legal f ramework of the procedures should be disposed 
on the method which ensures the efficiency of the Community Law having direct effect , 
see 118/76 Balkan Import Export v. Hauptzollamt Berlin Packhof. [ 1977] European Court 
Reports, 1177. 
38
 240/78. Atalanta Amsterdam BV v. Produktschap voor Vee en Vlees [1979] European 
Court Reports, 2137. 
39
 39/72. Commirsion v. Italy [1973] European Court Reports, 101., 93/71. Leonensio 
v. Minstero dell' Agricoltura e Foreste [1973] European Court Reports, 101. 
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membership, it will practice them together with the other member states and 
with the EU itself. This view can be derived from the Hungarian Constitution's 
Art. 2/A, paragraph 1, according to which: "By virtue of treaty, the Republic 
of Hungary, in its capacity as a Member State of the European Union, may 
exercise certain constitutional powers jointly with other Member States to the 
extent necessary in connection with the rights and obligations conferred by the 
treaties (...)". This common exercise of competences can be realised in a way that 
in the case of a concrete task, only the bodies of the Community will proceed 
(e.g. the European Commission in the case of an antidumping procedure).40 
These are also in conformity with that constitutional obligation of Hungary, 
which declares that "The Republic of Hungary shall take an active part in 
establishing a European unity in order to achieve freedom, well-being and 
security for the peoples of Europe".41 
5.2 This type of transformation of the practice of sovereignty occurred with 
our Accession Treaty.42 According to the facts emphasised above, the CCP has 
to be homogeneous; theoretically, after our accession there is no possibility of 
derogation f rom its rules. There is only one real exception to this: not later 
than 1 May 2007, the Hungarian foreign trade administration is allowed to 
establish an annually decreasing customs contingent in the case of raw 
aluminium.43 Because of our accession to the CCP, the transformation of the 
system of means became necessary. According to the Act XXIX of2004 On the 
accepted amendments concerning the accession Art. 140 paragraph 1: "the 
export and import of commodities, services and rights representing material 
value in intercommunication and the transference of them through the Hungarian 
Republic can be restricted only in accordance with an international treaty". 
Consequently, according to the main rule the overturn of foreign trade is 
free, but as the emphasis put on 'international treaty' refers to the fact that 
today the influencing or restricting of foreign trade (through customs, 
allowances, etc.) can occur mainly by the rules laid down in international law 
40Hungarian Constitution, Art. 2/A para. 1. last sentence: "( . . . ) these powers may be 
exercised independently and by way of the institutions of the European Union". 
41
 Hungarian Constitution, Art. 6. para. 4. 
42
 Act XXX of2004 on the promulgation of the Accession Treaty. 
43
 See Annex X, Section 9 of the Accession Act which belongs-as an integral par t - to 
the Accession Treaty promulgated by the Act X X X of 2004. Practically, this ' temporal 
derogation' affects directly only the Hungarian aluminium imports f r om Russia, it amounts 
to saying that three years moratorium is allowed to Hungary to f ind alternative stock 
sources/exporters in lieu of the Russian one (e.g. f r o m a number of countries bounded by 
bilateral free trade agreements to the EU can be imported customs-free aluminium). 
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and in the Accession Treaty (and EC law) and not by the autonomy of the 
country. 
5.3 In our foreign trade law, our obligation of modification because of the 
accession is being dealt with two regulation levels. On the one hand, we had to 
harmonise our international law obligations of commerce subject with the CCP, 
and on the other hand, on the level of our national law, namely: our customs 
law, our foreign trade licensing system, the application of the quantitative 
measures, and in the imposition of the protective measures, it was necessary to 
implement some corrections until the end of the accession procedure. In some 
cases, the obligation could only be fulfilled by deregulation, but in other cases 
we had to perform a positive legislative task. The particular fields can be 
surveyed according to the above introduced grouping in the following points. 
6. The Harmonisation of our International Treaties with the CCP 
6.1 Among the contractual means, it was the multilateral framework, more 
precisely the WTO-GATT rules that raised several questions concerning our 
accession. Both Hungary and the Community are founding members of the 
WTO, consequently both the WTO agreement and its annexes have to be 
applied, the change had occurred only in the sense of legal techniques. 
This legal technical change basically refers to the relationship between 
the national law and the norms of WTO, since all the obligations originating 
from WTO membership, for example, the decision of the dispute settlement 
body today, is not directly embraced by the international law-Hungarian law 
forlula, but it is represented as an obligation through the EC Law, as a special 
transmitter medium. This theoretical problem is one of the controversial 
questions of the CCP, a lot of monographs and studies deal with this problem. 
According to the technical literature, there are two major extremes in this 
question: on the one hand, WTO obligations can be perceived in the relation-
ship between the international law and the EC Law, but on the other hand, 
there is another view, which is increasingly accepted: the WTO norms access 
directly onto the level of EC Law norms and assert themselves through a special 
direct effect.44 The answers given to these seemingly theoretical questions have 
44
 This problem is assumed by OTT, A: GATT unci WTO im Gemeinschaftsrecht. Köln-
Ber l in-Bonn-München, 1997. Also see Zonnekeyn, G.: EC Liability for Non-implemen-
tation of Adopted WTO Panels and Appellate Body Reports. In: Kronenberg, V. (ed.): The 
European Union and the International Legal Order: Discord or Harmony? T h e Hague, 
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serious practical consequences, as well: for example, whether it is possible to 
refer to WTO norms in the processes of the European Court of Justice depends 
on this factor. 
It was indispensable for Hungary-on a multilateral level-to form an identical 
level concerning the facultative obligations, as well. Thus, our individual 
colmitments to GATT in 1994 could not have been maintained after our 
accession: for example, we have to adopt the system of the tariff commitments 
in its entirety. The analyses made before our accession point out that in the 
case of Hungary and other non-EU member commercial partner countries, it 
will result in the decrease of the customs level.45 However, we have to add 
that our international trade before the accession-showing one of the highest 
rates among the candidate countries-was mainly carried out with the member 
states of the EU; therefore this change of our multilateral level obligations 
only affected the importers and exporters in their relationship with the third 
states. Naturally, the change of the average customs level induces demands 
of compensation; however, the undertakings concerning this do not belong 
to the competence of the national foreign trade administration, but that of 
the EU. 
At this point, it is useful to mention the commodity agreements. The 
requirement of the harmonisation emerger in this case as well. According to 
the practice of the European Court of Justice, the commodity agreements 
connected with the operation of the UNCTAD belong to the sphere of CCP.46 
However, there is a difference in the commodity agreements concerning the 
251-272.; Royla, P.: WTO-Recht-EG-Recht: Kollision, Justizibialität, Implementation. Euro-
parecht, 2001/4. and Sander. G.: Zu r unmittelbaren Anwendbarkeit der WTO-Abkommen 
in der europäischen Rechtsordnung. Verfassung und Recht in Übersee, 2. 
45
 Ld. Jánszky, Á.-Meisel, S.: Magyarország ElJ-csatlakozásának WTO-összefiiggései 
[The WTO-aspects of the Hungarian Accession to the EU]. Budapest, 1999. According to 
calculations based on the year 2001, after the accession, there will be only approximately 
1600 higher E U - M F N tarrifs Art.s than the Hungarian equivalent. 
46
 See ECJ Opinion, No. 1/78. Upon a request by the European Commission, the ECJ 
to give an opinion on the compatibility the TEC with the Treaty of the draft international 
agreement on natural rubber which was the subject of negotiations in the UNCTAD, and 
whether the Communi ty is competent to conclude the agreement in question. See para. 45 
of the opinion: "Art . 113 empowers the Community to formulate a commercial "policy" 
based on "uniform principles" thus showing that the question of external trade must be 
governed from a wide point of view and not only hav ing regard to the administration of 
precise systems such as customs and quantitative restrictions." and para. 63. "( . . . ) The 
envisaged International Natural Rubber Agreement, in spite of the special features which 
distinguish it f r o m classical trade and tariff agreements , comes under the commercial 
policy as it is envisaged in Art. 113 of the EEC Treaty." 
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question whether only the EU has the right to become a member of the 
multilateral agreements, or the member states have this opportunity as well? 
In the case of the former, the membership of Hungary could not outlast the 
accession (e.g., the sugar agreement), but in the case of the latter, our accession 
inferred that we become members in certain commodity agreements, which 
had not been accepted yet, because of the marginality of the national interest 
on those fields (e.g., tropical tree agreement). 
6.2 Our accession also implicitly affected the bilateral agreements, like the free 
trade agreement. The reason for this is that the maintenance of these is contrary 
to the principles of CCP, therefore, they could not remain in force after 1 May 
2004.47 However, thd change here is a question of legal techniques, as well, 
since for instance, the CEFTA member states having remained outside the 
present enlargement circle made an association agreement with the EU, thus the 
only factor that will change is the legal basis of the liberalised trade. However, 
the change caused some problems in practice. Here, we can refer to the 
Hungarian-Romanian circulation of commodities which until our accession was 
regulated by the CEFTA-agreement. Although Romania made an association 
agreement ( 'Europe-agreement') with the EU on 1 February 1993 which, 
regarding the accession, was amended, it has not been reinforced by the 
European Parliament yet, thus it has not come into force. In the above-
mentioned modification, the original preferences of the CEFTA were also 
included, but because of the duration of the ratification process the present trade 
is on a normal customs level, it seems to be in a 'vacuum'. This situation-based 
on the pre-accession customs level-causes considerable damage both to 
Hungary and to Romania, in the relation, which is one of the highest volume 
circulations among the CEFTA members. However, this case is a good example 
for the fact that the Hungarian foreign trade administration is not capable of 
stepping up, even under the pressure of the national producers, to solve this 
problem, since it does not possess any direct means for this because of the 
exclusive competence character of the CCP.48 
47
 Accession Act, Art. 6. ( 1 ): „With effect f rom the date of accession, the new Member 
States shall withdraw from any free trade agreements with third countries, including the 
Central European Free Trade Agreement ( . . . ) " . 
48
 The Hungarian influence is possible only in an indirect fo rm, like the pressing of the 
ratification by the Hungarian members of the European Parliament, which was done in this 
case, see The European Parliament has ratified the extension of the Romanian association 
agreement. BRUXINFO (23. 02. 2005.) 
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Besides, we can refer to the fact that our member state status resulted our 
accession to several bilateral trade agreements. Accordingly, Hungary became 
(and will become) a part of the system of the preferential and other bilateral 
agreements of the EU. These agreements may come under the following four 
categories: 
a) Firstly, as an individual category the so-called Cotonou Agreement 
should be mentioned,49 to which Hungary (with the other new member states) 
acceded 'automatically' by the Accession Act as of 1 May 2004.50 
b) The Agreement on the European Economic Area51 belongs-tebhnically 
speaking-to an other group. The new member states can accede under special 
conditions laid down in Art. 128 of this Agreement. 
c) Thirdly, the accession to a number of agreements and conventions 
shall be agreed by a conclusion of a protocol between the Council, acting 
unanimously on behalf of the member states, and the third country, countries 
or international organisation concerned. The Commission have to negotiate 
these protocols on behalf of the Member States on the basis of negotiating 
directives approved by the Council, acting in unanimity, and in consultation 
with a committee comprised of the representatives of member states.52 It is 
particular in these cases that the new member states have to apply the provisions 
of the agreements at issue, as f r o m the date of accession, and pending the 
conclusion of the necessary protocols referred above.53 Strictly speaking, it 
means that the new member states have to implement the provisions of these 
agreements in their national legal order temporarily.74 As a special example the 
44
 Partnership Agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific 
G r o u p of States of the one part, and the European Communi ty and its Member States, 
of the other part. T h e agreement w a s signed on 23 June 2000 in Cotonou (in the 
'administrative'-but non official-capital of Republic of Benin). See Official Journal, L 317 
(15. 12. 2000.) 3. 
50
 See Accession Act, Art. 6. (4) 
51
 Agreement on the European Economic Area between the European Communities, 
their Member States and the Republic of Austria, the Republic of Finland, the Republic of 
Iceland, the Principality of Liechtenstein, the Kingdom of Norway and the Kingdom of 
Sweden , Official Journal, L 1 (3. 1. 1994.) 3. Hungary will accede prospectively to EEA 
Agreement in the course of 2005. See T h e Agreement between Hungary and EEA can be 
s igned in Mai 2005. BRUX1NFO (12. 04. 2005.) and Decision of the Hungarian Parliament 
4 /2004 . (III. 2.). 
52
 Cf. with Accession Act, Art. 6. (2) 
53
 Accession Act, Art. 6. (6) 
54
 Agreements and conventions of this art are in force in relation with the following 
countr ies for instance: Algeria, Armenia , Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Croatia, Egypt, FYROM, 
Georgia , Israel, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Mexico, Moldova, Morocco, 
HARMONISATION OF THE HUNGARIAN LEGAL ORDER WITH THE EU'S... 277 
association agreement between the Community, its member states and the 
Republic of Turkey can be highlighted, which was amended by a protocol 
establishing as of 1996 Customs Union. But the extension of this agreement to 
the new member states could not have hitherto come into force owing to 
Turkish foreign policy: namely, this act would be interpreted as a de facto 
recognition of the Republic of Cyprus. In spite of this fact, as is to be expected, 
Turkey will sign the new protocol of the agreement before engaging in accession 
negotiations on 3 October 2005. Up to that date the system of bilateral free 
trade agreements between Hungary and Turkey remains in force55 in which, 
naturally, the provisions of the EC Law were implemented before our accession. 
Namely, the level of the liberalization in the relations of Turkey and Hungary 
is as the same as after the extension of the Ankara Agreement, and that is the 
most important difference between the position of the above outlined CEFTA 
Agredment and the other multilateral agreements concluded before the enlarge-
ment. We had to denounce the first one, before accession, but in the relations 
concerned by the second group of agreements we can maintain the agreement 
until the conclusion between the 'EU25' and the third country in question. 
d) The fourth category consists of agreements concluded formally in the 
same procedure as stated in the preceding paragraph (c) (the Commission 
negotiates a protocols on behalf of the Member States on the basis of negotiating 
directives approved by the Council etc.), but the principal difference is in the 
legal consequences, i.e. the new member states are not obliged to apply these 
agreements by way of temporarily transplanting their provisions into the 
national legal order.5'1 The agreements concluded with Switzerland, Belarus, 
Chile, China, or the agreement negotiated with the Mercosur countries belong 
to this group. 
Romania, the Russian Federation, San Marino, South Africa, South Korea, Syria, Tunisia, 
Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. In fact, all of the agreements on textil 
goods signed by the Community before enlargement belong to this category, c f . with 
Accession Act, Art. 6. (7). But we can add that the importance of these textil agreements 
decreased significantly because of change of the multilateral legal framework at the 
beginning of 2005. 
55
 See Act XX of 1998. On the promulgation of the Free Trade Agreement between 
Republic of Hungary and Republic of Turkey. 
56
 Accession Act, Art. 6. (2) 
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7. The Harmonisation of Hungarian Foreign Trade Material and 
Procedural Law and their Framework after the Accession 
7.1 By our accession, the logic of the regulation of our foreign trade material 
and administrative law has utterly changed. This naturally can be derived from 
the above-mentioned function alteration. The stages of the regulatory process 
concerning our foreign trade administrative law are the following: 
a) On the top level of the hierarchy is the primary legislation of the EU, 
this way the forming of our foreign trade administration can only happen in 
accordance with the rules of the primary EC Law. Among the regulations of 
the primary sources of EC Law (founding treaties, the amendments, attached 
protocols etc.) the following ones are rather fundamental from the point of 
view of this field: Art. 23-31. TEC (The Customs Union), Art. 131-135. TEC 
(Common commercial policy, Customs cooperation), Art. 296-298. TEC (national 
reservation in certain cases, internal market "safeguard clause" etc.), Appendix 
IV of Accession Act, para. 5. (the effects of the accession on the customs 
union), Appendix X (Ad interim provisions regarding Hungary), Accession Act 
Art. 27. para. 1. (Application of customs and customs reduction in the field of the 
EURATOM) and Art. 37. (provisional safeguard clause). 
b) The obligations of the international law (GATT-WTO etc.) are on the 
second level. However, if these obligations refer to the field that is not regulated 
by the EC Law, affect the competence of the Hungarian authorities, and by the 
omission of the next level, namely the EC Law level, they affect directly the 
Hungarian regulatory level, and hereby the operation of national authorities. It 
also follows from the rulings of the objective effect57 of our new customs act. 
A similar case can only exist, if the given question does not belong to that 
central core of the CCP, which substantiates the exclusive competence of the 
Community, inasmuch as in a case of a norm of the international law is only 
allowed to oblige the Community and not a member state or a member state 
body. 
c) It is the EC-law that contains the core of substantive law of the customs 
and the administration of customs, the regulation of the export and import 
regimes and the common executive regulations. 
d) The next level is the national regulatory level, which can be divided into 
two other levels: e.g., in the case of Hungarian customs law, the central norm 
51
 Act CXXVI. of 2003. On the implementation of Common Customs Code Art. 2. (1): 
"This act, and the provisions of international treaties having effect in Hungary (. . .) shall be 
applied to the subjects not regulated in the Community law (.. .)." 
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is the Act CXXVI of 2003 On the implementation of Common Customs Code 
and the implementation regulations belong here, as well.58 
7.2 As it has already been mentioned, the implementation of the rules and 
instruments of CCP can occur in diverse ways. There are some instruments, 
e.g. the international agreements discussed in the section of the contractual 
instruments, the implementation of which can only take place with the co-
operation of community bodies. Contrarily, it is more typical that the imple-
mentation of the norms mentioned above is possible by the cooperation of the 
bodies of the Community and the member state institutions, or it happens 
exclusively on a member state level. The antidumping measure can be mentioned 
as an example for the previous one, since the course of the proceedings and 
the imposition of the antidumping duty belong to the community bodies 
(Commission, Council). However, the real execution and collection of the 
antidumping duty happens through the authorities of member states. In the case 
of the latter, we can mention as a good example the regulation that intends to 
hinder the marketing of the piratical products, since in this case the execution 
process happens completely through the member state authorities. 
7.3 The harmonisation of the national customs law had already started before 
the accession negotiations; therefore, the national customs law was able to 
apply the institutions of the EC Law before our accession. The Act С of 1995 
has been worded according to the Community Customs Code and it deviates 
from it only in some points, e.g. in the regulations of the customs-free zones. 
By the accession, the above-mentioned community customs rules, mainly the 
Community Customs Code, its enforcing regulation and the common tariff 
possess direct effect, so the pertinent regulations of our customs law and customs 
tariff had to be overruled.54 Besides, the transformation of the organisation system 
of the customs administration has begun earlier, as well. In this process, the 
58
 E.g. processual frameworks of ex-post controlling, warehousing system, the inter-
pretation of the customs tariffs etc. 
59
 The above-mentioned pre-accession analysis concluded that the reception of the 
common customs tariff results in the decrease of 5500 customs items and the increase of 
1600. However, it was already obvious at that time that it would not considerably affect the 
export-import rates, since the latter was mostly realized in the directon of the member 
states of the EU. This was determined before our accession-primarily among the industrial 
commodit ies-by the free trade commissions of our association agreement, in relation to 
which this way our integration to the internal market did not result in any considerable 
position change. 
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sources provided by the PHARE tenders, and the participation in other programs 
financed by the European Commission, also helped.60 In accordance with this, 
our new customs act61 was accepted by the Hungarian Parliament at the end of 
2003, the most fundamental aim of which was to insure the functioning of the 
unified internal market and the implementation of the community customs 
law. The area of application of the act expands to the territory of the Republic 
of Hungary and the proceedings of customs offices established abroad. The 
technique of regulation follows the well-settled method of other member states; 
namely, it attaches the national executive procedure norms directly to certain 
provisions of the Customs Code.62 This means that it explicates some commis-
sions of the Community Customs Code, and if it is possible, it determines some 
complementary regulations (e.g. the caritative usage of the to-be-abolished 
commodities). 
The realization of the rules of the community customs law and the national 
implementation rules occur through the organisational system of the Customs 
and Excise Guard (CEG).63 The role, the operation and the organisational 
system of the CEG is determined in the Act XIX of 2004. The elements among 
the scope of duties that are in closer relation with the implementation of the 
CCP are the following: 
- the customs control of the circulation of commodities and passengers 
through the customs borders, the imposition and collection of the non-
community charges and duties in connection with the customs process 
and the customs dues; 
- directly or indirectly - in a certain special circle-the examination of the 
identity of goods (quality, classification according to tax rules) and the 
examination of the fact whether or not the examining process have 
taken place; 
- the customs and statistics oriented checking, correction, registration, 
totalizing, data processing and deliverance of the data of the customs 
documents; 
60
 E.g. a project, directly supported by one the European Commission which advances 
the connectivity of the informatic sys tems and the accession of them into the European 
systems of the Hungarian customs management . 
61
 Act CXXV of2003. On the implementation of common customs law. 
62
 The subsidiary background norm to-be-applied is the Act IV of 1957 On the general 
rules of the administrative procedures. 
63
 'Vám- és Pénzügyőrség ' in Hungarian. 
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- the fulfilment of the taxing, controlling and post-controlling tasks 
determined by customs, tax and other legislations.64 
7.4 The transformation of the export and import regime happened according to 
the logic of the customs administration concerning our accession. The import 
and export rules of the Community as the elements of the CCP of exclusive 
character prevailed directly after 1 May 2004. 
Within this field the most important segment is the sphere of commercial 
defensive devices, which directly affects the Hungarian market, as well. Since 
the gaining of membership, the more or less 140 protective measures (anti-
dumping and countervailing duties) of the Union that are in force against third 
states function as a 'protective shell' around the Hungarian market, as well. 
The transformation of thd licensing administration happened in connection 
with the implementation of the export and import regime. As a successor of the 
Licensing and Administrative Office of the Ministry of Traffic and Economy 
the Hungarian Commercial Licensing Authority (HCLA) was created65 as a 
central office possessing a nationwide competence. The most important part of 
its activity-in relation to our topic-is the fulfilment of the import and export 
licensing tasks referring to certain goods or countries and being derived from 
the community law and the international economic agreements. To make it clear, 
besides the customs authorities the HCLA is the executive basis of the CCP. 
Relating to the implementation of the CCP, as its most fundamental competence, 
it fulfils the import and export licensing tasks referring to the implementation 
of the restrictions and those referring to certain goods or countries and being 
derived from the EU Law, the international economic agreements and separate 
legislation. However, it also operates the licensing order on fields that only 
partly belong to the CCP (the foreign trade of the dual-use products and 
technologies66) or do not belong to it at all (e.g., the trade of certain military 
engineering, the prohibition of chemical weapons). Though it does not belong 
to our topic closely, it is worth mentioning that the HCLA accomplishes 
64
 See Act XIX of 2004 Art. 2. Besides the tasks enumerated above, the CIG exercises 
other-in our examination not relevant-types of powers, e.g. implementation of the 
common agricultural policy, investigation authority in revenue tax cases, complet ion of 
other international cooperative tasks etc. 
65
 Governmental Decree No. 36/2004. (III. 12.). On Hungarian Commercial Licensing 
Authority. 
66
 Governmental Decree No. 50/2004. (III. 23.). On Licensing of the foreign trade of 
the dual-use products and technologies. 
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authorial registration tasks and functions as a permissive authority regarding 
certain internal and foreign economic affairs.67 
It is the Governmental Decree No. 110/2004. (IV.28) on Export an Import 
of Commodities, Services and Rights Representing Material Value ('licensing 
decree'-LD) that created the harmonised frames of the licensing order. This 
LD does not use the expression 'foreign trade ' any more, since the more 
comprehensive notion of ' trade' both refers to the internal market-oriented-
this way it does not cross the common customs borders-import and export. 
The force of LD affects the following fields: 
a) Commodities, services and rightr representing material values, which 
means that 
- export to other member states of the EU crossing the border of the 
Republic of Hungary, or its import from the other member states. In the 
case of certain commodities, the same rules are valid to the contracting 
countries of the so-called European Economic Area as to the member 
states;68 
- export to countries outside the EU crossing both the frontier of the 
Republic of Hungary and the common customs frontier, or its import 
from such countries; 
- the transition of it through the Republic of Hungary. 
b) Enterprising export and import. 
The circulation licence and the function licence belong to the force of LD, 
according to the previous practice. It is the obligation of request for licence 
that is-directly and occasionally-attached to the affair of the export, import or 
transit of the commodities in the case of circulation licence. However, in the 
case of a function licence obligation, the import, the export or the transit cannot 
be carried out without a function licence. 
The circulation licence commodities can be classified into the following 
two groups: 
- The export69 of certain commodities from the territory of the Republic of 
Hungary (including re-export) to such countries that are not members of 
the EU, or the import70 of these goods from those non-member countries. 
The commodities belonging to here e.g., the pyrotechnical devices (gun-
67
 E.g. the l icensing of public depositories, of acquirement of t imeshare properties, 
enrollment of some activities (tour operators and guides etc.). 
68
 Besides the 25 member states, Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein. 
69
 See LD Appendix 2 (a). 
70
 See LD Appendix 2 (b). 
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powder, fireworks), safety equipment (bullet-proof waistcoat, gas mask), 
and goods that are doubly dangerous to public safety and certain fire-arms 
that are permitted for civil usage. 
- The export of certain goods from the territory of the Republic of Hungary 
(including re-export) in any sort of relations, and in any respect, the import 
of these goods into the territory of the Republic of Hungary and this 
transport71 through country (certain pyrotechnic devices and services and 
e.g. the special safety paper that is used for printing money). 
There are some sorts of activities that can only be performed by possessing 
a function licence,72 e.g. in connection with certain radioactive materials, 
pyrotechnics, certain fire arms, with doubly dangerous-classified devices, with 
military engineering-defence technology and definite commercial activities 
related to safety papers. 
The LD contains the sanctions of the violation of the licence obligation, as 
well. According to this, the issue of the licence can be denied and the issued 
licence can be withdrawn, if 
- the functioning of the entitled of the licence is contrary to the law or any 
other rule, including the regulations of the EU, 
- the circumstances at the time of the issue have been altered in a way that 
the denial of the petition would be appropriate and the licence does not 
fulfil the regulations determined in this order or the conditions determined 
in the permission, 
- the petitioner reported unrealistic data, 
- the petitioner does not possess the necessary official licence. 
Nevertheless, any sort of foreign trade activity without an official licence 
can be conshdered to be a crime, since according to the Act IV of 1978 on the 
Criminal Code Art. 298 ("Foreign Trade Activities without Licence"), the 
person, who engages in foreign trade activities subject to licence without a 
licence, or exports or imports goods without a licence for exportation or 
importation, commits a felony, and shall be punishable with imprisonment 
of up to three years. Although the elements of the crime have been mitigated in 
1993, but the seriousness of the sanction still conjures up the pre-1990 period 
when the foreign trade activity was a state monopoly. 
Besides the CEG and the HCLA there are more organisations and institu-
tions that have a role in the implementation of the devices of the CCP. In a 
71
 See LD Appendix 2 (c) 
12
 See LD Appendix 3. 
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wide sense of implementation, the role of the Hungarian legislative authorities 
can be taken into consideration when the issue of national law is also necessary 
to the appropriate transposition of the CCP. Besides, there are a lot of co-
operating authorities which - during the implementation process - help the job 
of certain institutions as subsidiary authorities, or their initiation into the 
proceedings is indispensable. Thus, in the licensing process of certain goods 
the preliminary agreement of the National Headquarters of the Police, the 
preliminary opinion of the Expert's Institute of the National Security Service, or 
the opinion of the Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority and the National 
Bank of Hungary. The aspects of certain military products are elaborated by 
the Interministerial Committee on Foreign Trade of Military Technology 
which is composed of the representatives of certain Ministries. 
8. Closing Remarks 
Consequently, it is obvious that the commercial policy authority of the EC is 
exclusive, as a general rule, any national legislation cannot be executed and in 
the moment of the entry into force of the accession treaty, the complete CCP 
legal material is gradually constructed on the national law and order in a 
determinant way. The Hungarian foreign trade administration is thd indirect 
and internal executor of this commercial policy law material. 
Before our accession to the EU, the importance, the scope for action of the 
foreign economic policy and, consequently, the ability to enforce interests of 
Hungary was rather negligible (e.g., if we consider the regional tension-e.g. 
Hungarian-Polish relations-which had not been resolved within the framework 
of the CEFTA). From this point of view, our accession to the EU might even be 
advantageous, since the central factor in our ability to enforce interests against 
the third states is the Union. However, the aim of the EC is not to create a 'pan-
European-like view' on its own, beside its autonomous intention, but these 
ambitions-thanks to the decision-making mechanism of the ССР-can be 
directly traced back to the intentions of member states. 
Therefore, that is what the foreign trade administration and diplomacy 
have to recognise, and stand up-within the framework of the decision-making 
procedures of the Community-as an initiative canalizing and enforcing the 
interests of the Hungarian producers and other market participants in all cases, 
when any kind of intervention is necessary in the relation of the third states. 
Naturally, it can be derived from the character of certain devices of the CCP 
that not only the foreign trade administration, but also the market participants 
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need to observe the processes affecting them more actively, and they have to take 
the opportunity and initiate the launching of these processes at the European 
Commission in cases when the conditions of application of directly applicable 
common devices (anti-subvention and antidumping procedures, trade barrier 
regulations) prevail. However, to reach this, a more active maintenance of the 
relationship between the national market participants and the representative 
organisations of certain common branches of industry is essential (e.g., EuroFer, 
COLIPA, COTANCE); the success of the action can only be assured in this 
manner. 
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In early 2005, one could hardly think of a more timely topic than a thorough, 
carefully edited investigation of issues involving nation-building, kin minorities, 
and the acceptable norms regulating minority and Diaspora politics in the post-
communist region. Only a few months have passed since the European Union 
was significantly expanded, thereby introducing into the European political 
discourse the concepts of kin minorities, kin state and home states. (The very 
creation of this terminology is due to the Venice Commission.) The fierce legal, 
political and academic debates on ethno-cultural aspirations, Diaspora state 
policies and ethnicity-based dual citizenship, as well as a constitutionally 
recognized right for minority identity are now European issues, adding a new 
angle of scrutiny to questions that are already familiar. 
For the Hungarian readership, this in-depth, multidimensional and multi-
faceted analysis of the Hungarian Status Law could not be timelier, as both the 
Hungarian Diaspora and politicians from the entire Hungarian political spectrum 
are in the process of recovering from the trauma of an unsuccessful referendum 
that proved to be damaging for all political platforms. Held on December 5, 
2004, this referendum posed the question of providing dual citizenship for kin 
minorities. 
The selection of academic essays from authors with a diverse geographical 
background (Central-Eastern Europe, Western Europe, the US, East-Asia) also 
represents a wide range of disciplines (legal, historic, social scientific), providing 
a unique assessment of a very symptomatic social phenomenon: the Status 
Law-syndrome. 
The book consists of nineteen essays by prominent scholars, followed by a 
fascinating and thorough chronology of the Hungarian Status Law's saga, and 
an exceptionally useful bibliography. The extensive selection of original 
documents included in the volume is also invaluable. As readers, we are ushered 
through the various stages of the Hungarian Status Law's legislative history, 
and find statements, declarations and other documents produced by an altogether 
unique Diaspora institution: the Hungarian Standing Conference. Also included 
are a number of bilateral instruments (memoranda of understanding, agree-
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ments), reports from international organizations-the Venice Commission, the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the OSCE, and various 
European Union organs-as well as texts of the Slovak, Slovene and Romanian 
status laws (or similar legislations). 
The volume's greatest strength is its diverse range of essays. This also 
involves a slight shortcoming, one that is an inherent weakness of the essay-
collection genre: due to the diversity of approaches and the authors' uncoor-
dinated analyses, the descriptions on legislative and political history strike 
the reader as somewhat repetitive if the papers are read consecutively. This is 
nonetheless a is a price that is definitely worth paying, given the distinctive 
originality of the various contributors. 
The book groups the essays by discipline, with a section each for history, 
social sciences, and legal studies. I will follow this tripartite division schema. 
Approaches from History 
The first section opens with a long essay by one of the editors, Osamu Ieda, 
a Professor of History at the Hokkaido University (Sapporo, Japan), entitled 
"Post-communist Nation Building and the Status Law Syndrome in Hungary". 
Professor Ieda gives a detailed description of the legislative history as well 
as a thorough analysis of the Act. On a theoretical note, he regards the status 
law syndrome-nation building across state borders and integrating the kin 
minorities abroad through legislation-as -a clear symptom of the failure of 
mega-area nation state systems (such as the Soviet empire), and also as an 
institutional necessity for national re-conceiving and re-adjusting in the post-
communist environment of European integration. He claims that "status laws 
were not simple reflexes of ethno-national concerns, but also reflected the 
requirements of the supranational process of regional integration in Europe." 
(p. 4.). The status law is thus a phenomenon generated by three interactive 
factors: the communist and Soviet imperial heritage; the emerging new national 
consciousness; and the eastward extension of European integration. 
The second essay by Nándor Bárdi, research fellow at the Teleki László 
Institute (Hungary) focuses on policy considerations behind the birth of the 
Status Law. The author covers the historical background through a detailed 
description of various post-1990 government policies concerning minority 
and Diaspora politics and provides a comprehensive assessment of Hungarian 
Diaspora politics throughout the 20th century, with special emphasis on the 
political transition of 1989, and subsequent bilateral (so-called basic) agreements 
between Hungary and its neighbors. 
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Approaches from the Social Sciences 
Written by George Schöpflin of University College London, "Citizenship and 
Ethnicity" opens the social sciences section with an assessment (and defense) 
of the Status Law-concept. The author investigates the Hungarian legislation in 
the context of two opposing post-Cold War polarities that exist in reciprocal 
potentiation: universalism and particularism. He claims that ethnicity and the 
ethnic dimension of the nation has been the particularism that attracted the 
greatest attention and disapprobation, since in the past decades democracy was 
understood as dependent on universalism. 
The author points out that the citizenship legislation of all pre-enlargement 
EU member states contain ethnic elements (to do otherwise and stick to a pure 
ius soli principle would create chaos and absurdity, given the rising number of 
parents who work abroad when their children are born). He considers it a fact 
of life that the very existence of the Hungarian state generates some sort of 
relationship between Hungary and the kin minorities-just as the mere fact 
that the same philological language is spoken by the Francophone in Switzer-
land, Belgium and France makes them have "more in common then not and 
this necessarily means defining a relationship with France.", (p. 94.) Given 
this, Professor Schöpflin is perplexed as to why the West became indignant 
when Hungary tried to regulate its ethnic problems overtly, legibly and 
transparently. All the Status Law does, according to him, is recognize and 
regulate ethnic problems, because "it is not possible to decouple culture from 
political power and political power is, at some level, necessarily vested in the 
state." (p. 94.). 
The author concludes that the FIDESZ-government was ahead of its time 
with its belief that the shared sovereignty-principle of European integration 
could be applied to Diaspora policies; the Western answer consisted in a 
resounding "no" to ethnicity and the pooling of sovereignty was to be limited 
to the European Union. But this leaves the Hungarian government with very 
little choice according to Professor Schöpflin: no alternative but to opt for dual 
citizenship. 
The next essay entitled "Status Law and 'Nation Policy"' was written by 
one of the volume's editors, Zoltán Kántor (Teleki László Institute, Hungary). 
Throughout the book, on many occasions, he is referred to as a leading expert 
and theoretician in the field. He scrutinizes one important aspect of the Status 
Law controversy: difficulties in defining the nation, membership in the national 
community and possible approaches to understanding what the concepts of 
cultural and political nation might mean. Besides providing a sharp, extensive 
analysis of the legislative history, he gives detailed descriptions of theories that 
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oppose the concept of the status law (expressed by Hungarian opposition 
liberals and representatives of international organizations like Günther Verheugen 
and Eric Jürgens). 
The central theme is the juxtaposition of the ethnocultural and the political 
conception of nationhood. Although the author does not refrain from showing 
moderate sympathy for the law, he manages to provide a well-balanced and 
thorough analysis of a number questions: 
- How can one determine objective and/or subjective criteria for member-
ship in the nation? 
- What is the relationship between domestic minority rights and aspirations 
of the kin-state nationalism? 
- How are we to understand constitutional languages (found in the 
Hungarian constitution, for example) like "minorities are nation-
constituting elements"? 
- If an ethno-national minority joins a government coalition, does that 
automatically make them a member of the home state's political nation? 
- How are we to perceive multiple identities of, for example, the Roma, 
Jews or Germans living in neighboring countries if they also identify 
themselves as Hungarians? 
In the next essay entitled "The Hungarian Status Law: A New European 
Form of Transnational Politics," the anthropologist Michael Steward (University 
College London) provides an especially thorough and deep historical and 
anthropological background (dating back to the 19th century), rebutting the 
suggestion that the Hungarian Status Law would be a post-modem bypassing 
of the nation state. He shows that the paradoxical insistence to keep the kin 
minority in the host states is, in fact, an expression of residual territorial 
revisionism. He thereby dismisses arguments that see the Status Law as an 
envisioning of new, multiple and overlapping identities and affiliations, that 
is, as a step beyond the territorial state and the modemist notion of a single, 
exclusive citizenship. He claims that the Status Law is in fact only a "trans-
formation of an older set of concerns to recreate ... a homology of democratic 
distribution and 'nation', . . . an attempt to give this kind of soft revisionism a 
new content." (p. 122.). 
The paper also links the Hungarian case to the broader transnational 
literature-on Haitians, Filipinos or Dominicans in the United States. His 
inquiry centers around the role of the state as promoter and sustainer of 
transnational social fields. Using the distinction between "traditional" Diaspora 
(people living in some sort of an exile) and the new form of "deterritorialized 
nation" (people may live anywhere, but will always 'bring the state with 
them'), he argues that the Hungarian Status Law is "no more than an attempt to 
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tum a 'traditional' Diaspora into a 'new' transnational nation. And in the very 
possibility of this simple shift much of the novelty of 'transnationalism' 
dissolves." (p. 147.). 
János Kis, probably the most influential Hungarian political philosopher, 
is the author the next essay entitled "The Status Law: Hungary at Crossroads". 
He follows a traditional jurisprudential method of analysis in showing how and 
why the Status Law was a mistake. 
On a side note, the author points out that nothing prevents liberals from being 
open to recognizing the nationalist reading's target community-the Hungarian 
minority, say. After all, a minority position may have inherent disadvantages 
that cannot always be counterbalanced by rights established for the individual. 
International law is therefore not hostile to the idea of collective rights; still, de 
collective does not become an ultimate bearer of the rights. The community of 
democratic states does not recognize collective rights as non-derivative 
principles, a reasoning based on the well being of supra-individual collectives. 
In his conclusion, Professor Kis remarks that in general, even though 
collective minority rights can be recognized, the improvement of the minority 
situation should not begin with collective rights, because their recognition 
raises difficulties for the majority. Those rights should be demanded first 
which the majority can accept relatively easily, that is, classical individual 
rights. More specifically, the Status Law should support minority organi-
zations and institutions, but not the creation of new constitutional subjects 
and status. 
Brigid Fowler (University of Birmingham) is another author to whom a 
number of other contributions refer, some approvingly, others critically. In her 
essay ("Fuzzing Citizenship, Nationalising Political Space: A Framework for 
Interpreting the Hungarian 'Status Law' as a New Form of Kin-state Policy in 
Central and Eastern Europe") the author sets forth a sympathetic assessment of 
the Hungarian Status Law, seeing it as a possible model for a post-modern, 
post-national step beyond the traditional modernist notion of statehood, which 
is based on absolute territorial sovereignty, singular national identities, and 
exclusive citizenship as the only possible legal and political relationship 
between states and individuals. She argues that the Status Law polemics bring 
academic and political attention to notions of citizenship, or quasi-citizenship 
beyond the nation state. These post-modern conceptions of kin-state relations 
challenge the archetypical 'modern' norms of citizenship and territoriality. The 
Status Law goes even beyond the relatively new EU-practices and institu-
tionalizes relationships between states and individuals who are neither citizens 
nor residents. "Inasmuch as Status Law-type legislation creates rights claimable 
by particular individuals against specific states, it creates a form of citizenship; 
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but it is a 'fuzzy citizenship', since it is not full citizenship, it does not coincide 
with any existing legal relationship between states and individuals, and its terms 
are often unclear." (p. 183-184.). 
In her concluding remarks, the author contrasts the Romanian and the 
Hungarian concepts, identifying the former as a representative of the 'modern' 
approach, one which adheres to the French style, state-led conception of equal 
citizenship rights built on a singular national identity and homogenous political 
community. 
According to the article, Hungary is supposed to represent the 'post-modern' 
conception. Unlike Romania, Hungary is viewed as embracing alternative 
principles of statehood, where the conceptual separation of state and nation 
implicitly opens the way to kin-state relationships which challenge modernist 
principles and make way for attenuated sovereignty and differential treatment 
to members of a single citizenry. 
Brigid Fowler brings attention to another interesting feature that both "camps" 
appeal to: 'Europe' and the European Union as a savior and an arbiter. The 
'modern' approach envisages Europe as a place where differences of national 
identity are superseded by a culturally neutral, equal European citizenship 
which leaves existing state-based arrangement intact, while for the right-
wing Hungarian government that advocated the Status Law, the European 
Union is the community of communities; a construction where different 
national identities are protected, cherished and can even supersede the territorial 
state. 
Constantin Iordachi (Central European University) employs a double 
comparative perspective in his essay entitled "Dual Citizenship and Policies 
toward Kin-minorities in East-Central Europe: A Comparison between Hungary, 
Romania and the Republic of Moldova". First it contrasts the Hungarian Status 
Law with Romania's legislation on dual citizenship and its impact on 
Romania's relationship with Moldova. Furthermore, it situates the Status Law 
within the overall patterns of ideological conflict between Romania and 
Hungary. The author looks at the various legislations: the Hungarian Status 
Law, the Romanian laws (1971, 1991 and 2003) and the Moldavian laws 
(1991 and 2000) on citizenship as attempts at reconstructing the national 
'imagined communities' against the background of radical post-communist 
socio-political and territorial reorganization (p. 240.). 
Regarding the Hungarian Status Law, the author argues that it is in fact 
a substitute, or a veiled form of dual citizenship, providing a peculiar 
combination of ethnic, territorial and statist principles. He evaluates the 1991 
Romanian citizenship law as an instrument for unifying ethnic Romanians into 
a single political community that will pave the road for a future reunification 
BOOK REVIEW 293 
with Moldova.1 By way of an insight into the complexity of the region 's 
Diaspora politics, we also find here a valuable (and rare) analysis of the 
Moldovan citizenship legislation and policy. 
Professor Iordachi argues that all these legislations are atypical, the 
Romanian citizenship law differs from classic repatriation laws, as it does not 
require former citizens to relocate in the country. The Hungarian Status Law, 
too, goes well beyond a law on minority protection. Furthermore, both employ 
a 'statist' perspective, by targeting former citizens who lost their citizenship as 
a result of border changes. The author notes that there is a difference here: 
while the Romanian law includes all former citizens, the Status Law introduces 
an "ethnic" filter. Nevertheless, this compensatory attitude towards involuntary 
loss of citizenship, according to Professor Iordachi, will create the suspicion of 
irredentism for both countries. Another similarity is that both the Hungarian 
and the Romanian laws clash with the internal legislation of the neighboring 
states (Romania and Slovakia, and Moldova and Ukraine respectively). Also, 
neither legislation seems to have served their political purpose, given that 
inter-state relations have become more tense... 
James Goldgeier and Zsuzsa Csergő (both at George Washington University) 
scrutinize the interplay between the two aspects mentioned in the title of their 
paper: nationalist strategies and European Integration. They offer a typology 
that distinguishes four models of nationalism, each with a separate set of 
strategies and institutional logic, as well as a vision of what kind of alliance 
the EU ought to be. 
The first model is that of 'traditional nationalism', a political strategy aimed 
at ensuring the convergence of political and cultural boundaries. This envisions 
a territorially sovereign, culturally homogenous nation-state. The authors bring 
the examples of Northern Irish Catholics, Basques, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Macedonia, Serbia, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania. Not suiprisingly, 
for this model, the European Union is ideally an alliance of nation states. 
The second model of 'substate nationalism' describes those groups that 
consider themselves rightful owners of a homeland that they do not have. 
1
 Between 1991 and 2000 alone, Romania granted c i t izenship to some 3 0 0 , 0 0 0 
Moldovan cit izens. 
:
 Moldova granted ful l ci t izenship r ights to all its permanent residents (who were 
former Soviet citizens). It means that R o m a n i a ' s o f fe r for c i t izenship would only have 
applied to e thnic Romanian ci t izens of M o l d o v a - w h o const i tute only about two th i rds 
of the la t te r ' s populat ion. Also , the Moldovan legislation did not recognize dual 
cit izenship. In light of all this, it is no wonder that no ove rwhe lming political wi l l has 
been fo rmed to unify the two states . . . 
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These historical, genuine minorities (as differentiated from relatively recent 
migrants) do not seek independent statehood (and thus are different from the 
secessionist movements that characterize the previous group), their aim is only 
secure existence for their community and strong political representation vis-à-
vis the state. According to the authors, Bavaria, Catalonia, North Rhine-
Westphalia, Salzburg, Scotland, Wallonia, and Flanders belong to this group. 
For this model, the European Union ought to be an alliance of nations. 
The third model is that of 'transsovereign' nationalism, in which nations do 
reach beyond state boundaries, but for various reasons abandon the idea of 
border-changes. These states (like Austria towards South Tirol, Russia towards 
Latvia or Ukraine, Romania towards Moldova) create institutions to link the 
nation with the kin minority across state boundaries. For this model, too, the 
European Union is ideally an alliance of nations. The authors see Hungary's 
nation-building strategies as particularly vivid examples of this model. 
Finally, in the case of the last model of 'protectionist nationalism', the 
priority is the preservation of traditional national culture in the face of immig-
ration and social change. This way, for countries like Austria, Belgium, France 
and Germany, the EU should also be an alliance of nation states-but, again, for 
a different set of reasons. 
The authors' most important claim is that nationalism and integration are 
two inter-related and dynamic processes, and the fact that a particular state 
chooses a particular form of nationalism-model, does not set it into stone. The 
European Union not only 'pools and shares sovereignty', they claim, but 
members also pool and share different varieties of nationalism. Furthermore, 
EU-developments themselves may affect nationalism-strategies. If, for example, 
the European Union moves in the direction of an alliance of states, rather 
than an institutional framework that de-emphasizes boundaries, sub-state 
nationalists may decide to shift to secessionism as a way for better interest-
representation. 
Also, the authors claim that in contrast with the opinion widely held among 
scholars, nationalism is not necessarily anti-integrationist. Some projects-like 
Hungarian trans-sovereignty-fit well within the European Union's endeavors. 
What is more, some groups will see the EU as a vehicle for achieving long-
sought goals through non-traditional and non-violent means (p. 296.). 
What is really important, the authors conclude, is that European integ-
ration may serve as a flexible tool for all these aspirations. President de 
Gaulle may have thought of the EU as a union of states, Chancellor Kohl 
could have imagined the EU as the Europe of regions, and Hungarian Prime 
Minister Orbán would have envisioned the European Union as a community 
of communities (p. 287.). 
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Closing the social sciences section is a wisp of an essay by Miroslav Kusy 
(Komensky University, Slovakia), "The Status Law in the Hungarian-Slovakian 
Context", tuned to play in a reconciliatory key. The author draws attention to 
the fact that the Status Law dispute is not between two hostile states, but 
between two good neighbors, who otherwise co-operate intensively (for 
example in the framework of the Visegrád process, the Council of Europe, 
the OSCE, and recently in the European Union). The solution should there-
fore consist in the use of discreet diplomatic language and a mutual search for 
consensus. 
Legal Approaches 
The last section contains shorter, and occasionally quite technical legal essays. 
It is worth noting the degree of concurrence characterizing this section. Unlike 
the previous sections, which presented side by side defenders and witty critics 
of the Status Law-phenomenon, all of the legal approaches conclude that 
Status Law legislations are apparently permissible by international legal or 
constitutional standards. The reason for this seems to be the legal approach as 
such. A passage from Renate Weber's analysis (see below) demonstrates this 
rather characteristically: "...It has been said that it is ridiculous to hold and 
carry a document attesting one's membership of a national group. It may be. 
But what is ridiculous is not illegitimate as long as it is not used in order to 
discriminate against the holder.. ." (pp. 357-358.). 
Herbert Küpper s (Institute for East European Law, Germany) essay describes 
the political, constitutional and legislative background, as well as the foreign 
policy and international law implications of the Status Law ("Hungary's 
Controversial Status Law"). 
The vast majority of the author's analysis is dedicated to the poor legislative 
standards and technical shortcomings of the law. He criticizes its 'skeleton 
law' nature, which means that most pertinent legal matters are referred to 
special legislation. He also draws attention to the undesirability of using legal 
concepts that exist in European law (like the free movement of persons) with 
different meaning in the Status Law. Also, he points to the fact that varied 
phraseology has been employed for the same phenomenon in the domestic 
context and in the case of neighboring countries. For example, the domestic 
Act on Minorities uses the term "national and ethnic minorities", while the 
Status Law, referring to the kin minority, operates with "Hungarian national 
communities." The author also emphasizes that 'programmatic phrases', norms 
without regulative content (which should ideally be limited to preambles of 
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Acts) are detrimental to the force of 'genuine' legal norms, because they serve 
to blur the difference between meaningful legal norms and propaganda. Another 
objectionable feature mentioned by Herbert Küpper is the all too frequent 
use of vague legal terms like "public educational institutions", "cultural 
goods", "Hungarian national traditions", "Hungarian cultural heritage", etc. 
Three of the volume's editors co-authored the next essay: Iván Halász, 
Balázs M aj tény i and Balázs Vizi. All are international lawyers and researchers 
at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. 
In "A New Regime of Minority Protection? Preferential Treatment of Kin-
minorities under National and International Law", the authors' aim is to assess 
centrally recurring debates on the Hungarian Status Law. They focus on the 
question of whether or not the law violates the principle of equality by 
discriminating among citizens of foreign states on the basis of ethnic origin. 
Having found that positive distinctions are not discriminatory, the analysis 
turns to the question of whether the fact that the preferences are provided for 
citizens of other states would make such practices impermissible on the 
grounds that it would clash with the principle of state sovereignty. According 
to the authors, the problem of infringing the sovereignty of other states seems 
to be a more relevant and central issue of compliance with international law, 
and not that of discrimination. In addressing this, the authors first provide 
thorough analyses of national constitutions (of Russia, Romania, Slovakia, 
Poland, Ukraine, Portugal and the original German Basic Law3), then consider 
Status Law-like legislations across Europe (in Slovakia, Romania, Slovenia, 
Russia, Bulgaria, Greece, etc.), finding that this practice also appears to be in 
line with international customary law. 
The authors conclude that the shortcomings of the Status Law have less to 
do with its objectives, rather than with the way it was drafted and the political 
terms in which it was presented. 
Renate Weber (Open Society Foundation, Romania) is the author of the next 
essay entitled "The Kin-State and Its Minorities: Which European Standards?". 
The author aims to look beyond the rhetoric and evaluate the law from the 
standards of international law. All in all, her conclusions concur with that of 
the previous essay. First, she argues that there are no minority rights that could 
be affected by the Status Law at all, because the legal obligation to uphold 
minority rights should be clearly distinguished from the option of providing 
preferential treatment. 
3
 Which , in its p reamble , had specif ic references to G e r m a n s who had lived in the 
Soviet occupat ion zone and were r emoved af ter reunif ica t ion. Section 116 still has 
explici t re ferences to Ge rmans from the V o l g a region and Transylvania) . 
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Second, she claims that no provisions of the law can be considered dis-
criminatory against the majority or other minority populations in neighboring 
countries. She clearly dismisses that, for example, Romanian citizens of 
Romanian origin would be discriminated against on the basis of their ethnicity 
if another country provided benefits and privileges to its kin minority. Even 
if those privileges go beyond the human and minority rights recognized by 
international or community law, their application would not deprive "other" 
Romanian citizens of their universal human rights. (Whether such conduct 
may result in tension within the home country, she adds, is another issue 
entirely.) 
The author argues that there are only two prima facie concerns that may 
hold water: one relating to a general principle of international law, namely that 
of friendly relations between states, and another, human rights protection for 
those who are potential beneficiaries of the law themselves. In her conclusions, 
Renate Weber dismisses the latter concern, while admitting a certain degree of 
culpability with respect to the first one. 
Former president of the Hungarian Constitutional Court László Sólyom was 
also the most charismatic among the Court's presidents. As a member of the 
Venice Convention, in his essay entitled "What Did the Venice Convention 
Actually Say?", he takes on the duty of clarifying certain conclusions of the 
Convention's lengthy and often misinterpreted report on the Hungarian Status 
Law. Such an explanation is timely, the author claims, as there are indeed 
difficulties about the terminology (translation), and even Günther Verheugen, 
Commissioner for Enlargement of the EU, referred to the report incorrectly in 
a legal assessment sent to the Hungarian Prime Minister. 
László Sólyom makes the following major points: The Commission 
declares that a new and original form of minority protection is emerging; the 
Hungarian Law is a part of this process. Although the appearance of such 
preferential measures is a positive phenomenon, they are too recent to account 
for the legal concept of customary international law. Such unilateral acts are 
therefore acceptable only if they meet the following four conditions: 
a) there is respect for the territorial sovereignty of states 
b) respect for treaties, 
c) respect for friendly relations between states, and 
d) respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms-with special emphasis 
on the prohibition of discrimination. 
In his conclusions, Professor Sólyom stresses the Commission's recommen-
dations that the system of bilateral and multilateral agreements should remain 
the main tool for minority protection. 
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The next essay entitled "Connections of Kin minorities to the Kin-state in the 
Extended Schengen Zone" is written by Judit Tóth, professor of constitutional 
law (University of Szeged and the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), one of 
the field's leading experts. 
Her article scrutinizes certain aspects of the Schengen regime and its 
ramifications with respect to Diaspora policy-thereby providing a unique angle 
and framework for the legal analysis of the Hungarian Status Law. 
The author draws attention to the fact that although all candidate states 
have Diaspora and minority communities, these topics have not been included 
in the European Union-accession talks, nor were representatives of kin minorities 
or ethnic groups involved in the negotiations. 
She describes in detail the European Union's approach to minority protection, 
and concludes that the EU prefers an 'indirect' approach: it tends to target 
contribution to cultural diversity, anti-discrimination, welfare, employment, 
regional development. Alternatively, the EU mentions minority protection 
vaguely as one of the political criteria for enlargement. With the European 
Constitution not yet in force, and with the resulting absence of proper regulatory 
mandate for EU institutions, the protection of minorities remains an internal 
matter for the member states-which are not necessarily members to relevant 
Council of Europe documents in the field. 
According to Professor Tóth, the problem has to do with the following: the 
introduction and gradual enforcement of Schengen and migration acquis has 
had a fundamental impact on the strategic relation of new members with kin 
minorities outside the Union. Thus, while candidate countries were doing their 
best preparing to reconstruct their visa regime and border control-policies, they 
felt obliged to adopt compensatory measures, such as unilateral acts on kin 
minorities or bilateral agreements. 
This therefore is an additional important context in which the Status Law 
should be considered. 
Fernand de Varennes's (Murdoch University School of Law) essay follows 
the classic tradition of legal argumentation by trying to answer the challenges 
that have been brought against the Hungarian Status Law. His paper ("An 
Analysis of the 'Act on Hungarians Living in Neighbouring Countries' and 
the Validity of Measures Protecting and Promoting the Culture and Identity 
of Minorities Outside Hungary") asks whether from the perspective of 
international legal obligations and minority rights, the statue would be 
extraterritorial, or alternatively, discriminatory. For the author, the underlying 
question concerns benefits provided for minorities, more precisely, whether or 
not states can provide these beyond their borders, and whether or not states can 
actually ban their citizens from seeking or accepting these. According to the 
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author's findings, the latter argument is entirely devoid of validity under inter-
national law. It would make all government fellowships for university study 
abroad programs illegal-a clearly bizarre outcome. 
Along with Professor de Varennes' essay, we find two detailed assessments 
of the Hungarian Status Law and its international and conceptual environment. 
Kinga Gál (Hungarian Academy of Sciences) documents the legislative and 
diplomatic history of the Status Law, placing it in a demographic and an 
international legal context ("the Hungarian Legislation on Hungarians Living 
in Neighbouring Countries). 
Enikő Felföldi (University of Szeged), another Hungarian academic, employs 
a somewhat similar approach in her essay ("The Characteristics of Cultural 
Minority Rights in International Law-With Special Reference to the Hungarian 
Status Law"). In her minority rights-oriented project, she first addresses the 
social and legal definitions for identity and culture-concepts that are corollary 
to minority policies. Following, she gathers applicable international legal 
materials (hard and soft law alike), as well as case law pertaining to cultural 
and educational rights. She then weights these findings in the context of the 
Hungarian law. 
Both essays provide useful additions to the international legal assessment 
of the Hungarian Status law. 
The volume's closing essay, written by Attila Varga (Associate Professor 
of Babes-Bolyai University and Member of the Romanian Parliament), entitled 
"Leigslative Aspects and Political Excuses: Hungarian-Romanian Disagree-
ments on the 'Act on Hungarians Living in Neighbouring Countries'", begins 
with a thorough analysis of various policies and legislative aspects of the 
Hungarian Law. 
The essay gives an illuminating account of the legislative counter-initiative 
that was prepared by the extremist Greater Romania Party, which would have 
regarded all Hungarian Certificate-holders as dual citizens and on those 
grounds would have disqualified them from holding any public office. 
We can confidently say that the editors and the authors have produced a 
volume that is a unique, comprehensive and fascinating collection of wide-
ranging analyses, approaches, and methodology. The book's value, and no 
doubt, its success, resides in its outstanding diversity of angles-its exploration 
of the conceptual and practical interdependence of identity, politics, minority 
rights, and Diaspora politics, as well as its travels beyond, towards other 
social, political and legal tribulations, ails and symptoms behind the Status 
Law-syndrome. 
András L. Pap 
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Sulyok, Gábor: A humanitárius intervenció elmélete és gyakorlata 
(The Theory and Practice of Humanitarian Intervention). Gondolat Kiadó, 
Budapest: 2004. 361 p. 
It is rare and for this reason all the more gratifying to welcome a new monograph 
in Hungarian on international law, especially in the field of humanitarian 
intervention where the legal problems are manifold and the domestic legal 
writing is sparse. This book is a revised version of a doctoral thesis that was 
conducted in conjunction with the University of Miskolc and the Institute for 
Legal Studies of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. 
The result is impressive indeed. Already the cover attests to the ambition of 
the author as it highly resembles the lay-out of the textbooks of the Oxford 
University Press. Fortunately its merits do not stop here. 
The book is divided into 2 main parts, the much longer first part dealing 
with the theoretical questions of humanitarian intervention, while the second 
part assessing the relevant cases. Both parts are presented in a historical 
perspective following the classical method. The book is heavily footnoted and 
the long pages of bibliography indicate a very thorough research. 
In the first chapter the readers get a comprehensive overview of just war 
theory and the evolution of the doctrine of intervention on behalf of the 
oppressed citizens of a state. The author lists Francisco de Vitoria, Hugo 
Grotius, Emeric de Vattel and Raphael Lemkin as they were mentioned in the 
legal literature as the possible inventors of the category and term humanitarian 
intervention.' 
In the end Mr. Sulyok attempts to give a functional definition of humanitarian 
intervention by analysing the definitions of major scholars and condensing their 
common elements. The author empasizes that the initiation of a humanitarian 
intervention does not necessarily have to be lawful therefore he includes also 
those definitions whose publicists did not regard humanitarian intervention a 
legal institution. 
The elements are the following: 
- The subject of humanitarian intervention is one or more states or an 
international organization. 
- The intervening state or organization has to observe dominantly 
humanitarian motives. 
1
 I consider the authorship of Raphael Lemkin highly improbable as Antoine Rougier 
already used this term in 1910. See Antoine Rougier , 'La théorie de l ' intervention 
d ' human i t é ' (1910) 17 Revue G e n e r a l e du Droit International Publ ic , Vol. 17, 1910, 
4 6 8 quoted in S i m o n Chesterman, Just war or just peace ? Oxford, 2002. 128. 
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- The object is always a state and the intervention is carried out without 
its consent. 
- The beneficiaries are the citizens of the targeted state. 
- The basis is grave, widespread and deliberate violation of human rights. 
- The targeted state is actively or passively responsible for these violations. 
- The scope is limited i.e. the intervention is confined to terminating the 
breaches or preventing further violations. 
- The recourse to armed violence is an ultima ratio measure, i.e. a 
measure of last resort. 
- During the execution of the intervention the rules of international armed 
conflict are applicable. 
- The intervention cannot breach the right to internal self-determination 
of the target state. 
Chapter 2 expounds the delimitation of humanitarian intervention from 
the related notions of international armed conflict, self-defense, reprisals, 
peace-keeping, humanitarian assistance and armed support of the fight for 
the right to self-determination. Some of these categories can be intertwined 
with humanitarian intervention: all humanitarian interventions are necessarily 
international armed conflicts as well, while humanitarian assistance endeavours 
to cure the symptoms of the same humanitarian tragedy that humanitarian 
intervention attempts to eradicate by military force. Hence, the author argues 
that the denial of humanitarian assistance - if it reaches the threshold of 
breaches usually warranting humanitarian intervention - could theoretically 
justify intervention. 
In Chapter 3 the author presents the basis of humanitarian intervention, i.e. 
explains the rights and the scale of their breach that vindicate intervention. He 
gives a short overview of the development of human rights and after a thorough 
analysis of the relevant human rights conventions comes to the conclusion that 
the breach of certain first generation non-derogable rights such as the right 
to life, freedom from torture and from inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment, freedom from slavery or servitude and certain procedural rights 
can be a ground for intervention." 
:
 The author compared the Universal Declara t ion on Human Rights , the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Polit ical Rights , the European Convent ion on Human 
Rights, the Amer ican Convent ion on Human Rights , the Afr ican Char ter of H u m a n 
and Peoples ' Righ ts and the Arab Charter on Human Rights. The author also examined 
the minimal requi rements of humani tar ian internat ional law and concluded that they 
were virtually identical in their content to these non-derogable r ights . 
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In determining the scale of human rights breaches or the so-called quantitative 
segment of humanitarian intervention, the author notes that publicist starting 
from Lassa Oppenheim supported intervention when the violations of funda-
mental human rights had „shaken the conscience of mankind". Taking that into 
account, the author concludes that the minimal quantitative threshold of inter-
vention is the commission of crimes against humanity. 
Chapter 4 explores the question of the legality of the initiation of humani-
tarian intervention. Mr. Sulyok methodically analyses and disproves every 
argument that seek to make humanitarian intervention compatible with the UN 
Charter system even though he cautiously admits that it might have been 
lawful in the XIX. century. 
The author affirms that the prohibition of use of force, enshrined in Art. 2 
(4) of the Charter, is absolute and despite its frequent breaches it has not 
eroded. The argument of certain scholars stating that humanitarian intervention 
is not in violation of this provision as it is not aimed „against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any State" is at odds with the travaux 
préparatoires. The legality of intervention cannot be deduced from relying on 
the Uniting for Peace resolution either, as it has not been used to authorize use 
of force since the Korean War and even if it was in force, it could only be used 
in cases of breach of peace or act of aggression. Mr. Sulyok also rejects the 
idea of an independent customary right authorizing humanitarian intervention 
noting the jus cogens status of Art. 2 (4) and the scarcity of opinio juris. 
Finally, the author lucidly illustrates that the theories of implied and ex post 
facto authorization of intervention that seek to prove Security Council 
approval in the absence of express authority to use force are highly speculative 
and do not enjoy widespread support. 
As a consequence, the single legitimate way of resorting to humanitarian 
intervention is by an express Security Council authorization taken under Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter. 
The second part of the book is comprised of succinct and articulate case 
studies. In each case the author first gives an account of the events and then 
attempts to legally evaluate them utilizing the criteria laid down in the first part. 
This part is divided into 3 chapters the first dealing with the alleged 
humanitarian interventions until 1945, in the „classical" era of international 
law, the second inspecting events between 1945-1990, while the last one 
assessing the post-1990 interventions. 
Following a very rigorous approach Mr. Sulyok finds only a few cases that 
meet his requirements. In some cases the protection of human rights only 
served as a pretext to conceal other, less laudable motives (e.g. 1877-1878 
intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Bulgaria), in others the intervening 
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State acted to protect its own citizens (e.g. 1979 Uganda). The practice of 
some authors including American interventions restoring democracy (e.g. 1989 
Panama) is also rejected by the author.2 The author similarly declines to include 
those instances where the intervening State gravely breached the provisions of 
humanitarian international law. 
The author raises some doubts about the 1999 NATO intervention in 
Kosovo. Even though he concedes that the Final Report of the ICTY Committee 
has not found evidence of clear violations of humanitarian international law,4 
the author still claims that the „means and methods were almost undeniably 
unproportional" and concludes that NATO committed „grave breaches of inter-
national humanitarian law" (p. 316). Nonetheless, he is still willing to accord 
the status of humanitarian intervention. 
At the end, the author only accepts unqualifiedly 5 interventions as humani-
tarian interventions. Apart from the Kosovo intervention, he includes the 
French intervention in the Central African Empire in 1979, the Tanzanian 
intervention in Uganda in 1979, the protection of Shiites and Kurds in North 
and South Iraq in 1991-1992 and the actions of the American-led UNITAF 
peace-keeping force in Somalia in 1992-1994. 
The great strength of The theory and practice of humanitarian intervention 
is the huge amount of sources the author has drawn on and the intellectual 
rigour employed to dissect and clarify the notion of humanitarian intervention. 
His book is a welcome return to the stricter adherence to the positive sources 
of law. Mr. Sulyok cogently proves the fallacies of those scholars who try to 
find a place for humanitarian intervention under the present UN Charter system 
and eloquently argues against those proponents of the intervention who assert 
that even unlawful humanitarian interventions are necessary to protect human 
rights. 
It is difficult to challange his conclusion that the present system of collective 
security is adequate to defend human rights if there is a political will and a 
customary right of humanitarian intervention would only lead to a series of 
abuse. Even today, it is not the threat of a possible Security Council veto that 
restrains states from acting against massive human rights violations but the 
lack of interest in a given conflict. 
However, not even this book is free of all controversies. One could question 
the approach of the author that first examines scholarly opinions and thus 
3
 See e.g. D ' A m a t o , A.: T h e Invasion of Panama was a Lawfu l Response to 
Tyranny. American Journal of International Law, Vol. 84, 1990. 84, 516. 
4
 See Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Commit tee Established to Review the 
N A T O Bombing Campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 9 June 2000. 
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constructs a unified definition containing the main elements of those views and 
later applies that definition to actual state practice to determine whether a 
certain intervention was humanitarian intervention. This approach seems to 
neglect the importance of opinio juris. Yet, Mr. Sulyok's method is under-
standable since there is hardly any record of explicit reliance on the doctrine of 
humanitarian intervention by any states. 
An other question is closely related to the first one. Given the author's 
positivist approach, it is not entirely understandable why he classifies humani-
tarian intervention in its entirety as a legal category. Mr. Sulyok admits that 
interventions are unlawful in the absence of Security Council authorization. Yet, 
he emphasises that he regards even these instances as falling under the legal 
notion of humanitarian intervention. However, if these acts are unlawful, it is 
difficult to comprehend why they should be classified as a legal phenomenon. 
Under international law, these acts are breaches of the prohibition of the use of 
force or even aggressions and labelling them humanitarian interventions seems 
to have no legal significance. 
On balance, I can only commend this book for the immense work invested 
that touches upon virtually all the major and minor questions of humanitarian 
intervention. Mr. Sulyok's book will serve as a valuable addition to library of 
all who are interested in this phenomenon. 
Tamás Hoffmann 
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